A

GRAMMAR

OF THE

English Tongue,

With NOTES,

Giving the Grounds and Reaſon of

Grammar in General.

To which are now added,

The Arts of *Poetry*, *Rhetoric*, *Logic*, &c.

Making a Compleat Syſtem of an

Engliſh Education.

For the Uſe of the

SCHOOLS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND.

The Second Edition, with Improvements.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE

QUEENS

Moſt Excellent Majeſty.

MADAM,

IT is the truly Royal Aſſertion of a very great Monarch, That it is one of the moſt glorious Signs of the Happineſs of a State, to have *Arts* and *Sciences* flouriſh, and that *Letters* ſhould be in as great Honour as *Arms*, becauſe thoſe are the principal Inſtruments of Virtue. Your Majeſties *Arms* have ſtruck a Terrour into your Enemies, where-ever they came; but the great WITS of our Nation, for want of public Encouragement, have all been rough Diamonds, and want the poliſhing of Art, which adds all the Luſtre, if not Value, to the Jewel.

The Politer ARTS have here been confin'd to Languages unknown, and ſo the briſker Spirits, averſe to the Formalities of the SCHOOLS, have choſen rather to deſpiſe what they cou'd not attain, than ſeem to allow they wanted any Meritorious Qualification.

The Book now presented to Your Majesty endeavours to open the Doors to all *Englishmen*, to learn the ARTS in their own Mother-Tongue; as the *Greeks*, and the *Romans* did of old, and the *French* Nation does at present. The Language of YOUR KINGDOM, Madam, is more capable of Perfection than that of any of those about us: And there is no manner of reason to doubt, but the *Royal Smiles* of Your Majesty would have as good an Effect here, as those of the *French King* in *France*; in Hopes of which, this Volume is most humbly laid at Your Majesties Feet, by

MADAM,

Your Majesties most Dutiful

and most Loyal Subject.

The



THE APPROBATION OF *Iſaac Bickerſtaff*, Eſq;

THE following Treatiſe being ſubmitted to my Cenſure, that I may paſs it with Integrity, I muſt declare, That as *Grammar in general* is on all hands allow'd he Foundation of All *Arts* and *Sciences*, ſo it appears to me, that this *Grammar* of the *Engliſh Tongue* has done hat Juſtice to our Language which, 'till now, it never obtain'd. The *Text* will improve the moſt ignorant, nd the *Notes* will imploy the moſt Learned. I therefore enjoin all my Female Correſpondents to Buy, Read, nd Study this *Grammar*, that their Letters may be ſomething leſs Enigmatic: And on all my Male Correſpondents likewiſe, who make no Conſcience of Falſe-Spelling and Falſe-Engliſh, I lay the ſame Injunction, on ain of having their *Epiſtles* expos'd in their own proer Dreſs, in my *Lucubrations*.

Iſaac Bickerſtaff, Cenſor.

OMISSIONS.

Page 72, after Line 10.

From other Names the Perſonal *is known,*
By having leading *and* following State *alone.*

Perſonal Names differ from all other Names, by having a *leading*, and a *following State.*

P. 108, after l. 19.

After theſe former Particles *ſtill ſet*
The Perſonal Names, *all in the* following State.

The *Perſonal Names* coming after any of theſe *Particles*, are to be put in their *following State*; as, *before Me, not I*; *againſt Him, not He*; *after Whom, not Who.*

ERRATA.

Page 19. line 4. for *if*, read *its*. P. 81. l. 6. for *more* r. *moſt*. P. 124. l. 18. for *the* r. *their*. P. 160. l. 26. for *faulty* r. *faultleſs*.

Advertiſement.

THE other ARTS, to compleat the whole Courſe of a perfect *Engliſh Education*, are preparing for the Preſs, and will be Publiſh'd with all convenient ſpeed.

The PREFACE.

THE Publication and Succeſs of the First Edition *of this* Grammar, *we find, ſtirr'd up the Emulation of two Gentlemen to give the Town their Performances in this kind: The firſt is call'd,* An Eſſay towards a Practical Engliſh Grammar; *the laſt had the emphatic Title of* THE Engliſh Grammar; or an Eſſay on the Art of Grammar apply'd to, and exemplify'd in, the Engliſh Tongue. *We were in hopes that two ſuch Gentlemen of Letters, whoſe Time had been devoted to the Inſtruction of others in the* Latin *and* Greek Grammar, *wou'd make ſome farther Progreſs in, and furniſh better Helps, and more eaſie Methods to, the* Engliſh *Student in his Mother-Tongue, than we who never had employ'd our Time in that Way. Had we found what we expected in them, we ſhou'd not have given ourſelves any farther Trouble of Reviſing our own for a* Second Impreſſion; *ſatisfy'd with the Honour of opening a Way for ſuch glorious Improvements. But we are apt to believe, that the very Qualification, from which we expected a more excellent Production, was the Cauſe of the little Progreſs they made in a Diſcovery that had ſo fairly been laid before them by Dr.* Wallis *and* Ourſelves: *For Cuſtom has ſo ſtrong a Force on the Mind, that it paſſes with the bulk of Mankind for Reaſon and Sacred Truth. The* Iriſh *thought themſelves oppreſs'd by the Law that forbid them to draw with their Horſes Tails, and that becauſe their Anceſtors had known no better Way of doing it: And Perſons who have not only been Educated themſelves, but have bred up others in a particular Method, muſt have a great Brightneſs of Soul to diſcover its Errors, and forſake them.*

The firſt Eſſayiſt *has, indeed, partly quitted the old Track, but cou'd not prevail with himſelf to quit it entirely. The* ſecond *is ſo far from parting with a Tittle of the old* Greek *and* Latin *Terms, that he pours in a new* Poſſe *upon us. The* firſt *is ſo full of Obſcurity and Confuſion, for want of Method, that his Book can be of little Uſe to the Inſtruction of the Ignorant; and the* later *has had ſo little Regard to the* Engliſh Tongue, *that in the Title of his Book he is guilty of an evident Miſnomer, it being no more an* Engliſh Grammar, *than a* Chineſe.

That the firſt Eſſayiſt *has no Method, is plain from his very Diviſion of* Grammar; *for having divided* Grammar *into four*

Parts, yet the Parts of Speech (which he unneceſſarily makes eight, after the old way) are plac'd under no one Head of that Diviſion; which *is* Orthography, Proſody, Etymology, Syntax. *'Tis confeſs'd, that the Author might have ſhelter'd the Parts of Speech under* Etymology, *in a Senſe, which many* Grammarians *have given it, but he has cut himſelf off from that Refuge; for giving the firſt Chapter of his ſecond Part (when he had diſpatch'd all his Doctrine of Words) the Title of* Etymology, *by way of Diſtinction, it is plain, he underſtood it in the Senſe of Derivation in the Diviſion, or he had forgot the Members of his Diviſion: Both which ways muſt of neceſſity produce Obſcurity and Confuſion.*

In the next place, this Eſſayiſt *has thrown that Part of his Diviſion laſt in his Book, which in Uſe, in Nature, nay, and in his own Poſition ought to be firſt: For the Doctrine of Letters is throughly to be known before we proceed to Words. But the Conduct of this Author in this particular, being contrary to the Order and Method of Nature, nay, contrary to his own diſpoſition of the Parts in the Diviſion it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily produce Confuſion and Obſcurity.*

Thirdly, *He entirely rejects* Proſody, *tho' voluntarily made the ſecond Member of his own Diviſion. Now, this Diviſion was neceſſary, or it was not; if it was neceſſary, it ought all-along to have been obſerv'd; if not, it ought never to have been made.*

Fourthly, *For want of Method, ſeveral Parts of Speech are jumbled promiſcuouſly together, the Doctrine of which ought to have been more diſtinct, for Diſtinction is a great help to Perſpicuity; without which, the Knowledge which we wou'd convey, muſt be very defective and obſcure. But this Author has not been ſatisfy'd to join the Conſideration of thoſe Parts of Speech, which in regard of their Nature and Order ought to have been ſeparate, but ſcatters the* Syntax, *or Conſtruction of our Language, through his Diſcourſe of Words; tho' the Doctrine of Words, ſeparately conſider'd, and in a Sentence, are things diſtinct enough.*

We muſt indeed confeſs, that we believe, that Dr. Wallis *miſled him in this particular, as he did us in our* Firſt Edition, *neither of us conſidering that the learned* Dr. *wrote to Men already skill'd in the* Latin Grammar, *and therefore had no need of treating them as ſuch, as were entirely ignorant of* Grammar.

Fifthly, *By affecting the old Terms, and the old faulty Diviſion of the Parts of Speech, he has multiply'd Words many Times in long, and often in* dark *Explanations of them by* Latin *Words, which being entirely unknown to the Learner, can only puzzle (not inſtruct) him. This Multiplicity of Words is again encreas'd,*

by

by repeating, at the end of every Chapter, its Contents, by way of Queſtion and Anſwer; by that means heaping a double, tho' uſeleſs, Load on the weak Memory of the young Learner.

Sixthly, *The Rules are not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd, which gives the Learner a difficulty in chooſing what to commit to his Memory, and what not. For theſe, and many other Reaſons, we cou'd not think this* Eſſay towards a Practical Engliſh Grammar *ſufficient to deter us from endeavouring to correct the Errors of our* Firſt Impreſſion, *and from giving the World an* Edition *more uſeful, and more perfect.*

But if the firſt Eſſayiſt *leave us ſo much Room for Hopes of making a much farther Progreſs in this Work than the World has yet ſeen, the* Eſſay on Grammar *very much enlarges thoſe Hopes, ſince in this we find not ſo much as any Aim at a* Grammar *peculiar to our own Language, the Author being content to repeat the ſelf-ſame Things the ſelf-ſame Way, as all thoſe have done who have endeavour'd to force our Tongue in every thing to the Method and Form of the* Latin *and* Greek. *For his Execution is ſo contrary to the Deſign he ſeems in one part of his* Preface *to propoſe, that by Writing in* Engliſh, *he only makes the Task the more difficult, ſince to underſtand his Terms the Reader muſt underſtand* Greek; *whereas in the ordinary Way of learning that Language, the Student is ſuppos'd to have a competent Knowledge of the* Latin, *before he approaches the* Greek Grammar. *To ſolve this, he tells us in the* Preface, *that every Man, Woman, and Child, ought to ſtudy the learned Languages, as incapable, without them, to underſtand the Terms made uſe of in ſeveral Profeſſions: Not conſidering, that by this he requires an Impoſſibility, ſince much the greater Part of Mankind can by no means ſpare* 10 *or* 11 *Years of their Lives in learning thoſe dead Languages, to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of their Own.*

But by this Gentleman's way of Arguing, we ought not only to be Maſters of Latin *and* Greek, *but of* Spaniſh, Italian, High-Dutch, Low-Dutch, French, *the* Old-Saxon, Welſh, Runnic, Gothic, *and* Iſlandic; *ſince much the greater number of Words of common and general Uſe are deriv'd from thoſe ſeveral Tongues. Nay, by the ſame way of Reaſoning we may prove, that the* Romans *and* Greeks *did not underſtand their own Tongues, becauſe they were not acquainted with the* Welſh, *or ancient* Celtic; *there being above* 600 *radical* Greek *Words deriv'd from the* Celtic, *and of the* Latin *a much greater number.*

With much better Reaſon the former Eſſayiſt *ſeems to require ſome Skill in the* Old-Saxon, *whence 'tis allow'd on all hands, the Body of our Tongue is really deriv'd. But we cannot agree*

with that Author, even ſo far as that, becauſe the very Nature and Genius of our Language is almoſt entirely alter'd ſince that Speech was diſus'd; and ſince the Meaning of Words is (except in ſome very few Caſes) to be ſought from the Uſage of our own, and not that of former Times. The Saxons, *for example, (if we may credit Dr.* Hicks) *had various Terminations to their Words, at leaſt two in every Subſtantive Singular; whereas we have no Word now in Uſe, except the* Perſonal Names, *that has ſo. Thus Dr.* Hicks *has made* ſix *ſeveral* Declenſions *of the* Saxon *Names, but ours have not ſo much as* one. *He gives them three Numbers; a* Singular, Dual, *and* Plural: *We have no* Dual *Number, except perhaps in* Both. *To make this plainer, we ſhall tranſcribe the ſix* Declenſions *from that Antiquary's* Grammar.

The firſt Declenſion, *which makes the* Genitive Caſe *in* es, *and the* Dative *in* e, *the* Nominative *in* as, *the* Genitive Plural *in* a, *and the* Dative *in* um; *as,*

Singul.	Nom. Smith	Plural.	Nom. Smithas
	Gen. Smithes		Gen. Smitha
	Dat. Smithe		Dat. Smithum
	Accuſ. Smith		Acc. Smithas
	Voc. Eala thu Smith		Voc. Eala ge Smithas
	Abl. Smith.		Abl. Smithum.

The ſecond Declenſion is of Names, whoſe Singular Number is a *in the Nominative, their Genitive, Dative, Accuſative, and Ablative in* an, *the Nominative Plural in* an, *Genitive in* a, *Dative,* um; *as,* Witega, *a* Prophet.

Sing.	Nom. Witega	Plural.	Witegan
	Gen. Witegan		Witegena
	Dat. Witegan		Witegum
	Acc. Witegan		Witegan
	Voc. Eala thu Witega		Eala ge Witegan
	Abl. Witegan.		Witegum.

The third Declenſion agrees with the firſt, only the Nominative Plural ends in u; *as* Andgit *the* Senſe.

Sing.	Nom. Andgit	Plural.	Andgitu
	Gen. Andgites		Andgita
	Dat. Andgite		Andgitum
	Acc. Andgit		Andgitu
	Voc. Eala thu Andgit		Eala ge Andgitu
	Abl. Andgite.		Andgitum.

The fourth Declenſion has the ſame Variations as the firſt, except that the Nominative Plural is the ſame as the Nominative Singular; as, Word.

Sing.

Sing.	Nom. Word	Plural.	Word
	Gen. Wordes		Worda
	Dat. Worde		Wordum
	Acc. Word		Word
	Voc. Eala thu Word		Eala ge Word
	Abl. Worde.		Wordum.

The fifth Declenſion agrees with the firſt, except that the Genitive Singular ends in e, *and the Nominative Plural in* a; *as in* Wiln, *a* Maid.

Sing.	Nom. Wiln	Plur.	Wilna
	Gen. Wilne		Wilna
	Dat. Wilne		Wilnum
	Acc. Wiln		Wilna
	Voc. Eala thu Wiln		Eala ge Wilna
	Abl. Wilne.		Wilnum.

The ſixth Declenſion has its Nominative Singular in u, *its Genitive in* a, *Dative, Accuſative, Vocative in* u; *and the Plural Caſes all form'd like thoſe of the fifth; as* Sunu, *a* Son.

Sing.	Nom. Sunu	Plur.	Suna
	Gen. Suna		Suna
	Dat. Sunu		Sunum
	Acc. Sunu		Suna
	Voc. Eala thu Sunu		Eala ge Suna
	Abl. Sunu.		Sunum.

The Adjectives, or Qualities, differ as much from thoſe in our preſent Language; for their Terminations diſtinguiſh the Gender; that is, the ſame Termination is for the Maſculine and Neuter, but a different for the Feminine; as, God, good.

	Maſculine and Neuter.		The Feminine.
Sing.	Nom. God	bonus, bonum.	Gode bona
	Gen. Godes		Godre
	Dat. Godum		Godne
	Acc. Godne, God		Gode
	Voc. Goda		Gode
	Abl. Godum.		Godre.

Plural.	Nom. Gode	boni, bonæ, bona.
	Gen. Godra	
	Dat. Godum	
	Acc. Gode	
	Voc. Gode	
	Abl. Godum.	

We might give you various Inſtances more of the eſſential difference between the old Saxon *and modern* Engliſh Tongue, *but theſe muſt ſatisfy any reaſonable Man, that it is ſo great, that the* Saxon *can be no Rule to us; and that to underſtand ours, there is no need of knowing the* Saxon. *And tho' Dr.* Hicks *muſt be*

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with that Author, even ſo far as that, becauſe the very Nature and Genius of our Language is almoſt entirely alter'd ſince that Speech was diſus'd; and ſince the Meaning of Words is (except in ſome very few Caſes) to be ſought from the Uſage of our own, and not that of former Times. The Saxons, *for example, (if we may credit Dr.* Hicks) *had various Terminations to their Words, at leaſt two in every Subſtantive Singular; whereas we have no Word now in Uſe, except the* Perſonal Names, *that has ſo. Thus Dr.* Hicks *has made* ſix *ſeveral* Declenſions *of the* Saxon *Names, but ours have not ſo much as* one. *He gives them three Numbers; a* Singular, Dual, *and* Plural: *We have no* Dual *Number, except perhaps in* Both. *To make this plainer, we ſhall tranſcribe the ſix* Declenſions *from that Antiquary's* Grammar.

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Singul.	Nom. Smith	Plural.	Nom. Smithas
	Gen. Smithes		Gen. Smitha
	Dat. Smithe		Dat. Smithum
	Accuſ. Smith		Acc. Smithas
	Voc. Eala thu Smith		Voc. Eala ge Smithas
	Abl. Smith.		Abl. Smithum.

The ſecond Declenſion is of Names, whoſe Singular Number is a *in the Nominative, their Genitive, Dative, Accuſative, and Ablative in* an, *the Nominative Plural in* an, *Genitive in* a, *Dative,* um; *as,* Witega, *a* Prophet.

Sing.	Nom. Witega	Plural.	Witegan
	Gen. Witegan		Witegena
	Dat. Witegan		Witegum
	Acc. Witegan		Witegan
	Voc. Eala thu Witega		Eala ge Witegan
	Abl. Witegan.		Witegum.

The third Declenſion agrees with the firſt, only the Nominative Plural ends in u; *as* Andgit *the* Senſe.

Sing.	Nom. Andgit	Plural.	Andgitu
	Gen. Andgites		Andgita
	Dat. Andgite		Andgitum
	Acc. Andgit		Andgitu
	Voc. Eala thu Andgit		Eala ge Andgitu
	Abl. Andgite.		Andgitum.

The fourth Declenſion has the ſame Variations as the firſt, except that the Nominative Plural is the ſame as the Nominative Singular; as, Word.

Sing.

Sing.	Nom. Word	Plural.	Word
	Gen. Wordes		Worda
	Dat. Worde		Wordum
	Acc. Word		Word
	Voc. Eala thu Word		Eala ge Word
	Abl. Worde.		Wordum.

The fifth Declenſion agrees with the firſt, except that the Genitive Singular ends in e, *and the Nominative Plural in* a; *as in* Wiln, *a* Maid.

Sing.	Nom. Wiln	Plur.	Wilna
	Gen. Wilne		Wilna
	Dat. Wilne		Wilnum
	Acc. Wiln		Wilna
	Voc. Eala thu Wiln		Eala ge Wilna
	Abl. Wilne.		Wilnum.

The ſixth Declenſion has its Nominative Singular in u, *its Genitive in* a, *Dative, Accuſative, Vocative in* u; *and the Plural Caſes all form'd like thoſe of the fifth; as* Sunu, *a* Son.

Sing.	Nom. Sunu	Plur.	Suna
	Gen. Suna		Suna
	Dat. Sunu		Sunum
	Acc. Sunu		Suna
	Voc. Eala thu Sunu		Eala ge Suna
	Abl. Sunu.		Sunum.

The Adjectives, or Qualities, differ as much from thoſe in our preſent Language; for their Terminations diſtinguiſh the Gender; that is, the ſame Termination is for the Maſculine and Neuter, but a different for the Feminine; as, God, good.

	Maſculine and Neuter.		The Feminine.
Sing.	Nom. God	bonus, bonum.	Gode bona
	Gen. Godes		Godre
	Dat. Godum		Godne
	Acc. Godne, God		Gode
	Voc. Goda		Gode
	Abl. Godum.		Godre.
Plural.	Nom. Gode	boni, bonæ, bona.	
	Gen. Godra		
	Dat. Godum		
	Acc. Gode		
	Voc. Gode		
	Abl. Godum.		

We might give you various Inſtances more of the eſſential difference between the old Saxon *and modern* Engliſh Tongue, *but theſe muſt ſatisfy any reaſonable Man, that it is ſo great, that the* Saxon *can be no Rule to us; and that to underſtand ours, there is no need of knowing the* Saxon. *And tho' Dr.* Hicks *muſt be*

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allow'd to have been a very curious Enquirer into thoſe Obſolete Tongues, now out of uſe, and containing nothing valuable, yet it does by no means follow (as is plain from what has been ſaid) that we are not oblig'd to derive the Senſe, Conſtruction, or Nature of our preſent Language from his Diſcoveries. But it is the preſent Tongue that is the only Object of our Conſideration, as it matters not to the underſtanding of that, whether we know that Kine is deriv'd from Cowin, or Swine from Sowin. Time indeed has an entire Dominion over Words, as well as over all other Productions of Human Kind. Thus in our Language, as well as in all others, Words have extreamly vary'd from their Original Significations. Thus Knave ſignify'd originally no more than a Servant, Villain, a Country Steward, or Villager: Yet, I fear, if you ſhou'd call a Man Knave, or Villain, it wou'd not much appeaſe his Choler, to tell him, that theſe Words (ſome Hundreds of Years ſince) had a very harmleſs Signification.

Our proper Deſign, therefore, is to convey a Grammatical Knowledge of the Language we now ſpeak, from whatever Springs and Sources deſcending down to us, in the moſt eaſie, familiar, and compendious Method that we cou'd poſſibly find out. Nor cou'd we by any means be diverted from this generous Aim, by any poor Ambition of ſeeming skill'd in the Foreign Terms of the old Grammarians; and tho' we have not rejected them out of Contempt of Learning (as they call it) or of the Languages from which they are deriv'd, yet we cou'd much leſs reſolve to ſacrifice the Eaſe of our Learner to a Cuſtom ſo injurious to the general Progreſs of thoſe, who are deſirous to know the Grammar of their own Mother-Tongue only.

To this End, we have been at ſome Pains to put all the Rules into as ſmooth and ſonorous Verſe as the Nature of the Subject wou'd bear; and we hope, that this has been far from giving any Obſcurity to the Senſe; but to give them the greater Light, under each we have added an Explanation in Proſe, according to the Way taken by that learned Jeſuite Alvarus, in his Grammar, which is not only us'd in almoſt all the Schools of Europe, except England, but commended by Schioppius, as the beſt practical Grammar of the Latin Tongue. It cou'd not be avoided, but that ſome of them muſt run leſs harmoniouſly than the reſt, but we believe the number of them is not great.

We have never met with any ſolid Objection againſt this Way (except ſome Peoples Inability to do the like) becauſe, indeed, its Excellence is in the very Nature of the Thing. For Verſe is far more eaſily learnt, and better retain'd, than Proſe; and Engliſh Verſe, by Reaſon of the Rhimes, yields a greater Aſſiſtance to the Learner

Learner than Latin Verſe, *one end of a* Verſe *recalling the other. An Author of good Reputation confirms our Opinion in theſe Words.* All Men paid great Reſpect to the Poets, who gave them ſo delightful an Entertainment. The Wiſer Sort took this opportunity of Civilizing the reſt, by putting all their Theological and Philoſophical Inſtructions into Verſe, *which being learnt with Pleaſure, and retain'd with Eaſe,* help'd to heighten and preſerve the Veneration already, upon other Scores, paid to the Poets.

By this means the Child, or Learner will be oblig'd to burthen his Memory with no more, than is abſolutely neceſſary to the Knowledge of the Art he ſtudies.

Nothing being more neceſſary to acquire a clear Knowledge of any thing, than a clear Method, we have taken a peculiar Care in this Edition to obſerve all the Rules of Method. *We begin with what is firſt to be learnt, that what follows may be underſtood; and proceed thus Step by Step, till we come to the laſt and moſt difficult, and which depends on all that goes before it. We have reduc'd the Terms, which are plain and obvious, into as ſmall a number as was conſiſtent with Perſpicuity and Diſtinction; for our End being the teaching only the preſent* Engliſh Tongue, *we had no Regard to any Term whatſoever, which had not an immediate Regard to that: By this means we believe we may ſay, That we have deliver'd the Learner from ſome Scores of Hard Words, impos'd in other* Grammars.

The Text *is what is only meant to be taught in the Schools; and in that, we hope, no Teacher of any tolerable Capacity, will find any Difficulty, that may not be ſurmounted by a very little Application. The* Notes *have been pleaſantly miſtaken, by a Man that ſhould have known better things, for ſuch* Commentaries *as the* Dutch Authors *have put to moſt of the* Claſſics, *i. e. an Explanation of obſcure Places, difficult Expreſſions, hard Words or various Readings; whereas theſe* Notes *conſiſt of more difficult Enquiries into* Grammar in general; *or ſometimes contain a Defence of* Particulars *in the Text, and at other times ſhew the Analogy between the* Grammar *of the* Engliſh, *and that of the* Latin Tongue: *All which muſt be of great Uſe to Men or Women of* Judgment *and* Learning, *but are not to be taught the young* Beginner, *whoſe Head cannot be ſuppos'd ſtrong enough for Diſquiſitions of that kind.*

Having taken theſe Precautions in the Grammar, *we thought ourſelves oblig'd to purſue them through the reſt of the* Arts *contain'd in this* Volume; *in which we have had a peculiar Regard to the Truth of each, without any Reſpect to ſuch Books as have*

been

been too long in the Poſſeſſion of the Schools. Poetry, Rhetoric, *and* Logic *have generally been taught in moſt of the Reſorts of* Learning *in* Europe, *in the* Latin Tongue: *It was, therefore, neceſſary to our Deſign of accompliſhing our* Engliſh Scholar, *that he ſhou'd loſe no Advantage which thoſe enjoy, who make their firſt court to the dead* Languages. *Nay, we may without Vanity ſay, that no Public School in* Europe *has any Courſe of* Poetry *equal to what we give here. We have ſeen all that have been taught, and not one of them proceeds any farther, than the Art of* Verſifying, *by teaching the ſeveral Quantities of* Words, *and what each ſort of* Verſe *requires. But this is the Art of making* Poetaſters, *not* Poets; *of giving a Taſte of* Numbers, *but not of the ſublimer Beauties of the* Authors *they read, which are of the firſt magnitude; by which means we often find, that thoſe who have ſpent many Years in teaching Schools, are the worſt Judges in the World of the very* Authors *they teach. If* Poetry *be at all to be ſtudy'd (for which there are a thouſand irrefragable Arguments) it ought to be truly taught, which yet it has never been in any Schools that we cou'd ever hear of. In this Art of* Poetry, *therefore, we have fix'd the Rules of every ſort of* Poetry, *which will be a great Diminution in Time of bad* Poets; *and we have farther, we hope, given a Standard of the Quantities of our* Tongue, *which if we have not perfectly obtain'd, we may venture to ſay, that we are not far from it.*

The General Rhetorics *of the Schools in* England *meddle only with the Tropes and Figures of Words and Sentences, but neglect the Cultivation of a young Invention. We know ſome ingenious Men have diſallow'd of putting any People on the Exerciſe of that Faculty; but we preſume, that we ought to do in this as the Youth of Antiquity did in their* Gymnaſtic *Exerciſes; they ſtaid not till they were Men of confirm'd Strength and Robuſtneſs, but began in a more tender Age to make their Limbs pliant, and ſo to knit their Sinews and Nerves, that they ſhou'd be without a ſtiffneſs, which wou'd not be remov'd by a late Application to that Art. Thus by uſing Youth early to a Methodical Invention, Exerciſe and Time will give a Readineſs and Facility in ſeeing what all Subjects will afford of Uſe to Perſuaſion, which a Mind unus'd to that way of thinking, will not eaſily find out.*

We may farther venture to ſay, that very few Schools in Europe *can boaſt ſo juſt a* Logic, *clear'd of the old Jargon, and delivering the direct way to Truth, not to uſeleſs Wrangles. This was drawn up by a very eminent Hand from Mr.* Lock, *Father* Malebranch, *the Meſſieurs of* Port-Royal, *and ſome others, tho' we have ventur'd to give it you ſomething ſhorter than it is in the* Original.

Up-

Upon this Noble Design *of an* ENGLISH EDUCATION, *&c. By Mr.* TATE, *Poet-Laureat to* Her Majesty.

AN *English Education!* Glorious Prize!
Fame claps her Wings, and sounds it to the Skies;
Tells 'em, the suff'ring *Muses* are referr'd
To be by *Theirs* and *Britain*'s Guardians heard:
Whose Judgment Awes at once and Charms Mankind,
Can silence *Slander*, and strike *Envy* Blind.

To *Grecian* Hills our Youth no more shall roam,
Supply'd with these *Castalian* Springs at Home:
Our Ladies too, as in ELIZA's Days,
Be doubly Crown'd, with Beauty and with Bays.
MINERVA bids the Muse *Their* Charter draw
To free Our injur'd Fair from Servile Awe;
And Cancel cruel PHOEBUS Salique Law.

O wondrous Blessing! yet on Terms so cheap,
That *lowest* Stations shall th' Advantage reap;
The *meanest Briton*'s in this Prize may share,
Our ALBION be what ROME and ATHENS were.

Then say what Thanks, what Praises must attend
The Gen'rous Wits, who thus could condescend!

Skill

Skill, that to *Art's* ſublimeſt Orb can reach,
Employ'd it's humble Elements to Teach!
Yet worthily Eſteem'd, becauſe we know
To raiſe *Their Country's* Fame they ſtoop'd ſo low.

Shall private Zeal beſtow ſuch Coſt and Toil
To Cultivate that long-neglected Soil
Our *Engliſh* Language (ſtor'd with all the Seeds
Of Eloquence, but choak'd with Foreign Weeds;)
And *Great* BRITANNIA not vouchſafe a Smile
To chear theſe ſpringing Glories of our Iſle?
If only Martial Conqueſts we advance,
And yield the Muſe's Bow'rs to vanquiſh'd *France*,
If here we fix our Pillars of Renown,
Will not reſenting *Britain*'s Genius frown,
And, while our Troops politer Realms o'er-run,
Cry, *So the* Vandals *and the* Goths *have done?*
When Honour calls my Sons to new Alarms,
And grow in *Arts* victorious, as in *Arms*,
Our Language to advance, and prove our *Words*
No leſs deſign'd for Conqueſt than our *Swords*;

Till *Learning's* Banners thro' our Realms are ſpred,
And Captive *Sciences* from Bondage led;
Tho' *Gallic* Trophies ſhall our Iſland fill,
Our Conqu'ring Wings are clipt, and LEWIS triumphs ſtill.

A GRAMMAR OF THE English Tongue.

Part I.

Chap. I.

[1] GRAMMAR *do's all the Art and Knowledge teach,*
According to the Use of every Speech,
How we our Thoughts most justly may express
In Words, together join'd, in Sentences.

[2] *Into*

Notes.

[1] The modern, as well as old Grammarians, have given us various Definitions of this very useful Art. That of a certain Author seems defective, when he says, *Grammar* is the Art of *Speaking*; since 'tis plain a Mastery of it, is of more Consequence in Writing; the Solecisms of Vulgar Discourse passing unheeded, tho' they would be monstrous in Writing. Of this Opinion we find the great Mr. *Lock*.

I cannot omit the Learned and Judicious Mr. *Johnson*'s Definition, *Grammar is the Art of expressing the Relations of Things in Construction, with due Accent in Speaking, and Orthography in Writing, according to the Custom of those, whose Language we learn.* If he had said of *Words*, not *Things*, and *Quantity* for *Accent*, (which is a Thing or Art which no body alive understands, since it relates to the rising and fal-

[2] *Into four Parts the Learn'd this Art divide:*
The First *to* Letters *is preciſely ty'd;*
The Second *does to* Syllables *extend;*
The Third *the various Rules of* Words *commend;*
The Fourth *it ſelf on* Sentences *does ſpend.*

For in Engliſh, as well as other Languages, this Art conſiſts of LETTERS, SYLLABLES, WORDS and SENTENCES. The *Second* is produc'd by the various Conjunctions of the *Firſt*; the different Union of the *Second* begets the *Third*; and the various joinings of the *Third* compoſe the *Fourth*.

In the perfect Knowledge of theſe four Heads conſiſts the Whole Art of GRAMMAR.

Letters being evidently the Foundation of the Whole, ought, in the firſt place, to be thoroughly conſider'd, and all thoſe Rules, which Induſtry and Obſervation have been able to furniſh, laid down in ſuch a manner, that the Underſtanding of the Learner being in ſome meaſure inform'd of the Reaſons of Things, may not paſs through this Book to ſo little purpoſe, as to learn only a few Words by rote.

ling of the Voice, not the Quantity.) We think it the moſt extenſive Definition we have met with; but, indeed, every thing is extraordinary in this Author's Book. And we are pleas'd to find, that ours (which was made before we had the Happineſs of ſeeing his Book) contains the Senſe of it. But to Speak, is to Explain our Thoughts by thoſe *Signs*, which Men have invented to that End. We find the moſt convenient Signs, are *Sounds*, and the *Voice*; but becauſe theſe Sounds are tranſient, and paſs away, Men have invented *Other Signs*, to render them more durable and permanent, as well as viſible, or Objects of the Eye; which are the Characters in Writing, call'd by the Greeks γράμματα, whence our Term of Grammar is deriv'd. Two Things we may conſider in theſe *Signs*: The *firſt*, what they are by their Nature, that is as *Sounds*, and *Characters*. The *ſecond*, their *Signification*; that is, the Manner in which Men make uſe of them to expreſs their Thoughts.

[2] Others divide Grammar in the following manner; as *Orthography*, or the Art of true *Spelling*; *Orthoepy*, or exact *Pronunciation*, as to quantity and Accent; *Etymology*, or the Derivation of Words, to diſcover the Nature and Propriety of ſingle Words; and *Syntax*, to join Words agreeably in Sentences. *Orthography*, or Spelling, has relation to Letters, both to the Knowledge of their Figures, and the Sounds expreſs'd by them, and the putting them together to form Syllables and Words. *Orthoepy* directs the Pronunciation of Syllables, as to their Length or Shortneſs: *Etymology*, or *Derivation*, regards *Words*; And *Syntax*, *Sentences*.

Mr. *Johnſon*, in his Grammatical Commentaries, much better: "From "hence there ariſe four Parts of "*Grammar*. *Analogy*, which treats "of the ſeveral Parts of Speech, their "De-

[3] A Letter, therefore, is a Character, or Mark, either in Print or Writing, which denotes the various Motions, or Poſitions of the [4] Inſtruments of Speech, either in producing, or ending of Sounds. Or you may term them Marks and Signs, expreſſing the ſeveral Sounds us'd in conveying our Thoughts to each other in Speech.

A Letter is an uncompounded Sound,
Of which there no Diviſion can be found:
Theſe Sounds to certain Characters we fix,
Which, in the Engliſh Tongue, *are Twenty-ſix.*

Of theſe Signs, Marks, or Characters, the Engliſh Language makes uſe of Twenty-ſix, as will appear from the following Alphabet.

Of

" Definitions, Accidents and Formations. *Syntax*, which contains " the Uſe of thoſe Things in Conſtruction, according to their Relations. *Orthography* of Spelling, " and *Proſody* of Accenting in Pronunciation. Our Diviſion is eaſily reduc'd to this for *Orthography*, whoſe natural Place is firſt, as the Foundation of the whole contains *Letters* and *Syllables*. *Analogy* Words, *Syntax* Sentences. As for *Proſody*, we preſume it falls more juſtly (eſpecially in *Engliſh*) under the Art of *Poetry*, as we have plac'd it, but as much as relates to the Pronunciation of Proſe is taken in by *Letters*, where their true Sound is taught; and our Terms being more plain and eaſy, and needing no Explanation, we have choſe to keep ſtill to them.

[3] There are other Definitions of Letters, as the following: *A* Letter *may be ſaid to be, a ſimple uncompounded Sound of, or in the Voice, which cannot be ſubdivided into any more ſimple, and is generally mark'd with a particular Character.* This Definition we take to err in two Particulars; *firſt*, tho' every Sound ought to be mark'd with a proper and peculiar Character, yet by the Corruption, or Primitive Ignorance of the firſt Writers of our Modern Tongue, the ſame Sounds are often expreſs'd by different Characters; and different *Sounds* are mark'd by one and the ſame Character: In the next place, *Letters* are the Signs of Sounds, not the Sounds themſelves: For the *Greeks* γράμματα is from Writing, and the *Latins Litera*, from *lineando*, (as *linea* it ſelf) or *linendo*; ſo that both Words ſignifie that which is mark'd on the Paper. But if there be any Character, Sign and Mark, that does not expreſs a Sound entirely ſimple, but a Sound compos'd and compounded of two or more, and is reſoluble into as many, it is not ſo properly a *Letter*, as an *Abbreviature* of ſeveral *Letters*, or a Contraction of them into one *Note* or *Mark*, containing in it ſelf ſo many Letters, as its Power contains ſimple Sounds. This is plain in the *Latin* &, *x*, the *Greek* ξ, ψ, ϛ, and many others ſufficiently known; for they are compos'd of (*et*,) (*cs*,) (κ*s*,) (π*s*,) (σ*τ*,) &c. On the contrary, a ſimple Sound, tho' it be expreſs'd perhaps by different Characters, yet it is to be eſteem'd but one Letter: For (*th*,) (*ph*,) no leſs than φ, θ, and *f*, are but ſimple Letters.

[4] The chief Inſtruments of Speech, Diſcourſe or Letters, are the

Lungs, the Wind-pipe, Throat, Tongue, Noſtrils, Lips, and ſeveral Parts of the Mouth. The Breath, or that Air that is inſpir'd or breath'd into us, is blown from the Lungs through the Wind-pipe, which furniſhes the Matter of the Voice or Diſcourſe. For from the various Colliſion of this Air or Breath, ariſes the Variety both of Tones and Articulation: And this Variety comes not from the Lungs, but from other Cauſes, as will anon be evident. For all the Variation which Sounds receive from the Lungs, is only from the different Force, with which they ſend out the Breath, by which the Voice becomes more or leſs ſonorous or loud; for the Lungs perform in Speech the Office of the Bellows in the Organ.

I know Anatomiſts have obſerv'd, that we cannot ſo much as talk without the Concurrence of twelve or thirteen ſeveral Parts, as the *Noſe*, *Lips*, *Teeth*, *Palate*, *Jaw*, *Tongue*, *Weaſon*, *Lungs*, *Muſcles* of the *Cheſt*, *Diaphragma*, and *Muſcles of the Belly*; but I have nothing to do with any Part, but what is immediately concern'd in the formation of Sounds, the Obſervation of the Manner of which, leads the Obſerver to certain uſeful Concluſions in the Subject we treat of. Farther Enquiries into other Parts concern'd more remotely in Speech, have little but Amuſements here, tho' of Conſequence in the Contemplation of the admirable Order of Nature.

The Variety of Tones (that is, as far as they relate to Gravity or Acuteneſs, flat or ſharp) ariſes from the Wind-pipe. For as a Flute, the longer and ſmaller it is, the more acute or ſharp, or ſmall the Tone; and the larger and ſhorter, the more grave and big the Tone is, that it gives. The ſame holds good in the Wind-pipe (whence, at leaſt, in ſome Meaſure, ariſes the Variety of Tones in the Voices of ſeveral Men; or even of the ſame Men in the different Parts of their Ages) but chiefly from the *Larynx*, or Knot of the Throat: For the Tone of the Voice is more or leſs grave or acute, as the ſmall Cleft of the Throat opens more or leſs; and this is the Seat of all Muſical Modulations.

From the ſame Seat muſt we ſeek the Reaſon of the Difference betwixt a gentle Whiſper, and loud Talk. For if, when we ſpeak, we make a tremulous Concuſſion of the Throat and Wind-pipe (that is, by reaſon of their Extenſion) it produces loud ſpeaking; but when the Throat and the Wind-pipe are leſs ſtretch'd, and more lax, it is Whiſpering. But all Letters are not capable of this Diverſity, or Variation; but only thoſe, which we call Vowels, half Vowels, half Mutes (and ſuch as derive themſelves from half Mutes:) For *b*, *t*, *c*, or *k*, are ſimply Mutes, and their Aſpirates never admit of that Concuſſion: nor is their Sound in loud Speech different from what it is in a Whiſper.

To this Head we may refer the Hoarſeneſs, often the Companion of Catarrhs, which hinders that Concuſſion of the Throat, and the Wind-pipe.

The Articulation of Words, or the Formation of the ſeveral Letters, begins when the Breath has paſt the Throat; and is almoſt wholly perform'd by the Noſtrils, Mouth, Tongue and Lips. Tho' theſe Remarks ſeem out of the Way to the Common Reader, yet a Judicious Maſter will find it worth his while to ſtudy this Point thoroughly. For by knowing what Letters are formed by the Mouth, Tongue, Throat, Lips, *&c.* the Maſter may give a great Light to the Learner in the Art of Spelling, and perhaps the moſt certain Rule of doing it juſtly, becauſe in theſe Notes we ſhall ſhew how every Vowel and Conſonant is form'd.

[5] Tho' it wou'd be too much from the preſent Deſign for me to enter into the Enquiry, who was the Inventer of Letters, and what Nation

Of the LETTERS. [5]

	Old English.		*Roman.*		*Italian.*		*Sounded.*		
1	𝔄	𝔞	A	a	*A*	*a*	*a*	*a*	
2	𝔅	𝔟	B	b	*B*	*b*	*be*	*eb*	
3	ℭ	𝔠	C	c	*C*	*c*	*ſee*	*ec*	*ke*
4	𝔇	𝔡	D	d	*D*	*d*	*dee*	*ed*	
5	𝔈	𝔢	E	e	*E*	*e*	*e*		
6	𝔉	𝔣	F	f	*F*	*f*	*eff*	*fe*	
7	𝔊	𝔤	G	g	*G*	*g*	*ghee*	*eg*	*ga*
8	ℌ	𝔥	H	h	*H*	*h*	*atch*	*ha*	*each*
9	ℑ	𝔦	I	i	*I*	*i*	*i*		
10		𝔧	J	j	*J*	*j*	*jay*	*ge*	
11	𝔎	𝔨	K	k	*K*	*k*	*ka*		
12	𝔏	𝔩	L	l	*L*	*l*	*el*	*le*	
13	𝔐	𝔪	M	m	*M*	*m*	*em*	*me*	
14	𝔑	𝔫	N	n	*N*	*n*	*en*	*ne*	
15	𝔒	𝔬	O	o	*O*	*o*	*o*		
16	𝔓	𝔭	P	p	*P*	*p*	*pee*	*ep*	
17	𝔔	𝔮	Q	q	*Q*	*q*	*cue*	*kwe*	*que*
18	ℜ	𝔯	R	r	*R*	*r*	*ar*		
19	𝔖	𝔰	S	ſ	*S*	*ſ*	*eſs*	*ſe*	
20	𝔗	𝔱	T	t	*T*	*t*	*tee*	*et*	
21	𝔘	𝔲	U	u	*U*	*u*	*u*		
22		𝔳	V	v	*V*	*v*	*va*	*ev*	
23	𝔚	𝔴	W	w	*W*	*w*	*double u*	*we*	
24	𝔛	𝔵	X	x	*X*	*x*	*ex*		
25	𝔜	𝔶	Y	y	*Y*	*y*	*wy*	*ye*	
26	ℨ	𝔷	Z	z	*Z*	*z*	*zed*	*ze*, or *ez*	

tion had the Honour of firſt enjoying this Benefit, yet that I may not wholly diſappoint ſome, who may expect this, I ſhall in a very few Words let him know, That the *Chineſe* are allow'd the Palm in this Particular; for their firſt King *Fohi*, who liv'd 1400 Years before *Moſes*, 500 before *Menes* the firſt King of *Egypt*, and 2950 before *Chriſt*, was the Author of this Invention, and writ in their Language a Book call'd *Texim*, which is the oldeſt in the World.

But this was in Parts too remote, and which had ſo little Communication with the World, that is, all that World which was then known, that we may reaſonably make another Enquiry after the Original of Letters in the hither Parts of *Aſia*, *Egypt* and *Europe*.

'Tis more probable from the *Mummies* and *Obeliſks*, that *Hieroglyphics* were in theſe Parts the firſt Manner of Writing, and even prior to *Moſes*; the *Pyramids* and *Obeliſques* being made, at leaſt in great meaſure, while yet the *Iſraelites* were in Slavery to the *Egyptians*, and by Conſequence not very well qualify'd for Inventions ſo curious and judicious.

Whether *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians* learn'd LETTERS from the *Egyptians*, or their Neighbours of *Judah* and *Samaria*, may be a Queſtion; ſince the Bible wrote in Letters is more likely to have inform'd them, than the *Hieroglyphics* of *Egypt*. But when or whereſoever the *Phœnicians* learnt this Art, I think it is generally agreed, that *Cadmus*, the Son of *Agenor*, firſt brought Letters into *Greece*, whence in ſubſequent Ages they ſpread over all *Europe*.

Thus much I have thought fit to ſay on this Head: What remains is, That as the difference of the Articulate Sounds was to expreſs the different Ideas and Thoughts of the Mind; ſo it is certain, that one Letter was intended to *ſignifie* only one Sound; and not, as at preſent, now to *expreſs* one Sound, and then another; which has brought in that Confuſion, that has render'd the Learning of our modern Tongues extreamly difficult; whereas if the various Sounds were conſtantly expreſs'd by the ſame numerical *Letter*, more than half that Difficulty wou'd be remov'd.

But ſince we are not here to reform, or indeed make a new Alphabet, as ſome have vainly, againſt the Stream or full Tide of Cuſtom, attempted; but to explain and deliver Rules about that which we have, and according to thoſe Errors and Miſtakes which Uſe, the inviolable Rule and Right of Speaking and Writing, has conſecrated, ſuch an Endeavour wou'd be as uſeleſs, as ſingular.

Chap. II.

Of VOWELS. [6]

Under two Heads theſe Letters *ſtill are plac't,*
The firſt holds Vowels, Conſonants *the laſt.*

THeſe Twenty-ſix Letters are naturally divided into two ſorts, which are call'd *Vowels* and *Conſonants*. *Vowels*, or perfect Sounds, being by Nature of greater Excellence than *Conſonants*, as Sounding by themſelves, and giving the later their Sounds, juſtly demand our firſt Conſideration.

A *Vowel*, therefore, is a Letter denoting a full Sound made in the Throat, and can be pronounc'd without the help and joining of any other Letter to it.

A Vowel *by it ſelf compleat is found,*
Made in the Throat, one full and perfect Sound.
Five Letters we can only Vowels *call,*
For A, E, I, O, U *contain them all.*

[7] In *Engliſh* we have but theſe five Marks, or Characters of theſe perfect Sounds call'd *Vowels*, *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and *y* at the end of a Syllable for *i*, which is only a different Figure, but entirely of the ſame Sound. When theſe Vowels end a Syllable, they are uſually long, but generally ſhort in all other Poſitions.

To

[6] It is of uſe to obſerve, that the ſeveral ſorts of Sounds us'd in Speaking, which we call *Letters*, are form'd in a very natural manner. For firſt, the Mouth is the Organ that forms them, and we ſee, that ſome are ſo ſimple, and unmixt, that there is nothing requir'd, but the opening of the Mouth to make them underſtood, and to form different Sounds. Whence they have the Names of *Vowels*, or *Voices*, or *Vocal Sounds*. On the other ſide we find, that there are others, whoſe Pronunciation depends on the particular Application, and Uſe of every Part of the Mouth, as the Teeth, the Lips, the Tongue, the Palate; which yet cannot make any one perfect Sound but by the ſame opening of the Mouth; that is to ſay, they can only ſound by their Union with thoſe firſt and only perfect Sounds; and theſe are call'd *Conſonants*, or Letters ſounding with other Letters.

[7] If we judge by the Characters or Marks, we find that there is not the ſame Number of *Vowels* in all Languages, and yet all Nations almoſt agree, that there are more different Sounds of *Vowels*, than they have common Characters to expreſs them.

For

To each of theſe, two different Sounds belong;
One that is ſhort, *another that is* long;
Five double Vowels *add, to fill the* Vocal *Throng.*

Each of theſe five has two diſtinct Sounds, that is, a long and a ſhort Sound; the ſhort Sound is always made long by adding *(e)* at the end, as *Lad, Lade*; *Met, Mete*; *Pip, Pipe*; *Rob, Robe*; *Tun, Tune*: To theſe we muſt add five double *Vowels*, compounded each of two of theſe. To attain to the perfect Knowledge of this, the Learner muſt firſt be taught the true Sounds of theſe five *Vowels*, as they lie ſingle, and each by it ſelf; for that is the Guide to arrive ſafely at all their Variations.

Beſides the long *and* ſhort, *to* (A) *does fall*
A Sound that's broad, *as in* all, ſhall *and* call;
And in all Words, that end in double (L),
As Wall, *and* Stall; *in* (ld), *as* bald *will tell:*
Betwixt a double (U) *plac'd and* (R),
As Warden, Ward, Warren, Warm, *and* Warmer.

(*A*) in theſe Words ſeems to have gain'd this broad Sound from the Ancient Spelling; which, ev'n in the Days of Queen *Elizabeth*, added a *(u)* after it, as in *talk*, it being then Written *taulk*, as in *Aſcham* and ſeveral other Writers before 1560, *&c.*

(*A*) beſides its ſhort and long Sound, has before *(l)* or rather double *(l)* generally a broad open or full Sound, as it has in Words ending in *(ld)*, *&c.* but when the double *(l)* is parted in the middle of a Word it is pronounc'd ſhort, as *Shallow*, *Tallow*; 'tis likewiſe broad when plac'd betwixt a (*w*) and (*r*), and likewiſe in *Waſh*, *Watch*, *Water*, *Wrath*, &c.

(A) *is ſhort when ſingle Conſonants conclude,*
Or two of the ſame into the middle intrude,
Or ſeem in Sound t'obtain the middle Part;
But yet the final (e) *do's length to theſe impart.*

[8] When

For this Reaſon I am of Opinion (ſays our learned Dr. *Wallis*) that they ought to be diſtinguiſh'd into theſe three *Claſſes*; *Gutteral*, or *Throat*-Sounds; *Palatine*, or Sounds of the *Palate*; and *Labial*, or Sounds of the *Lips*, as they are form'd either by the Throat, the Palate, or the Lips.

If therefore we make this Diviſion of the Vowels according to that Number of vocal Sounds, as we find them in our Time, (as we ought) then will their number be Nine, *viz.* Three in the *Throat*, three in the *Palate*, and three in the *Lips*, according to the three ſeveral Degrees

or

[8] When a ſingle Conſonant ends a Syllable, as *Bat*, *can*, *far*, *(a)* is ſhort; and when two of the ſame Conſonants meet in the middle of a Word, as in *batter*, *cannot*, *Farrier*, &c. and when a ſingle Conſonant in the middle Sounds double, as in *baniſh*, *Dragon*, *Habit*, &c. and when it precedes two Conſonants that end a Word, as *blaſt*, *paſt*, &c. But ſilent (e) ev'r after theſe two Conſonants, lengthens the *(a)*, as *paſte*, &c.

(A) ſtill we long moſt juſtly do ſuppoſe
In Words which but one Syllable compoſe,
Whenever ſilent (e) *is in the cloſe.*
And when in th' end of Syllables, 'tis known
In words that have more Syllables than one.

(A) ſounds long, ſmall, and ſlender, 1ſt, in Words of one Syllable with *(e)* at the end, as *make*, *fate*, *late*, &c. but this is the natural Effect of ſilent *(e)*, which always gives length to the 'foregoing Vowel, and ought never to be written when that is ſhort, 'tis likewiſe long in the ends of Syllables in Words of many Syllables, as *Cradle*, *Ladle*, &c.

No common Word in (a) *can e'er expire,*
And yet its Genuine Sound retain entire.

(A) is obſcure, or not plainly pronounc'd, in the Word *Thouſand*.

None but proper Names end in this Vowel, except theſe ſeven in *(ea)*, which yet ſound *(e)*, as *Lea*, *Plea*, *Flea*, *Pea*, *Sea*, *Tea*, *yea*; the laſt Word is out of uſe.

Of the Vowel (E.)

[9] (E) *is of different* Sound, *and various* Uſe,
Silent it ſelf, all Vowels *does produce*;
But leaſt it ſelf, yet ſometimes it is found
To lengthen ev'n its own *preceding Sound*,
As we in Scene *and* Glebe, *and others find*,
But (e) *is moſtly of the ſhorter kind.*
But then its Sound is always clear expreſt,
As in Whet, let, Well, met, *and* Reſt.

The

or Manners of opening the Mouth; that is, by a *larger*, *middle*, and *leſs* degree of opening it in thoſe three Places or Seats.

[8] We generally pronounce *(a)* with a more ſmall and ſlender Sound, than moſt other Nations; as the *French* generally do their *(e)* when follow'd by *(n)* in the Word *Entendment*, tho' ſomething ſharper and clearer; or perhaps its moſt uſual Sound in our Tongue comes neareſt to the French Neuter, or open *(e)*, as in the Words *Etre*, *Tete*, &c.

or

The Sound of this *Vowel* is differently expreſs'd, and of various and great Uſe in the Pronunciation of other *Vowels*; for, when ſilent it ſelf, it lengthens them all, but is ſeldom long it ſelf, or lengthen'd by it ſelf in Words of one, or more than one Syllable.

Its Sound is always ſhort, howe'er expreſt,
As fret, help, left, Beard, dreamt, *and* bleſt;
Unleſs made long by ſilent final (e),
Or double (e) *in Form or Sound it be.*

A ſingle Conſonant at the end after (*e*) makes it ſhort, as in *Bed*, *fret*, *Den*, &c. two or three Conſonants at the end after it does the ſame; (*ft*) as *left*, (*ld*) as *held*, (*lm*) as *Helm*, (*lp*) as *help*, (*lt*) as *melt*, (*mp*) as *Hemp*, (*nt*) as *dent*, *bent*, (*pt*) as *kept*, (*rb*) as *Herb*, (*rd*) as *Herd*, (*rk*) as *jerk*, (*rm*) as *Term*, (*rn*) as *Hern*, (*rt*) as *pert*, (*ſh*) as *Fleſh*, (*sk*) as *Desk*, (*ſt*) as *Reſt*, *beſt*, *bleſt*. The Sound of (*e*) expreſs'd by (*ea*) in the middle of ſeveral Words is ſhort; as *already*, *Beard*, *Bearn*, (a Child) *Weather*, *Treaſure*, *cleanſe*, *Dearth*, *dreamt*, *Earneſt*, *Earth*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Feather*, *Head*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Jealous*, *Leachery*, *Lead*, *Meadow*, *Meaſure*, *Pearl*, *Peaſant*, *Pleaſure*, *ready*, *Seamſtreſs*, *ſpread*, and many more.

It being thus naturally ſhort, it lengthens it ſelf in Words of one Syllable but in theſe ſixteen Examples,

1. *Bede*, } Proper Names.
2. *Pede*, }
3. *Vere*, }
4. *Crete*, an Iſland.
5. *Ere*, before that.
6. *Glebe*, Land.
7. *Glede*, a Kite.
8. *Here*, in this Place.
9. *Mede*, a Country.
10. *Mere*, a Lake or Fenn.
11. *Mete*, Meaſure.
12. *Rere*, hindermoſt.
13. *Scene*, in a Play.
14. *Scheme*, a Draught.
15. *Sphere*, a Globe.
16. *Theſe*.

To theſe, in my Opinion, we may add *there*, *were*, and *where*, tho' by a different, yet wrong, Pronunciation, ſome ſound the firſt (*e*) in theſe Words like (*a*) long.

In

or as the *Italians* do their (*a*). But yet not like the fat or groſs (*a*) of the *Germans*, which if long, we expreſs by (*au*) or (*aw*), or if ſhort, by ſhort (*o*).

[9] This Vowel is pronounc'd with a clear and acute Sound, like the *French* (*e*) *Maſculine*: but it ſcarce ever has the obſcure Sound of the *French* (*e*) *Feminine*; unleſs when ſhort (*e*) goes before (*r*), as in *Vertue*, and *Stranger*.

[10] The

In Words of more than one Syllable, the (*e*) at the end lengthens theſe Words, as,

1. *Adhere.*
2. *Apozeme.*
3. *Auſtere.*
4. *Blaſpheme.*
5. *Cohere.*
6. *Complete.*
7. *Concede.*
8. *Concrete.*
9. *Convene.*
10. *Extreme.*
11. *Greve*, Lord.
12. *Impede*, to hinder.
13. *Intercede*, mediate.
14. *Interfere.*
15. *Intervene.*
16. *Nicene*, Creed.
17. *Obſcene.*
18. *Portreve.*
19. *Precede.*
20. *Recede.*
21. *Replete.*
22. *Revere.*
23. *Severe.*
24. *Sincere.*
25. *Superſede.*
26. *Supreme.*

Note, That *complete*, *replete*, *extreme*, *ſupreme*, are often ſpelt *compleat*, *repleat*, *extream*, *ſupream*; but ſince they are ſpelt both ways, I wou'd not omit them, tho' they, when in *eam*, belong properly to the following Rule.

When long, acute and clear (e) *ſounds we ſee,*
As in ev'n, evil, be, me, we *and* he.
Ea, ie *and double* (e) *are found,*
Still to expreſs of (e) *the longer Sound.*

Cuſtom lengthens the Sound of (*e*) by the improper *double Vowel* (*ea*) in all Words where it does not ſound (*a*) ſhort, or (*e*) ſhort, as will be ſeen when we come to that improper *double Vowel*.

The Sound of (*e*) is lengthen'd by (*ei*) in theſe Words only,

1. *Conceit.*
2. *Conceive.*
3. *Deceit.*
4. *Deceive.*
5. *Either.*
6. *Neither.*
7. *Inveigle.*
8. *Receipt.*
9. *Receive.*
10. *Seize.*
11. *Weild.*

(*ei*) lengthens the Sound of (*e*), or gives it that of double (*e*) in theſe,

1. *Atchievement.*
2. *Believe.*
3. *Belief.*
4. *Beſiege.*
5. *Bier.*
6. *Brief.*
7. *Caſhier.*
8. *Chief.*
9. *Cieling.*
10. *Field.*
11. *Fiend.*
12. *Friend.*
13. *Frontier.*
14. *Grief.*
15. *Grievance.*
16. *Grieve.*
17. *Grievous.*
18. *Lief.*
19. *Liege.*
20. *Mulitier.*
21. *Piece.*
22. *Piedmont.*
23. *Pierce.*
24. *Prieſt.*

25. *Re-*

25. *Relief.*	30. *Shriek.*	35. *Thieve.*
26. *Relieve.*	31. *Sieve.*	36. *Thievery.*
27. *Reprieve.*	32. *Shield.*	37. *Thieviſh.*
28. *Siege.*	33. *Thieves.*	38. *Yield.*
29. *Shrieve.*	34. *Thief.*	

In all other Words the Sound of (*e*) long is expreſs'd by the *double Vowel* (*ee*), as in *Bleed*, *Creed*,&c. [10] The Sound of (*e*) in *Stranger* is obſcure.

When (e) *ends Words it has no Sound at all,*
Except in Words which we do proper call;
Except it doubled be in Form *or* Sound,
The *is to this the Sole Exception found.*

(*e*) it ſelf, at the end of a Word, has now no proper Sound of its own, as in *make*, *have*, *love*, &c. except in *the*, which is writ with a ſingle (*e*), to diſtinguiſh it from *thee*; and ſome Proper Names, as *Phœbe*, *Penelope*, *Paſiphae*, *Gethſemane*, and in *Epitome*, &c. for (*e*) ſimple is ſeldom elſe pronounc'd at the end of a Word, for *he*, *me*, *ſhe*, *we*, *be*, and *ye*, ſound and wou'd better be written by (*ee*).

Whene'er the Sound of (e) *is in the End,*
Some of theſe Letters will expreſs't you'll find.
Y, *or*, ie, happy; ey, *as in* Key,
Double (e) *agree*; ea, *as in* Tea.

But the Sound of (*e*) is at the end of many Words, tho' differently expreſs'd; *firſt*, and moſt commonly, by (*y*); as *happy*, *holy*, *mercy*; theſe words may be writ with (*ie*) or (*y*), as the Writer pleaſes.

2*dly*, By (*ey*), in *Angleſey*, *Balconey*, *Honey*, *Cockney*, *Humphrey*, *Key*, *Ramſey*, and many more; tho' Cuſtom now begins to prevail in the omiſſion of the (*e*).

3*dly*, The Sound of (*e*) at the end is expreſs'd by (*ee*), as in *Phariſee*, *Sadducee*, *agree*, *Chaldee*, *Bee*, *Knee*, and many more.

The Sound of (*e*) at the end is likewiſe expreſs'd by (*ea*), as in *Sea*, *Flea*, *Plea*, *Pea*, *Tea*, *yea*.

When

[10] The Uſe of this (*e*) is the lengthning the Sound of the foregoing Conſonant; and a very learned Man is of Opinion, that it had this Original, That it was pronounc'd but in obſcure manner, like the (*e*) *Feminine* of the *French*; ſo that the Words *take*, *one*, *Wine*, &c. which are now Words of one Syllable, were formerly Diſ-ſyllables, or Words of two Syllables, *ta-ke*, *o-ne*, *Wi-ne*; ſo that the firſt Vowel terminating the firſt Syllable, was therefore long; and that obſcure Sound of the final (*e*) by

Where e'er the ſilent (e) *a Place obtains,*
The Voice *foregoing Length and Sofineſs gains.*
And after (c) *and* (g) *this ſoftning Power remains.*

The ſilent *(e)*, which is put at the end of Words and Syllables, does not only produce, or lengthen the foregoing *Vowel*, but often renders its Sound more ſoft; as in *Face* and *Lace*; ſo in *Rag*, *Rage*, *Stag*, *Stage*, *hug*, *huge*.

In Compound Words its Silence (e) *retains,*
Which in the Simple, in the end it gains.

It does the ſame Office in the middle Syllables, when it follows (*g*) or (*c*), as in *Advancement*, *Encouragement*; ſince (*c*) and (*g*) are always ſounded hard, unleſs (*e*) or (*i*) ſoften them; as *ſing*, *ſinge*, *ſwing*, *ſwinge*, &c.

I, O *and* U, *at th' end of Words require*
The ſilent (e), *the ſame do's* (va) *deſire.*

The ſilent (*e*) is added to (*i*), (*o*) and (*u*), at the end of Words, becauſe the Genius of the Language requires it; and likewiſe to (*v*) Conſonant or (*va*), except when an (*i*) follows in the ſame Word; as in *living*, *thriving*, &c. to avoid the concourſe of too many Vowels, it's preſerv'd in *blameable*, *changeable*, &c. to mark the diſtinct Syllables. For (*ie*) we often now put (*y*), as *Mercy* for *Mercie*, and *dy* for *die*, &c.

In Compound Words, tho' of obſcurer ſound,
Or ev'n ſilent, (e) *muſt ſtill be found.*

Tho' (*e*) by little and little vaniſh'd ſo far, that in the end it was totally neglected, as the *(e) Feminine* of the *French* often is, the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel being preſerv'd, and all the other Letters keeping their Sounds, as if the *(e)* were likewiſe to be pronounc'd. And a ſtronger Argument of this is, that we ſee this mute *(e)* in the old Orthography or Spelling perpetually annex'd to many Words, in which it is now conſtantly omitted, as *Darke*, *Marke*, *Selfe*, *Leafe*, *Waite*, and innumerable more, to which Words there is no Reaſon to imagin, that it ſhou'd have been join'd, if it had not been pronounc'd *Dar-ke*, *Mar-ke*, *Sel-fe*, *Lea-fe*, *Wai-te*, &c. For, 'tis plain, it could not be join'd to thoſe Words to make the foregoing Syllable long, which is now its principal Uſe, becauſe the precedent Syllables are either not long, or made ſo by their *Diphthongs*, or *double Vowels*. Another Proof of this is, that we find in the old Poets this *(e)* makes either another Syllable or not, as the Occaſion of the Verſe requires; which happens to the *French (e) Feminine*, both in Verſe and Proſe.

But tho' this mute *(e)* is not ſounded in our Time, yet is it far from being of no uſe and ſuperfluous, for beſides its demonſtrating, that thoſe Words were formerly of more Syllables, than they are at preſent, it yet ſerves to theſe three Uſes;

Tho' *(e)* be not ſounded, or at leaſt very obſcurely, yet muſt it not be left out in Writing in the middle of Compound Words, as *namely*, *finely*, *cloſely*, *handſomely*, *whereof*, *wherein*, *whereon*, &c. nor after *(l)* at the end of a Word, another Conſonant preceeding it, tho' obſcurely ſounded, as *Bridle*, *Rifle*, *Bugle*, &c. for its Virtue ſtill reaches the foregoing Vowel, as to its Length and Softneſs, unleſs where three Conſonants intervene, as in *Fiddle*, *Ruffle*, &c. which are call'd a Syllable and half, tho' in reality they are two diſtinct Syllables, as is plain from our Verſes.

When (n) *concludes a Word, the* (e)*'s obſcure,*
Or does perhaps no Sound at all endure.

The Sound of *(e)* before *(n)* at the end of a Word is very obſcure, or rather ſilent, as *eleven*, *ſeven*, *even*, *Heaven*, *bounden*, *beaten*, &c. and this is ſo plain, that in Verſe they are now always us'd for Words of but one Syllable. But proper Names of Perſons and Places are an Exception to this Rule, as *Eden*, *Eben*, &c.

When (re) *concludes a Word the Sound removes*
Before the (r) *and* (u), *it moſtly proves.*

The Sound of *(e)* after *(r)* is ſilent, or paſſes into a precedent *(u)* obſcure; as *Fire*, ſounds *Fi-ur*; *Deſire*, *Deſi-ur*; *more*, *mo-ur*; *Mare*, *Ma-ur*; *Rere*, *Re-ur*, &c. The ſame holds in *Acre*, *Maſſacre*, *Meagre*, *Maugre*, &c.

When (s) *at th' end of Plural Words is found,*
It to the ſilent (e) *affords no Sound.*

(E) is

Firſt, To preſerve the Quantity of the 'foregoing Vowel, which if long before, remains ſo, tho' that final or mute *(e)* be pronounc'd. *2ly*, To ſoften the ſound of *(c)* *(g)* and *(th)*, as *huge*, *ſince*, *breathe*, *wreathe*, *ſeethe*, which that being away, wou'd be pronounc'd *hug*, *ſink*, *breath*, *wreath*, *ſeeth*, &c. *3ly*, To diſtinguiſh *(v)* Conſonant from *(u)* Vowel, as in *have*, *crave*, *ſave*, &c. which wou'd elſe be *hau*, *crau*, *ſau*, &c. but *(v)* Conſonant having now a peculiar and proper Character, it may perhaps hereafter happen that this mute *(e)* may be left out after it.

Whenever there is neither of theſe Conſiderations, it is redundant, except when it follows *(l)*, preceded by ſome other Conſonant, as in *Handle*, *Candle*, &c. here indeed the Uſe is not ſo apparent as in the following Inſtances, yet it has even here an obſcure Sound, and the ending Conſonants cou'd not be pronounc'd without it; nay, in Verſe they always make two Syllables: So that Dr. *Wallis*, who makes it here redundant, is certainly miſtaken; tho' he is perfectly in the right in *Idle*, *Trifle*, *Title*, *Table*, *Noble*, &c. ſince, as he obſerves here, the mute, or rather the obſcure *(e)* produces it.

This

(*E*) is ſilent when (*s*) is added to ends of Words in *Names* which ſignifie more than one; as in *Blades*, *Trades*, *Glades*, *Babes*, &c. but the Reaſon of this is, becauſe the Word had (*e*) ſilent to ſoften and lengthen the Sound before, and the (*s*) is only added to ſhew, that it ſignifies more than one. Thus in *dotes*, *bites*, *takes*, *likes*, *ſtrikes*, &c. which you will find anon to to be call'd, by way of Excellence, Words that affirm ſomething of ſome Name, or Perſon. And tho' the Affirmation and Name are often written with the ſame Letters, as *Trades* ſignifying many Trades, and *trades*, *he trades*; yet, beſides the Senſe, the writing the Name with a Capital or great Letter, and the Word of Affirmation with a ſmall, (for ſo they ought to be written) may ſufficiently diſtinguiſh them.

Nor muſt (*e*) final be omitted, tho' the Syllable, that goes before conſiſt of a *double Vowel*, as *Houſe*, *Cleanſe*, *Diſeaſe*, *Increaſe*, &c. and in *Horſe*, *Nurſe*, *Purſe*.

But (e) *between two* (s's) *at the end,*
Do's to the Ear a certain Sound commend;
Or elſe between c, g, ch, z *and* s,
It ſtill another Syllable muſt expreſs.

But here it is to be noted, that Words that have the Sound of (*s*), or (*s*) mingled in their Sound, (*es*) then makes another and a diſtinct Syllable; as after (*e*) in *Traces*, *Places*, *Slices*, &c. after (*ch*) in *Breaches*, *Reaches*, *Leeches*, *Riches*, &c. after (*g*) in *Stages*, *Sieges*, *obliges*, &c. after (*s*) in *Horſes*, *Muſes*, *Cloſes*, *Noſes*, *Roſes*, &c. after (z) in *razes*, *amazes*, *ſurprizes*, &c.

[11] *Of the Vowel* (I).

When (I) *precedes* ght, *and* nd,
Gh, mb, gn, ld *ſtill long will be*;
Elſe it is always ſhort, as you will ſee.

As for its being long when (*e*) ſilent concludes the Syllable, as in *tide*, *abide*, &c. that is according to the general Rule of (*e*) ſilent after any other Vowel; the ſame will hold of (*e*) after (*r*) in *Fire*, *Deſire*, &c. Examples of the foregoing Rule, are

This mute (*e*) in the middle of Words is ſeldom us'd, unleſs it was in the primitive Words a final (*e*), as in *Advancement*, *Changeable*, &c. it was final in *Advance*, *Change*, &c. But this (*e*) which is mute in words of the ſingular Number, is ſounded in the plural, *Houſe*, *Houſes*, &c.

[11] When (*i*) is ſhort, it ſounds moſt commonly like that of the (*i*) of the *French*, and other Nations, with the ſmall Sound; but when 'tis long, it is pronounc'd like the *Greek* (ει).

are *Delight, Fight, Mind, rind, kind, high, nigh, ſigh; climb, deſign, mild, Child,* except *build, guild.* Short, as *bid, did, will, ſtill, win, quilt, Mint, ſit,* &c.

(I) *before* (r) *the Sound of* (u) *does ſute,*
Except in ir *for* in, *as in* irreſolute.

Irreverent, irrevocable, irretrievable, irreligious, &c.

(I) *before* (er) *and* (on) *ſtill ſounds as* (ye),
And after (ſt) *the Sound the ſame will be.*

Examples are *Bullion, Onion, Communion, Hollier, Collier, Pannier,* &c. *Celeſtial, Chriſtian, Combuſtion, Queſtion,* &c. and ſo it ſounds in *Poiniard.* 'Tis obſcure in *Goſſip.*

To Sound like double (e), (i) *does incline,*
As in Machine, *and* Shire, *and* Magazine;
Like (a) *in* Sirrah; *but writ* (oi) *in* join.

And alſo in *appoint, boil, broil, joint,* &c.

No Engliſh Word can end in naked (i),
It muſt add (e) *or in their Room place* (y).

The (*e*) is added to (*i*) in the Concluſion of Words, and (*y*) often put in their Room, yet (*ie*) is better after (*f*) and (*s*), as in *crucifie, dignifie, craſie, buſie, Gipſie,* &c. Tho' Incurioufneſs, often in theſe Words, puts (*y.*)

[12] *Of the Vowel* (O).

(O) *does expreſs* three *ſeveral ſorts of Sound,*
As (o) *in* go, *the Mouth ſtill opening round:*
Of (au) *in Folly,* (u) *in* come *and* ſome,
And before (l) *and ſingle* (m), *except in* Home.

This Vowel expreſſes (*o*) round in *Roſe,* (*a*) long in *folly, fond,* (*u*) obſcure in *come* and *ſome,* &c.

(*O*) in theſe places Sounds (*u*) becauſe theſe Words were Originally ſpelt with a (*u*) and not an (*o*).

(O) *ſtill is ſhort, unleſs when it is found*
In one of all theſe ways to lengthen Sound;
When (o) *a Word or Syllable does cloſe,*
Unleſs when double Sounds of Conſonants oppoſe.

It

[12] Short (*o*) is pronounc'd like the *German* (*a*) or open or fat (*o*), only it is ſhort; as in *fond, mollifie,* &c. long (*o*) is pronounc'd like the *Greek* (*ω*) and the *French* (*au*).

[13] The

It cloſes in *go, ho, lo, ſo, wo, no, who, do, undo, whoſo,* &c. or when it ends Syllables, as in *glo-rious, Sto-ry,* &c. exceptions, as *Body, codicile, notable,* &c. when the Sound of the following Syllable is doubled.

When (o) *before double* (l) *its place does hold,*
Or elſe before (ld), *as Scroll, bold, Gold*
Before (lt) *as* molten, Bolt; *before*
(Lſt), *as* Bolſter, *and ſeveral more*

Examples. When double (*l*) ends a Word, as *Toll, Poll, Roll, controll,* &c. but thoſe were Originally written with (*ou*), and yet retain the long Sound of the *double Vowel.* (*ld*) as *old, Scold, hold,* &c. before (*lt*) and (*lſt*) as *Bolt, holt, Colt, Upholſterer,* &c.

Before (rd), (rge), *as* Cord *and* Forge,
Ford, Sword *and* gord, *and likewiſe* George & gorge.
Before (rm), (rn), (rt), *as* Storm,
Forlorn, exhort, *and others may inform.*

But ſofter and more obſcure in *Fort, Comfort, Effort,* which has two ways of Pronunciation, the laſt Syllable being long, and the firſt ſhort ſome Times, and at other Times the contrary, tho' the firſt way is the moſt juſt and true Quantity, *Purport, Tranſport,* &c.

Before (ſt) *and* (ught); *as* Poſt,
(*But with a ſharper Tone in* Froſt, loſt, Coſt)
Nought, bought, Thought, *and after it when we view*
The Syllable cloſe up with double (u),
As we in blow, ſhow *and* know *find true.*

If it be long by the Syllables ending with (*w*), it will be no leſs by adding (*e*) ſilent, whoſe Quality is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel, and which ought to be added in *Bowe, blowe, Crowe, glowe,* &c. to diſtinguiſh them from Words which have the Sound of the proper *double Vowel* (ow); as *How, now, Cow,* &c.

In Words of many Syllables (O)'*l be*
Obſcure in Sound, when plac'd before a (P).

As for Example, in *Biſhop, Biſhoprick*; but in Words of one Syllable it ſounds open, as in *ſlop, hop, ſlop,* &c. It is likewiſe very obſcure before (*n*) at the end of a Word, as in *Hatton, Hutton, Button, Farſon, Capon, Falcon,* &c. But theſe are rather ſilent (*o*)'s than obſcure (*u*)'s, the ſecond Syllable being

ſo much ſuppreſs'd, that it ſeems no more than the ſecond in *Heaven, even*, &c. which Uſe has now made but one.

When ſingle (l) *or* (m), *or* (r) *purſue*
(O), *when its plac'd 'twixt* (r) *and double* (u)
When follow'd by (va) *and ſilent* (e) *we prove*,
(O) *then ſounds* (u), *except in* Rove, Grove, ſtrove.

This is plain from theſe Examples: *Colour, Columbine, Colony*, &c. *Comfort, come, Kingdom, Beſom, Fathom, random*, &c. but *commonly*, &c. is excepted. *World, Work, Worſhip*, &c. before (*th*), as *Brother, Mother, ſmother*, &c. except *Broth, Cloth, Froth, Troth, Wroth*; but moſt of theſe have been, and are ſtill frequently written with (*oa*). (*O*) after (*r*), in *Apron, Citron, inviron, Iron, Saffron*, is obſcure like (*u*), and in *Rome* (the City) 'tis pronounc'd like (*oo*) in *Room*.

The Sound of (o) *in th' end you ſtill muſt know*
Is ne'r expreſs'd thus nakedly by (o),
Except in do, unto, go, lo, ſo, *and* no.

(*O*) never ends an *Engliſh* Word, except before excepted, and *undo, whoſo*, (an antiquated Word) *to, too, two, who, wo, mo*, (for *more* is a Word quite out of uſe) the Sound of (*o*) being there expreſs'd by (*ow*), except in *Foe, Toe, Doe, Roe*.

[13] *Of the Vowel* (U).

Two Sounds in (u) *we certainly ſhall find*
Rub's *of the ſhorter*, Muſe *the longer kind*.

The long Sound is what it bears in the ſingle *Vowel*, the ſhort is more obſcure and Lingual. The ſhort Sounds are *Dub, rub, rut, Gun, Drum, burſt, muſt, Ruſt*.

Long, when in Words of many Syllables
It ends a Syllable, as in Durables.

This Vowel, when it ends a Syllable in Words of many Syllables, is long; as in *Curious, Union, Importunity, Furious, Purity, Security*, &c. But this long Quality of (*u*) in this place ſeems to come from (*e*) final, underſtood, tho' left out to avoid the claſhing of two Vowels, for it might be *Dureable, Impuneity*, &c. tho' a following Vowel of any kind will, after a ſingle Conſonant, naturally lengthen the foregoing; except when the Sound of the following Conſonant is doubled, as in *Bury, buryed*,

[13] The (*u*) long is pronounc'd like the *French* (*u*), ſmall or ſlender.

[14] We

buryed, Study, &c. where the (*u*) is ſhorten'd and falls into the Sound of (*o*) ſhort or obſcure.

No Engliſh Word in (u) *can fairly end,*
If Sound expreſs'd by (ew) *or* (ue) *we find.*
Except you, thou *and* lieu, *and this one Word* adieu.
Few Words begin with, or i'th' middle have (eu).

Inſtead of (*u*) in the end, we put (*ew*), or (*ue*), as *Nephew, New, Sinew, Yew,* &c. and *accrue, Ague, Avenue,* &c. Nor is the Sound of (*u*) in the beginning and middle of Words, in many Words, except ſuch as are deriv'd from the *Greek*; as *Euchariſt, Eunuch, Euphrates, Eulogy, Eutychus, Euphony, Deuce, Deuteronomy, Europe, Euroclydon, Euſebius, Euſtace, Euterpe, Eutyches, Feud, Grandeur, Pleuriſie, Pleuritick, Rheumatick, Rheumatiſm, Rheum.*

Where e'er the (u) *is long beſides, 'tis found*
That its own Character denotes its Sound.
Ar, ir, or, *with* ure, *and* er,
T'expreſs the Sound of (u) *we oft prefer.*
When at the end of Words, that do conſiſt
Of many Syllables, they are plac't.

The Sound of (*u*) in all other places, but what are mention'd where it is long, is expreſs'd by the Vowel it ſelf; but when it is obſcure and ſhort in the end of Words of many Syllables, (and ſome of one) it is ſometimes expreſs'd by (*ar*), by the Corruptneſs of our Pronunciation; as in *Altar, angular, calendar, jocular, medlar, pedlar, pillar, ſolar,* &c. or by (*ir*), as *Birch, dirt, ſhirt, ſir, ſirname*; to *ſpirt*, or *ſquirt* Water, *ſtir, third, thirty*, the Words deriv'd from it, &c. or by (*or*), as in *Anceſtors, actors, adminiſtrator, ambaſſador, anchor, aſſeſſor, corrector, councellor, oppreſſor,* &c. or by (*ure*), as in *Adventure, architecture, conjecture, conjure, creature, feature, figure, fracture, furniture, geſture, impoſture, incloſure, indenture, injure, jointure, juncture, lecture, leiſure, manufacture, mixture, nature, nurture, overture, paſture, peradventure, picture, pleaſure, poſture, preſſure, rapture, rupture, ſcripture, ſculpture, ſtature, ſtructure, ſuperſtructure, tenure, tincture, torture, treaſure, venture, veſture, verdure.*

These we have inſerted becauſe the (*u*) is ſhort and obſcure, tho' it have (*e*) final at the end, and ſerves therefore for an Exception to that Rule, as well as an Example of this.

Or by (*er*), as *Adder, Adulterer, Auger* a Tool, *Balliſters, Banner, Fodder, Croſier, Crupper, Daughter, ſlaughter,* &c. [14]

CHAP.

[14] We ſhall here, at the end of the *Vowels*, ſay a few Words of their Formation, which well ſtudy'd, will (as we have obſerv'd) be a great Help to the Art of Spelling. To proceed therefore according to the Diviſion made in our Notes on Number [6]. The *Gutturals*, or *Throat-Letters*, or *Vowels*, are form'd in the top or upper part of the Throat, or the lower part of the *Palate* or *Tongue*, by a moderate Compreſſion of the Breath. When the Breath goes out with a full guſt, or larger opening of the Mouth, the German *(a)*, or the open *(o)* is form'd. But the *French*, and other Nations, as well as the *Germans*, moſt commonly pronounce their *(a)* in that manner: The *Engliſh* expreſs that Sound, when it is ſhort, by ſhort *(o)*; but when it is long, by *(au)* or *(aw)*, but ſeldom by *(a)*. For in the Words *fall*, *Folly*, *Call*, *Collar*, *Laws*, *Loſs*, *Cauſe*, *Coſt*, and *odd*, *ſawd*, *ſod*; and in many other Words like theſe, there is the ſame ſound of the *Vowels* in both Syllables, only in the firſt it is long, and in the laſt ſhort. And this perhaps might bring our former Diviſion of Sounds into doubt, ſince that ſuppoſes the Difference to ariſe from their Length or Brevity; whereas here we make the Sounds the ſame. But this muſt be here underſtood of the Formation of the Sounds; that is, the ſhort and the long Sounds are produc'd in the ſame Seats or Places of Formation; but in the former Rule the Hearing only is the Judge of the Sounds, as they are emitted, not as to the Place of their Formation.

In this ſame Place, but with a more moderate Opening of the Mouth, is form'd the French *(e)* Feminine, with an obſcure Sound: Nor is there any Difference in the Formation of this Letter, from the Formation of the 'foregoing open *(a)*, but that the Mouth or Lips are more contracted in this, than in the former. This is a Sound, that the *Engliſh* ſcarce any where allow, or know, except when the ſhort *(e)* immediately precedes the Letter *(r)*, as *liberal*, *Virtue*, *Liberty*, &c.

The ſame Place is the Seat of the Formation of *(o)* and *(u)* obſcure, but ſtill with a leſs opening of the Mouth; and it differs from the French *(e)* Feminine only in this, that the Mouth being leſs open'd, the Lips come nearer together. This ſame Sound the *French* have in the laſt Syllable of the Words *ſerviteur*, *ſacrificateur*, &c. The *Engliſh* expreſs this Sound by ſhort *(u)*, as in *turn*, *burn*, *dull*, *cut*, &c. and ſometimes by a Negligence of Pronunciation, they expreſs the ſame Sound by *(o)* and *(ou)*, as in *come*, *ſome*, *done*, *company*, *country*, *couple*, *covet*, *love*, &c. and ſome others, which they ought more juſtly to give another Sound to. The Welſh generally expreſs this Sound by *(y)*, only that Letter at the end of Words with them ſounds *(i)*.

The Palatine Vowels are form'd in the *Palate*, that is, by a moderate Compreſſion of the Breath betwixt the middle of the Palate and the Tongue; that is, when the hollow of the Palate is made leſs by the raiſing of the middle of the Tongue, than in the Pronunciation of the Throat, or *Guttural Sounds*. Theſe Sounds are of three ſorts, according to the leſſening or enlarging of the ſaid Hollow; which difference may be produc'd two ſeveral ways, either by contracting the Mouth or Lips, the Tongue remaining in the ſame poſition; or by elevating the middle of the Tongue higher to the fore-parts of the Palate, the Lips or Mouth remaining in the ſame ſtate. This is done either way, and it is the ſame thing if it were done both ways.

The *Engliſh* ſlender *(a)* is form'd by a greater Opening of the Mouth; as in *Bat*, *bate*, *Sam*, *ſame*, *dam*, *Dame*, *Bar*, *bare*, *ban*, *bane*, &c. This Sound differs from the fat or open *(a)* of the *Germans*, by raiſing the middle of the Tongue, as the

Engliſh

Engliſh do, and ſo compreſſing the Breath in the Palate; but the *Germans*, on the contrary, depreſs their Tongue, and ſo depreſs the Breath into the Throat. The *French* expreſs this Sound when (*e*) goes before (*m*) or (*n*) in the ſame Syllable, as *entendement*, &c. The *Welſh* and the *Italians* pronounce their (*a*) with this Sound.

In this ſame Seat the *French* form their (*e*) Maſculine, by a leſs, or the middle opening of the Mouth, with an acute Sound, as the *Italians*, *Engliſh*, *Spaniards*, and others, pronounce this Letter; for it is a middle Sound betwixt the 'foregoing Vowel, and that which follows: But the *Engliſh* expreſs this Sound not only by (*e*), but when it is long, by (*ea*), and ſometimes by (*ei*); as *the*, *theſe*, *ſell*, *Seal*, *tell*, *Teal*, *ſteal*, *ſet*, *Seat*, *beſt*, *Beaſt*, *red*, *read*, *receive*, *deceive*, &c. But thoſe Words which are written with (*ea*) would really be more rightly pronounc'd, if to the Sound of (*e*) long, the Sound of the Engliſh (*a*) juſtly pronounc'd, were added; as in all probability they were of old pronounc'd, and as they are ſtill in the Northern Parts. And thus thoſe written with (*ei*) wou'd be more juſtly ſpoken, if the Sound of each Letter were mix'd in the Pronunciation.

In the ſame place, but yet with a leſſer opening of the Mouth, (*i*) ſlender is form'd, which is a Sound very familiar with the *French*, *Italians*, *Spaniards*, and moſt other Nations. This Sound, when it is ſhort, is expreſs'd by the *Engliſh* by (*i*) ſhort; but when it is long, it is generally written with (*ee*), not ſeldom with (*ie*), and ſometimes by (*ea*), as *ſit*, *ſee't*, *fit*, *feet*, *fill*, *feel*, *field*, *ſtill*, *ſteel*, *ill*, *eel*, *ſin*, *ſeen*, *near*, *dear*, *bear*, &c. Some of thoſe Words which with this Sound are written with (*ea*), are often and more juſtly expreſs'd by (*ee*), and others ſpelt with (*e*) Maſculine, adding to it the Sound of (*a*) ſlender, very ſwiftly pronounc'd. The *Welſh* expreſs this Sound not only by (*i*), and in the laſt Syllable by (*y*), but alſo by (*w*), which Letter they always pronounce in that manner, and ſound the Diphthongs or double Vowels *au*, *eu*, like *ai* and *ei*.

The Labial, or Lip-Vowels, are form'd in the Lips, being put into a round form, the Breath being there moderately compreſs'd. There are three Sorts or Claſſes of theſe, as well as of the former.

The round (*o*) is form'd by the larger Aperture or Opening of the Lips, which Sound moſt People give the Greek ω; the *French* with the ſame pronounce their (*au*), and the *Engliſh* almoſt always pronounce their long (*o*) and alſo (*oa*), the (*a*) as it were quite vaniſhing in the utterance; of which the ſame may be ſaid as was before on (*ea*), as *one*, *none*, *whole*, *Hole*, *Coal*, *Boat*, *thoſe*, *choſe*, &c. The ſhort (*o*) is expreſs'd by the open one, as I have ſaid before, but more rarely by the round one.

The German fat (*a*) is form'd in the Lips, by a more moderate or middle degree of opening 'em. The ſame Sound is us'd by the *Italians*, *Spaniards*, and not a few others. The *French* expreſs this Sound by *ou*, the *Welſh* by *w*; the *Engliſh* generally by *oo*, more rarely by *u* or *ou*, as *Foot*, *ſhoot*, *full*, *Fool*, *Pool*, *good*, *ſtood*, *Wood*, *Mood*, *Source*, *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, &c. But *do*, *move*, and the like, are better expreſs'd by round (*o*) than fat (*u*).

Slender (*u*), ſo much in uſe with both *French* and *Engliſh*, is form'd in the ſame place, but with a leſſer opening of the Lips. This Sound is every-where expreſs'd by the *Engliſh* with their long (*u*), ſometimes by (*e*) and (*ew*), which yet are better pronounc'd by retaining the Sound of the (*e*) Maſculine, as *Muſe*, *Tune*, *Lute*, *dure*, *mute*, *mew*, *brew*, *knew*, &c. Foreigners wou'd obtain the Pronunciation of this Letter, if they wou'd endeavour to pronounce the Diphthong (*iu*), by putting the ſlender

ſlender (*i*) before the Letter (*u*) or (*w*), as the Spaniard in *Ciudade*, a City; but this is not abſolutely the ſame Sound, tho' it comes very near it; for (*iu*) is a compound Sound, but the French and Engliſh (*u*) is a ſimple. The Welſh generally expreſs this Sound by *iw*, *yw*, *uw*, as in *lliu*, Colour; *llyw*, a Rudder; *Duw*, God.

We allow theſe nine Sounds to be Vowels, that is, diſtinct, unmixt Sounds, nor do we know any more; for the Engliſh broad (*i*) does not ſeem to be a ſimple Sound, yet we do not deny, but that there may now be in ſome Part of the World, or Poſterity may diſcover more vocal Sounds in theſe Seats of Voice, than thoſe Nine which we have mention'd, and ſo 'tis poſſible there may be ſome intermediate Sounds, ſuch as perhaps is the French (*e*) Neuter, betwixt the Palatine Vowel (*a*) ſlender and (*e*) Maſculine; for the Aperture or Opening of the Mouth is like the continu'd Quantity, diviſible *in infinitum*: For as in the numbring the Winds, firſt there were four Names, then twelve, and at laſt thirty-two; thus whereas the *Arabians*, and perhaps the ancient *Hebrews*, had only three Vowels, or one in each Seat, now in our Times we plainly diſcover at leaſt three in every Seat; perhaps our Poſterity may interpoſe ſome betwixt each of theſe.

But all theſe Vowels are capable of being made long or ſhort, whence ariſes the difference of Quantity in long and ſhort Syllables, tho' ſome of 'em are very rarely long, as obſcure (*u*) and (*e*) Feminine: Others are more rarely ſhort, as round (*o*) and ſlender (*u*), at leaſt in our Tongue. But ſome of the Conſonants are capable of contraction, and being lengthned, (eſpecially ſuch as make the neareſt approaches to the nature of Vowels) except *p*, *t*, *k*, or hard *c*, which are abſolute Mutes, nor have any manner of proper Sound, but only modifie the Sound either of the preceding or ſucceeding Vowel.

Here we think it proper to bring all theſe Vowels into one View, rang'd in their proper Claſſes.

Opening.

Vowels.	Greater.	Middle.	Leſs.
Guttural or Throat	*a* / *o* open	*e* Feminine	*o* obſcure
Palatine or Palate	*a* ſlender	*e* Maſculine	*ee* / *i* ſlender
Labial or Lip	*o* round	*oo* / *u* fat	*u* ſlender

CHAP. III.

Of DOUBLE VOWELS, *proper and improper.* (15.)

When of two Vowels *the compounded Sound*
Fully in one Syllable is found
Of both partaking, yet diſtinct from all,
This we a Double Vowel *ſtill do call.*

WHat we call *Double Vowels*, is, when the Sound of two *Vowels* is mixt perfectly in one Syllable, and indeed, makes a diſtinct Sound from either and all the other *Vowels*, and would merit peculiar Characters, if we were to form an Alphabet, and not follow that, which is already in Uſe; by which we expreſs theſe diſtinct Sounds by the two *Vowels*, whoſe Sound compoſes them; (*ai*) in *fair*, (*au*) in *laud* or *applaud*, (*ee*) in *bleed*; *ſeed*, &c. (*oi*) in *void*, (*oo*) in *food*, and (*ou*) in *houſe*.

But if the Sound of one is heard alone,
'Tis then improperly ſo call'd, we own,
Tho' of the Proper *it before be one.*

When two Vowels come together in one Syllable, and produce no other Sound, but what one of the two gives alone, then is that not properly, but improperly call'd a *Double Vowel*; as (*ea*) is every where pronounc'd (*e*) long, the Sound of the (*a*) not mingling at all with it, is entirely ſuppreſt; as in *meat*, *pleaſure*, *treaſure*, &c. (*ie*) ſounded like (*ee*) in *ſeen*, as in *fiend*; and (*ei*) ſounds only (*e*) long, as in *receive*, and (*ey*) in *key*, or like (*ai*), and ſo make no proper *Double Vowel*. (*Eau*), (*eu*), (*ew*), ſound only (*u*) long, as in *beauty*, *eunuch*, *few*.

Hence it follows, that a true and proper *Double Vowel* muſt conſiſt of two diſtinct Vowels in one Syllable, yet making but one Sound compounded of thoſe two Letters, and different from the other ſingle *Vowels*; they muſt be in one Syllable, becauſe two *Vowels* often come together, but make two diſtinct Syllables, as in *aereal*, *annual*, *aguiſh*, *aloes*, &c.

of

[15] Theſe Double Vowels are commonly call'd *Diphthongs*, or *Compounded Sounds*, as ſharing in (or blending) the Sound of Two Vowels in One.

[16] (*ei*)

Of the proper Double Vowel (ai), *or* (ay).

Six proper Double Vowels *we allow*,
Ai, au, *and* ee, *and* oi, *and* oo, *and* ou,
At th' end of Words write ay, aw, oy, *and* ow.

The proper *Double Vowels* are therefore only theſe mention'd in the Rule. Firſt (*ai*), or (*ay*); for (*ai*) ends no *Engliſh* Word, according to the former general Rule, that (*i*) ends no Word in our Tongue, and (*ay*) begins none, except a Word of one Syllable; as *ay* in *Ay me!* an Exclamation. This *Double Vowel* is therefore written (*ai*) in the beginning and middle of Words, but (*ay*) at the end.

In the beginning, as *Air*, *aim*, *ail*, *aid*, but *eight* in number, and thoſe Words that are deriv'd from it, have the Sound of (*ai*), but are ſpelt (*ei*): In the middle of Words, as *brain*, *frail*, *affair*, *repair*, but ſome few are ſpelt here likewiſe by (*ei*) for (*ai*), as *conceipt*, *receipt*, *deceipt*, *heir*, *reign*, *vein*, *weight*, &c. (*ay*) is put at the end, as *dray*, *clay*, *fray*, *play*, *day*; and of all other Words that ſound (*ai*), except *convey*, *grey*, (colour and badger) *greyhound*; *obey*, *prey*, *purvey*, *ſurvey*, *they*, *trey* or *trey-point*, *Whey*.

Tho' ſometimes the Letters of this *Double Vowel* (*ai*) deviate from their proper Sound, into that of (*i*), or (*e*) ſhort, yet is the Spelling preſerv'd in (*ai*), as *again*, *Villain*, *Fountain*, *Wainſcot*, &c.

The finical Pronunciation in ſome Part of this Town of *London* has almoſt confounded the Sound of (*ai*) and (*a*), the Maſter and Scholar muſt therefore take a peculiar Care to avoid this Error, by remembring that (*a*) ends no *Engliſh* Word, unleſs before excepted; and however you pronounce, write always *day*, not *da*; and ſo of the reſt.

When (*a*) and (*i*) come together in proper Names, eſpecially thoſe of Scripture, as *Ja-ir*, *Mo-ſa-ic*, *Re-pha-im*, &c. they are parted, and make two Syllables.

Of the Double Vowel (au) *or* (aw).

The *Double Vowel* (*au*) is expreſs'd at the beginning and middle of Words by (*au*), at the end by (*aw*), except in *aw*, *awful*, *awl*, *awkerd* or *awkward*, &c. where (*aw*) begins the Words; and *Bawble*, *bawl*, *brawl*, *crawl*, *dawn*, *dawning*, a *Flawn*, a ſort of Cuſtard; *Hawk*, and Words or Names deriv'd from it; *Hawſer*, *Lawn*, *Prawn*, *Spawl*, *Spawn*, *ſprawl*, *Strawberry*, *tawney*, tho' in the middle are writ with (*aw*), all other Words are in the middle as well as beginning (*au*), except

ſuch

ſuch as by the Appoſition of (*ll*) to (*a*) ſound (*au*); as *Ball*, *Call*, *Hall*, &c. Tho' the Sound of this double Vowel be the ſame with (*a*) in *all*, *ſmall*, &c. yet 'tis different from the common and more general Sound of that Letter.

Au begins a Word, as *Audience*, *Authority*, *auſtere*, *augment*, &c. *Au* is us'd in the middle of Words, as *aſſault*, *becauſe*, *Cauldron*, *Cauſe*, *Cauſey*, *daunt*, *debauch*, *fraud*, *gaudy*, *jaunt*, *vaunt*, *Jaundice*, *Laurel*, *Maud*, *Maudlin*, *pauſe*, *Sauce*, *Vault*, &c.

But *aw* muſt always conclude a Word, becauſe our Language abhors a bare naked *u* at the end of a Word; as *Claw*, *Paw*, *raw*, *ſaw*, *Law*, &c.

Theſe two Letters are often parted in Proper Names, and make two Syllables; as in *Archela-us*, *Hermola-us*, &c. yet in *Paul*, *Saul*, &c. it remains a double Vowel.

Of the Double Vowel (ee). [16]

The (ee) *that was excluded heretofore*
From Proper Double Vowels, we reſtore:

Tho' (*ee*) has been excluded by an ingenious Gentleman, from the number of Proper Double Vowels, becauſe (*ee*) ſounds like (*i*) in *Magazine*, *Shire*, and *Machine*, yet the ſame Reaſon holding againſt (*au*) much ſtronger, becauſe it ſounds the ſame as (*a*) in *all*, *call*, *fall*, &c. we have thought it but juſt to reſtore (*ee*) to its Right, ſince it is a very diſtinct Sound from both the long and ſhort Sound of (*e*), which are native: That in *Shire*, &c. is borrow'd from this Double Vowel, as that of *all*, *call*, *ſhall*, &c. is from (*au*); theſe in (*a*) being much more numerous, than thoſe in (*i*).

The ſingle (*e*) in Words of one Syllable moſtly ſounds (*ee*), as *me*, *he*, *ſhe*, *we*, *ye*, *be*, *here*, &c.

Of the Double Vowel (oi) *or* (oy).

The proper Double Vowel (*oi*) at the beginning, is written by (*oi*); as *Oiſter*, *Oil*, &c. It is in the ſame manner expreſs'd in the middle; as *Poiſe*, *noiſe*, *Voice*, *rejoice*, &c. This Double Vowel, in many Words, has the Sound of (*i*) long; as in *point*, *anoint*, *Joint*, &c. (*Oy*) is written at the end of all Words; as *Boy*, *coy*, *Joy*, *deſtroy*, *employ*, &c.

Of

[16] (*ee*) or *ie*, is ſounded like the French long *i*, (that is, ſlender *i*) for the French give the ſame Sound to *fin*, *vin*, as we ſhould do to *feen*, *veen*; or perhaps *fien*, *vien*, as we do in *Fiend*.

Of the proper Double Vowel (oo).

Two Vowels of a ſort no Word begin;
So (oo), *in th' middle only, is let in.*

[17] As no *Engliſh* Word begins with two of the ſame Letters, except *Aaron*, *Aaronite*, ſo cannot (*oo*) be put at the beginning of a Word, nor at the end, but of *too* in *too much*, and when it ſignifies *alſo*; and in *Cuckoo*, as ſpelt by ſome. The Uſe therefore of (*oo*) is chiefly, if not only, in the middle of Words; as in *Loom*, *aloof*, *boon*, *Reproof*, *Broom*, *Room*, *Food*, *Fool*, *Tool*, *cool*, *Gooſe*, and where the true and proper Sound of this Vowel is expreſs'd, as it is in many other Words. This Double Vowel ſounds (*u*) in theſe Words; they were anciently written with a (*u*) or (*ou*), in which the (*u*) only was ſounded.

But it ſounds like ſhort (*u*) in *Flood* and *Blood*, and like (*o*) long in *Door*, *Floor*, *Moor*, &c.

As other Letters the Office do of oo,
So that of others by oo's *performed too.*

And as the Figures of this double Vowel often expreſs the Sounds of other Letters, ſo by the ſame original Error of Pronunciation other Letters expreſs the Sound proper to this double Vowel; as (*ou*) in *could*, *ſhould*, *would*, &c. and ſingle (*o*) in *Wolf*, *Wolves*, *Rome*, *Tomb*, *Womb*, *approve*, *behove*, *move*, *reprove*, &c.

Of the proper Double Vowel (ou) *or* (ow).

When (ou) *retains its juſt compounded Sound,*
A proper *Double Vowel it is found:*
But when the Sound of either is ſuppreſt,
It ſinks t' improper, *as do all the reſt.*

This proper Double Vowel (*ou*) or (*ow*) has two Sounds, one proper to it as a Double Vowel, or as compos'd of both (*o*) and (*u*); as in *Houſe*, *Mouſe*, *Louſe*, *Owl*, *Fowl*, *Town*; *to bow*, *Fowl*, *Bough*, *our*, *out*, &c. and another, which is improper to its nature, the Sound of the (*u*) being entirely ſunk, as in *Soul*, *Snow*, *know*, &c. Thus, in Words ending in (*ow*) obſcure, (*o*) only is ſounded; as in *ſhallow*, *ſorrow*, *Arrow*, *Bil-*

[17] oo is ſounded like the fat *u* of the Germans, and the *ou* of the French; as in the Words *good*, *flood*, *Root*, *Foot*, *looſe*, &c.

 [18] All

Billow; where the (*w*) ſeems only put for Ornament-ſake, meerly to cover the nakedneſs of ſingle (*o*). This holds in moſt Words of more than one Syllable. (*Ou*) is alſo ſounded like (*u*) ſhort in *couple*, *Trouble*, *ſcourge*, &c. in which the Sound of the (*o*) is entirely ſunk, and leaves it no longer a proper Double Vowel. Thus in *you*, *your*, and *Youth*, the (*u*) is ſounded long.

In *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, and a few others, it ſounds (*oo*). But in the modern way of ſpelling and ſounding, the (*l*) is left out, and *cou'd*, *wou'd*, *ſhou'd*, ſound *cood*, *wood*, *ſhood*, &c.

(Ou) *the Beginning, and the Middle takes*;
And ſtill the End of Words for (ow) *forſakes.*

(*Ou*) begins a Word, as *Ounce*, *our*, *out*, and its Compounds; *Ouſel*, except *Owl*: And in the middle of moſt Words; as, *Hour*, *Flour*, *Mountain*, *Fountain*, *bounce*, *flounce*, &c. except *Crown*, *Clown*, *Down*, *drown*, *frown*, *Gown*, *Town*, *Bower*, *Dowager*, *Dower*, *Dowry*, *bowſe*, *dowſe*, *ſowſe*, *Fowl*, *Howlet*, *Towel*, *Towel*, *Trowel*, *Vowel*, *blowſe*, *drowſy*, *Carrowſe*, *Cowardice*, *Endowment*, *lowre*, *Power*, *Tower*, *Howard*, *Allowance*, *Advowſon*, *Bowl*, *rowel*, *rowing*, *Shower*, &c.

This Sound is always at the end of a Word expreſs'd by (*ow*), as *now*, *bow*, *enow*, &c. In ſhort, this is a general Rule, That whenever a proper Double Vowel loſes its native Sound, and varies to any other ſimple Sound, it ceaſes to be a proper, and becomes an improper Double Vowel, as having only the ſimple and uncompounded Sound of ſome one ſingle Vowel. There is but one Exception to this Rule, and that is, when it wanders to the Sound of another Double Vowel, which is only done by (*ou*), when it ſounds (*oo*) in *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, &c. [18]

of

[18] All other Sounds, beſides thoſe enumerated in the foregoing Diſcourſe of ſimple Sounds, are plainly compounded, tho' ſome of them are commonly thought to be ſimple.

The Diphthongs, or double Vowels *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, *au*, *eu*, *ou*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, *aw*, *ew*, *ow*, when they are truly pronounc'd, are compounded of the foregoing or prepoſitive Vowels, and the Conſonants *y* and *w*, which yet are commonly taken for ſubſequent Vowels: For in *ai*, *au* or *ay*, *aw*, the (*a*) ſlender is ſet firſt; in *ei*, or *ey*, the (*e*) Feminine; in *eu*, or *ew*, the (*e*) Maſculine; in *oi*, *ou*, or *oy*, *ow*, the open (*o*) is ſometimes ſet firſt, as in the *Engliſh* Words *Boy*, *Toy*, *Soul*, *Bowl*, a Cup; ſometimes obſcure (*o*), as in the *Engliſh* Words *boil*, *toil*, *Oil*, *Bowl*, *Fowl*, &c. We grant by the Pronunciation of ſome Men, open (*o*) is us'd in theſe Words.

Of the Improper Double Vowels. [19]

Th' improper *Double Vowels we declare*
Nine, as (aa), (ea), (eo), *and* (eu) *are*
(Ie), (oa), (oe), (ue), *and* (ui):
But all their ſeveral Sounds here let us try.

The Juncture of theſe ſeveral *Vowels* can never be properly call'd *Double Vowels*, ſince they every one produce but the Sound of one Letter; (*tial*) is always ſounded (*ſhal*), as in *impartial*, *credential*, &c. where the (*ti*) is turn'd into (*ſh*), or the two *Vowels* are divided after (*ſt*) or any other Conſonant but (*r*) and (*c*), and ſo make two Syllables, as *beſtial*. Thus (*io*) following (*t*) and before (*n*), ſounds (*ſhun*), as *Conſtitution*, *Diſcretion*, &c. (*io*) retains the ſame Sound, when it follows ſingle or double (*s*), as in *Alluſion*, *Aſperſion*, *Compulſion*, *Suffuſion*,

* But, whereas ſome will needs have it, that the Conſonants (*y*) and (*w*) do not at all differ from (*i*) and (*u*), or (as we write them) (*ee*) and (*oo*), very ſwiftly pronounc'd; it may eaſily be found to be a manifeſt Error, if we nicely attend the Formation of the Words *yee* and *woo*, eſpecially if we often repeat them; for he will obſerve, that he cannot paſs from the Sound of the Conſonant, to the Sound of the following Vowel, without a manifeſt Motion of the Organs, and by that means of new Poſition, which does not happen in the repeating of the Sounds (*ee*) and (*oo*).

We are ſenſible, that theſe which we call Diphthongs, or double Vowels, in different Tongues, have different Sounds, of which we have no Buſineſs now to treat; yet theſe may all be found and diſcover'd among thoſe Sounds, which we have diſcours'd of; and may be ſo referr'd to their proper Places. The long (*i*) of the *Engliſh* is plainly compounded of the Feminine (*e*) and (*y*), or (*i*), and has the ſame Sound entirely with the *Greek* (ει).

The *Latin* æ, œ, the *Engliſh* *ea*, *oa*, *ee*, *oo*, and ſometimes *ei*, *ie*, *ou*, *au*, (the like being to be found among other Nations) altho' they are written with two Characters, are yet (at leaſt as we pronounce them now) but ſimple Sounds.

[19] They are juſtly call'd improper, becauſe they are moſt uncompounded in Sound, tho' written with two Vowels. 'Tis probable when this Spelling prevail'd, each Letter had a ſhare in the Sound, but Negligence and Corruption of Pronunciation has wholly ſilenc'd one. This is remarkable, that in moſt of them the firſt Vowel prevails, and gives the Sound.

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* *This is Dr.* Wallis's *Obſervation, which we do not think concluſive for what he brings it, becauſe in the Inſtance he gives, the* (y) *and the* (w) *are plac'd before the Vowels, and then they are Conſonants confeſs'd; but when they come after Vowels, they have the very ſame Effect on the Organs, as* (i) *and* (u) *have: For no Body contends that they are never* Conſonants, *or that when* Conſonants, *they are form'd in the ſame manner, as when* Vowels.

ſion, *Verſion*, &c. *Admiſſion*, *Compaſſion*, *Expreſſion*, &c. But when (*io*) follows (*ſt*), they are parted into two Syllables, as in *Queſtion*, *Combuſtion*; and the ſame is to be obſerv'd after any other *Conſonant*. (*Ua*) are always ſeparated, except after (*g*) in (*gua*), and (*q*) in *qua*; as *Language*, *Lingual*, &c. *Qualify*, *Quality*, &c. except likewiſe when it follows (*ſ*), and then it ſounds (*ſua*), as in *perſuade*, *diſſuade*, and their Derivatives *perſuaſive*, *diſſuaſive*, &c. and *ſuavity*, an obſolete Word.

Next (*uo*) muſt always be parted, except after (*q*), which can't be ſounded without (*u*), as in *quick*, *Quality*, *Qualm*, *quote*, &c.

The improper Double Vowels are counted Nine in number, as (*aa*), (*ea*), (*eo*), (*eu*), (*ie*), (*ea*), (*oe*), (*ue*), and (*ui*).

(Aa) *ſounds* (a), *but it is ſeldom found*;
(Ea) *four ſeveral ways declares its Sound*;
(E) *long*, (a) *ſhort*, (e) *ſhort*, *and double* (ee),
As in ſwear, Heart, Head, *and in* Fear *you ſee.*

(*Aa*) is ſeldom in any Word but Proper Names, and there only ſounds (*a*), and is generally divided.

(*Ea*) is ſounded four ſeveral ways, 1*ſt*, like (*a*) long, as *bear*, *ſwear*, *tear*, *wear*; 2*ly*, like (*a*) ſhort, as *hearken*, *Heart*, and Words deriv'd from it, as *hearty*, *heartleſs*, &c. alſo its Compounds, as *Heart-burning*, *Hearts-eaſe*, *faint-hearted*, &c. 3*ly*, (*e*) ſhort, as *already*, *ready*, *Beard*, *Breaſt*, *Head*, &c. 4*ly*, It ſometimes ſounds (*ee*), or (*e*) long; as in *appear*, *Arrear*, *Fear*, *near*, &c. *Bead*, *conceal*, *Deal*, *Veal*, *glean*, *clean*, &c. And generally the long Sound of (*e*) is writ (*ea*), as *Feaſt*, *Beaſt*, &c. and the ſhort Sound of (*e*), as *beſt*, *Gueſt*, &c.

(Eo) (e) *ſhort*, *and double* (e) *we find*,
As well as (eu), *to ſound long* (u)'*s inclin'd.*

(*Eo*) ſounds (*e*) ſhort in *Feoffee*, *Jeopardy*, *Leopard*, *Yeoman*, (*e*) long in *People*, *Feodary*, and (*o*) ſhort in *George*.

(*Eu*), or (*ew*), ſound (*u*) long; as *Deuce*, *Deuteronomy*, *Pleuriſie*, &c.

(Ie) *ſounds* (y) *in ending Words*; *and* (e)
Short, *and long*, *or double* (e) *'twill be.*

(*Ie*) is ſounded (*e*) long in *Cieling*, *Caſhier*, *Field*, *Fiend*, *Frontier*, &c. but (*e*) ſhort in *pierce*, *fierce*, &c. It is us'd likewiſe for (*y*) at the end of Words.

(Ei) *ſounds* (ai) a *long in* feign *and* eight.
It ſounds (e) *long in* perceive, Deceit.

(Ei) ſounds like *(ai)*, or *(a)* long, in *Reign, feign, eight, weighty*, &c. It ſounds *(e)* long in *deceive, perceive, Deceit.*

This Rule is general, That the Letter which gives or predominates in the Sound, is always plac'd firſt in theſe improper Double Vowels.

The (a) *to* (o) *in* (oa) *we apply,*
To make (o) *long, and ſilent* (e) *ſupply.*

In (*oa*) the (*a*) ſeems added only to make the (*o*) ſound long, ſupplying the (*e*) ſilent, it giving the ſame Sound; as in *Cloak* and *Cloke, approach, broach, Coaſt, doat, float, Goat, hoary, Load, Moat, Oak, poach, roam, Soal*, a Fiſh, *Toad, Woad*: (*oa*) has a peculiar broad Sound in *broad, abroad, Groat*; and that of (*ai*) in *Goal.*

The (o) *and* (e) *alternately prevails;*
In (oe) *when this ſounds, then that ſtill fails.*

In (*oe*) ſometimes the (*e*) prevails, and the (*o*) is ſilent; as in *OEconomy, OEdipus, OEcumenical, OEconomical*; but in *Croe* (of Iron) *Doe, Foe, Sloe, Toe, Woe*, the (*e*) is ſilent, and the (*o*) produc'd; theſe latter being Words of Engliſh Origin, as well as Uſe, the former of the Greek. *Shoe*, and *Woe*, to make Love, ſome write with (*oo*), leaving (*o*) bare, contrary to the Genius of the Engliſh Language; whereas the Diſtinction wou'd be preſerv'd, and the Sound juſtly expreſs'd, by adding (*e*) to the (*oo*).

(Ue) *one Syllable we ſeldom ſound;*
(U) *after* (g) *to harden* (g) *is bound.*

Few Words have (*ue*) ſounded as one Syllable, as *Guelderland, Guerkins*; *gueſt* for *gueſs*, is wrong ſpelt, tho' too much us'd of late by the Ignorance or Negligence of Authors, or Printers; for its true Spelling is *gheſs*: in all which the (*u*) is only added to harden the Sound of the (*g*), the (*e*) only being ſounded; tho' (*gue*) in *Guerdon* ſounds (*gue*), as do the Terminations, or Endings of ſeveral Words, as *Apologue, Catalogue, collegue, collogue, Decalogue, Dialogue, Epilogue, Fatigue, Intrigue, League, Plague, Prologue, prorogue, Rogue, Synagogue, Theologue, Tongue, Vogue.* At the end of the following Words (*e*) is added to (*u*), not only to cover its nakedneſs, according to the Genius of the Tongue, but ſometimes to produce the (*u*); as in *accrue, Avenue, cue, due, enſue, Feſcue.*

Glue,

Glue, hue, perdue, purſue, reſidue, Retinue, Rue, ſpue or *ſpew, ſue.* But (*ue*) in all other Words are parted, nor make any manner of Double Vowel, as in *Affluence, Cruelty, Gruel*, &c.

(Ui) *three ſeveral ſorts of Sound expreſs,*
As Guile, rebuild, Bruiſe *and* Recruit *confeſs.*

The improper Double Vowel (*ui*) has three ſeveral ſorts of Sound, 1. as (*i*) long, in *beguile, Guide, diſguiſe, quite*, &c. 2. (*i*) ſhort, in *Guildford, build, rebuild*, &c. 3. (*u*) long, as in *Bruiſe, Recruit, Fruit*, &c.

Chap. IV.

Of the CONSONANTS. [20]

A Conſonant *no proper Sound obtains,*
But from its ſounding with, *its Name it gains;*
And yet it varys every Vowel's *Sound,*
Whether before, or after it, 'tis found.

THo' a Conſonant be a Letter that cannot be ſounded without adding ſome Single or Double Vowel before or after it, and therefore derives its Name from *conſounding*, or *ſounding with*, yet may juſtly be defin'd, A Letter ſhewing

[20] As the Vowels were divided into three Claſſes, ſo we divide the Conſonants into the ſame Number; the *Labial*, or *Lip*; the *Palatine*, or *Palate*; the *Guttural*, or *Throat* Conſonants, as they are form'd in the *Throat*, *Palate*, or *Lips*; that is, while the Breath ſent from the Lungs into theſe Seats, is either *intercepted*, or at leaſt more forcibly *compreſs'd*.

But it is beſides to be remark'd, that we may obſerve a *triple Direction of the Breath*. For firſt, it is all directed wholly to the Mouth; that is, ſeeking its Way or Outlet thro' the Lips; or ſecond, it is almoſt wholly directed to the Noſtrils, there to find Paſſage out; or third, it is as it were equally divided betwixt the *Noſtrils* and the *Mouth*: But we believe this Diverſity of the Direction of the Breath wholly proceeds from the various Poſition of the *Uvula*.

Since therefore the Breath ſent out in this threefold manner may be perfectly *intercepted* thrice in each of theſe Seats, there are nine different Conſonants which derive their Origin from them, and which, for that Reaſon, we call *primitive*, or clos'd Conſonants: But if the Breath be not wholly intercepted in theſe Seats, but only more hardly compreſs'd, find, tho' with Difficulty, ſome Way of exit; various other Conſonants are form'd, according to the various manner of the Compreſſion; which Conſonants we ſhall call *deriv'd*, or

open

ing the ſeveral Motions and Configurations of the Parts of the Mouth, by which the Sound of the Vowels is variouſly determin'd, are firſt divided into *ſingle* and *double*; the double are *x* and *z*, the reſt are all ſingle; and theſe are again divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*; eleven Mutes, and four proper Liquids: *h*, *s*, and *w*, are *Neuters*, as not ſtrictly adhering to either.

The Conſonants *we juſtly may divide*
Into Mutes, Liquids, Neuters; *and beſide*
We muſt for Double Conſonants *provide.*
Eleven Mutes GRAMMARIANS *do declare,*
And but four Liquids, l, m, n, *and* r.
Behind the Mutes *the* Liquids *gently flow*
Inverted, from the Tongue they will not go.

Conſonants are divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*, call'd alſo *Half-Vowels*; the *Mutes* are, *b*, *c*, *d*, *f*, *v*, *g*, *j*, *k*, *p*, *q*, *t*, and are ſo call'd becauſe a *Liquid* cannot be ſounded in the ſame Syllable, when a *Vowel* follows it, as *(rpo)*.

The *Liquids*, or *Half-Vowels*, as they have ſome ſort of obſcure Sound of a *Vowel* attending their Pronunciation, which is likewiſe imitated in their Names, as *el*, *em*, *en*, *ar*, ſo the Name of *Liquid* imports the eaſie motion, by which they nimbly glide away after a *Mute* in the ſame Syllable, without any *ſtand*, and a *Mute* before it can be pronounc'd in the ſame Syllable, as *pro* in *probable*.

(C) *the hard Sound of* (k) *will ever keep*
Before (a), (o), (u), (l), *and* (r); *as* creep,
Clear, Cup, Coſt, Cat: *Before* (e), (i), *and* (y),
Or ev'n the Comma that do's (e) *imply,*
It moſtly takes the ſofter Sound of (s);
As City, Cell, *and* Cypreſs *muſt confeſs.*
When final (c) *without an* (e) *is found,*
'Tis hard; but ſilent (e) *gives ſofter Sound.*

[21] The genuine and natural Sound of (*c*) is hard, like (*k*), as when it precedes (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), (*l*), or (*r*); as in *Cat*,

open Conſonants. As to the particular Formation of them, ſee the Notes, at the end of the Chapter.

[21] The *French* expreſs the ſoft (*c*) by this Figure (ç) for Diſtinction, which Character wou'd be of uſe if it were introduc'd among us; tho' it muſt be confeſs'd, that there is ſo much the leſs need of a new Character, as the Rule is ſo general as to admit of no Exception. Some affect to imitate the *French* Way of Spelling here, and write *Publique* for *Publick*, not conſidering that they uſe *(qu)* becauſe they have no *(k)*.

[22] The

Cat, Coſt, Cup, clear, creep. But before (*e*), (*i*), and (*y*), and when there is an Apoſtrophe or Comma above the Word, denoting the abſence of (*e*), it has generally the Sound of (*s*), as *Cell, City, Cypreſs.* If in any Word the harder Sound precedes (*e*), (*i*) or (*y*), (*k*) is either added or put in its place, as *Skill, Skin, publick:* And tho' the additional (*k*) in the 'foregoing Word be an old way of Spelling, yet it is now very juſtly left off, as being a ſuperfluous Letter; for (*c*) at the end is always hard, without (*y*) or the ſilent (*e*) to ſoften it, as in *Chace, Clemency,* &c.

Moſt Words ending in the Sound of *ace, ece, ice, oice, uce,* muſt be written with (*ce*), not (*ſe*), except *abaſe, abſtruſe, baſe, caſe, ceaſe, amuſe, conciſe, debaſe, decreaſe, Geeſe, imbaſe, encreaſe, mortiſe, Paradiſe, profuſe, promiſe, recluſe, Treatiſe, Abuſe, diſuſe, excuſe, Houſe, Louſe, Mouſe, refuſe, uſe, cloſe, looſe.*

Moſt Words ending in *ance, ence, ince, once,* and *unce,* muſt be written with (*c*) between the (*n*) and (*e*), except *denſe, condenſe, diſpenſe, immenſe, incenſe, tenſe, intenſe, propenſe, ſuſpenſe, ſenſe.*

(*C*) before (*h*), has a peculiar Sound, as in *chance, Cherry, Church, Chalk, Chip*; but in *Chart* 'tis like (*k*), and in *Chord* in Muſick.

The genuine Sound of (s) *is ſtill acute*
And hiſſing; but the Cloſe that does not ſute,
There 'tis obſcure, and ſoft pronounc'd like zed,
And ſometimes 'twixt two Vowels *when 'tis ſped.*

(*S*) being ſo near a-kin to the ſoft Sound of (*c*), we thought it naturally follow'd that Letter in our Conſideration, tho' not in the Alphabet. When (*s*) therefore keeps its genuine Sound, it is pronounc'd with an acute or hiſſing Sound, but when it cloſes a Word, it almoſt always has a more obſcure and ſoft Sound like (*z*), and not ſeldom when it comes between two *Vowels*, or *double Vowels*, when it has this ſoft Sound, Propriety and Diſtinction require, that it be writ with the ſhorter Character of that Letter, as, *his, adviſe,* &c. and with the larger in all other places, as *hiſs, deviſe,* if written with an (*s*) and not with a (*c*), as it too often is. There are but four Words of one Syllable, which end with hard (*s*), *yes, this, thus, us.*

That (s) *with* (c) *you may not ſtill confound*
To learn, and mind the following Rules you're bound.

By Vowels follow'd, (ſi), (ti), *and* (ci) *alike*
With the ſame Sound do ſtill the Hearing ſtrike.
In Words deriv'd they keep a certain Law,
Impos'd by thoſe from whence their Sound they draw.
If thoſe in (de), (ſ) *or* (ſe) *do end,*
To their Derivatives they (ſi) *commend;*
If with (ck) *or* (ce) *their cloſe they make,*
Then the deriv'd (ci) *will ſurely take;*
But if with (t) *or* (te) *that do conclude,*
Then with (ti) *Derivative's endu'd.*

[22] *Si, ti,* and *ci* ſound alike, as in *Perſuaſion, Muſician, Section, Imitation,* &c. Theſe words are all deriv'd from others, and therefore when the Original Words end in *(de), (ſ),* or *(ſe),* then *(ſi)* is us'd; as *perſuade, Perſuaſion, confeſs, Confeſſion, confuſe, Confuſion,* &c. If with *(ce),* or *(ck),* or hard *(c),* then *(ci)* is us'd; as *Grace, Gracious, Muſick, Muſician,* &c. But if with *(t),* or *(te),* then *(ti)* is us'd, as *Sect, Section, Imitate, Imitation,* &c. except *Submit, Submiſſion, Permit, Permiſſion.*

Tho' this Letter ſeems very regular in its Sound of *(ſe)* in the beginning, and *(es)* at the end of Words, yet it is too apt to be miſtaken for *(c),* eſpecially in the beginning: Yet by the following Rules and Exceptions, the Miſtake may be obſerv'd to be remov'd.

Moſt Words beginning with the Sound of *(s)* before *(e)* and *(i)* muſt be written with *(s),* except theſe with *(c)* before *(e).*

Ceaſe, Cedar, Celandine, Celery, Celebrate, Celebration, Celerity, Celeſtial, Celibacy, Celibate, Cell, Cellar, Cellarage, cement, Cenſe, Cenſor, cenſorious, Cenſure, cent, Centaurs, Centre, Centinody, Knot-graſs, an Herb; *Centory,* or *Centuary,* an Herb; *Centry, Centurion, Century, cephalic, Cere-cloath, ceremonial, Ceremonious, Ceremony, certain, certainly, Certificate, certifie, cerulean, Ceruſs, Ceſs, Ceſſation, Ceſſion, Cetrach,* Finger-fern; and theſe Proper Names, *Cecrops, Celſus, Cenchrea, Cephas, Cerberus, Cerinthus, Ceres, Cæſar.* And

[22] The Reaſon to thoſe who know *Latin,* is much eaſier; for if they are deriv'd from a *Latin* Supine ending in *(tum),* then *(ti)* is us'd, as *Natum, Nation*; but if the Supine end in *(ſum),* then *(ſi)* is us'd; as *Viſum, Viſion; Confeſſum, Confeſſion.* If the Word be deriv'd from a *Latin* Subſtantive of the firſt Declenſion ending in *(ca)* or *(tia),* or of the ſecond Declenſion ending in *(tium)* or *(cium),* then *(ci)* is us'd; as *Logica Logician, Gratia Gracious, Vitium Vicious, Beneficium Beneficient,* &c.

[23] This

And theſe of (*c*) before (*i*).

Cicatrice, *Cicely*, ſweet and wild Herbs; *Cieling*, *Cichory*, *Cileire*, Drapery or Foliage wrought on the Heads of Pillars; *Cinders*, *Cinnabar*, *Cinquefoil*, *Cinnamon*, *Cinque-ports*, *Ciperus*, a ſweet Root; *Cion*, or *Scion*, *Cipher*, *Circle*, *Circlet*, *circular*, *Circuit*, *circulate*, *circulation*, *circumciſe*, and all Compounds of *circum*—; *Ciſtern*, *Citarion*, *Citizen*, *citrine*, or *citrean*, *Citron*, *Citrul*, a ſort of Cucumber; *Citadel*, *City*, *Cives*, a ſort of ſmall Leeks; *Civet*, *Civilian*, *civility*, *civilize*; and theſe Proper Names, *Cicero*, *Cicilia*, *Cilicia*, *Cimbrians*, *Cimmerians*, *Circe*, *Cirenceſter*, *Cisbury*, *Ciſſa*, *Ciſtertian*, Monks, *Citherides*.

And theſe likewiſe are excepted of (*c*) before (*y*).

Cybels, *Cyclades*, *Cycle*, *Cyclometry*, *Cyclops*, *Cygnets*, *Cylindrical*, *Cymbal*, *cynical*, *Cinics*, *Cynthia*, *Cyprian*, *Cypreſs*, *Cyrene*, *Cyril*.

The Sound of (*ſ*) in the middle of Words is uſually written with (*ſ*), except *Acerbity*, *Acetoſity*, *adjacent*, *Anceſtors*, *antecedent*, *Artificer*, *cancel*, *Cancer*, *beneficence*, *Chancel*, *Chancellor*, *Chancellorſhip*, *Chancery*, *conceal*, *concede*, *conceit*, *conceitedneſs*, *conceive*, *Concent*, Agreement or Harmony in Muſick; *concenter*, *concentric*, *concern*, *Chalcedony*, *concernment*, *concert*, *concertation*, an affected Word, *Conceſſion*; *Deceaſe*, *decede*, an affected Word; *Deceit*, *deceive*, *December*, *Decency*, *decennial*, *decent*, *Deception*, *deceptive*, *Decertation*, an affected Word for ſtriving; *Deceſſion*, as bad a Word for departing; *exceed*, *excel*, *Excellency*, *except*, *Exception*, *Exceſs*, *Grocer*, *Grocery*, *immarceſſible*, a pedantique Word for incorruptible; *imperceptible*, *Incendiary*, *Incenſe*, *incarterate*, *incentive*, *inceſſant*, *inceſſantly*, *inceſtuous*, *Innocence*, *innocent*, *intercede*, *Interceſſor*, *Interceſſion*, *intercept*, *mercenary*, *macerate*, *Mercer*, *Mercery*, *Magnificence*, *magnificent*, *Munificence*, *munificent*, *neceſſary*, *Neceſſaries*, *neceſſitate*, *Neceſſity*, *neceſſitous*, *Necromancer*, *Larceny*, *Ocean*, *Parcel*, *Parcels*, *precede*, *precedential*, *Precedence*, *Precedent*, *preceptive*, *Precepts*, *Predeceſſors*, *ſincere*, *Sincerity*, *Saucer*, *Sorcerer*, *Sorcereſs*, *Sorcery*, *Macedon*, *Macedonia*. Before (*i*) in the middle, as *Acid*, *Acidity*, *Accident*, *Ancient*, *Angliciſm*, *Galliciſm*, &c. in *ciſm*; *anticipate*, *artificial*, *aſſociate*, *audacious*, *Audacity*, *beneficial*, *calcine*, *calcinate*, *Council*, *capacious*, *capacitate*, *Capacity*, *conciſe*, *cruciate*, *Crucible*, *crucify*, *Crucifix*, *decide*, *decimal*, *decimate*, *Decimation*, *decipher*, *Deciſion*, *deciſive*, *Deficiency*, *delicious*, *docible*, *Docibility*, *efficacious*, *efficient*, *eſpecially*, *Exception*, *Exerciſe*,

Ex-

Exciſe, Exciſe-man, Exciſion, excite, excruciate, explicite, fecible for *feaſible, gracious, implicitly, implicit, incapacitate, incapacity, inauſpicious, incident, incidentally, incircle, Inciſion, Inciſure, incite, invincible, judicial, judicious, Loquacity, medicinal, Multiplicity, municipal, Nuncio, officiate, officious, pacify, pacific, Parcimony, Parricide, participate, Pencil, perſpicacious, Perſpicacity, pervicacious, pertinacious, Precinct, precious, Precipice, precipitate, Precipitation, preciſe, preciſely, prejudicial, proficient, Pronunciation, provincial, rapacious, Ratiocination, reciprocal, recital, recite, reconcile, reconcileable, Rouncivals, ſagacious, Sagacity, Sicily, Simplicity, ſociable, Sociableneſs, Soceity, Socinians, Soleciſm, ſolicite, Solicitation, Solicitor, ſolicitous, Solicitude, ſolſticial, ſpacious, ſpecial, Specialty, ſpecifical, Species, ſpecific, Specimen, ſpectous, Sufficiency, ſufficient, ſupercilious, ſuperficial, Superficies, ſuſpicious, tacit, Taciturnity, Turciſm, Veracity, Vivacity.*

Moſt Words ending with the Sound of (*ſi*) or (*ſe*), muſt be written with (*cy*), except *Apoſtaſy, buſy, Controverſy, Courteſy, Daiſy, Ecſtaſy, eaſy, Epilepſy, Fanſy,* ſpell likewiſe, tho' wrong, *Fancy, Frenſy,* or *Frenzy, Gipſy, greaſy, Hereſy, Hypocriſy, Jealouſy, Leproſy, Palſy, Panſy,* a Flower, *Pleuriſy, Poſy,* Noſegay, and Motto of a Ring, *Poeſie,* Poetry, *purſy, queaſy, Canſy,* to *Propheſy, Cauſey, clumſey, Kerſey, Linſey-woolſey, Malmſey, Tolſey, Whimſey.*

In moſt Words (*ſ*) between two Vowels has the ſound of (*z*), except thoſe enumerated in the Rule about *ace, ece,* &c. under (*c*).

Moſt Words ending in the ſound of *arce, erce, orce, urce,* muſt be written with (*ſ*) between the (*r*) and (*e*), except *amerce, Divorce, Farce, fierce, Force, pierce, ſcarce, Scarcity, Source.*

After (*ou*), (*ſ*) ſoft, and not (*c*), muſt be written; as *houſe,* to *houſe*; *mouſe,* to *mouſe*; *rouſe,* to *rouſe*; unleſs (*n*) interpoſes, and then it muſt be with (*c*), as *Bounce, flounce, Ounce,* &c.

All Words of one Syllable, that end with, and bear hard upon the Sound of (*ſ*), muſt be written with (*ſs*), except *this, thus, us,* and *yes*; but if they are Words of many Syllables, or more than one, and end with the like Sound in (*us*), the (*s*) is not double, but (*o*) inſerted before; as *ambiguous, barbarous,* &c.

(T) *be-*

(T) *before* (i), *t' another* Vowel *join'd,*
To ſound like th' Acute, and hiſſing (s) *we find:*
But when an (x) *or* (s) *do's* (i) *precede,*
For its own ſound it ſtrenuouſly do's plead.

(*T*); when (*t*) comes before (*i*), follow'd by another Vowel, it ſounds like the acute or hiſſing (*s*), as in *Nation, potion, expatiate*, &c. but when it follows (*ſ*) or (*x*), it keeps its own Sound, as in *Beſtial, Queſtion, Fuſtion*, &c.

(*T*) with an (*h*) after it, has two Sounds, as in *thin*, the Tongue touching lightly the Extreams of the upper Teeth; and *then*, where the Tongue reaches the Palate, and the Root of the Teeth, making ſome mixture of (*d*).

(H), *tho' deny'd a Letter heretofore,*
We juſtly to the Alphabet reſtore.

(*H*), tho' excluded the Number of Letters by *Priſcian* and ſome of our Moderns on his Authority, yet in the *Hebrew* Alphabet has three Characters; and beſide ſome obſcure Sound of its own, it mightily enforces that of the Vowels, and is manifeſtly a Conſonant; after (*w*) it is prohounc'd before it, as *when, white*, Sounds *hwen, hwite*; (*k*) before (*n*) borrows its Sound, as *knave, knight, hnave, hnight*. 'Tis indeed ſometimes near ſilent, as in *honour, hour*, &c. but ſo are many other Conſonants in particular Poſitions.

(X), *and* (Z) *are double Conſonants;*
The firſt the Pow'r of (c), *or* (ks), *vaunts,*
The ſecond that of (ds) *does boaſt,*
The Force of (d) *is now entirely loſt,*
Or rather to a ſtrenuous hiſſing toſt.

(*X*) and (*Z*) are double Conſonants, containing two Powers under one Character; the former (*cs*), or (*ks*), the latter (*ds*), tho' the Sound of the (*d*) be not now heard, and only a ſtrong ſibilation or hiſſing be diſcover'd. The former expreſſing (*ks*) or (*cs*), cannot begin a Word, except ſome proper Names, *Xanthe, Xanthus, Xantippe, Xantippus, Xenarchus, Xeneades, Xenius, Xenocrates, Xenophanes, Xenophilus, Xenophon, Xerolibia, Xerxenina, Xerxes, Xyſtus, Xiphiline*, and ſome few Terms not vary'd from the *Greek* (this Rule meaning only Words purely Native and not relating to Art) and ends only ſome not all of that Sound; which is expreſs'd ſix ſeveral Ways: (1*ſt*,) At the end of ſhort Syllables by (*cks*), as *Backs, Necks, Sticks, Rocks, Ducks, Bricks, mocks*, &c.

(2*dly*,) At the end of Syllables made long by a *double Vowel*, it is expreſs'd by (*ks*), as *Books*, *looks*, *breaks*, *ſpeaks*, &c. (3*dly*,) By double (*cc*) in the middle of Words where (*e*) or (*i*) follows; as *Accelerate*, *Accent*, *accept*, *Acceptation*, *Acceſs*, *acceſſible*, *Acceſſion*, *acceſſory*, or *acceſſary*, *Accidence*, *Accident*, *accidential*, *inacceſſible*, *Occident*, *occidental*, *ſucceed*, *Succeſs*, *Succeſſion*, *ſuccedaneous*, *ſucceſsful*, *ſuccinct*, *Succinctneſs*. (4*thly*,) By (*ct*), in Words ending in *action*, *ection*, *iction*, *ection*, *uction*, and *unction*; as *Extraction*, *Perfection*, *Prediction*, *Concoction*, *Deſtruction*, *compunction*; only except *Complexion*, *Reflexion*, a bending back, but more properly *Reflection*, when it relates to thought; *Connexion*, *Crucifixion*, *Defluxion*. (5*thly*,) By (*cts*) at the end of ſome Words, as *Abſtracts*, *Acts*, *collects*, *contracts*, *Defects*, *Effects*, *Inſects*, *Objects*, *Projects*, *Subjects*; he *affects*, *corrects*, *inſtructs*, for *affecteth*, &c. the (*th*) being now entirely chang'd into (*s*). (6*thly*,) laſtly, The Sound of (*k*) muſt be written with (*x*), in the beginning, middle and end of all other Words, except *ecſtacy*. After (*ex*) never write (*s*), and ſeldom (*c*), but in *except*, *exceed*, *exceſs*, *exciſe*, *excite*, &c. and (*c*) after (*ex*), comes before (*co*), (*cu*), (*cl*) and (*ch*), having a full Sound, as *excommunicate*, *excuſe*, *exclaim*, *exchange*.

(K) *before* (i), (e) *when hard*, *is ſeen*;
And before (n), *as* know, kill, keen.

(K) begins all Words of a hard Sound before (*e*), (*i*) and (*n*), as *keep*, *kill*, *know*, *knack*, &c. nor is it ever put before any Conſonant but (*n*), and then with ſo much conſtraint, that it almoſt loſes its Sound for that of (*h*).

Before all other Conſonants (c)'s *plac't*,
Altho' the harder Sound is there expreſt.

And if the Sound of (*k*) comes before any other Conſonant, it is expreſs'd by (*c*), as in *Character*, *clear*, *cringe*.

The Sound of (*k*) at the beginning of any Word or Syllable before (*a*), (*o*) or (*u*), is always expreſs'd by (*c*), as *Cat*, *con*, *cup*; or when a ſilent (*e*) follows (*k*), as *ſpake*, *ſpoke*; or (*ea*) in the middle, as *ſpeak*, *bleak*, &c. and then (*k*) is written ſingly without (*e*) final.

To (y) *a double Nature does belong*,
As Conſonant, *and* Vowel *in our Tongue*.
The firſt *begins all Words*, *yet none can end*,
The laſt, *it for the Cloſe does ſtill contend*.

[23] (*Y*) is both a Vowel and Conſonant; as a Vowel, it has appear'd to an ingenious Author to be ſuperfluous; yet it is of great uſe in our Language, which abhors the ending of Words in (*i*); and when the Sound of (*i*) comes double, tho' in two diſtinct Syllables, as in *dying*, *frying*, &c. When it follows a Conſonant it is a Vowel, and when it precedes a Vowel it is a Conſonant, and ought to be call'd (*ye*), and not (*wy*); and tho' it ends ſo many Words as a Vowel, it can end none as a Conſonant.

At the end of all Words of one Syllable (*y*) has a ſharp and clear Sound, as *by*, *dy*, *dry*, *ſly*, *why*, *ſhy*, *thy*, &c. But at the end of Words of more Syllables it generally ſounds obſcure, like (*e*), as *eternally*, *glorioufly*, *godly*, &c. except at the end of *Words of Affirmation*, as *apply*, *deny*, *edify*, &c. (*y*) only precedes Vowels, and chiefly (*a*), (*e*), (*o*); and theſe it alſo follows and incorporates with them into *double Vowels*, for (*ay*), (*ey*), (*oy*), have the ſame Sound with (*ai*), (*ei*), (*oi*); but the former are more us'd at the end of Words. In the middle of Words it is not ſo frequently us'd for a Vowel, except in Words of the *Greek* Origin.

And the ſame Right the double (u) *demands*;
Begins as Conſonant, *as* Vowel *ends*.

[24] (*W*). This Letter in its moſt general uſe is a Conſonant, going before all the Vowels, except (*u*); it likewiſe precedes (*r*), and follows (*s*) and (*th*), as *Want*, *went*, *Winter*, *wrath*, *write*, *thwart*. It follows as a Vowel (*a*), (*e*), (*o*), and unites with them into the *double Vowels* (*aw*), (*ew*), (*ow*), as well as (*u*); as *Sow*, *ſowe*, *ſaw*, *few*: But in (*oo*) it generally is obſcure, eſpecially in Words of many Syllables, as in *Shadow*, *Widow*, &c.

It likewiſe, as has been obſerv'd under (*h*), goes before (*h*), tho' it be ſounded after it, as in *when*, *what*, &c.

(Va) *to the* (f) *in Nature is ally'd*,
And to it final, *has* (e) *always ty'd*.

[25] (*Va*),

[23] This Conſonant is ſounded like the *German* (j) Conſonant, that is with a Sound moſt nearly approaching an extream rapid Pronunciation of the Vowel (*i*). The *Arabians* expreſs (*y*) by their *ye*, or our (*w*) by their *waw*.

[24] The (*w*) is ſounded in *Engliſh* as (*u*) in the *Latin* Words *quando*, *lingua*, *ſuadeo*, and others after *q*, *g*, *ſ*. We generally make this Letter a Conſonant, yet its Sound is not very different (tho' it does ſomething differ) from the *German* Vowel, the *fat* or *groſs* (*u*) very rapidly pronounc'd.

[25] (*Va*) or (*V*) Conſonant, as 'tis call'd, is near a-kin to (*f*): It never ends a Word without ſilent (*e*) after it, nor is it ever doubled, however ſtrong the Accent may be upon it; in *Engliſh* it only goes before *Vowels*, it likewiſe follows (*l*) and (*r*), as *Calves*, *Carve*, &c.

(G) *varies with the* Vowel *ſtill its Sound,*
Soft before (i), (e); *before the reſt hard's found:*
By (h) *and* (u) *'tis harden'd, as in* Gheſs
And Guilt, *and as ſome other Words expreſs.*

(*G*) changes its Sound according to the Vowel it precedes, for before (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), it has a hard Guttural Sound, as *Game*, *Gold*, *Gum*: But this hard Sound is melted into a ſofter, by (*e*), (*i*), or (*y*), as *Gentle*, *Danger*, *Ginger*; but it is harden'd here by the Addition of (*h*) or (*u*), as *Gheſs*, *Guilt*, &c. It retains its native Guttural Sound before (*e*) in theſe: *Altogether*, *anger*, *Auger*, *beget*, *Conger-eel*, *exegetical*, *Finger*, *forget*, *gear*, or *geer*, *Geeſe*, *geld*, *Gelderland*, *Gelder*, Roſe, *Gelding*, *get*, *Gewgaws*, *heterogeneous*, *homogeneal*, *heterogeneal*, *homogeneous*, *hunger*, *Hanger*, *Hungerford*, *linger*, *longer*, *Monger*, *ſpringeth*; obſolete, *ſtringed*, *Vinegar*, *winged*, *wringeth*, *wrongeth*, now written *wrings*, *wrongs*, *younger*; but a *Singer* with a Voice, and a *Singer* by Fire; a *Swinger* on a Rope; and a *Swinger*, a great Lye, muſt be diſtinguiſh'd by the Senſe, or the old Way of Spelling the ſoft Sounds, by adding a (*d*) after the (*n*), as indeed they Sound. (*D*) before (*g*) always ſoftens the Sound of (*g*), as *Hog*, *hodge*, *log*, *lodge*, *dog*, *dodge*, &c. (*G*) is hard before (*i*) in the following Words; as, *Argyle*, *begin*, *gibberiſh*, *gibblegabble*: *Gibbons*, *Giddens*, Sirnames; *giddy*, *gift*, *gig*, *giggle*, *giglet*, *Gilbert*, *gild*, *gilder*, *Gildon*, a Sirname; *Gillet*, a Sirname; *Gills*, *guilt-head*, *Gimlet*, *gimp*, *gird*, *girder*, *Girdle*, or *Girdler*; *Girl*, *girt*, *Girth* of a Horſe; *Gith*, *gittern*, *give*, *Gizzard*; with all the Compounds and Words derived from any of theſe.

Two (gg)'s *together make both hard remain,*
Tho' (i), *or* (e) *or* (y) *be in their Train.*

When

[25] The (*V*) Conſonant we pronounce as the *French*, *Italians*, *Spaniards* and other Nations do, that is with a Sound very near approaching the Letter (*f*); yet (*f*) and (*v*) have the ſame difference which (*p*) and (*b*) have.

[26] If

Whenever two (*gg*)'s come together, they are both hard, tho' (*e*) (*i*) or (*y*) follow.

If the primitive or original Word end in hard (*g*), all Words deriv'd from them do the ſame; as *Dog*, *dogged*, &c. but moſt of theſe latter are under the former Rule, becauſe moſt of them double the (*g*). (*N*) between the Conſonant and (*g*) hardens it; as *ſtronger*, *longer*, *ſinger*, &c.

(Je)'s *always ſoft, a Vowel ſtill precedes,*
And in a Syllable the foremoſt leads.
All Words, where-e'er this ſofter Sound we ſee
Before (a), (o) *and* (u), *are writ with* (Je).

(*Je*)or (j) Conſonant always begins a Syllable, is ever plac'd before, never after a Vowel, and has an unvary'd Sound, as being pronounc'd every where as ſoft (*g*) in *Ginger*; but when the Sound of ſoft (*g*) is at the end of a Word, it is expreſs'd by (*g*), with ſilent (*e*) after it, *Rage*, *Sage*, *Wage*, &c. or with (*dg*), as *Knowledge*, &c.

All Words beginning with this ſoft Sound before (*a*), (*o*) and (*u*), muſt be written with (*je*) as well as all proper Names deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*.

Many Words which now begin with a (*g*) before (*e*), were originally ſpelt with (*J*), as *Jentleman*, not *Gentleman*; and ought indeed, to be thus written always, which wou'd avoid Confuſion in the Spelling.

(Q) *in its Sound, is always ſounded* kue,
And ne'er is writ without a following (u).

(*Q*) Sounds (*kue*) or (*que*), and has always (*u*) after it, and begins all Words with that Sound. It ends no Word without (*e*) after it, and that in but a few Words of *French* Termination, as *Antique*, *oblique*, *pique*, *barque*, *cinque*. [26]

To

[26] If the Breath *directed thro' the Mouth to the Lips*, be intercepted by the *cloſing of the Lips*, the (*P*) is form'd; the *Greek* (Π); the *Hebrew* (*Pe*). The *Arabians* have not this Letter, but ſubſtitute in its place (*Be*) or (*Phe*); the *Perſians*, beſides this (*Phe*) of the *Arabians*, have their (*H*), which they diſtinguiſh from (*Be*), by putting three Points under it.

If the Breath reaches not the *Lips*, but be wholly intercepted in the *Palate*, by moving the tip of the Tongue to the fore-part of the Palate, or, which is all one, to the roots of the upper Teeth, the Conſonant (*T*) is form'd; the *Greek* (*T*), the *Arabian* (*Te*) or (*Ta*), &c.

But if the Breath do not ev'n reach ſo far, but be intercepted at the top of the Throat, by moving the hinder

To theſe we ſhall add ſome Rules relating to Conſonants join'd together.

(Gh) *in the beginning does expreſs*
(G) *hard, as in* Ghoſt *we find, and in* Gheſs.
Elſewhere this (h) *we moſtly now omit,*
Yet by it the Syllable a Length *does get.*
In Northern Parts *this very* (h) *is found*
With a much ſofter Aſpirate to Sound.

In the beginning of Words (*gh*) is pronounc'd like hard (*g*): Elſewhere 'tis now almoſt wholly left out, but yet it implies, that the Syllable is to be lengthen'd. But ſome (eſpecially the Northern People) Sound the (*h*) with a ſofter Aſpiration; as in *Might, Light, Night, Right, Sight, Sigh, weigh, Weight, Though*; (but the three laſt Letters in this Word are now by the Politer thrown away as uſeleſs). *Thought, wrought, taught*, &c.

(Gh) *ſometimes will ſound like double* (f),
As Cough, tough, rough, enough, trough *and* laugh.

When *enough* ſignifies Number, 'tis ſpelt *enow*.

(Ch) *produces a Compounded Sound,*
Which from (ty) *moſt ſurely may rebound.*
Or from (tſh), *as in* Church *'tis found.*

We muſt except Words that are deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*, eſpecially proper Names, and where a Conſonant follows; for there they ſound harder, like (*c*) or (*k*).

(Sh) *like* (ſy), (ph) *like* (f) *we find,*
And the (th) *is of a double kind*;
Sometimes a ſofter Sound, a-kin to (d),
Sometimes a ſtronger, that's a-kin to (t).

(*Th*) Sounds (*dh*) ſometimes, where it has a ſofter Sound, as it has in the following Words: As *thou, thee, thy, thine, the, this, that, thoſe, theſe, they, them, their, there, thence, thither, whither, either, whether, neither, though, although*; but in theſe two laſt it is generally left out. And in ſome Words ending in (*ther*), as *Father, Mother, Brother, Leather, Feather*; and in *ſmooth, Breath, Wreathe, ſeethe, bequeathe, Clothe.*

Elſewhere it generally has a ſtronger Sound; as in *with, without, within, through, think, thrive, throw, thruſt, Thought, Thigh, thing, Throng, Death, Breath, Cloth, Wrath, Length, Strength, thick, thin*, &c.

PART

part of the Tongue, to the hinder part of the Palate, *(k)* or hard *(c)* is form'd, and the *Greek* (κ), &c. The *Welſh* always give their *(c)* this hard Sound. Theſe three Conſonants we call abſolute Mutes; for they give no manner of Sound in themſelves, or indeed can give any, becauſe the Breath no way gets into the free Air, for it neither gets out by the Noſtrils, nor by the Mouth.

If the Breath, *equally divided between the Noſtrils and the Mouth*, be intercepted by the cloſing of the Lips, the Conſonant *(B)* is form'd, the *Greek* (β), the *Arabian Dal*, &c. But if the Breath be intercepted in the Throat by the hinder parts of the Palate and Tongue (G) is form'd, the *Greek* (γ), &c. The *Welſh* always give this hard Sound to their (G). And theſe we call *half Mutes*, for they make a little ſort of Sound in the Noſe, which can be heard by it ſelf without the aſſiſtance of the Sound of any other Letter.

If the whole, or, if you pleaſe, the greater part of the Breath be divided to the Noſtrils, only in its Paſſage ſtriking the Air that remains in the concave or hollow of the Mouth, the Lips being juſt clos'd, *(M)* is form'd, the *Greek* (μ), the *Arabian Mim*, &c. But if the Cloſure or Interception be made in the fore-part of the Palate, *(N)* is form'd, the *Greek* (ν), and the *Hebrew* and *Arabian Nun*. But if in the Throat, that is in the back-part of the Palate, that Sound is form'd, which the *Greeks* expreſs by (γ) before (κ), (γ), (χ), (ξ): And the *Latins* of old by (g), as *Agchiſis*, *agceps*, *agulus*, &c. for *Anchiſes*, *anceps*, *angulus*, as *Priſcian* and *Varro* aſſure us. Which all now write with (n) before the ſame Conſonants, eſpecially in the ſame Syllable; ſuppoſe (k), (q), (x), and (c), (g), (ch), pronounc'd with a hard, that is their genuine Sound. For the Sound of (n) is different in the Words *thin*, *ſin*, *in*; from that in *ſing*, *ſingle*, *ſink*, *ink*, *lynx*, &c. ſo in *hand*, *band*, *ran*; from what it is in *hang*, *bank*, *rank*, &c. Nay, the Sound of this Letter is vary'd in the very ſame Words: For (n) ſounds otherwiſe in *lon-ger*, *ſtron-ger*, *an-ger*, *drin-ker*; *in-gruo*, *con-gruo*; but otherwiſe in *long-er*, *ſtrong-er*, *ang-er*, *drink-er*; *ing-ruo*, *cong-ruo*. So we hear ſome ſaying *in-quam*, *tan-quam*, *nun-quam*, &c. while others pronounce them as if they was written *inq-wam*, *tanq-wam*, *nunq-wam*; or *ink-wam*, *tank-wam*, *nunk-wam*. When (n) is pronounc'd in the former, the Extremity of the Tongue always ſtrikes the fore-part of the Palate near the roots of the upper Teeth; but in the latter, the ſame Extremity of the Tongue rather depends to the roots of the lower Teeth; but the hinder-part of the Tongue is rais'd to the hinder-part of the Palate, and there intercepts the Sound; to wit, it is form'd in the Mouth in the ſame manner, as (g); but it has the ſame Direction of the Breath with (n). And this, if we are not deceiv'd, is that very Sound which many wou'd give to the *Hebrew* ע, when they teach us to pronounce it by *ng*, *ngh*, *gn*, *nghn*, &c. for they inſinuate ſome Sound, which does not perfectly agree with either (n) or (g), but has ſomething common to both. And we know not but the *Spaniards* mean the ſame Sound by their (ñ) mark'd thus over head.

We call theſe three Conſonants *half Vowels*; for they have a greater proper Sound than thoſe which we lately call'd *half-Mutes*.

Theſe nine Conſonants, which we have diſcours'd of, are form'd by a total Interception of the Breath, ſo that it has no manner of Paſſage through the Mouth, which therefore we nam'd *clos'd*: But the ſame Formation remaining, *if the Breath hardly preſs'd, yet (tho' with difficulty) find an Outlet*, thoſe Conſonants are form'd, which we call *open'd*, which are the *Aſpirates* of all thoſe (except the *half Vowels*) from whence they are deriv'd:

More

More *ſubtle* and *thin*, if the Breath goes out by an oblong Chink, Slit or Crevice; or more *groſs*, if it go out by a round Hole. They are referr'd to the ſame Claſſes their *Primitives* were, as being near a-kin to them. We ſubjoin no *Aſpirates* to the *half-Vowels*; not that there is no Sound when the Breath breaks from him that is about to pronounce them, but becauſe that Sound has not yet, as far as we can diſcover, obtain'd any Place in the Liſt, or Catalogue of Letters; for it expreſſes the Lowing of an Ox, or the Humane Sigh; that is, if that be made in the Lips, this chiefly is in the Palate or Throat.

If the Breath eſcape the Mouth, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (*p*), its Aſpirate (*f*), or (*ph*), that is, the *Greek* (φ), the *Arabian* (*Phe*), the *Welſh* (*ff*), is form'd and pronounc'd; nor is it of Conſequence whether the Breath gets out by a longiſh Chink, or by a round Hole; for tho' that Way the Sound is more *ſubtle* and *fine*, and this more *groſs*, yet the Diſtinction of both is ſo very nice and ſmall, that we doubt whether they in any Language are expreſs'd by different Letters.

If the Breath break out by a Chink, when we are going to pronounce (*b*), it forms the *Engliſh* (*v*) Conſonant, *&c.* The *Spaniard* not ſeldom gives the ſame Sound to (*b*), uſing the Letters (*b*) and (*v*) promiſcuouſly. The *Welſh* expreſs this Sound by (*f*), and the foregoing Sound by (*ff*). The *Engliſh Saxons* either had not this Sound, or expreſs'd it by (*f*) in Writing, for they knew nothing of the (*v*) Conſonant; and they wrote many Words with (*f*) (as the *Engliſh* did after them for ſome Ages) which are now written with (*v*), as much as thoſe which ſtill are ſpelt with (*f*); as *gif*, *Heofen*, &c. which now are writ *give*, *Heaven*, &c. The *Arabians* and *Perſians* have not this Sound: And the *Turks* pronounce their *Vaw* in this manner, and as a great many, the *Vau* of the *Hebrews* (which ſome think more properly pronounc'd as the *Arabic Waw*, or *w*). And we doubt not but the *Æolic* (*f*) had this Sound; for ſince the *Greeks* had before the Character (φ), there was no manner of need to invent a new one to expreſs the ſame Sound. Beſides *Priſcian* owns, that the *Latin* (*f*) had formerly the ſame Pronunciation, that is, the ſame Sound, that was afterwards given to the (*v*) Conſonant, and ſo the Letter (*f*) paſt to the Sound of (φ) or (*ph*).

But if the Breath make its Way out *through a round Hole*, the *Engliſh* (*w*) is form'd and the *Arabian* (*waw*), which Sound many give to the *Hebrew* (*vau*). But the *German* (*w*), if we miſtake not, has a Sound compounded of this and the former Letter; that is, by placing that before this; ſo that the *Engliſh* wou'd ſpell that with *vwa*, which the *Germans* expreſs by *wa*. This Sound is not very different from the *Engliſh* (*oo*), the *French* (*ou*), and the *German* groſs or fat (*u*) moſt rapidly pronounc'd. For this Reaſon ſome have thought it a Vowel, tho' it be in reality a Conſonant, yet it muſt be own'd very near a-kin to a Vowel. The *Welſh* make that a Vowel, as well as this a Conſonant, expreſſing them by the ſame Character (*w*), but when 'tis a Vowel, it is accented over-head, and ſounds long; in other Places 'tis a Conſonant, its Sound being ſhort; as, *Gwˆydd*, (which is two Syllables) a Gooſe; *gwˆyr*, crooked; *gwˆyr*, Men. Whenever this Sound in *Latin* follows *ſ*, *q*, *g*, as in *ſuadeo*, *quando*, *lingua*, &c. moſt take it for a Vowel; and perhaps ſome, who wou'd have it a Conſonant in the *Engliſh* Words *wade*, *perſwade*, *ſway*, &c. and yet the Sound is the very ſame in both Places. But the ſubjoin'd Vowel in the Diphthongs or double Vowels, (*au*), (*eu*), (*ou*), truly pronounc'd, is no other than this very Conſonant; as any Man may ſee by conſulting the diſcerning *Gataker*, in his Treatiſe of *double Vowels*.

If

If the Breath more groſly goes out by the *Hole*, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (*T*), the *Greek* (θ) is form'd, the *Arabic* (*The*), &c. and the *Engliſh* (*Th*), in *Thigh*, *thin*, *thing*, *thought*, *throng*: The *Anglo-Saxons* formerly expreſs'd this Sound by this Note (*þ*), which they call'd *Spina*, or the *Thorn*: The *Welſh* always write it with (*th*).

But if the Breath on this Occaſion go more *ſubtilly* out of the Mouth by a *Chink*, that part of the Tongue which is next to the Extremity being lifted up, that the Breath may, as it were, be flatted or thin'd, and preſs'd with a wider, but groſs Form, the *Greek* (σ) is form'd, the *Hebrew Samech* and *Shin*, the *Arabic Sin* and *Sad*; the *Latin* and *Engliſh* (*ſ*), pronounc'd with its right Sound, that is, a *ſharp*, *acute*, or *ſtridulous*, or *hiſſing* Sound; as in the Words, *Yes*, *this*, *us*, *thus*, *biſs*, *leſs*, *ſend*, *ſtrong*, &c. With this Sound we alſo pronounce ſoft (*c*) before (*e*), (*i*) and (*y*); as in *Grace*, *Mercy*, *Peace*, *ſince*, *Principal*, &c. The *French* ſometimes give the (*c*) the ſame Sound when it has a Tail, as in *Gar*Ç*on*.

If the Breath get out of the Mouth by a Hole in a groſſer manner, when you are about to pronounce (*D*), it forms the *Arabic Dhal*, the *Hebrew Daleth*, the ſofter (*D*) of the *Spaniards*; that is, as that Letter is pronounc'd in the middle and end of Words, as *Majeſtad*, *Trinidad*, &c. The *Engliſh* write this Sound in the ſame manner as they do another, which we have lately nam'd; that is, with (*th*) in *thy*, *thine*, *this*, *tho'*, &c. The *Anglo-Saxons* writ that Sound with (Ð), but this with (ð), as is plain from their Writings, (tho' they ſometimes confounded theſe Characters), but in following Ages the *Engliſh* expreſs'd both Sounds by (þ), which by degrees, degenerated into the Character (ƿ), which in very many Manuſcripts perpetually begins thoſe Words which now are written with (*th*). And hence ſprung the Abbreviations of *the*, *that*, *thou*, by ẏ, ẏ, ỿ. The *Welſh* expreſs the former Sound by (*th*), the latter by (*dd*), only ſome pretend that it is better written by (*dh*), who have not been able to alter the old *Orthography*. But we (as we have obſerv'd) expreſs both Sounds by (*th*), but erroneouſly, ſince neither of them is a compounded Sound, but evidently ſimple, varying or deſcending almoſt in the ſame manner from the Sounds of (*d*) and (*t*); as (*f*) and (*v*) do from the Sounds of (*p*) and (*b*). We grant, that by the ſame Reaſon, that (*ph*) is written for (*f*), (*bh*), (*th*) and (*dh*), might be alſo written, that is in ſome meaſure, to ſhew the Affinity and Derivation of the Aſpirate Letters, to thoſe from whence they draw their Original. But it is evident from the following Words, that the genuine Sound compos'd of the Letters, is plainly different from that of the Aſpirate Letter; as *Cobham*, *Chat-ham*, *Wit-ham*, *Maitham*, *Wad-ham*, *Wood-houſe*, *Shepherd*, *Clap-ham*, *Meſs-ham*, &c. And thus we find entirely other Sounds in *Ocham*, *Block-head*, *Hog-herd*, *Cog-hill*, *Houſ-hold*, *Diſ-honour*, *Miſ-hap*, *diſ-honeſt*, *diſ-hearten*, *Maſ-ham*, *Cauſ-ham*, *Wiſ-heart*, &c. than thoſe which we commonly write with (*ch*), (*gh*), (*ſh*): But the *French*, the *Flemings*, and many others, do not at all, or extreamly little, pronounce either of thoſe Sounds which we expreſs by (*th*); and while the *French* endeavour to pronounce it, they utter (*t*), the *Flemings* (*d*), and ſome others (*ſ*). Yet it is not hard to pronounce theſe genuine Sounds, if we wou'd but take a more peculiar Care of, and have a nearer Regard to their Formation. That is, all the Parts of the Formation remain the ſame as if we were going to pronounce (*t*) and (*d*), only we ſuffer the Breath to go out of our Mouths here, and not there. We muſt alſo take heed, that for want of Attention, the part of the

Tongue

Tongue next to the Extremity riſe a little, and ſo form the Letters (*ſ*) and (*z*); for as (*ſ*) is to (*t*), ſo is (*z*) to (*d*), as we ſhall now explain.

If when you are about to pronounce (*d*), you extrude the Breath in a more *ſubtle* manner, as it were thin'd by a Chink or Crevice, (the Part next to the Extremity of the Tongue being to that end lifted up) the *Latin* (*z*) is form'd, the *Greek* (ζ), the *Hebrew Zain*, and the *Arabian* (*ze*), which Sound the *Engliſh* expreſs by their (*z*); but they, as well as the *French*, do ſometimes expreſs this Sound by (*ſ*); eſpecially when it is plac'd between two *Vowels*, and in the end of a Word, as in *Pleaſure*, *Eaſe*, *Laws*, &c. And when a *Name* or *Noun*, with hard (*s*) in the laſt Syllable is made a *Verb* or *Word*, then this *Verb* or *Word* is pronounc'd with ſoft (*ſ*), (that is *z*); ſo a *Houſe*, a *Louſe*, a *Mouſe*, a *Price*, *Advice*, (or *Adviſe*, according to ſome; tho', in our Opinion, the (*c*) ought to be kept in the Name, as a farther Diſtinction of the *Name* from the *Word* or *Verb*) *cloſe*, *Braſs*, *Glaſs*, *Graſs*, *Greaſe*, end with hard (*ſ*); but to *houſe*, to *louſe*, to *mouſe*, to *priſe*, or *prize*, (tho' *Prize* with a (*z*) ſignifies a Purchaſe, a Caption of ſome Ship, &c. or the Reward of ſome Action, or to be obtain'd by ſome Action, &c.) to *adviſe*, to *cloſe*, to *braze*, &c. are pronounc'd with ſoft (*ſ*) or (*z*). But other Letters in the like manner have an analogous Alteration. For from the Names *Wife*, *Life*, *Strife*, *Half*, *Calf*, *Safe*, *Breath*, *Cloth*, are pronounc'd with the harder Sounds; they are thus made *Verbs* or *Words*, to *Wive*, to *Live*, to *Strive*, to *Halve*, to *Calve*, to *Save*, to *Breathe*, to *Clothe*. The *Italians* (eſpecially when it is doubled) expreſs (*z*) ſtronger, as the *Hebrew* (צ), (*tz*): Thus not a few pronounce in *Latin* Words when (*t*) goes before (*i*) and another Vowel follows; as *Piazza*, *Venetia*, they pronounce *Piatza*, *Venetzia*, &c.

We may add to (*d*), or, if you pleaſe, to (*n*), two other Letters form'd in the ſame Seat, that is, in the Palate, *viz.* (*l*) and (*r*). We chuſe rather to join theſe Letters to (*d*) and (*n*), than to the Letter (*t*), by reaſon of the Concuſſion of the *Larynx*, or Wind-pipe, and the Emition of the Breath to the Noſtrils in their Pronunciation, of which the Letter (*t*), and all that are deriv'd from it, are utterly incapable.

The Letter (*l*) is form'd if when you are about to pronounce the (*d*) or (*n*), you gently ſend out the Breath from one or both Sides into the Mouth, and by the Turnings of the Mouth to the open Lips, with a Trembling of the Tongue. And the Sound of this Letter, if we are not deceiv'd, is the ſame in all Languages, as the *Hebrew* ל, and the *Greek* λ.

But the *Welſh* have another and ſtronger, tho' a kindred Sound to this, which they write with a (*ll*), to diſtinguiſh it from that of the ſingle (*l*), by the Breath's being much more forcibly preſs'd into the Mouth, whence proceeds a more frothy Sound, as it were, compounded of (βλ). But this Sound, we think, no other Nation knows, unleſs perhaps the *Spaniards*.

The Letter (*r*), which is generally call'd the Dog-Letter, is likewiſe form'd in the Palate; that is, if when you are about to pronounce (*d*) or (*n*), the Extremity of the Tongue being turn'd inward by a ſtrong and frequent Concuſſion, beats the Breath that is going out; from which Conflict that horrid or rough Sound of the (*r*) proceeds. And the Sound of this Letter is the ſame in all Nations, as the *Hebrew Reſh*, and the *Greek* (ρ). The *Welſh* frequently ſubjoin (*h*) to this Letter; and their (*rh*) anſwers the *Greek* aſpirated (῾ρ). They tell us, that the *Americans* bordering on *New-England*, or at leaſt a great part of them, cannot pronounce either an (*l*) or (*r*), but ſubſtitute (*n*) in their Place;

Place; thus, for *Lobſter*, they ſay, *Nobſtan*.

If the Breath, being more ſtrictly compreſs'd, breaks out *more ſubtilly*, when you are about to pronounce (*k*) or hard (*c*), it forms the *Greek* (χ), the *Arabian* (*cha*), truly pronunc'd, *&c.* that is by a middle Sound betwixt (*c*) and (*b*); and this Sound is very familiar to the *Germans* and *Welſh*, and they both expreſs it by *ch*. But it is quite laid aſide in *Engliſh*; for our *ch* is a quite different Sound, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

But if the Breath go out in a groſſer manner, and leſs impreſs'd (by reaſon of the more lax Poſition of the Tongue, and larger Exit for the Breath) the *Latin* (*h*) is form'd; and the *Hebrew* and *Arabian* (*He*) and the *Greek aſpirate Spirit*. And this Sound is common to moſt Nations. But the *French*, tho' they write (*h*), ſeldom pronounce it. The Difference between the Sound of this and that of the foregoing Letter is only this, that the Breath in the former is expell'd with a greater Force, and by a narrower Paſſage, as it were through a Chink, and is therefore nam'd the double *Aſpirate*; this more freely, and as it were through a Hole or larger Paſſage.

The *Greeks*, as if it were no Letter, (becauſe its Sound is but ſmall) call it an *Aſpiration*, and (at leaſt now a-days) ſet it not down in the direct Line of the Letters, but put it over the Head of a Letter: Tho' formerly they did ſet 'em before the Vowels in the direct Line, but they ſet the (ϱ) after them, if we are not miſtaken, and this makes them uſe (*h*) for a Note of an Hundred; for what is now written ἑκατὸν, was formerly written Ηεκατὸν. But we can ſee no manner of Reaſon why (*h*) ſhould not be a Conſonant in all other Languages; for it is by no means to be rejected from the Number of Letters, becauſe the Sound of it is ſometimes not pronounc'd by the *French* and ſome others; for that is no more than is common to many other Letters, eſpecially of the *Hebrew*, and other Oriental Tongues, which are quieſcent or ſilent: Nor becauſe it does not hinder the Eliſion of the foregoing Vowel, when another Vowel follows in the ſubſequent Word; for (*m*) wou'd then lie under the ſame Fate, and (*ſ*) anciently did not hinder this Contraction. But we muſt confeſs, that there is ſome doubt whether the *Latins*, who were ſuch mighty Emulators of the *Greeks*, allow'd (*h*) to be a Letter or not, eſpecially when we find the *Grammarians* ſo earneſtly denying, it with *Priſcian* at the Head of them.

If when you are about to pronounce (γ), or the hard (*g*), the Breath being more hardly compreſs'd, goes out by a more ſubtle Chink, as I may ſay, or Slit, that Sound is form'd which is expreſs'd by *gh*. The *Engliſh* ſeem formerly to have had this Sound in the Words *Light*, *Night*, *Right*, *Daughter*, &c. but now they only retain the Spelling, entirely omitting the Sound; but the *North-Country* People, eſpecially the *Scots*, almoſt retain it ſtill, or rather ſubſtitute the Sound of (*h*) in its room. The *Iriſh* in their (*gh*) have exactly this Sound, as in *Logh*, a Lake, *&c.* It differs from the *German* (*ch*) as (*g*) does from (*c*), that is by the Direction of the Breath to the Noſtrils, which neither (*c*) nor (*ch*) can do. But the *Germans* generally write by (*ch*) thoſe very Words which the *Engliſh* write with (*gh*), for their Nacht, recht, liecht, fechten, tochter, anſwer our *Night*, *right*, *light*, *fight*, *Daughter*; and there are many more Words of the ſame kind. The *Latins*, *Greeks*, *Hebrews* and *Arabians* knew nothing of this Sound. The *Perſians* pronounce their *Ghaf* with this Sound, which is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabic Kef* by three Points over it.

But if the Breath go out more freely, and as it were through a more large Hole, the *Engliſh* (*y*) Con-

Conſonant is form'd; the *German* (j) Conſonant, the *Arabian* (ye), which Sound many contend belongs to the *Hebrew* (jod). For this Sound is very near a-kin to that of the Vowel (i) ſlender, moſt rapidly pronounc'd. The Diphthongs, as they are call'd *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, are promiſcuouſly written by (i) or (y), eſpecially by the *Engliſh* and the *French*. *Y* is not only put for (i) at the end of Words, but in the middle, when (i) follows the Sound of (i); as *dying*, *lying*, &c. the *Anglo-Saxons*, and after them the *Engliſh*, for many Ages always put a Point over (y), when it was us'd for the Vowel (i), thus (ẏ)

But it is manifeſt, that there is a great Affinity between this Letter and *g* and *gh*, from thoſe Words, which are now written by *gh*, as *light*, *might*, *thought*, &c. being in the old Manuſcripts written with (y), in the ſame Character, as *yet*, *yonder*, &c. For they had a three-fold Figure, one (ȝ), which we now expreſs by *th*, as we have already obſerv'd; another which was us'd for (i) Vowel, and differing from the former only by the Point over it; and a third (ȝ), which was always put for (y) Conſonant, and which was found in thoſe Words which we now ſpell with *gh*: But the Library-keepers, of latter Times, ignorant of the Matter, have by a very groſs Error ſubſtituted in the room of it the Character of the Letter (z), when they made thoſe monſtrous Words **thouzt**, **ſouzt**, &c. for *thought*, *ſought*, &c. or rather for *thouyt*, *ſouyt*, &c. as they were then us'd to be written by (y) Conſonant, as we may find them in the Impreſſions of *Chaucer*, and others of the old Poets. We muſt alſo add, that not a few Words, which we now ſpell with (y), the old *Saxons*, and now moſt commonly the *Germans*, wrote with *g*; for our Words *Slay*, *ſayl*, *ſay*, *pay*, *day*, *rain*, and many more, are partly by the *Anglo-Saxons*, and partly by the *Germans* written **Schlagen**, **ſegel**, **ſeger**, **ſag**, **tag**, **tegen**. And on the contrary many Words which are now written with (g), were formerly written with (y); as, *again*, *againſt*, *given*, &c. were anciently written *ayen*, *ayenſt*, *yeoven*, &c.

Thus we have run through all the ſimple Sounds that we know, and have given Rules for their ſeveral Formations, and diſtributed them into their ſeveral Families and Claſſes; and as we have of the Vowels, ſo ſhall we here of the Conſonants, give you a Plan, which your Eye may view all at once.

Conſonants,	Labial or Lip	Mute — P	F | F		
		Half-Mute — B	V | W		
		Half-Vowels M	a Lowing		
	Palatine or Palate	Mute — T	S | T H		
		Half-Mute — D	Z | D H	L. R.	
		Half-Vowel — N	a Sigh		
	Guttural or Throat	Mute — C	CH | H		
		Half-Mute — G	GH | T		
		Half-Vowel — n	a Sigh		
			more ſubtil,	more groſs,	Aſpirates,

As we have ſaid ſomething of the Compound Sounds of the Vowels, we ſhall add a Word or two here of the Compound Conſonants. The *Engliſh* (*j*) Conſonant, or ſoft (*g*), or (*dg*), is compounded of (*d*) and (*y*), as is plain from *Jar*, *joy*, *gentle*, *lodging*, which ſound *Dyar*, *dyoy*, *dyentle*, *lodying*, &c. the *Arabian Gjien* (which Letter, tho' it deſcend from the *Hebrew Gimel*, retains not its Sound) and the *Italian Gi*.

The *French* (*j*) Conſonant and ſoft (*g*) is compounded of the Conſonants (*zy*); for their *Je*, *J*; *age*, *aye*, &c. are *Zye*, *azye*, &c. the *Perſians* expreſs this Sound by their *Zye*; which is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabian Ze* by having three Points over it.

The *German* (*j*) Conſonant is plainly a ſimple Sound, that is, as we have ſaid, the ſame with the *Engliſh* (*y*).

The *Engliſh* (*ſh*), the *French* (*ch*), the *German* (*ſch*), the *Hebrew* and *Arabic* (*ſhin*) ſound (*ſy*), for the *French Chambre*, the *Engliſh ſhame*, and the *German ſcham*, ſound *Syambre*, *ſyame*, *ſyam*. The *Welſh* expreſs this Sound by (*ſi*), wherefore with them (with a Note of Production over the following Vowel) *Sion*, (*John*), is a *Monoſyllable*, but *Sion* (Mount *Sion*) a Word of two Syllables.

The *Engliſh* (*ch*) or (*tch*), ſounds (*ty*), for *Orchard*, *Riches*, &c. ſound *Ort-yard*, *Rit-yes*, &c. The *Italians* pronounce their (*c*) thus before (*e*) and (*i*). The *Perſians*, to expreſs this Sound, beſides the *Arabic* Alphabet, make uſe of their (*che*), which, by having three Points beneath it, is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabic Gjim*. If before the *Engliſh* Word *yew*, you ſeverally put *d*, *t*, *ſ*, *z*, it will be made *dyew*, *tyew*, *ſyew*, *zyew*, which is the *Engliſh Jew*, *chew*, *ſhew*, and the *French Jeu*, Play.

The (*X*) of the *Latins*, and almoſt all other Languages, and the *Greek* (ξ), is compos'd of (*cſ*), (*κσ*). This Letter is not known to the *Hebrews*, nor the Oriental Tongues; but in the room of it they write thoſe ſimple Letters of which it is compos'd; which the *Germans* likewiſe often do, for their *Ochs*, *wachs*, *ſechs*, *ſechſt*, &c. are the *Engliſh Ox*, *wax*, *ſix*, *ſixt*; the *Welſh* always write this with (*cſ*).

The *Latin* (*k*) was anciently put (*ca*), and they promiſcuouſly wrote *Calendæ*, and *Kalendæ*; but it now generally has the ſame ſimple Sound which the *Greek* (κ), whence it is deriv'd, or the *Latin* (*c*), and it wou'd be plainly a ſuperfluous Letter if (*c*) always retain'd its genuine Sound; and therefore the *Welſh*, whoſe (*c*) has always one conſtant Sound, have no ſuch Letter, as well as ſome other Nations.

The *Latin* (*q*) of old, put for (*cu*) or rather (*cw*), which has always (*u*) after it, has the very ſame Sound with (*c*) or (*k*) and is a ſuperfluous Letter. The *Welſh* have it not, but always put for (*q*), (*cw*), or (*chw*). And the *Anglo-Saxons* wrote *Cþen*, that is, *Cwen* for *Queen*.

The *Engliſh* (*wh*) is pronounc'd perfectly (*hw*), and the *Anglo-Saxons* us'd to place them ſo; and we cannot tell how the ſucceeding *Engliſh* came to invert the Poſition, and ſet the (*w*) before the (*h*).

But this is worthy our Obſervation, That the Conſonants (*y*) and (*w*), tho' it be not minded, moſt commonly are ſubjoin'd to kindred Conſonants before kindred Vowels; that is, (*y*) is often ſubjoin'd to the Guttural Conſonants (*c*) (*g*), when a Palatine Vowel follows; for *can*, *get*, *begin*, &c. ſound as if they were written *cyan*, *gyet*, *bigyin*, &c. for the Tongue can ſcarce paſs from theſe Guttural Conſonants, to form the Palatine Vowels, but it muſt pronounce (*y*). But it is not ſo before the other Vowels, as in *call*, *Gall*, *go*, *Gun*, *Gooſe*, *come*, &c. (*W*) is ſometimes ſubjoin'd to the Labial or Lip Conſonants (*p*) and (*b*) eſpecially before open (*o*); as *Pot*, *Boy*, *boil*,

boil, &c. which are ſounded as if ſpelt thus, *Pwoi*, *Bwoy*, *bwoil*, &c. but this is not always done, nor by all Men.

We have (*page* 2) conſider'd Letters, as the Signs of Sounds, but have not yet examin'd the *Analogy* they bear to the Sounds they repreſent. We have already ſaid, that *Sounds* are taken for the Signs of our Thoughts, and that Men invented certain Figures, to be the Signs of thoſe *Sounds*. But whereas theſe Figures or Characters, in their firſt Inſtitution, ſignifie immediately only the *Sounds*, yet Men often carry'd their Thoughts of the Characters, to the very *Things* which the *Sounds* ſignify'd; whence it comes to paſs, that the Characters may be conſider'd two ways, *viz.* either as they ſimply ſignify the *Sound*, or as they aſſiſt us in conceiving that which is ſignify'd by the *Sound*.

Four Things are neceſſary to give them their Perfection in the firſt State.

(1.) That every Figure or Character mark or denote ſome *Sound*: that is to ſay, That no Character be ſet down in any Word, but what is pronounc'd.

(2.) That every *Sound*, which is expreſs'd in the Pronunciation, be mark'd with ſome Figure: that is to ſay, That we pronounce nothing but what is written.

(3.) That every Figure mark only one ſimple, or compounded Sound.

(4.) That one and the ſame *Sound*, be not mark'd by more Figures than one.

But conſidering the Character in the ſecond manner, that is to ſay, As they help us in the Conception of thoſe Things, which the *Sounds* ſignify; we find ſometimes, that it is for the Better, that the foregoing Rules are not always obſerv'd, eſpecially the firſt and the laſt.

Becauſe firſt, it often happens in thoſe Languages which are deriv'd from Others, that there are certain Letters, which are not pronounc'd, and which, for that reaſon, are of no manner of uſe to the Sound, but are yet uſeful in helping us to underſtand that which the Words ſignifie. As for Example, in the French Words, *Champs*, *Temps*, and *Chants*, the (*p*) and (*t*) are not pronounc'd, which are of uſe to the ſignification, becauſe by them we find, that the firſt comes from *Campus*, and *Tempus*, the later from *Cantus*.

In Hebrew itſelf there are Words which differ only by one ending in *Aleph*, and the other in *Hamech*, that are not pronounc'd; as יָרֵא, which ſignifies *to fear* or *dread*, and יָרֶה, *to throw, fling, caſt*, &c.

Hence 'tis plain, that this Abuſe of Words (as 'tis call'd) is not without its Benefit to the Language.

The difference between the Capitals and Small Letters, may ſeem to ſome a Contradiction to the fourth Rule, That *one and the ſame Sound be not mark'd with more than one Figure*: And for this Reaſon, they urge, that the ancient, as well as the preſent Hebrew, had none of this difference; and that the *Greeks* and *Romans*, for a long time, made uſe of only Capital Letters in their Writing. But this Diſtinction is of great Advantage, and Beauty, in mingling with a pleaſing Variety the Capitals and Small Letters, in the beginning of Periods, proper Names, &c. and to diſtinguiſh Names from Words of Affirmation, and all other Parts of Speech.

Beſides, this Objection will hold againſt the Difference of Hands, or Figures of Writing or Printing, as the Roman, *Italic*, German, &c. in the Impreſſion of this very Book, or any other Language, ancient or modern, which is very uſefully imploy'd in the Diſtinction, either of certain Words, or certain Diſcourſes and Sentences, which conveys the Force and Energy intended by the Author, to the Reader, and does not at all change the Pronunciation.

Tho' what we have ſaid be ſufficient

cient to ſhow, that the uſe of Letters which are not pronounc'd, is not ſo great an Imperfection as generally imagin'd, at leaſt in thoſe Inſtances, and Particulars of Words deduc'd from other Languages; yet it muſt be allow'd, that there are too many crept in by a Corruption which has ſpread it ſelf through ſeveral Languages. Thus it muſt be confeſs'd, that it is a certain Abuſe to give the Sound of (*s*) to (*c*), before an (*e*) and (*i*), and of pronouncing (*g*) before the ſame Vowels, otherwiſe than before the others; of having ſoften'd the (*s*) between two Vowels; and of giving (*t*) the Sound of (*s*) before (*i*), follow'd by another Vowel, as *Gratia*, *Action*, *Diction*, &c.

Some People have imagin'd, that they cou'd Correct this Fault in the Vulgar Tongues, by inventing new Characters, as Mr. *Lodwick* has done in his univerſal *Alphabet*, and *Ramus*, in his *Grammar* of the *French Tongue*, by retrenching every Letter that was not pronounc'd, and writing every Sound by that Letter, to which the Sound to be expreſs'd was proper, as by placing an (*s*) before (*i*) and (*e*), and not a (*c*) and the like: But he, and all others of his Mind, ought to conſider, that beſides the Diſadvantage this wou'd be to the Vulgar Tongues, for the Reaſons urg'd before, they wou'd attempt an Impoſſibility; and they little think how difficult a thing it is to change, and bring the People of a whole Nation to the change of a Character they have been us'd to, Time out of Mind; and the Emperor *Claudius* found himſelf diſappointed in an Attempt of this Nature, and was fain to lay aſide his Deſign of introducing a Character he had prepar'd.

All that can be done in this particular, is to retrench by degrees all thoſe Letters which are of no Uſe, either to the Pronunciation, or the Senſe, or Analogy of Languages, as the *French*, and we have begun to do; and to preſerve thoſe, that are uſeful, and to ſet ſome certain ſmall Marks to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe, which are pronounc'd, or which may intimate to us the ſeveral Pronunciations of the ſame Letter. But even this labours under a Difficulty not to be remov'd but by degrees, and in many Years; for the altering any of the preſent, or adding any new Characters at once, wou'd be of no manner of Uſe, while all the chief Books of the Language are without theſe Marks or Alterations, and ſo many People muſt be oblig'd to learn their *Alphabet* over again, or be puzl'd to read what wou'd then be Written or Printed. And indeed, the Rules we have given in theſe Caſes, will (we perſuade our ſelves) be of more Uſe than all theſe Projects for directing the Learner. Yet, to omit nothing that has been offer'd with any Probability, we ſhall add the Method of a *French* Author, to this End; a Point above or below will ſerve for the firſt Caſe, and when (*c*) is pronounc'd like (*s*), it may have a Tail added; and when the (*g*) is pronounc'd like an (*j*) Conſonant, its Tail need not be quite clos'd.

The End of the First Part.

Part II.

Chap. V.

Of Syllables.

A Syllable's *a compleat and perfect Sound,*
In which one ſingle, or one double Vowel's *found;*
Or either join'd with Conſonants, *and ſpoke*
In one ſole breathing, as in Cloke.

[1] A Syllable is a compleat Sound utter'd in one Breath, which ſometimes conſiſts of one *Vowel*, or double *Vowel*, ſometimes of one *Vowel*, or double *Vowel* join'd to one or more *Conſonants*, not exceeding ſeven in Number.

By this Definition it is plain, that one ſingle Vowel may compoſe a Syllable; as the firſt Syllables in the following Words, *A-braham*, *E-ternal*, *I-vory*, *O-rient*, *U-nity*. But no num-

[1] The Word SYLLABLE is deriv'd from the Latin *Syllaba*, and that from the *Greek* Word συλλαβη from συλλαμβάνειν, which is to comprehend; ſo that *Syllaba*, in the Latitude of the Term, may be taken for any Comprehenſion or Connection in general, but in a *Grammatical* Senſe, only for a Connection of Letters in one Sound. *Scaliger* has defin'd a *Syllable* to be an Element under one Accent, that is, what can be pronounc'd at once: *Priſcian* more plainly has it, *Comprehenſio Literarum*, &c. *a Comprehenſion of Letters falling under one Accent, and produc'd by one Motion of breathing*. Yet this has been rejected by ſome GRAMMARIANS, as imperfect, and excluding all Syllables of one Letter: Another has defin'd it thus, *A* SYLLABLE *is a literal or articulate Voice of an individual Sound*; for every Syllable muſt fall under the ſame Accent, for as many Vowels as may occur in a Word, to be produc'd under divers Accents, or with ſeveral Motions of the breathing ſo many Syllables; and on the contrary, tho' there be ſeveral Vowels, if they are pronounc'd under one Accent, and with one Breathing, they make but one *Syllable*.

In every Word, therefore, there are as many Syllables as there are vocal Sounds, and vocal Sounds are Vowels ſimple or compound, and each of theſe in its Formation, requires a diſtinct Motion of the Pectoral Muſcles. Thus *a*, *a*, *a*, make three Syllables, form'd by ſo many Motions, diſtinguiſh'd by ſmall Stops betwixt each Expiration or Breath-

ing

number of Conſonants can be ſounded without a Vowel, for tho', after the *Mutes* and *Liquids*, (*bl*), (*cr*), in *Table* and *Acre*, the (*e*) be quieſcent, or at leaſt obſcure, yet that Sound, which is expreſs'd by thoſe Conſonants, is deriv'd from that (*e*), by which, making a ſort of Sound, we think (*bl*) and (*cr*) are not juſt Exceptions made to this Rule, for from Verſification it is plain, that *Table* is compos'd of a long and a ſhort Syllable.

As many Vowels *as emit a Sound,*
So many Syllables *in Words are found.*

As many Vowels, or double Vowels, as are found in any Word, of ſo many Syllables is that Word compos'd, except any of the Vowels be ſilent or quieſcent, as the final (*e*), and ſome Vowels which make the improper double Vowels, the Rules of which have been already given in the *Firſt Part* treating of LETTERS, and the (*e*) which is added to ſome Syllables in the middle of Words; as the (*e*) in *Advancement* and *Rudesby*, which ſerve only to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. Except likewiſe Words ending in (*es*), and no (*s*) coming before (*e*); as *Names*, *Trades*, &c. but if (*s*), or the Sound of (*s*), comes before (*es*), it is another Syllable; as *Horſes*, *Aſſes*, &c. *Faces*, *Races*, *Pages*, *Prizes*: And when (*u*) follows (*g*) or (*q*); as in *Quart*, *Guide*, *Guilt*, &c. and when (*e*) is follow'd by (*n*); as in *even*, *Heaven*, &c. but when this (*e*) is generally left out, they become one Syllable every where.

Eight Letters in ſome Syllables *we find,*
And no more Syllables *in Words are join'd.*

[2] As there are but eight Letters in any Syllable, ſo has no Word above ſeven or eight Syllables (and few in *Engliſh* ſo many) as *Re-con-ci-li-a-ti-on*, *In-com-pre-hen-ſi-bi-li-ty*.

To divide Syllables juſtly in Writing, eſpecially when part of a Word is written in one Line, and part in another, this is a general Rule.

When any ſingle Conſonant *is ſeen,*
Single or double Vowels *plac'd between,*
The Conſonant *divides ſtill with the laſt,*
But to the firſt the (P) *and* (X) *joins faſt.*

When

ing, whereas one (*a*) of the ſame length, is form'd but by one.

[2] In *Hebrew*, all the Syllables begin with a Conſonant, allowing *Aleph* to be one, and a Syllable has never more than one Vowel.

When a ſingle Conſonant comes between two Vowels, or between a ſingle and double-Vowel, it muſt in the dividing Syllables be joyn'd to the later.

Except when (x) or (p) comes between two Vowels; for they are joyn'd to the firſt, as in *Ex-ample*, *Ox-en*, *up-on*; except *Su-pine*.

In compound Words its own will each retain,
The ſame additional Endings muſt obtain.

Except Compounds, where each Word compounding retains its proper Letters; as *un-arm'd*, *un-uſual*, *in-ure*, *adorn*, *with-out*, *with-in*, *Safe-ty*, *love-ly*, *Name-leſs*, &c.

When a Word receives an additional Termination, or ending; as (ed) *Wing-ed*; (edſt) *Deliver-edſt*; (eth) *Deliver-eth*; (for which *Delivers* is now written, and the former ending entirely rejected) (eſt) *Deliver-eſt*; (ing) *Deliver-ing*; (er) *Deliver-er*; (ance) *Deliver-ance*.

The Conſonants *preceeding* (l) *and* (r),
Follow'd by (e) *never divided are.*

As *in-ſe-pa-ra-ble*, *Tri-fle*, *Mi-tre*, &c. But this Rule ſeems included in that of initial Conſonants.

Two Conſonants *betwixt two* Vowels *plac't*,
If they begin a Word, purſue the laſt.
But thoſe that can no Word at all begin,
Can ne'er a Syllable, *without a Sin.*

When two Conſonants come between two Vowels, if they be ſuch as can begin a Word, they both go to the latter Vowel; but if they cannot begin a Word, they muſt be parted, one joyning the firſt Vowel, and the other the latter.

To make this the plainer, we ſhall here enumerate the double-Conſonants that can begin Words; which you may eaſily know by putting (e), or any other Vowel, after them, and if they naturally and eaſily fall into one articulate Sound, they can begin a Word; if not, they muſt be parted into diſtinct Syllables.

Theſe Conſonants that begin Words, are Thirty in number.

Bl.	*Bleed*	Gl.	*Glory*
Cl.	*Clear*	Pl.	*Plane*
Fl.	*Fleet*	Sl.	*Slight*
Br.	*Brace*	Gr.	*Grove*
Cr.	*Croud*	Pr.	*Prince*
Dr.	*Dry*	Tr.	*Treat*
Fr.	*Froſt*	Wr.	*Wrath*

Ch.

Ch. *Change*	*Sn.* *Snare*
Dw. *Dwarf*	*Sp.* *Spill*
gn. *gnaw*	*Sq.* *Squib*
Kn. *Knave*	*ſt.* *ſtill*
Qu. *Queen*	*Sw.* *Swear*
ſc. *ſcant*	*th.* *this*
ſh. *ſhow*	*tw.* *two*
ſm. *ſmart*	*Wh.* *Wheel.*

Nine ways Words begin with three Conſonants, as,

Sch. *Scheme*	*Spl.* *Spleen.*
Scr. *Screen*	*ſtr.* *ſtrain*
Shr. *Shrine*	*Thr.* *Three*
Skr. *Skrew*	*Thw.* *Thwart*
Spr. *Spread*	

In ſhort, all this Rule is compriz'd in this, that a *Mute* and a *Liquid* following one-another, go together with the laſt Vowel, but all double-Conſonants in the middle beſides, are divided.

To this, as well as the former Rules, this Exception holds, That Compounds keep each its Part, as has been obſerv'd; and additional Endings are diſtinct Syllables.

But ſuch Conſonants as cannot begin a Word, can never begin a Syllable, and muſt therefore be parted in the Diviſion of Syllables; as in *ſel-dom*, for *(ld)* can't begin a Word; *(lt)* in *Mul-tiply*, *Trumpet*, *ar-dent*, *Can-did*, *ac-cord*, *ſwag-ger*, &c.

When three or more Conſonants meet in the middle of a Word, that Word is generally a Compound, and therefore each keeping its own, generally the firſt Conſonant goes to the firſt Vowel, and the other to the latter; as in *Con-tract*, *In-ſtruction*, &c.

Two Vowels *meeting each with its full ſound,*
Always to make two Syllables *are bound.*

If two Vowels come together, and both fully ſounded, they muſt be divided, and make two Syllables, as *Re-enter*, *Mu-tual*, &c.

The following Obſervations relating to Syllables, or to the Pronunciation of Letters, as they are plac'd in Syllables, and not ſingly by themſelves, we thought more proper for this place, than where they have been plac'd by Others; for to talk of the Pronunciation of Syllables, before the Learner knows what a Syllable is, ſeems ſomething prepoſterous.

The

The Sound of (*ſhal*) in Words of more Syllables than one, is written in ſome by (*ti*) before (*al*), as *Credential*, *Equinoctial*, *Eſſential*, *Nuptial*, *Impartial*, &c. Some others write (*ci*) before (*al*), as *Artificial*, *Beneficial*, *Judicial*, *Prejudicial*, &c. and the Reaſon is, that the Primitive Words from whence theſe are deriv'd, end in (*ce*), as *Artifice*, *Benefice*, *Prejudice*, &c. or from the *Latin* Words, in which as (*t*), or (*c*) is us'd, it continues in *Engliſh*, as *Judicial*, from *Judicialis*, &c.

The Sound of (*ſhan*), muſt be written (*cian*), as *Arithmetician*, *Grecian*, *Logician*, *Magician*, &c. from *Arithmetic*, *Grece*, *Logic*, and *Magic*; and ſo all others from the (*c*) in *Latin*, except *Ocean*, *Preciſian*, *Tertian*, *Egyptian*, *Aſian*, &c.

The Sound of (*ſhate*) is expreſs'd by (*ti*), before (*ate*), in *Gratiate*, *expatiate*, *negotiate*, *vitiate*, &c. except *emaciate*, *Aſſociate*, *Nauſeate*.

The Sound of (*ſhent*) is written by (*cient*), in *Ancient*, *Proficient*, &c. (*cient*), in *Patient*, *Impatient*, &c. and (*ſcient*), in *Omniſcient*, &c.

The Sound of *zhun*, or *ſhun* in the End of Words, muſt be written (*tion*), with (*t*), except *Alluſion*, *Animadverſion*, *Aſcenſion*, *Aſperſion*, *Averſion*, *Circumciſion*, *Colliſion*, *Colluſion*, *Comprehenſion*, *Compulſion*, *Concluſion*, *Condeſcenſion*, *Confuſion*, *Contuſion*, *Convulſion*; *Deciſion*, *Decurſion*, *Deluſion*, *Diviſion*, *Diffuſion*, *Dimenſion*, *Diſcurſion*, *Diſpanſion*, *Diſperſion*, *Deſſenſion*, *Diſtenſion*, *Diſſuaſion*, *Diverſion*, *Diviſion*, *Divulſion*; *Effuſion*, *Emulſion*, *Eroſion*, *Evaſion*, *Everſion*, *Exciſion*, *Excluſion*, *Excurſion*, *Expanſion*, *Exploſion*, *Expulſion*, *Extenſion*, *Extruſion*; *Illuſion*, *Immerſion*, *Inciſion*, *Incluſion*, *Incurſion*, *Inheſion*, *Inſperſion*, *Introverſion*, *Intruſion*, *Invaſion*, *Irriſion*; *Manſion*; *Occaſion*, *Occiſion*, *Occluſion*; *Penſion*, *Perſuaſion*, *Proviſion*; *Reprehenſion*, *Reverſion*, *Revulſion*; *Sponſion*, *Suffuſion*; *Verſion*: To theſe add the following Words in (*ſſion*), as *Admiſſion*, *Commiſſion*, *Compaſſion*, *Compreſſion*, *Conceſſion*, *Concuſſion*, *Confeſſion*; *Deceſſion*, *Depreſſion*, *Diſmiſſion*; *Expreſſion*; *Impreſſion*, *Interceſſion*; *Miſſion*; *Omiſſion*, *Oppreſſion*; *Paſſion*, *Percuſſion*, *Permiſſion*, *Proceſſion*, *Profeſſion*, *Progreſſion*; *Seceſſion*, *Seſſion*, *Succeſſion*.

The following Words written (*ſition*), tho' moſt of the like Sound are ſpelt (*tition*), as *Petition*; *Acquiſition*, *Compoſition*, *Depoſition*, *Diſpoſition*, *Diſquiſition*; *Expoſition*; *Inquiſition*, *Interpoſition*; *Poſition*; *Tranſition*, *Tranſpoſition*. [3]

Part

[3] At the End of this ſhort *Part* of our Diviſion, we ſhall lay down a new Method of learning to Read in all Languages, as we find it in a *French* Author, and which perhaps an ingenious School-maſter may improve to the Advantage of his Scholars: To which we ſhall add, what Mr. *Lodwick*, our own Countryman, has advanc'd on the ſame Head.

This Method (ſays our Author) regards chiefly thoſe, who cannot Read: It is certain, that the Learners find no great difficulty in learning the Letters themſelves, but the hardeſt Labour and Pains they go through, is in joining the Letters together in Syllables. For every Letter has its peculiar Name, which is pronounc'd differently by it ſelf, from what it is in Conjunction with other Letters; for Example, If you teach a Child to pronounce *Fry* in a Syllable, you firſt make him pronounce *ef, er, y*; which muſt perfectly confound him, when he comes to joyn theſe three Sounds together, out of them to form the Sound of the Syllable *Fry*.

The ſame Obſervation is made by Mr. *Lodwick*; As the preſent *Alphabet*, ſays he, are imperfect, ſo are alſo the *Primmers*, or firſt *Books*, wherein Children are taught to Spell and Read. Firſt, In not having a perfect *Alphabet*. And Secondly, In not being digeſted in ſuch a Method, as is fit and proper to teach them as they ought to be taught. For the uſual Way of teaching to Spell, is to diſmember every Syllable (of more than one Letter) into many Syllables, by expreſſing every Letter a-part, and *Syllabically*; and the Conſonants with ſuch a Vowel as they are ordinarily nam'd with, and then requiring them to join all theſe Syllables into one Word.

But how prepoſterous this Method is, one Inſtance for all will manifeſt: Suppoſe the Monoſyllable *Brand*, to be ſpell'd, they will teach them thus to diſmember it; *Bee, er, a, en, dee*, and then require them to join theſe into one Syllable, which 'tis impoſſible for them to do, and they muſt expreſs this one Syllable by five Syllables, which was not deſign'd; whereas they ſhou'd teach them to expreſs every Syllable entire at firſt ſight, without diſmembering it; and to do this, they muſt proceed gradually: Firſt beginning with the moſt *ſimple Syllables*, and ſo by degrees proceeding to the more difficult and *compounded*, till they can readily pronounce a whole Syllable at firſt ſight; even the moſt difficult that are. To that end let all the *Primmers* be thus contriv'd; at the top of the Leaf, let all the Vowels be plac'd ſingly in Order, as they follow in one Rank, and in the ſame place Syllables, 1ſt, Of *one Vowel*, and *one Conſonant* following it, throughout all the Variations; then of *one Conſonant*, and *one Vowel* following that. 2*dly*, Of *two Conſonants* before, and *one Vowel* following throughout the Variations. 3*dly*, Of *one Vowel*, and *three* or *four Conſonants* following; and of *three Conſonants* going before, and *one Vowel* following. 4*thly*, Of *one, two*, and *three Conſonants* going before a *Vowel*; and *one, two, three*, or *four Conſonants* following. 5*thly*, Of ſome Syllables with Diphthongs and Triphthongs. For Example:

a. e. i. o. u, &c.
ab. eb. ib. ob. ub, &c.
ad. ed. id. od. ud, &c.
ba. be. bi. bo. bu, &c.
ald. eld. ild. old. uld, &c.
dra. dre. dri. dro. dru, &c.
balm. belm. bilm. bolm. bulm, &c.

After this, place a number of Words of *two, three*, or *four Syllables*, from the more eaſy, to the more difficult Expreſſions, without heed to their Significations; tho' in our Opinions, if there cou'd be ſome Order and Connections in their Signification, it would help the Memory: Further, let there follow ſome Words of ſeveral Syllables, with the Accent variouſly plac'd, as on the *firſt, ſecond*, and *third*, &c.

Thus

Thus far Mr. *Lodwick*, who proceeds farther, but that relating too much to his Universal *Alphabet*, can not have a place here.

To this we shall add some Rules of Spelling, which tho' we did not think full enough of Demonstration to be inserted in the Body of the Rules, yet since they really afford Matter of Speculation sufficient to employ the curious Teacher or Learner of his *Mother Tongue*, and may perhaps be render'd capable of Improvement, we shall here add. They were given us by one Dr. *Jones*, who (as we ghess by his Name) being a *Welsh-man*, may, in some Particulars of his Book, be misled by the Pronunciation of his own Tongue; yet is his Book worth our Consideration. But this will be plainer from his Observations.

His Maxims are, first, *That all Words were Originally Written as Spelt.* Tho' this may be disputed, yet the Consequence is not so great as to make us enter into the Controversie.

His next is, *That all Terms which have since alter'd their Sound*, (the Origin of the difficulty of Spelling) *did it for Ease and Pleasure.*

From the *harder*, *harsher*, *longer*, to the *easier*, *pleasanter*, and *shorter* Sounds, which for that Reason became the more usual. From hence it follows, *That all Words that can be sounded several ways, must be Written according to the hardest, harshest, longest and most unusual Sound.* And this Rule, he assures us, is without Exception in our Tongue.

The longest Sound is that which expresses most simple Sounds, or sounds the same number after the longest manner, thus, if you say *agen* and *again*, it must be written *again*; because it sounds more Letters. The same may be said of *Favor* and *Favour*.

The more unusual Sound is known to all, by common Practice.

Thus none can fail to know which is the *longest* and most *unusual Sound*, and that its sufficient almost in all Cases, because the length and unusualness of the Sound, causes it to be the harder Sound, which is the third thing to be observ'd in this universal Rule.

But to make the use of this Rule compleat, because it may happen that some Words (tho' not many) may sound divers ways, and yet express the same number of Letters, and that in the same manner, either long or short, and both Sounds alike usual, as in *Anger*, and *Angur*; *Finger*, and *Fingur*, &c. it will be useful to know which in such a Case is the easier and pleasanter simple Sound, and to which harder and harsher Sounds they are so like, as that they are apt to exchange Sounds with 'em.

A is much easier than *E* or *O*; *B*, than *P*; *D*, than *T* or *th* in *tho'*; *E*, than *I*, *O*, *U*; *EE*, than *E*, *I*, *O*; *G*, than *C* for *K*, or hard *C*, or *ch* in *chew*; *M*, *ng*, than *N*; *Ou*, than *O* or *U*; *Sh*, than *Ch* or *S*; *T* in *The*, than *Th*; short *U*, than *A*, *E*, *I*, *O*; *V*, than *F* or *Ph*; *Z*, than *S* in *so*.

Simple Sounds are easier than Compounds; Compounds of two Sounds, than Compounds of three, and so on; and Compounds of easie Sounds, than Compounds of hard Sounds.

Double Characters are to be reckon'd as single, if they have but one Sound.

We have omitted the particular Proofs of these Rules, which the Reader may consult his Book for, if his Curiosity prompt him; this being sufficient to give Ground to his Enquiry; And, we believe, in trying, he will find 'em sometimes pretty true, if not always.

The End of the Second Part.

Part

Part III.

Of WORDS. [1]

INTRODUCTION.

WE come now from meer Sounds, to [2] *Words*, which convey ſomething to the Underſtanding: For by theſe we are able to expreſs our Thoughts, or Sentiments of all that we ſee, feel, hear, taſte, touch, or underſtand. All *Knowledge* indeed draws its Original from the Senſes; and our *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reaſoning*, under which the ſeveral Claſſes, or Orders of Words, are rang'd, proceed from theſe Notices of Things, and Beings, and their Relations to each other, and have no other Source: By theſe we know, that there are Things; that theſe Things have certain Qualities, Beings, Actions, or Paſſions, *&c.* whence it ſeems pretty plain, that the *Words*, which are to expreſs our Sentiments of theſe Things, muſt bear ſome Proportion and Likeneſs to the Things they are to expreſs. Being therefore in *Converſation*, or *Writing* to expreſs or ſignifie all the Objects of our Senſes, and the mental, or intellectual Deductions from them, *Words* are naturally, to that End, to be divided into four original Claſſes or Orders, i. e. *Things*, or rather the *Names* of *Things*; the *Qualities* of thoſe Things, the *Circumſtances*, *Actions*, *Paſſions*, and *Beings* of Things, with their *Relations*, *Regards*, and *Connections* to, and with each other in Sentences.

According to this, there are four Parts of Speech, or four Heads, to which every *Word* in all Languages may be reduc'd.

The four Parts of Speech.

[3] NAMES. } { AFFIRMATIONS.
QUALITIES. } { PARTICLES, or the *Manners* of *Words*.

[1] It

[1] It may here be proper to Explain what we mean by a *Word*, which we think may be thus defin'd: *A diſtinct articulate Sound, which Men have made the audible Sign of ſome one of their Thoughts.* Or if we rather take it from Words, as Written and Spoken, we may define it thus. *Words are diſtinct articulate Sounds, implying by common Conſent, ſome Thoughts or Operations of the Mind, expreſs'd by ſome certain Marks, Figures, or Characters agreed on by Men, as the viſible Signs of thoſe Sounds and Thoughts.*

This laſt Definition includes Words in both Senſes, that is, both as Spoken and Written.

[2] Man being a Converſible Animal, and form'd for Society, there was a Neceſſity of ſome Way or Means of conveying the Mind, or Thoughts of one Man to another; which tho' it might be in ſome meaſure done by the Eyes, Hands, Fingers, Motions and Geſticulations of the Body, *&c.* as in the Pantomimes of the Ancients, and Mutes of the Seraglio, *&c.* yet thoſe being more imperfect, as well as more troubleſome and tedious, Nature, (which always chooſes the eaſieſt and moſt efficacious Way) directs Mankind to impart the Sentiments of his Mind, rather by the Voice, and the Motions of the Tongue, which are more eaſy in the ſeveral Variations of Sounds, than any other Way. For this Reaſon, Men have diſtinguiſh'd every Modification of the Voice, by a particular Letter, (of which we have already diſcours'd at large, both in the Text, and the Notes); and tho' theſe Letters are not many in number, yet are they by their various Conjunctions, ſufficient for all the Languages that ever were, or ever can be in the Univerſe. They are indeed but Twenty-ſix in our Tongue, and yet they may be ſo variouſly diſpos'd, as to make more than five Hundred and Seventy-ſix ſeveral Words of two Letters; and Twenty-ſix times as many Words may be form'd of three Letters; that is to ſay, Fifteen thouſand and ſix; and Twenty-ſix times as many more may be made of four ſeveral Letters, that is, Nine hundred thouſand thirty-ſix; and ſo on in proportion. From this manifold Generation of Words, from the various Combinations of Letters, we may judge of their vaſt Variety, as being indeed not much leſs than Infinite.

[3] In all Languages there are *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*: *Names* ſignifie *Things*; *Qualities* ſignifie the Manners or Qualities of thoſe Things; *Affirmations* affirm ſomething of them. And there are other Words which ſignify neither of theſe, but the relation of one to the other, and thoſe are the *Manners of Words*: But theſe Relations of Words to Words are of ſeveral Kinds, which are expreſs'd by ſome of theſe Particles, or ſhort Words, *of*, *to*, *for*, *O*, *by*, *with*, *through*, *in*, &c. of which in *Conſtruction*.

It is true, that ſome have endeavour'd to reduce all Words to three Claſſes, which we ſhall conſider in our Notes; but others vainly boaſt, or pretend to contract 'em yet cloſer into two, either ignorant of the Operations of the Mind, which they were invented to expreſs, and which can never be brought into that compaſs, as will be plain from what follows; or for want of conſidering what they ſay; or to be thought Men of wonderful Penetration by ignorant Hearers. Thoſe Gentlemen, who have with great Clearneſs of Reaſon propos'd them under three Heads, have however told us, that ſome Philoſophers have thought themſelves oblig'd to add a fourth, diſtinct from the other three; as will appear from the Sequel.

Words having ſomething corporeal and ſomething ſpiritual in 'em, we may ſay, they conſiſt of Soul and Body: The Ideas of the Mind, when they command the Organs of the Voice, to form ſuch Sounds, which

are

are the audible Signs of those Ideas, are the *Souls* of Words; but Sounds form'd by the Organs of the Voice, are the material Part, and may be call'd the *Body* of *Words*.

We shall therefore, here consider them, as they are abstracted from Sound, in their Relation to the Mind of Man, and in which we have the Advantage of all other Creatures, and a very strong Proof of our Reason Superiour to them; that is, by the *Use* we make of *Words*, to convey our Thoughts to each Other, and that surprizing Invention of combining six and twenty Sounds in so multiplicious a manner, as we have said, by which we discover the Variety of our Thoughts, and all our Sentiments on all manner of Subjects, tho' there be no real or natural Likeness betwixt the Words, and Operations of the Soul of Man; but only Signs by Compact, and Agreement, to signify our Thoughts.

Words therefore, being (as is said) invented to express our Thoughts, it follows, that we cannot perfectly discover the different Sorts, and Significations of Words without, first considering what passes in our Minds.

It is agreed by all Philosophers, that there are three Operations of the Mind, *viz. Perception, Judgment*, and *Reasoning*.

PERCEPTION is the simple Apprehension of any Thing, or Quality of a Thing, whether purely *Intellectual*, as when we simply think of the *Being*, *Eternity*, and *Decree of God*; or *Corporeal*, and *Material*, as a *Square*, a *Circle*, a *Horse*, a *Dog*.

JUDGMENT affirms that the Thing we *perceive*, is so, or not so, as having the Ideas of the *Earth* and *Roundness*; affirm, *that the Earth is round*.

By REASONING, we draw Consequences to evince the Truth, or Fallacy of a contested Proposition, by comparing it with one or more incontestable Propositions; or in short, from two Judgments, to infer a third, as when we have judg'd that Virtue is Praise-worthy, and that *Patience* is a Virtue, we infer and conclude that *Patience* is Praise-worthy.

Hence we may easily observe, that this *third* Operation of the Mind, is but an Extension of the *second*. It will therefore be sufficient for our present Subject, to consider the first two, or what of the first is contain'd in the second; for if we seriously attend what passes in our Mind, we shall find, that we very rarely consider the simple Perception of Things, without affirming something or other of it, which is the Judgment.

This Judgment we make of Things, as when we say *the Earth is round*, is call'd a *Proposition*; and therefore every Proposition naturally includes two *Terms*, one call'd the *Subject*, which is the Thing, of which the *Affirmation* is, as *the Earth*; and the other is call'd the *Attribute*, which is the Thing that is affirm'd of the *Subject*, as *round*; and then, *is*, which is the Connection betwixt these two Terms.

But it is easy to perceive, that these two Terms do properly belong to the first Operation of the Mind, because that is what we *conceive*, and is the Objects of our Thoughts; and that the Connection belongs to the *second*, which may be properly call'd the Action of the *Mind*, and the manner in which we think.

And thus the greatest Distinction of that which passes in our Mind, is to signify, that we may consider the Objects of our Thoughts, and the Form and Manner of them, of which the chief is the *Judgment*. But we must besides refer thither the *Conjunctions*, *Disjunctions*, and other the like Operations of the Mind, as well as all the other Motions of the Soul, as Desires, Commands, Interrogations, *&c.*

From hence it follows, that Men wanting Signs to express what passes in the Mind, the most general

Diſtinction of Words, muſt be of thoſe which ſignify the Objects, and Manner of our Thoughts, tho' it frequently happens, that they do not ſignify the Manner alone, but in Conjunction with the Objects, as we ſhall ſoon demonſtrate; having already ſhown that the Knowledge of what paſſes in the Mind, is neceſſary for the underſtanding the Principles of GRAMMAR.

The Words of the firſt Claſs, are thoſe which we call *Names*, *Perſonal Names*; QUALITIES deriv'd from *Words of Affirmation*, or *Verbs* (call'd in the *Latin* Participles), *Fore-plac'd Words*, (or Prepoſitions), and *added Words*, (or *Adverbs*). Thoſe of the ſecond, are *Words of Affirmation*, (or *Verbs*) *joining Words*, (or Conjunctions) and Interjections, as the old GRAMMARIANS call'd them abſurdly, diſtinguiſhing them into a peculiar Part of Speech, which are plainly only *added Words* of Paſſion, which all derive themſelves by a neceſſary Conſequence, from the natural Manner of expreſſing our Thoughts.

CHAP. VI.

Of NAMES. [1]

Whate'er we ſee, feel, hear, *or* touch, *or* taſte,
Or in our Underſtanding's *Eye is plac'd,*
NAMES *properly we call; for always they*
Some certain Image to the Mind convey;
As Man, Horſe, Houſe, Virtue, *and* Happineſs,
And all ſuch Words as Things *themſelves expreſs.*

[2] NAMES expreſs the *Things themſelves*, that is, every Thing that is the Object of our ſeveral Senſes, Reflection, and Underſtanding; which conveying ſome certain *Idea*, or *Image*, to the Mind, they want not the Help of any other Word to make us underſtand 'em. Thus when we hear any one ſay, *A Man*, *a Houſe*, *a Horſe*, *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Happineſs*, &c. we perfectly underſtand what he means.

Before the NAMES, a, an, *or* the *may be,*
But Thing *you never after them can ſee.*

[3] Since

[1] The Words that ſignify the ſimple Objects of our Thoughts, are in all Languages, but *Engliſh*, call'd NAMES; but our firſt Formers of *Grammar*, either out of Affectation or Folly, corrupted the *Latin* Word *Nomen*, into the Barbarous ſound *Noun*, as it is call'd in the Vulgar *Grammars*. And thus the *Grammarians* have made a Diviſion of NAMES, calling the Name of a Thing or Subſtance, a *Noun Subſtantive*, and that, which ſignifies the *Manner* or *Quality*, a *Noun Adjective*.

jective. But these additional Terms of *Substantive* and *Adjective*, seem to us superfluous, and burthensom to the Minds of the young Learners; without any manner of Benefit to the Understanding; for the different Natures of the two Words is fully expres'd by the Terms NAMES and QUALITIES, and it is vain to do that by many, which may be done by few. Nature is simple in all her Operations, and he is the best Engineer, who produces the Effect, with the fewest Wheels, Screws, &c.

Those who use these Terms give this Reason for them, that they are call'd *Adjectives*, or (as some) *Adnouns*, because having no Natural Substance of their own, they subsist by nothing but the *Noun Substantive*, to which they are joyn'd; as in these two Words, *round Earth*; the last is the *Substantive*, and the first only signifies the Manner or Quality of its Being: That is, the *Adjective*, *Adname* or *Quality* cannot be put by it self in any Sentence; it wou'd not make Sense, it wou'd convey no Idea to the Mind; for to say *a Round*, *a White*, *a Black*, *a Crooked*, &c. is to say nothing: It requires therefore some *Name*, or *Noun Substantive*, as they call it, to be join'd to it, to make Sense, or form any Idea; as a *round Ball*, a *white Horse*, a *black Hat*, a *crooked Stick*, are true Objects of the Thoughts, and every Body understands them: But if you say *a Man*, *a Horse*, *a House*, &c. we perfectly know what you mean; and therefore subsisting by it self, in good Sense is call'd a Substantive Name, or in the vulgar Phrase a *Noun Substantive*.

[2] The Objects of our Thoughts are either *Things*, as the *Sun*, the *Earth*, *Water*, *Fire*, *Air*, *Wood*, &c. which we generally call SUBSTANCE; or the *Manner* of Things, as to be *round*, *red*, *hard*, *knowing*, &c. which are call'd ACCIDENTS. And there is this difference betwixt the *Things*, or *Substances*, and the *Manner of Things*, or *Accidents* that the *Substances* subsist by themselves; but the *Accidents* subsist only *by*, and *in* the *Substances*.

This is what makes the principal Difference betwixt Words, that signifie the simple Objects of our Thoughts; the Words which signifie *Substances*, or the Things themselves, are call'd *Names*, or *Substantive Names*; and those which signify *Accidents*, by expressing the *Subjects*, with which these Accidents agree, are call'd *Qualities*, or (according to the common Way) *Adjective Names*, or *Adnames*.

This is the first Original of *Names*, both *Substantive* and *Adjective*, or *Names* and *Qualities*. But we have not stopt here; for less Regard has been had to the Signification, than to the Manner of signifying. For, because the Substance is that which subsists by it self, the Appellation of *Substantive Names* has been given to all those Words which Subsist by themselves in Discourse, without wanting another *Name* to be join'd to them, tho' they did only signifie Accidents. Thus on the contrary, even those Words, which signifie Substances, are call'd *Adjectives*, when by their Manner of signifying they may be join'd to other *Names* in Discourse: As the *Warriour God*, *the Bowyer King*, and the like, which tho' they are call'd Names put together by Apposition, degenerate here plainly into the Signification of Qualities, belonging to the *Names*; and are therefore *Names* degenerated into *Qualities*, or *Substantives* into *Adjectives*.

But the Reasons that renders a Name uncapable of subsisting by it self, is when, besides its distinct Signification, it has another more confus'd, which we call the CONNOTATION of a Thing, to which that agrees which is meant by the distinct Signification.

Thus the distinct Signification of *Red*, is *Redness*, but it signifies the

Subject of that Redneſs, confus'dly, which makes it not capable of ſubſiſting by it ſelf in Diſcourſe, becauſe we muſt expreſs, or underſtand the Word which ſignifies the Subject. As, therefore, that *Connotation* makes the *Adjective*, or *Quality*, ſo when that is taken away from Words, which ſignify *Accidents*, they become *Subſtantives* or *Names*: As from *Colour'd*, *Colour*; from *Red*, *Redneſs*; from *Hard*, *Hardneſs*; from *Prudent*, *Prudence*, &c. On the contrary, when you add to Words ſignifying *Subſtances*, that *Connotation*, or confus'd Signification of a Thing, to which the *Subſtances* have Relation, makes them *Adjectives*, or *Qualities*, as *Man*, *Manly*, *Mankind*, &c.

The *Greeks* and the *Latins* have an infinite Number of theſe Words; as *ferreus*, *aureus*, *bovinus*, *vitulinus*, &c. but they are not ſo frequent in the *Hebrew*, nor in *French*, and many of the vulgar Tongues; but in the *Engliſh*, we think, they are not more rare, than in the dead Languages.

Again, if we take theſe *Connotations* from theſe *Adjectives* or *Qualities* form'd of *Names*, or of *Subſtantives*, we make them new *Subſtantives*, which we may properly call *Derivatives*, and ſo *Humanity* comes from *Humane*, and *Humanus* from *Homo*.

But there is another ſort of *Names*, which paſs for Subſtantives, tho' in Reality they are Adjectives, ſince they ſignify an *accidental* Form; and beſides, denote a Subject to which that Form agrees: Such are the Names of the ſeveral Offices, and Profeſſions of Men; as *King*, *Philoſopher*, *Painter*, *Soldier*, &c. but the Reaſon why theſe paſs for Subſtantives, is, that they can have nothing but Man for their Subject, at leaſt, according to the ordinary way of Speaking, and the firſt Impoſition of Names, ſo not neceſſary to join their Subſtantives with them, ſince they may be underſtood without any Confuſion, and they can have no Relation to any other Subject. By this means, theſe Words have obtain'd what is peculiar to Subſtantive, *viz.* to Subſiſt by themſelves in Diſcourſe.

'Tis for this very ſame Reaſon that certain *Names*, and *Perſonal Names*, or *Pronouns* are taken *Subſtantively*, becauſe they relate to a Subſtance ſo general, that it is eaſily underſtood, as our *Country*, *Earth* is underſtood; *Judea*, *Province* is underſtood.

And we have obſerv'd, that *Adjectives* or *Qualities* have two Significations; one diſtinct of the *Form*, and one confus'd of the *Subject*: But we infer not from thence, that they ſignifying the moſt diſtinct Signification, are alſo the moſt direct; for they ſignify the Subject directly, tho' more confus'dly, but the Form only indirectly, tho' more diſtinctly. Thus *White* ſignifies directly ſomething *that has Whiteneſs*, but in a very confus'd manner, without denoting in particular any one Thing that may have *Whiteneſs*, and it ſignifies *Whiteneſs* only indirectly, but in as diſtinct a manner as the Word *Whiteneſs* it ſelf.

There are two ſorts of *Ideas*, one repreſents to us a ſingle Thing, as the *Idea* of ones *Father*, *Mother*, a Friend, his own Horſe, his own Dog, *&c.* The other *Idea* preſents to us ſeveral things together, but of the ſame Kind, as the *Idea* of Man in general, Horſes in general, *&c.* But not having different *Names* for theſe different *Ideas*, we call the Names of ſingle *Ideas*, *proper Names*; as the Name of *Plato*, which agrees to one particular Philoſopher, ſo *London* to one City; and thoſe Names which ſignify common *Ideas*, general, or appellative Names, as the Word *Man*, which agrees with all Mankind; of the ſame Kind are the Words *Lion*, *Dog*, *Horſe*, &c. yet the proper Name often belongs to ſeveral at the ſame time, as *Peter*, *John*, *Robert*, &c. but this is only by Accident, by reaſon that many have taken the ſame Name; but then

Since *Names* expreſs the *Things themſelves*, you cannot put the Word *Thing* after 'em, without Nonſenſe. Thus you cannot ſay *Man Thing*, *Virtue Thing*, and the like.

They alſo admit of *a* or *the* before 'em, or *an*, if they begin with a Vowel.

Of Names *three ſeveral ſorts there are,*
As Common, Proper, Perſonal *declare.*

There are three ſorts of NAMES; *Common Names* are ſuch as agree to, or expreſs a whole Kind, as the Name *Horſe* ſignifies *my Horſe*, *your Horſe*, and all *the Horſes* that are.

Proper Names diſtinguiſh *Particulars* of the Kind from each other; as *Cæſar*, *Pompey*, *Cicero*, diſtinguiſh thoſe from all the reſt of Mankind. The ſame holds of the Proper Names of *Cities*, *Towns*, *Mountains*, *Rivers*, *Countries*, &c.

Perſonal Names are us'd when we ſpeak of *Perſons* or *Things*, to avoid the Repetition of the ſame Word, and ſupply the place of Names of Men, Women, and Things.

Two different Endings different Numbers ſhow,
And which no other Part of Speech do's know.

[3] *Names* in general ſignifying either one, or more of the ſame Kind, muſt have two different Numbers to expreſs this difference; as, the *Singular*, which ſignifies but *One*, and the *Plural*, which ſignifies *more* than *One*; and all *Names* diſcover this Diſtinction of Number, by the changing their Endings; as, *Man*, One Man; *Men*, more than One.

This likewiſe gives another Mark to diſtinguiſh *Names* from the other Parts of Speech: For tho' the *Affirmations* have two Numbers, yet are they not thus diſtinguiſh'd; as we ſhall ſee when we come to 'em. There are two more Diſtinctions of *Names*, which come properly after all the Parts of Speech, becauſe they depend on the Knowledge of 'em.

To Singular Names *we always add an* (s)
When we the Plural Number *wou'd expreſs*;
Or (es), *for more delightful eaſie ſound,*
Whene'er the Singular *to end is found*
In (ex), *or* (ze), (ch), (ſh), *or* (s)
(Ce), (ge) *when they their ſofter ſound confeſs.*

The *Singular* Number is made *Plural* by adding *(s)* to the *Singular*; as *Tree*, *Trees*; *Hand*, *Hands*; *Miles* and *Mile*: But when the Neceſſity of Pronunciation requires it in the

place of (*s*), we muſt add (*es*); that is, when the Singular ends in (*s*) or (*ſe*), (*ze*), (*x*), (*ſh*), (*ce*), (*ch*) or (*ge*) pronounc'd ſoft, as *Horſe*, *Horſes*; *Fox*, *Foxes*; *Fiſh*, *Fiſhes* and *Fiſh*; *Maze*, *Mazes*; *Prince*, *Princes*; *Tench*, *Tenches*; *Page*, *Pages*; by which means the *Plural Number* conſiſts of two Syllables, tho' the *Singular* is but one; as all the foregoing Examples ſhew.

The following Exceptions yet are ſeen,
When for the (s) *the* Plural *ends in* (en);
As Oxen, Women, Chicken, Brethren, Men.
Cow *has the Plural* Cows, *or* Keen, *or* Kine;
And ſo has Sow *the Plural* Sows *or* Swine.

Ox, *Chick*, *Man*, and all deriv'd from it, as *Horſeman*, *Footman*, &c. *Woman*, *Child*, *Brother*, have the Plural in (*en*); tho' *Brethren* ſignifying both *Brothers* and *Siſters*, has likewiſe *Brothers*; and *Swine* ſignifies both male and female, and with (*a*) before it, is us'd for *One Hog* or *Sow*. *Chicken* is ſometimes likewiſe us'd for *one Chick*: *Deer*, *Sheep*, *Fern*, are the ſame in both Numbers; of the Singular with (*a*) before them.

To theſe Irregulars *ſome more add yet*;
As Louſe, Lice; Mouſe, Mice; Gooſe, Geeſe; & Foot, Feet;
And Tooth, Teeth; Die, Dice; *and alſo* Penny, Pence
Deriv'd from Penny's, *Critics ſay*, *long ſince*.
The Names *whoſe Sing'lars end in* (f), *or* (fe),
Their Plurals have in (ves), *we always ſee*;
As Calf, Calves; Sheaf, Sheaves; half, halves; *and* Wife, Wives;
Leaf, Leaves; Loaf, Loaves; Shelf, Shelves; ſelf, ſelves; Knife, Knives:
Add unto theſe Wolf, Wolves; Thief, Thieves; Life, Lives.

Staff has *Staves*, tho' the double (*ff*) Singular generally makes double (*ff*) with (*s*) in the Plural; as *Cliff*, *Skiff*, *Muff*, &c. *Miſchief* is us'd both *Miſchieves* and *Miſchiefs* in the Plural; (*f*) and (*ve*) are ſo nearly related, that they eaſily paſs from one into the other, in all Languages.

Except Hoof, Roof, *and* Wharf, *and* Proof, Relief,
Ruff, Cuff, Skiff, Muff, Dwarf, Handkerchief, *and* Grief.

There may be ſome others of the ſame Kind, theſe are enow to make good the Exception in the ſound of thoſe Singulars that end in (*s*) and (*th*): There is a like Softning or Alleviation, without changing the Letters, as *Houſe*, *Houſes*, as

as it were *houzes*; *Path*, *Paths*; *Cloth*, *Cloths*, or *Cloaths*. *Earth* keeps its harder Sound when 'tis us'd in the *Plural*, which is but ſeldom.

Cuſtom, to which all Languages muſt bow,
Does to ſome Names no Singular *allow.*

Uſe has in *Engliſh*, as well as other Languages, deny'd the Singular Number to ſome Words; as *Annals*, *Alps*, *Aſhes*, *Bowels*, *Bellows*, *Breeches*, *Calends*, *Creſſes*, *Goods*, (meaning Things poſſeſs'd by any one, as the Goods of Fortune) *Entrails*, *Ides*, *Smallows* of every kind, *Nones*, *Sciſſars*, *Snuffers*, *Shears*, *Tongs*, *Lungs*, &c.

To others ſhe, with arbitrary Will,
Denys the Claim of Plural *Number ſtill*;
All Proper Names *we in this Rule contain,*
The Names of Liquids, Herbs, *moſt ſorts of* Grain,
Fat, Unctuous Matter, Wax, Pitch, *and* Glue,
The Names of Virtues, Vice, *and* Metals *too.*

As we have ſome Words which have no Singular Number, ſo on the other hand we have many more without a Plural; ſome by the Nature of the Things ſignified, others by meer Uſe. Thus all Proper Names of Men, Women, Mountains, Rivers, or any other Creature, to whom (for Diſtinction) a Proper Name is given; as *Bucephalus* to the Horſe of *Alexander the Great*: Theſe have no Plural Number, becauſe they naturally agree but to one: For when we ſay, the *Cæſars*, the *Alexanders*, the *Mordants*, and the like, it is figuratively, including under thoſe *Proper Names* all thoſe who reſemble them in their Valour, Conduct, Virtue, &c. except *Alps*, and perhaps *Appenines*.

To theſe we may add the Names of *Virtues*, *Vices*, *Habits*, abſtract Qualities; of *Metals*, *Herbs*, *Spices*, *Liquids*, *Unctuous Matter*, *Fat*, *Wax*, *Pitch*, *Glue*; moſt ſorts of Grain, as *Wheat*, *Rye*, *Barley*, *Darnel*, except *Oats* and *Tares*, (*Peas*, *Beans* and *Vetches* are Pulſe, not Grain, tho' ſet down by ſome for 'em) likewiſe *Chaff*, *Bran*, *Meal*. The Names of Spices, as *Pepper*, *Ginger*, *Mace*, *Cinnamon*, except *Cloves* and *Nutmegs*: Of Herbs and Drugs, *Cochineal*, *Sotherwood*, *Graſs*, *Madder*, *Rue*, *Moſs*, *Fennel*, *Roſemary*, *Wolfwort*, *Cliver*, *Endiff*, *Sage*, *Parſley*, *Spicknard*, *Spinach*, *Savory*, *Hellebore*, *Hemlock*, &c. except *Colworts*, *Leeks*, *Artichoaks*, *Cabbages*, *Nettles*, and thoſe whoſe Names are compounded with *Foot* or *Tongue*, as *Crowfoot*, *Adders-tongue*: Of Liquids, as *Air*, *Choler*, *Blood*, *Muſt*, or new *Wine*,

Wine, *Ale*, *Beer*, *Spittle*, *Snot*, *Sweat*, *Urine*, *Vinegar*, *Milk*: Of Unctuous Matter, as *Honey*, *Butter*, *Fat*, *Greaſe*, *Amber*, *Wax*, *Marrow*, *Pitch*, *Roſin*, *Tar*, *Glue*, *Lard*, *Dirt*, *Sulphur*, *Bitumen*, *Brimſtone*: Of Metals, as *Lead*, *Braſs*, *Pewter*, *Tinn*, *Copper*, *Silver*, *Gold*; add *Ivory*, *Jet*: Of Virtues, *Prudence*, *Juſtice*, *Chaſtity*; and of Vices, *Pride*, *Sloath*, *Envy*: Of Abſtract Qualities, *Wiſdom*, *Probity*, *Modeſty*, *Baſhfulneſs*, *Swiftneſs*, *Boldneſs*, *Conſtancy*, *Courage*, *Ardour*, *Candour*, *Contempt*, *Paleneſs*, *Fame*; add to theſe *Hunger*, *People*, *Vulgar*, *Offspring*, *Ruſt*, *Duſt*, *Soot*, *Wool*, &c.

The beſt Rule for this is, That Things that are ſmall and undiſtinguiſhable, want the *Plural* Number; but thoſe which are larger, and more diſtinguiſh'd, have it.

Thus much for *Names Common* and *Proper*; we ſhall conclude this Head with a thorough Examination of the *Third ſort*, call'd *Perſonal Names*. [4]

Three

then other Names are added, which determine and reſtore the Quality of a *proper Name*. Thus the Name of *Charles* is common to many, yet if you add the (2*d*), it becomes proper to the King of that Country where 'tis ſpoken. Nor is it neceſſary ſometimes to make any Addition, becauſe the Circumſtances of the Diſcourſe ſufficiently denote the Perſon that is ſpoken of.

[3] The *common Names* which agree to ſeveral, may be conſider'd ſeveral Ways: For *Firſt*, They may either be apply'd to one of the Things to which they agree, or may all be conſider'd in a certain Unity, which the Philoſophers call UNIVERSAL UNITY. 2*dly*, They may be apply'd to ſeveral together, conſidering them as ſeveral.

To diſtinguiſh theſe two ſorts of Ways of *Signifying*, two Numbers have been invented, the *Singular*, as a Man; the *Plural*, as *Men*. Nay, the *Greeks* have yet another *Number*, call'd the *Dual Number*, or ſignifying two; the *Hebrews* have the ſame, but that is only when the Words ſignifie a thing double either by Nature, as the *Eyes*, the *Hands*, the *Feet*; or by Art, as *Sciſſars*, *Tongs*, &c.

As for *Common* and *Appellative Names*, they ſeem all naturally to require a Plural Number, yet are there ſeveral which have none, whether by the Influence of Cuſtom only, or ſome Reaſon; ſo the *Names* of *Gold*, *Silver*, *Iron*, or other Metals, have ſcarce any Plural in any Language. The Reaſon of which we fancy to be this, That becauſe of the great Reſemblance there is between the Parts of Metals, every Species thereof is not conſider'd, as having ſeveral Individuals under it. This is very palpable in the *French*, where to denote a ſingular Metal, we add the Particle of Partition, *de L'or*, *de L'Argent*, *du Fer*, Gold, Silver, Iron, as we ſay *Irons*, but then it ſignifies not the Metal it ſelf, but Inſtruments made of Iron; the Latin *Æra*, ſignifies Money, or a certain ſounding Inſtrument, like the Cymbal, &c.

But this difference of Number in the Names, is expreſs'd by a difference of Termination or Ending, as is expreſs'd in the Text. But tho' *Qualities* ſhou'd have a Plural, becauſe they naturally imply an uncertain Signification of a Subject, which renders them capable of agreeing with ſeveral Subjects, at

leaſt

leaſt as to the Manner of ſignifying, tho' in Effect they did only agree to one; yet in *Engliſh* there is no difference of the Termination or Ending, to diſtinguiſh this Agreement.

There are three Things more, which are *Caſe*, *Declenſion* and *Gender*, which the *Engliſh Names* have not. But the Caſes of the *Latin* and *Greek* expreſſing the Relations of Word to Word, and their dependance on each other, we ſupply that with greater eaſe by Prepoſitions; as by *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, &c. But theſe having a peculiar regard to the Conſtruction of Words join'd in Sentences, we ſhall refer our Learner to that place.

Tho' we have (in our Language) no Note of difference of Gender, either by the Ending or Termination of the Words, or any Article proper to them, yet we thought it proper in this general view of GRAMMAR, which we give you in theſe *Notes*, to add ſomething on this Head in Relation to other Tongue.

The *Adnames*, or *Adjective Names*, or, as we call them, *Qualities*, naturally agree to ſeveral, and therefore it has been thought fit, both for the avoiding of Confuſion and the Ornament of Diſcourſe, with Variety of Terminations to invent a Diverſity in the *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, or *Qualities*, ſuitable to the *Names*, or *Subſtantives* with which they agree.

Now Men having conſider'd themſelves, and obſerv'd the conſiderable Difference of the two Sexes, thought fit to vary the ſame Adjective Names, by giving them different Terminations, as they are differently apply'd to Men or Women; as when we ſay in Latin, *bonus Vir*, a good Man; in the Maſculine, ſpeaking of a Woman, they change the Ending of the *Adjectives* or *Quality*, and ſay *bona Mulier*.

But in *Engliſh* we are more ſtrict in this, for we expreſs the difference of Sex by different Words, and not by the Variation of *Epithets* or *Subſtantives*; as *Boar*, *Sow*; *Boy*, *Girl*; *Brother*, *Siſter*; *Buck*, *Doe*; *Bull*, *Cow*, *Bullock*, *Heifer*; *Cock*, *Hen*; *Dog*, *Bitch*; *Duck*, *Drake*; *Father*, *Mother*; *Gander*, *Gooſe*; *Horſe*, *Mare*; *Husband*, *Wife*; *Lad*, *Laſs*; *King*, *Queen*; *Man*, *Woman*; *Maſter*, *Dame*; *Nephew*, *Neice*; *Peacock*, *Peahen*; *Ram*, *Ewe*; *Son*, *Daughter*; *Uncle*, *Aunt*; *Widower*, *Widow*; *Wizard*, *Witch*; *Batchelor*, *Maid*, *Virgin*; *Knight* or *Lord*, *Lady*. But the following twenty four Feminines or Females, are diſtinguiſh'd from the Males, by the Variation of the Termination of the *Male* into (*eſs.*)

Abbot	*Abbeſs*
Actor	*Actreſs*
Adulterer	*Adultreſs*
Ambaſſador	*Ambaſſadreſs*
Count	*Counteſs*
Deacon	*Deaconeſs*
Duke	*Dutcheſs*
Elector	*Electreſs*
Emperor	*Empreſs*
Governor	*Governeſs*
Heir	*Heireſs*
Jew	*Jeweſs*
Lion	*Lioneſs*
Marquis	*Marques*, or *Marchioneſs*
Maſter	*Miſtreſs*
Prince	*Princeſs*
Prior	*Prioreſs*
Patron	*Patroneſs*
Poet	*Poeteſs*
Prophet	*Propheteſs*
Shepherd	*Shepherdeſs*
Tutor	*Tutoreſs*
Viſcount	*Viſcounteſs*

And two in (*ix*), as *Adminiſtratrix Executrix*.

This is all that our Language knows of any thing like the Genders, which is only a different way of expreſſing the Male and the Female; but the old Languages have gone farther; for as ſame *Adjectives* or *Qualities* might have Relation to other Things, beſides Men and Women, it was thought neceſſary to Appropriate to them, one or other of the Terminations invented for

Men

Men and *Women*: Hence all other Names, or Subſtantives, have been rang'd under the Heads of Maſculine or Feminine; and ſometimes indeed not without a plauſible Reaſon, as in the Names of Offices properly belonging to Men, as *Rex*, *Judex*, &c. (which as we have before hinted, are but improperly *Subſtantives*) which are of the *Maſculine Gender*, becauſe *Homo* is underſtood. In the ſame Manner, all the Female Offices are of the *Feminine Gender*, as *Mater*, *Uxor*, *Regina*, &c. becauſe *Mulier* is underſtood.

But this happens in other Caſes meerly by Fancy, without any other Reaſon, than the Tyranny of Cuſtom; and therefore it varies according to the Languages, or even according to the Words introduc'd from one Language into another. Thus *Arbor*, a Tree, is *Feminine* in *Latin*; but *Arbre*, is Maſculine in *French*; and *Dens* (a Tooth) is Maſculine in *Latin*, and Feminine in *French*, (*Dent*). Nay, that has ſometimes chang'd in one, and the ſame Language according to Time and Occaſions. And thus according to *Priſcian*, *Alvus* in *Latin*, was anciently Maſculine, and afterwards became Feminine; *Navire* (a Ship) was anciently *Feminine* in *French*, but is now *Maſculine*.

The ſame Variation of Cuſtom or Uſe has made ſome Words, which were formerly certain, of a doubtful Gender, being us'd as Maſculine by ſome, as Feminine by others; as *hic*, or *hæc Finis*, in *Latin*; and *le*, or *la Comte* in *French*.

But the Gender which is call'd doubtful, is however not ſo common as ſome *Grammarians* imagine, for it properly belongs only to the Names of ſome Animals, which in *Greek* and *Latin* are promiſcuouſly join'd both to Maſculine and Feminine *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, to expreſs either the Male or Female, as *Bos*, *Canis*, *Sus*, &c.

There are ſtill other Words, which they place under the Neuter Gender, but they are properly only *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, taken *Subſtantively*, becauſe they commonly ſubſiſt in Diſcourſe by themſelves, and have not different Terminations accommodated to the different Genders, as *Victor*, *Victrix*, *Rex*, *Regina*, *Piſtor*, *Piſtrix*, and the like.

We ought alſo here to obſerve from hence, that what the *Grammarians* call *Epicene*, is not a different Gender, for *Vulpes* (a Fox), tho' it indifferently ſignifies either the Male or Female, is really of the Feminine Gender in the *Latin*; and thus in *French*, the Word *Aigle* (an *Eagle*) is truly *Feminine*; becauſe the Maſculine or Feminine Gender in a Word, does not ſo properly regard its Signification, as that it ſhou'd be of ſuch a nature as to join with *Adjective* or *Quality*, in the Maſculine or Feminine Termination, as either does occur: And ſo in the *Latin*, *Cuſtodia*, *Vigilia*; *Priſoner*, or *Watchmen* or *Centinels*, are really Feminine, tho' they ſignifie Men: This is what is common in the Genders to all Languages that have them.

The *Latin* and *Greek* in the Neuter Gender do not regard them, having no Relation to the Male or Female Sex, but what Fancy gives them, and the Termination of certain Words.

[4] Tho' we think it pretty obvious, that *Perſonal Names* are not a different Part of Speech from *Names*, notwithſtanding ſome, who are wedded to the old way only becauſe it is old; yet we ſhall here add the learned Mr. *Johnſon*'s Proof of this Truth. *Pronoun* (ſays he in his fifth Animadverſion, *p.* 10) *quaſi pro Nomine*; *It is put for a* Noun, *then it ſeems by the Name, and our Author* (LILLY) *it is much like a* Noun *in his Definition of it, ſo like indeed, that it is the ſame: The only difference betwixt it and other* Nouns, *is, that it ſignifies a Perſon Primarily, and Secondarily a Thing, which is* Voſſius's *Definition of it.* Primario Nomen, *eſpicit, I ſuppoſe* Nomen Perſonæ, ſecundario rem. *Analog.* lib. 1. cap. 3.

and

Three Perſons *only every Language claims,*
Which we expreſs ſtill by the following Names;
I, thou, *and* he, ſhe, it, we, ye, *and* they,
If you to theſe will add who, what, *you may.*

[5] Since in Diſcourſe whatever is ſaid, is ſpoke either of our ſelves, to another, or of a third, it is neceſſary that there be three Perſons; *I*, the firſt, *thou*, the ſecond, and *he*, *ſhe*, *and if it ſignifie a Perſon, it muſt come under the Notion of a* Noun; *for a* Perſon *is a* Thing, *ſuch a* Thing *as may be conſider'd alone by the* Underſtanding, *and be the* Subject *of a* Predicate, *I mean the* Subſtantive Pronoun, *for there are alſo* Pronouns Adjective. *Indeed, this Part of* Speech *is in order of Nature the* firſt Noun; *for when* Adam *and* Eve *were only in the World, they needed no other Name but* I *and* Thou *to ſpeak to one-another, and whoſe Names were not given them out of any Neceſſity. The* Pronoun *therefore is a* Noun, *only a* Perſonal *one, to be us'd when we ſpeak of* Things *Perſonally, to which (upon the Multiplication of Mankind) was added the* proper Name *to diſtinguiſh* Perſons *by, and alſo particular* Things, *which are as it were ſpoken of Perſonally, when they are ſpoken of particularly. And thus we find* Nouns *us'd in the* firſt Perſon, *as* Romulus Rex Regia Arma aſſero. Liv. l. 1. *alſo* Anobal peto pacem. Id. l. 30. *and* Callopius recenſui at the End of *Terence*'s Plays. And thus far Mr. *Johnſon*, which is ſufficient to ſhow, that we have juſtly plac'd them here under the Head of NAMES.

[5] The frequent Repetition of the ſame Words being as diſagreeable as it is neceſſary for us to ſpeak often of the ſame Thing, to avoid this there are, in all known Languages, certain Words eſtabliſh'd to ſupply this defect and remove this Indecorum, which are call'd *Pronames*, for *Names*, *Perſonal Names*, or as vulgarly in Engliſh, *Pronouns*.

In the firſt place it has been obſerv'd, that it wou'd be tedious as well as indecent to be often naming our ſelves by our *Proper Names*, and for that Reaſon the *Proname* of the *firſt Perſon* was introduc'd to ſtand in the place of his Name who ſpeaks, as *I*, *Eye*.

And on the other-hand, to avoid the too frequent Repetition of the Name of the Perſon to whom you ſpeak, *thou* or *you*, (*Pronames* of the *ſecond Perſon*) were invented.

And laſtly, to avoid the too often repeating the Names of other *Perſons* or *Things* of which we diſcourſe, the *Perſonal Names* of the *third Perſon* were invented; as *He*, *She*, *it*, *who*, *what*.

Theſe *Perſonal Names* performing the Office, and ſupplying the Place of other *Names*, they have like them two *Numbers*; that which ſignifies *one*, and that which ſignifies more than *one*, (*i. e.* the *Singular*); as *I*, *thou*, *you*, *he*; and the *Plural*, as *we*, *ye*, or *you*, and *they*. *You* (as has been ſaid) is us'd in the *Singular* for *thou* and *thee*, as well as in the *Plural* for *ye*. Thus in *French*, *vous* for *tu* and *toy*.

In other Languages which have *Genders*, the *Pronoun* has the ſame, the *firſt* and *ſecond* are common, except in the *Hebrew*, and thoſe Languages which imitate that in which the *Maſculine* is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Feminine*; but in the *Engliſh* we have no *Genders*, as has been ſeen in the foregoing Notes. The ſame may be ſaid of Caſes. There is this to be obſerv'd in theſe *Perſonal Names*, That the Termination changes in *both Numbers* when it comes after a *Verb* or *Word of Affirmation*; as *I*, *me*; *we*, *us*; *thou*, *thee*; *you*, or *ye*, *you*; *he*, *him*; *ſhe*, *her*, *they*, *them*; except *it*, which does not vary.

[1] In

ſhe, or *it*, the third, of which all other Words but *I* or *thou*, with the *Plurals*, are. If we ſpeak of a Male, we ſay, *he*; if of a Female, *ſhe*; if of Things, that have no Sex, we uſe *it*. The *Plural Number* of *I* is *we*; of *thou*, *you* and *ye*; tho' by Cuſtom we ſay *you*, when we ſpeak but to one Perſon, *thou* being ſeldom us'd but to GOD, as, *wilt thou, O Lord!* and on ſolemn Occaſions to Princes, *Remember, O Prince! that thou art born a Man*; otherwiſe *thou* is never us'd but in Contempt, Anger, Diſdain, or Familiarity. *He*, *ſhe*, and *it*, have (in the *Plural Number*) only *they*.

Theſe Names *in both the Numbers we allow*
A leading *and a* following State *to know.*
The leading State *is* I, *the* following ME,
The following State *is* US, *the* leading WE,
Thus THOU *and* THEE, YE, YOU, HE, HIM, & SHE
HER; THEY *and* THEM; *who and whom*; *but* WHAT
To vary like the Reſt do not think fit. [*and* IT,

Thoſe *Perſonal Names* have in both Numbers a double *Form* or *State*, the firſt is what we may call the *leading State*, as *I*; the ſecond the *following State*, as *ME*. In the *Plural Number* the *leading State* is *WE*, the *following US*. The Second is in the *leading State THOU*, in the *following THEE*, in the Plural *YE* and *YOU*. The third is in the *leading State HE*, if we ſpeak of a Male in the *following*, *HIM*, or *SHE*, *HER*, and in the Plural *THEY*, *THEM*, which is the *Plural* of *HE*, *SHE* and *IT*, which never varys its Ending, and is in both States *IT*, when we ſpeak of Things of neither Sex. *WHO* in the *leading State* of both Numbers has *WHOM* in the *following State* in both. It is call'd the *Interrogative*, becauſe it asks Queſtions of *Perſons* or *Individuals* (as, *Who is there, Peter?*) as *What* does of the *Kind*, or *Quality*; and alſo in the order of a *Thing*; as, *What is that? it is a Book*; *What art thou?* in the order of Number, the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, *&c.* (which is the ſame in both the *leading* and *following* State, or indeed, like *It*) *It* has no State.

But to make this the plainer, we ſhall lay down a view of all theſe *Perſonal Names* together, in both their ſtates.

Perſ. 1.	Sing.		*I*	*Me*
	Plur.		*We*	*Us*
Perſ. 2.	Sing.		*Thou*	*Thee*
	Plur.		*Ye*	*Us*
Perſ. 3.	Sing.		*He*	*Him*
			She	*Her*
	Plur.		*They*	*Them*
Interrog.	Perſons		*who*	*whom*
	Things		*what*	

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.
of QUALITIES.

We've seen, that Names *the Things themselves express,*
Qualities *the* Manners *of those Things confess;*
And on the Names *entirely depend,*
For without them they can no Sense pretend:
As round, black, white, swift, crooked, square,
Must (to be understood) to Names *adhere.*

[1] NAMES, as we have seen, express the *Things* themselves, *Qualities* are the Manners of those *Things*, as *good*, *bad*, *round*, *square*, &c. For Example, The Being of *Wax*, is the Substance of *Wax*, or *Wax* it self, without regard to any *Form* or *Colour*, and is what we properly call the *Name*; the *Roundness*, *Squareness* of the Figure, (which may be absent without any Detriment to the Being of the Wax) are the Manners of the *Being*; as, to be ignorant, or knowing, are the *Manners* or *Qualities* of our *Being*; thus we say a *round*, *black*, *white*, &c. *Table*; *Table* is the *Name*, and *round*, *black*, *white*, &c. are the *Qualities* of that *Name*.

And since these Words are added to *Names* to explain their *Manner* of Being, in respect of some Quality, Number, Figure, Motion, Relation, Posture, Habit, &c. as a *cunning Fox*, the *third Heaven*, a *crooked Crab-tree*, a *swift Horse*, a *Golden Candlestick*, &c. they are properly call'd *Qualities*, and are incapable, preserving their Nature, of being added to any other Part of Speech.

Thing, *that to follow* Names *did still deny,*
Does after Qualities *good Sense supply.*
As black Thing, white Thing, good Thing *may convince,*
This *makes* that *understood, and be good Sense.*

You

[1] In our *Notes* on NAMES, we have likewise deliver'd such Sentiments of *Qualities*, under the Title of *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, &c. as are sufficient to be said on this Head, at least as far as relates to the *General* GRAMMAR. But we cannot omit Mr. *Johnson*'s Proof, *That the* Adjective *or* Quality *is a different Part of Speech from the Name or Substantive.* Grammatical Commentaries, *p.* 8. *The* Adjective

jective (*no doubt of it*) requires a *Substantive* to be join'd with it in Speech, to which it may adhere. *But the Question is, whether it be a* Noun, *or* Name of a Thing; *that is, whether it be equally so with the* Substantive; *for if it be not, there is not an* unequal Participation *of the* Genus *between these two, and so the Division is imperfect and* Equivocal: *That is, these two have not the same* Genus, *and therefore cannot be the same Part of Speech. Now I suppose, that no body will say, the* Adjective *is equally, or as much the* Name of a Thing *as a* Substantive. *The* Substantive *represents all that is essential to the Nature of the* Thing; *as* Homo *a* Man, *represents* Animal rationale, *or a* rational Living Creature; *but* Bonus Good, *represents only an accidental Quality, which tho' morally necessary, is not naturally so, but meerly accidental. So that tho' a* Man *may be call'd* Good, *and therefore* Good *in some Sense may be said to be his* Name, *yet it is not equally as much his* Name *as* Man, *this last representing all that is essential to his Nature, the other only what is accidental. For* Adjectivum *comes from* adjicio, *and there can be no need of adding any thing to the* Substantive *but what is* accidental, *for what is necessary and essential, is in the* Substantive *already. 'Tis therefore a sufficient Definition of a* Substantive, *That it is the* Name of a Thing; *but that it may be known what is meant by* Thing, *I have added*, which may so subsist in the Imagination, as to be the Subject of Predication: *And the true Definition of an* Adjective, *is, that* it is a Word added to the Substantive to declare some additional Accident of the *Substantive* consider'd by it self; as of Quality, Property, Relation, Action, Passion, or manner of Being. *I have added* consider'd by it self, *because the Relations of* Substantives, *as consider'd in Sentences, is declar'd by* Prepositions *and not by* Adjectives. *Here is then a very different End and Intention in the use of these Words; and that is one good Ground of constituting different Parts of* Speech. *But then, not only the End in Signification, but the End also in Construction is very different, and that is the other Ground of making different* Parts of Speech. *For I know no Reason why any body shou'd be troubled with the Distinction of the several* Parts of Speech, *but to know their different Significations and Constructions in general, or how generally to make use of them in* Speech.

Tho' this be a Demonstration of the difference between the *Name* and *Quality*, or *Substantive* and *Adjective*, and that they are two different Parts of Speech; yet since what follows proves the *Participle* and *Adjective* to be one part of Speech, we shall pursue our learned Author's Discourse, only adding, that *Scioppius* long since contended for the same thing, in his *Institutiones Grammaticæ Latinæ*, in the beginning of his *Auctuarium*, p. 162 of the Book.

Now the Construction of a Substantive *is its Government by which it is govern'd, in such Case as its Dependance requires in its several Relations that it may have in a Sentence: Whereas the only Construction of the* Adjective *is its Agreement with its* Substantive, *or being govern'd by it so as to agree with it in Case, Gender and Number, whatever Relation it be in, or whatever Case it be in by that Relation. And tho'* Substantives *be put in Apposition with other* Substantives, *and agree with them, yet this is no real Objection, such* Substantives *becoming* Adjectives *by that very Use; as an* Adjective *or any other* Part of Speech *becomes a* Substantive, *when it is us'd like a* Substantive; *that is, consider'd as a* Thing. NOW *in this the* Participle *and the* Adjective *both agree as well in Signification as Construction.*

You may know this Part of Speech, by putting *Thing* after it, which it will bear with good Senſe, as a *good Thing*, a *black Thing*, a *white Thing*, &c. nor has it any differing Ending to expreſs *one*, and *many*. And as it cannot be underſtood, or convey any Idea, or Notion by it ſelf, (as we cannot in Senſe ſay, a *black*, a *white*, &c.) without being join'd to ſome *Name*, (as a *black Horſe*, a *good Man*, a *white Houſe*, &c.) ſo it bears all *Particles* expreſſing different *relations of Names* with the *Name* to which it belongs; for it can do nothing, nor ſignifie any thing, without a *Name* expreſs'd or underſtood, as, to *hit the white* (Mark) is underſtood; to *bowl on a Green* (Turf) is underſtood; refuſe the evil (*Thing*), and chooſe the good (*Thing*), is in both places ſuppos'd.

In Qualities *no different Number are,*
As their unvary'd endings may declare.

This is ſpoke as to their Forms in our Language, for in other Languages, where they have various Terminations, they have Numbers.

Three kinds of Qualities *there are we know,*
Which from their Names immediately do flow:
Firſt, from poſſeſſion, we poſſeſſive *call,*
And from all Names *by adding* (s), *do fall.*

Theſe

ſtion. The Adjective *declares an accidental difference of the* Subſtantive, *ſo does the* Participle. *The* Adjective *denominates the* Subſtantive *by that accidental difference, ſo in ſome Senſe becomes its* Name, *ſo does the* Participle; *unleſs any one will ſay that a* trotting Horſe *does not as much denominate the* Subſtantive *as a* white Horſe. *The* Adjective *agrees with its* Subſtantive *in Conſtruction, and ſo does the* Participle. *The only difference between them is, that the* Participle *is ſaid to ſignify ſome diſtinct time. I ſhall conſider that hereafter, but if that difference be ſufficient to make them two* Parts of Speech, *the* Adjective *and* Subſtantive *muſt be two different* Parts, *becauſe of a greater difference. But that* that *difference is not ſufficient to make them different* Parts of Speech, *I ſhall ſhow in my Animadverſion upon the* Infinitive Mood; *which notwithſtanding its Conſignification of Time, I ſhall prove to be a* Subſtantive. *And therefore, if Conſignification of Time will not* unſubſtantive *that, as agreeing in the general Signification and Uſe of a* Subſtantive, *ſo neither will the like Conſignification of Time* unadjective *the* Participle, *which agrees in general Signification and Conſtruction with the* Adjective.

Thus far Mr. *Johnſon*; and he makes his Word good in Animadverſion, from *p.* 341, to 350. which he may conſult, that is not ſatisfy'd with what we have produc'd from him on this Head.

Theſe *Poſſeſſive Qualities*, or *Qualities* of *Poſſeſſion*, are made by any *Name*, whether *Singular* or *Plural*, by adding (*s*) or (*es*), if the neceſſity of Pronunciation require it; as *Mans* Nature, for the Nature of *Man*; *Mens* Nature, for the Nature of *Men*. *Waller's Poems.*

But if the plural Name in (s) *does end,*
The (s) poſſeſſive *and that* (s) *is join'd.*

If the Plural Name (as it generally does) end in (*s*), the two (*ss*) (that is that which forms the Number, and that which forms the Poſſeſſion) join in one, or rather one is left out for the eaſineſs of Sound; as the *Lords Houſe*, for the *Houſe of Lords*; the *Commons Houſe*, for the *Houſe of Commons*, inſtead of the *Commons's Houſe*, *the Lords's Houſe*.

The ſame in Proper Names *is often found,*
For the more eaſy Flowing of the Sound.

The ſame is often done in the Singular Number, when a proper Name ends in (*s*), as *Priamus Daughter*, *Venus Temple*; for *Priamus's Daughter*, or *Venus's Temple*. Tho' the full writing is ſometimes preſerv'd, as King *Charles's Court*, and St. *James's Park*, and the like. [2]

Whene'er two Names *compounded we do ſee,*
The firſt is always deem'd a Quality.

This is the other ſort of *Qualities* that derive themſelves immediately from NAMES; as *Sea-fiſh*, *Self-love*, *River-fiſh*, *Turkey Voyage*, *Sea Voyage*, *Home-made*, *Self-murder*, *Manſlaughter*, *Gold-Ring*; and this ſort of *Qualities* Dr. *Wallis* calls *reſpective*; in which, almoſt all other reſpects (but thoſe of *poſſeſſive Qualities*) are imply'd; which are yet more diſtinct, when they are requir'd to be expreſs'd by *Particles*. This is nothing elſe but the Name put after the manner of a *Quality*, and join'd to the following Word

[2] Thoſe who have imagin'd that this (*s*) was put in the place of *his*, (the firſt part being cut off by *Apharesis*) and that therefore the Note of *Apoſtrophe* ought always to be expreſs'd or underſtood, are extreamly out of the way in their Judgment. For tho' we do not deny, but the Note of the Apoſtrophe may juſtly (ſometimes) be plac'd there, to give a more diſtinct perception of the uſe of the (*s*) where there is occaſion, yet we muſt deny that, therefore it ought always to be done, and to ſignify the Abſence of his; for it is join'd often to the Names of Women, and to *Plural Names*, where *his* cannot be ſuppos'd to be without a palpable Soleciſm; and in the Words *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, *hers*, where ſure no body cou'd ever dream that *his* cou'd be.

[3] The

Word by this line or mark call'd a *Hyphen* -, to incorporate it, as it were, into one Word, and which is ſometimes done without that ſhort line.

As Qualities *from* Names, *we ſee, do flow,*
Thus ſome to Perſ'nal Names *we likewiſe owe*;
As our, ours; their, theirs; her, hers; my *and* mine;
His, your, yours, *and* its, *and* whoſe, thy, *and* thine.

Theſe are Perſonal Poſſeſſives, and *my, thy, her, our, your, their*, are us'd when they are join'd to *Names*; as *this is my Horſe, this is my Hat.* But *mine, thine, hers, yours, theirs* are us'd when the *Name* is underſtood; as *this Horſe is mine*; *this Hat is thine*; that is, *this Horſe is my Horſe*; *this Hat is thy Hat*, &c. Thus *own* cannot follow the later, but the former, as we ſay, not *yours own*, or *ours own*, but *your own*, and *our own.* But *mine* and *thine* are moſt commonly us'd when a *Name* follows that begins with a Vowel; as *my Arm*, or *mine Arm*; *thy Aunt*, or *thine Aunt.* We ſhall put them all in one View, as we have done the *Perſonal Names.*

		with the Name.	without the Name.
Perſ. 1.	Sing.	*My*	*Mine*
	Plur.	*Our*	*Ours*
Perſ. 2.	Sing.	*Thy*	*Thine*
	Plur.	*Your*	*Yours*
		His	
Perſ. 3.	Sing.	*Her*	*Hers*
	Plur.	*Their*	*Theirs*

Theſe by no means ſubſiſting by themſelves, nor ſignifying any thing without reference to ſome other *Name* or *Names*, are properly *Qualities.* [3]

Ano-

[3] The Demonſtratives *this* and *that*, and their Plurals *theſe* and *thoſe the ſame*, and the Relative or Interrogative *which*, are by no means *Pronames*, but *Adjectives.* For they are not put for a *Name* or *Subſtantive*; that is, they do not ſupply the place of a Name (as is eſſential to a *Proname*, and which the very Denomination of the

Another ſort of Qualities *there are,*
Which being, doing, ſuffering *declare,*
And Time imply, as preſent, paſt, *to* come,
In ſome more plainly, more obſcure in ſome.
In (ing) *it ends, when* doing *is expreſs'd,*
In d, t, n, *when* ſuffering's *confeſs'd.*

Theſe *Qualities* are what the old GRAMMARIANS call'd *Participles*, and a modern Author has continu'd under that Name, notwithſtanding what Mr. *Johnſon*, *Sciopius*, and others have urg'd; but without any Reaſon produc'd for ſo doing. But we being convinc'd that thoſe Reaſons are not to be anſwer'd, beſides ſeveral more which might be produc'd; as Words which ſignify *Time*, *Action*, &c. and yet are allow'd, on all Hands, not to be either *Participle*, *or of Affirmation*, venture to call them *Qualities*.

We have not in the Verſe ſaid any thing of the Ending when it betokens *Being*, becauſe that is confin'd to that one Word, and therefore needs no Rule; and is only *being* and *been*. *I* being *ſick*, *ſent for a Doctor*. *I have* been *a Soldier*. It ſignifies *doing*; as, *I am* hearing *a Song*; *I was* tuning *my Harpſicord*. It ſignifies *ſuffering*; as, *I was* beaten, *I was* abus'd; and the like. [4]

(A)

Word demonſtrates to be neceſſary to it) but they are added to *Names* or *Subſtantives*, as the *Qualities* or *Adjectives* are; as *this Man*, *that Man*, the *ſame Man*. If they ever occur without their *Names* or *Subſtantives*, which they often do, the *Subſtantives* are always underſtood; thus we ſay, *one*, *all*, *many*, *others*, *the Learned*, *the Unlearned*, omitting or leaving out the *Subſtantives* or *Names*, and yet theſe *Adjectives* are not put into the Number of *Pronames*.

Which, is the ſame in both Numbers, and is us'd when we ſpeak of *Things*, as *who* and *whom* are when we talk of *Perſons*.

We muſt obſerve, that *what* is us'd Adjectively when it ſignifies *Qualis*, and is in a Queſtion, as in *what Man?* that is, what kind of Man, or in Number the firſt, ſecond, and that is often us'd for *which*, and ſo is an *Adjective*.

The Word *own*, very often emphatically ſubjoin'd to *Names* and *Pronames*, is likewiſe an *Adjective*; as *your* own *Horſe*, *my* own *Goods*, Alexanders *own Sword*.

The Word *ſelf*, tho' plac'd by ſome among the *Pronames*, (becauſe 'tis generally render'd into *Latin* by the Word *ipſe*, is yet plainly a *Subſtantive* or *Name*, to which there is ſcarce any Word directly anſwers in the *Latin*; that which comes neareſt to it is *Perſona*, or *Propria Perſona*; as *thyſelf*, *myſelf*, *ourſelves*, *yourſelves*, *himſelf*, *itſelf*, *themſelves*, are we confeſs us'd for *hisſelf*, *itsſelf*, *theirſelves*; but interpoſing *own*, we ſay *his own-ſelf*, *its ownſelf*, *their ownſelves*. In the ſame Senſe we meet in the Greek Poets, ὁς βίη as βίη Ἡρακλῆος or Ἡρακλέος, *Hercules ipſe*, *Hercules himſelf*, *Hercules his ownſelf*.

[4] The time that is imply'd by this

(A), (an), *and* (the), *we* Qualities *may name,*
Becauſe their Uſe and Nature are the ſame.

Theſe Signs of *Names*, (*a*) and (*the*), have the Nature of *Qualities*, for they are added to *Names*, nor ſubſiſt or convey any Idea without them, and pay the ſame Attendance on the *Names*.

The uſe of theſe Signs are worthy Remark; for (*a*) before a Conſonant, and (*an*) before a Vowel, extend the Signification of a *Name* to any one, and ſo to all, one by one, of its kind; but (*the*) reſtrains it to ſome *Particular*, and by that means makes a *Common* equivalent to a *Proper Name*.

But ſince theſe Signs don't Individuals ſhow,
They ne'er before a Proper Name *can go;*
Nor before Perſ'nal Names *and* Qualities,
Nor when the thing in general we expreſs,
Nor before Names *of* Vertues, Herbs *and* Vice.

But theſe Signs not denoting *Individuation*, are not ſet before *Proper Names*; as *Peter*, *John*, *William*, &c. Nor before *Perſonal Names* or *Qualities*. Nor are they us'd when the Name expreſſes the Thing in General; as we ſay, Man *being Mortal, ſoon fades away and dies*; not *the*, or *a* Man, and we ſay *Vertue conſiſts in the Mean*, not *a*, or *the Vertue*, &c. Theſe *Signs* ſignifying *Particularity*, we ſay *the Juſtice of God*, ſince that is *particular*. Nor are they ſet before the particular *Names* of *Vertues* or *Vices*, or *Herbs*, *Metals*, &c. as we ſay, not a *Temperance*, a *Sloath*, a *Thyme*, an *Hiſſop*.

(*A*) and (*an*) ſometimes ſignifie *one*, as *all to a Man.* [5]

The is a Demonſtrative, and ſignifies the ſame as *that*, but leſs emphatically. It denotes the determination of one or more

this ſort of *Quality* or *Adjective*, is generally obſcure in *Engliſh*, and rather plac'd in the *Word of Affirmation*, which is generally plac'd with it; but in *Latin* we agree with Mr. *Johnſon* againſt *Sanctius*, That the time is ſignify'd pretty plainly by the Participle.

[5] Names generally ſignify Things in a general and unlimitted Senſe, but *Signs*, or *Articles* (as ſome call them) reſtrain and determine the Signification of Names, and apply them to a particular Thing. If we ſay, *'tis a Happineſs to be King*, 'tis an uncertain, wandring and undetermin'd Word; but if you add (*the*) to it, and ſays *'tis a Happineſs to be the King*, it determines it to be the King of the People mention'd before. So that theſe little Signs contribute much to the clearneſs of Diſcourſe.

The *Latins* have none of theſe *Signs* or *Articles*, whence *Scaliger* falſely concluded, that they were uſeleſs; but he is indeed a Critic that very often is in the wrong: And here 'tis plain from the Inſtances given, that they are neceſſa-

ry

more, to which the general Word is actually apply'd. Thus we uſe the Word *Earth* when we deſign the Species or Element; but *the Earth*, when we mean the Globe of Earth (which is a certain determin'd Individual) 'tis plac'd with both in the Singular or Plural Number, becauſe we may ſpeak determinately of one, as well as more Individuals.

As neither of theſe are fix'd to a Word of *a general Signification*, or *proper Name*, ſo are they not us'd when any other Quality is preſent that virtually contains 'em; as, *a Man, one Man, ſome Man, any Man*; *the World, this World*; for here *one, ſome, any, this*, certainly imply *a* and *the*.

There are beſides ſome particular Phraſes, as *many a Man, never a Man*, which differ from *many Men, no Men*, as *every Man* from *all Men*; the former ſignifie *many Men, all Men, no Men*, ſeparately, or taken diſtinctly; the later conjunctly, or collectively. Nor are the following abſolutely unlike theſe, when (after *ſuch*, and the Particles of Compariſon, *as, ſo, too*, and ſcarce any others) the *Quality* (*a*) is interpos'd between the *Name* and its *Quality*, (which is uſually put after it) as, *Such a Gift is too ſmall a Reward for ſo great a Labour, and as great a Benefit.*

When QUALITIES *for* NAMES *we e'er find ſet,*
They then the Properties of NAMES *will get.*

Qualities are ſometimes put for *Names*, and then they aſſume their Rights and Properties; tho' ſome contend, that the *Names* are always underſtood, tho' not expreſs'd, to make 'em ſubſiſt in good Senſe.

Moſt

ry to the avoiding Ambignities. The *Greeks* have one ὁ, ἡ, τό. Tho' theſe Signs ſhou'd not be put before proper Names for the Reaſon given, yet the *Greeks* do ſometimes put the Article to the *Proper Names* of Men, a ὁ φιλίππος, and the *Italians* do it Cuſtomarily, as *l'Arioſto, Il Taſſo, l'Ariſtotele*; which the *French* imitate in thoſe *Words* or *Names* which are purely of *Italian* Original, but in none elſe; and we put them to the Names of *Rivers*, as the *Thames*, the *Ouze*, the *Rhine*, &c.

In fine, the *Articles* or *Signs*, are not put to the *Qualities* or *Adjectives*, becauſe they muſt receive their determination from other *Names* or *Subſtantives*. Or when we find them ſet before *Qualities* or *Adjectives*; as the *Black*, the *White*, &c. then are they ſet for *Names*, or *Subſtantively*: The *White* means as much as *Whiteneſs*, or elſe the *Subſtantive* is underſtood; as the *Black* is the *black Mark*, or *Spot*.

[1] We

Moſt Qualities by two Degrees do riſe,
Or fall as much in Number, Bulk, *or* Price;
By adding to its end or, er, *or* eſt,
Which by ſome little Words *is elſe expreſt;*
As wiſe, wiſer, wiſeſt, *and* moſt wiſe;
But (very) *oft the Place of* (more) *ſupplys.*

Qualities have yet another Difference from *Names*, for they admit by the Variation of their Endings, or by the Addition of *ſome little Words*, Degrees of Compariſon. For, ſignifying *Manners* or *Qualities*, they naturally muſt be of ſeveral Degrees, which encreaſe twice, by adding (*er*) to the QUALITY it ſelf, and (*eſt*). *Fair* is the *Quality* it ſelf, for Example, its *firſt* riſing or Degree is *fairer*; and the next, beyond which there's none, is *faireſt*. Theſe again are form'd by *little Words*, without altering the Ending or Termination of the *Quality*; as, *fair*, *more fair*, *moſt* or *very fair*.

All Words therefore, whoſe Signification will admit *Encreaſe*, and conſequently in good Senſe will ſuffer theſe Words (*more*, *moſt*, or *very*) before 'em, are *Qualities*, that have their Degrees of Compariſon, or of Encreaſe and Decreaſe.

Theſe three alone irregular are found,
Good, bad, *and* little, *alter* Name *and Sound.*

Theſe three have an irregular manner of being compar'd, as *good*, *better*, *beſt*; *bad*, or *ill*; *worſe* (and *worſer*) *worſt*; *little*, *leſs*, (or *leſſer*) *leaſt*: To which add *much*, (or *many*) *more*, *moſt*.

But there are ſome *Qualities*, before which you cannot in good Senſe put *more* or *moſt*, as *all*, *ſome*, *any*, &c. for we cannot ſay *more all*, *moſt all*, &c. *Much*, *more*, and *moſt*, when they are joyn'd to Names of the Singular Number, ſignifie Quantity; as, *much*, *more*, *moſt Wine*: But when the Name joyn'd to them is of the Plural Number, they ſignifie Number, as, *much*, *more*, and *moſt Company*; but *much* is chang'd into *many* when Numbers are ſignified. Thus the *Quality* ALL joyn'd with a *Name* of the Singular Number, relates to *Quantity*, as *all the Wine*; but with a *Name* of the Plural Number, it ſignifies *Number*, as *all the Children*. *Every* is never put with a *Name* of the Plural Number, as *every Man*, not *every Men*. Thus *enough* ſignifies *Quantity*, whoſe Plural is *enow*, which ſignifies *Number*; *I have Wine enough*, *I have Books enow*.

When the *Quality* NO has no Name after it, we ſay *none*; as, *Is there no Wine? There's none.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of AFFIRMATIONS.

[1] WE come now to that Part of Speech which is the Soul of a Sentence, for without this a Sentence cannot ſubſiſt, ſince nothing can be ſpoken that is affirm'd or deny'd without it. The *Latins* call this Part of Speech *Verbum*, from whence our *Engliſh* Grammarians very awkardly have borrow'd *Verb*, which all other Nations, that borrow from the *Latin*, call in their own Tongue *Word*, for that is the plain Engliſh of *Verbum*: The *Word* was us'd by way of Eminence; but if our Grammarians had us'd *Word* inſtead of *Verb*, tho' it wou'd have been more eaſie and obvious to the Learner's Memory and Underſtanding, yet it would require a long Explanation of its Nature as a *Part of Speech*, nothing of that being contain'd in its Name; but the very Eſſence of it is expreſt in the Term *Affirmation*, ſince all Words of this kind do *affirm Something of Something*; as will be plain from the Notes on this Head.

[2] *An.*

[1] We have thus far explain'd thoſe Words, which ſignifie the Objects of our Thoughts, to which indeed the Prepoſitions and Adverbs belong, tho' the Order of the Text has poſtpon'd 'em: We now come to conſider thoſe Words, which ſignify the Manner, as *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, *Conjunctions*, or joyning Words, and *Interjections*.

The knowledge of the Nature of the *Verb*, or *Affirmation*, depends on what has been ſaid at the beginning of theſe Notes on Words, and that is, that the Judgment we make of Things (as when I ſay, *the Earth is round*) neceſſarily implys two Terms, one call'd the SUBJECT, which is the Thing of which the Affirmation is made, as the *Earth*; and the other the ATTRIBUTE, which is what is affirm'd of the Subject, as *round*. And beſides theſe two Terms, there is in that Propoſition another Word, which is the Connection of thoſe two Terms, and which is properly the Action of the Mind, which affirms the Attribute of the Subject. Men are therefore under an equal Neceſſity of inventing Words, that mark and denote the Affirmation, which is the principal Manner of our Thoughts, as to invent theſe, which mark the Objects of 'em. And this third Connective Term, is what is generally call'd a *Verb*, but more intelligibly an AFFIRMATION, ſince its chief Uſe is to ſignifie the Affirmation; that is, to ſhow that the Diſcourſe in which this Word is us'd, is the Diſcourſe of a Man, who not only conceives Things, but judges, and affirms ſomething of 'em; in which the

the Verb, or Affirmation, is diſtinguiſh'd from ſome Names and Qualities, which ſignifie Affirmation likewiſe; as, *affirmans*, *affirmatio*, becauſe they do not ſignifie, that the Thing is become the Object of our Thoughts, by the Reflection of the Mind, and therefore do not mark, that he who uſes thoſe Words affirms, but only, that he barely conceives an Affirmation.

We have ſaid, that the chief uſe of the *Verb*, is to ſignifie the *Affirmation*, becauſe we ſhall ſee, that the Verb is likewiſe made uſe of, to ſignifie other Motions of the Soul, as *to deſire*, *to pray*, *to command*, &c. but it is only by changing the Inflection, and the Mode. We ſhall at preſent only conſider the Verb in its chief Uſe and Signification, which is that which it has to the *Indicative*, or firſt *State*, *Mode*, or *Manner*.

According to this Senſe, it may be ſaid, that the *Verb* or *Affirmation* ought to have no other Uſe, but the marking the Connection we make in our Minds, between the Terms of a Propoſition. Thus there is only the Verb *eſſe*, *to be*, (which is call'd a Verb Subſtantive) that remains in this ſimplicity: And further, we may ſay, that even this Verb is properly thus ſimple, only in the third Perſon of the Preſent Tenſe or Time, *eſt*, *is*, and on certain Occaſions: For as Men naturally incline to ſhorten their Expreſſions, they have always joyn'd to the Affirmation, other Significations in the ſame Word. 1*ſt*, They have joyn'd that of ſome Attribute, by which means two Words then make a Propoſition; as when I ſay, *Petrus vivit*, Peter *lives*, becauſe the Word *vivit* (or lives) includes both the Affirmation, and Attribute of being alive, ſince it is the ſame thing to ſay, *Peter lives*, and *Peter is living*; thence ariſes the great diverſity of Verbs, in every Language; whereas if the general Signification of the Affirmation were only given to the Verb, without joyning any particular Attribute, there wou'd be no need of more than one Verb in each Language, which is that we call Subſtantive.

2*dly*, They have joyn'd the Subject of the Propoſition on certain Occaſions, ſo that Two Words (nay, even One) may make an entire Propoſition, two Words, as *ſum Homo*, becauſe *ſum* not only ſignifies the *Affirmation*, but includes the Signification of the *Pronoun*, or *Perſonal Name*, *Ego*, *I*; which is the Subject of the Propoſition. And in our own Tongue we always expreſs it, I *am a Man*. One Word may likewiſe expreſs an entire Propoſition; as, *vivo*, *ſedeo*, &c. For theſe *Verbs* include both the *Affirmation* and the *Attribute*, as we have already ſaid; and being in the firſt Perſon, they include the Subject likewiſe, as, *I am living*, *I am ſitting*: And hence comes the difference of Perſons, which is generally in Verbs.

3*dly*, They have alſo join'd a Relation to the Time, with reſpect to the Thing affirm'd; ſo that one Word (as *cœnaſti*) ſignifies that I affirm of him, to whom I ſpeak, the Action of *ſupping*, not for the preſent time, but the paſt, *Thou haſt ſupp'd*. And from hence the Verbs derive their diverſity of Times, (or as the Vulgar has it, Tenſes) which is alſo generally common to all Verbs, or Words of Affirmation.

The diverſity of theſe Significations, join'd in the ſame Word, is what has hinder'd a great many otherwiſe, of a very good Capacity, from rightly underſtanding the Nature of the Verb, becauſe they have not conſider'd it according to what is eſſential to it, which is the Affirmation, but according to the various Relations accidental to it, as a Verb, or Word of Affirmation.

Thus *Ariſtotle* confining himſelf to the third Signification, added to that which is eſſential to it, defines a Verb, *Vox ſignificans cum Tempore*,

pore, a *Word, that ſignifies with Time.* Others, as *Buxtorfius*, adding to it the ſecond, defines it, *Vox flexilis cum Tempore, & Perſona, a Word that has divers Inflections with Time and Perſon.*

Others have confin'd themſelves to the firſt Signification, added to the Eſſential, which is that of the Attribute; and conſidering, that the *Attributes* Men have join'd to the *Affirmation* in the ſame Word, are commonly Actives and Paſſives, have thought the Eſſence of a *Verb* conſiſts in *ſignifying the Actions and Paſſions.* And in fine, *Julius Scaliger* thought that he had diſcover'd a great Myſtery in his Book *of the Principles of the Latin Tongue*, by ſaying, that the diſtinction of Things into *permanentes, & fluentes, Things permanent or laſting, or fixt, and paſſing, or that paſs away*, was the true Original of the diſtinction of *Names*, or *Nouns* and *Verbs* or *Affirmations*; ſince *Names* are to ſignify the former, and *Verbs* the latter. But we may eaſily perceive that theſe Definitions are falſe, and do by no means explain the true Nature of the *Verb.*

The manner of the Connection of the two firſt ſhow it ſufficiently, becauſe 'tis not there expreſs'd, what the *Verb* ſignifies, but only that with which it ſignifies, *viz. Cum Tempore, cum Perſona*; the two latter are ſtill worſe, having the two great Vices of Definitions, which is to agree, *neque omni, neque ſoli:* For there are *Verbs* which ſignify neither *Actions* nor *Paſſions*, nor what paſſes away, as *exiſtit, quieſcit, friget, alget, tepet, calet, albet, viret, claret*, &c. of which we may have occaſion to ſpeak elſewhere.

There are Words which are not *Verbs*, that ſignify Actions and Paſſions, and even Things tranſient, according to *Scaliger*'s Definition. For 'tis certain, that *Participles* (or Qualities deriv'd from Verbs) are true *Nouns*, and yet thoſe of *Verbs active*, ſignify *Actions*, and theſe of *Verbs paſſive*, Paſſions, as much as the *Verbs* themſelves from which they are form'd, and there is no Reaſon to pretend that *fluens* does not ſignify a Thing that paſſes, as well as *fluit.* To which may be added againſt the two firſt Definitions of the *Verb*, that the Participles ſignify alſo with Time, there being a preſent, a paſt, and a future, eſpecially in the *Latin* and *Greek*, &c. And thoſe who (not without Reaſon) believe that a *Vocative Caſe* is truly the ſecond Perſon, eſpecially when it has a different Termination from the Nominative, will find, that on that ſide there wou'd be but a difference of the more, or the leſs, between the *Participle* and the *Verb.* And thus the eſſential Reaſon, why a Participle is not a Verb, is, that it does not ſignify the *Affirmation*; whence it comes that to make a *Propoſition*, which is the Property of the *Verb*, the Participle muſt add a *Verb*, that is, reſtore that which was taken away, by turning the *Verb* into the *Participle.* For how comes it that *Petrus vivit, Peter lives*, is a *Propoſition*; and *Petrus vivens, Peter living*, is not ſo, unleſs *eſt, is*, be added, as *Petrus eſt vivens, Peter is living*, but becauſe that Affirmation (which is in *vivit*) was taken away by making the *Participle vivens?* whence it appears, that the Affirmation that is, or is not found in a Word, makes it to be, or not to be a *Verb.*

Upon which we may obſerve *en paſſant*, that the Infinitive *Mode* or *Form*, or *Mood*, which is very often a *Noun* or *Name*, (as when we ſay in *French, le Boire, le Manger*) is different from Participles, the Participles being Noun Adjectives, or what we call *Qualities*: But the *Infinitive Moods* are *Noun Subſtantives*, or *Names* made by Abſtraction of thoſe *Adjectives*; in the ſame manner as of *Candidus, Candor* is made, and of *White, White-*

Whiteneſs. Thus *rubet*, a *Verb*, ſignifies *is red*, including the Affirmation and the Attribute; *rubens*, the Participle ſignifies only *Red*, without *Affirmation*, and *Rubere* taken for a *Noun*, ſignifies *Redneſs*.

It ſhou'd, therefore, be allow'd a conſtant Rule, that conſidering ſimply what is eſſential to a *Verb*, the only true Definition is *Vox ſignificans Affirmationem*, a *Word that ſignifies an Affirmation*, ſince we can find no Word that marks an *Affirmation*, but what is a *Verb*; nor any *Verb* but what marks it (at leaſt) in the *Indicative*, or *firſt Mood*: And there can no manner of doubt be made, that if a Word were invented, as *eſt*, wou'd be, which ſhould always mark the Affirmation, without having any difference of Time or Perſon; ſo that the diverſity of Perſon ſhou'd be mark'd only by *Nouns* or *Names*, and *Pronames* or *Perſonal Names*, and the diverſity of Times by *Adverbs* or added *Words*, (as in *Engliſh*) it wou'd however be a true *Verb*. As in the Propoſitions, which the Philoſophers call eternally true, as *God is infinite*, *Body is diviſible*, *the whole is greater than its Parts*; the Word (*is*) implies only the ſimple Signification, without any Relation to Time, becauſe 'tis true to all Times, and without our Minds ſtopping at any diverſity of *Perſons*.

Thus the *Verb* (according to what is eſſential to it) is *a Word that ſignifies Affirmation*. But if we wou'd join its principal Accidents, it may be thus defin'd, *Vox ſignificans Affirmationem, cum Deſignatione* Perſonæ, Numeri & Temporis, *a Word which ſignifies* Affirmation *with the Deſignation of the* Perſon, Number *and* Time, which agrees properly with the *Verb Subſtantive*. But for the others, in as much as they differ by that Union, Men have made of the *Affirmation* with certain *Attributes*, they may be thus defin'd, *Vox ſignificans* Affirmationem *alicujus Attributi, cum Deſignatione* Perſonæ, *&c. a Word ſignifying the* Affirmation *of ſome* Attribute, *with the Deſignation of* Perſon, Number *and* Time: We may likewiſe tranſiently obſerve, that the Affirmation (as 'tis conceiv'd) may be the Attribute of the *Verb* alſo, as in the *Verb affirmo*, which Verb ſignifies two *Affirmations*, one regards the Perſon ſpeaking, and the other the Perſon ſpoken of, whether it be of himſelf, or of another. For when we ſay, *Petrus affirmat*, it is the ſame as to ſay, *Petrus eſt affirmans*, and then *eſt* marks our *Affirmation*, and the Judgment we make concerning *Peter* and *affirmans*, that we conceive, and attribute to *Peter*.

The *Verb* NEGO (on the contrary) contains by the ſame Reaſon an Affirmation and Negation. For it muſt be farther obſerv'd, that tho' all Judgments are not *affirmative*, and that there are ſome Negatives; nevertheleſs *Verbs* never ſignify any thing of themſelves but Affirmations; Negations are only mark'd by Particles, or little Words, as *non*, *ne*, *haud*, &c. or by Nouns that imply it, as *Nullus*, *nemo*, &c. which being join'd to *Verbs*, change the Affirmation into a Negation, as, *no Man is immortal*, *Nullum Corpus eſt indiviſibile*. Tho' much of theſe Notes, which relate to the Knowledge of the true Nature of a *Verb*, may ſeem to (and indeed in many Things do) relate more to the dead Languages than the living, yet there is nothing advanc'd which will not be uſeful to the Student of GRAMMAR, ſince by theſe Obſervations he will enter into the very Eſſence of the Art, and ſee in what it is founded on the Nature of Things; and we are very certain, that great part of theſe *Notes* are equally advantageous to our underſtanding the Nature of our own Words, and in what they are founded on the general Reaſon of all Languages.

[2] *An* Affirmation (*as the Word do's ſhow*)
Something affirms, and do's Number *know,*
[3] *And* Time *and* Perſon; *whether it expreſs*
Action, Being, Paſſion; *or their want confeſs.*

An *Affirmation* is a Part of Speech (as the Word imports) which affirms ſome Attribute, which the Deſignation of Time, Number and Perſon, expreſſing *being*, *doing* or *ſuffering*, or the want of them, or the like.

Two Times the Engliſh *Language only knows,*
The firſt the preſent, *next the* paſſing *ſhows;*
And they by diff'rent Ending are made known
By adding (d), *or* (ed) *are moſtly ſhown;*
The preſent Love, *the* paſſing lov'd *do's make,*
Or elſe ſome other Affirmations *take*
Before it, which its different Times declare,
And in the Rules of Affirmations *ſhare.*

All *Affirmations* affirming in *Time*, this *Time* is expreſs'd either by different Endings, as *Love*, *lov'd*, or *loved*; *burn*, *burn'd*, or *burned*; or by putting other *Affirmations* before them, which alſo expreſs the Manner of the *Affirmation*, as *have*, *ſhall*, *will*, *might*, *wou'd*, *ſhou'd*, &c. as will be ſeen in the Sequel.

In *Engliſh* we have but two Times diſtinguiſh'd by the different ending; the *Preſent* is the *Affirmation* it ſelf, as *I Love*; the ſecond is the *paſſing*, as *I lov'd*: All other Times are expreſs'd by the 'foreſaid Words.

The Perſonal Names *the Perſons do expreſs,*
As I, thou, he, we, ye, *and* they *confeſs.*
With theſe their various Endings too agree,
As we by love, loveſt *and* loves *may ſee.*

The Perſons of the *Affirmations* are always expreſs'd by the Perſonal Names *I*, *thou*, *he*, in the *Singular*, and *We*, *ye*, or *you*, and *they*, in the *Plural* Number; the *two firſt* reaching only themſelves, the *third* all other *Names*, becauſe *all* other NAMES are of the *third Perſon*. They alſo vary their their Endings in the *ſecond* and *third Perſon Singular*; as *I love*, *thou loveſt*, *he loves*; *we*, *ye* and *they love*, in the *preſent Time*; and *I loved*, *thou lovedſt*, *he loved*, in the *paſſing Time*; the *Soldier fights*, *Gold prevails*. *I love*, beſides the *firſt Perſon*, denotes the *Time* when *I love*, that is, the *preſent Time* when I am ſpeaking; but by adding (*d*), it ſignifies the Time *paſſing*, as *I loved*, *lov'd*, or *did love*.

[4] *The*

[2] We have in the 'foregoing Notes obſerv'd, that the diverſity of *Perſons* and *Numbers* in *Affirmations* or *Verbs*, proceeds from the joining in the ſame Word the Subject of the Propoſition, at leaſt on certain Occaſions, to the *Affirmation* proper to the *Verb*, to ſhorten the Expreſſion, (tho' this will not hold in moſt Modern Tongues, at leaſt in none which want variety of Terminations, to diſtinguiſh the Perſons, which we do by Perſonal Names) for when a Man ſpeaks of himſelf, the Subject of the Propoſition is the *Pronoun* or *Perſonal Name*, of the firſt Perſon *Ego*, *I*, and when he ſpeaks of him, to whom he addreſſes himſelf, the Subject of the Propoſition is the Pronoun of the ſecond Perſon *Tu*, *thou*, *you*.

Now that he may not always be oblig'd to uſe theſe Pronouns, it has been thought ſufficient to give to the Word which ſignifies the Affirmation, a certain Termination which ſhows, that it is of himſelf a Man ſpeaks, and that is what is call'd the firſt Perſon of the Verb, as *Video*, *I ſee*.

The ſame is done with Reſpect to him, to whom a Man addreſſes himſelf; and this is call'd the ſecond Perſon, *vides*, *thou ſeeſt*, or *you ſee*. And as theſe *Pronouns* have their *Plurals*, that ſignify more than one, as when a Man talking of himſelf joins others, as *us*, *we*; or of him, to whom he ſpeaks, by joining others, as *you*, to two different Terminations in the *Latin*, are join'd to the Plural, as *videmus*, *we ſee*, *videtis*, *you ſee*.

But becauſe often the Subject of the Propoſition is neither a Man's ſelf, nor the Perſon to whom he ſpeaks, 'tis neceſſary not only to reſerve theſe two Terminations to thoſe two Perſons, but that a third be made, to be join'd to all other Subjects of a Propoſition. And this is what is call'd the third Perſon, as well in the Singular Number, as Plural; tho' the Word *Perſon*, which properly agrees only to rational and intellectual Beings, and ſo is proper but to the two former, ſince the third is for all other ſorts of Things, and not for Perſons only. By that we ſee, that naturally what we call the third Perſon ought to be the *Theme* of the *Verb*, as it is alſo in all the Oriental Tongues, for it is more natural, that the Verb ſhou'd ſignify properly the Affirmation, without making any Subject in particular, and that afterwards, it be determin'd by a new Inflection, to include the firſt or ſecond Perſon, for a Subject.

This diverſity of Terminations for the firſt Perſon, ſhows that the Ancient Languages had a great deal of Reaſon not to join the *Pronouns* of the firſt and ſecond Perſon to the Verb, but very rarely (and on particular Conſiderations) contenting themſelves to ſay, *Video*, *vides*, *videmus*, *videtis*, becauſe theſe Terminations were originally invented for this very Reaſon, *viz.* to avoid joining the Pronouns to the Verbs: Yet all the vulgar or living Languages, and ours eſpecially, always joyn them to their Verbs; for we ſay, *I ſee*, *thou ſeeſt*, or *you ſee*, *we ſee*, &c. the Reaſon of which may be, or rather plainly is, that our Verbs have no diſtinct Terminations to expreſs the Perſons without them.

But beſides theſe two Numbers, *Singular* and *Plural*, which are in Verbs as well as Nouns, the *Greeks* have a *Dual Number*, which is proper only to two, but this is not ſo commonly made Uſe of, as the other two.

The Oriental Languages thought it proper to diſtinguiſh when the Affirmation related to the one, or the other, and to the Maſculine, or Feminine; for this Reaſon they gave the ſame Perſon of the Verb two Terminations to expreſs the two Genders, which indeed is a great help in avoiding *Equivocals*.

[3] The Signification of the *Time*, is another thing which we

have ſaid to be join'd to the Affirmation of the Verb; for the Affirmation is made according to different Times, ſince we may affirm a Thing *is*, *was*, or *will be*; whence other Inflections are given to *Verbs*, ſignifying theſe ſeveral Times, which our Engliſh Grammarians have by a barbarous Word call'd *Tenſes*: But there are but three *ſimple Tenſes*, or *Times*, the *Preſent*, as *amo I love*; the *Paſt*, as *amavi*, *I have lov'd*; and the *Future*, as *amabo*, *I will* (or *ſhall*) *love*.

But becauſe in the Paſt one may mark, that the Thing is but juſt paſt or done, or indefinitely that it was done; it from this proceeds that in the greateſt part of the Vulgar Languages there are two ſorts of *Preterits* or *Paſt Times*, one that marks the Thing to be preciſely done, and is therefore call'd Definite; as, *I have written*, *I have ſaid*; and the other that marks or denotes it done indeterminately, and therefore call'd Indefinite, or *Aoriſtus*; as, *I wrote*, *I went*, *I din'd*; which is properly only ſpoke of a Time, at leaſt of a Days diſtance from that in which we ſpeak. But this holds truer in the French Language, than in any other, for in that they ſay, *J'ecrivis hier*, *I wrote Yeſterday*, but not *J'ecrivis ce Matin*, nor *J'ecrivis cette Nuit*, but *Jay* ecrit *ce Matin*, *Jay* ecrit *cette Nuit*, &c.

The Future will alſo admit of the ſame Differences; for we may have a mind to denote or mark a Thing that is ſuddenly to be. Thus the Greeks have their *Paulo-poſt* future, ὀλίγον μέλλων, which marks the Thing about to be done, as ποιήσομαι, *I am about to do it*: And we may alſo mark a Thing that is ſimply to happen, as, ποιήσω, *I will do it*; amabo, *I will love*.

This is what we may ſay of the Times, or Tenſes of Verbs, conſidering 'em ſimply in their Nature, as Preſent, Paſt, and Future. But becauſe it has been thought fit to mark theſe Tenſes, with a relation to another, by one Word, other Inflections have been invented in the Verbs or Affirmations, which may be call'd the *Compound Tenſes*, or *Times*.

The firſt is that, which marks the Paſt, in relation to the Preſent, and 'tis call'd the Preterimperfect Tenſe, or Time, becauſe it marks not the Thing ſimply and properly, as done, but as imperfect, and preſent, with reſpect to a Thing which is already nevertheleſs paſt. Thus when I ſay, *Cum intravit cœnabam*, *I was at Supper when he enter'd*, the Action of Supping is paſt in reſpect of the Time, of which I ſpeak, but I mark it as preſent in reſpect of the Thing of which I ſpeak, which is the *Entrance of ſuch a one*.

The ſecond Compound Time, or Tenſe, is that which doubly marks the paſt, and on that account is called the Preterpluperfect Tenſe, or the Time more than perfectly paſt; *Cœnaveram*, *I had ſupp'd*; by which I denote my Action of ſupping, not only as paſt in it ſelf, but alſo as paſt in reſpect to another Thing, which is alſo paſt; as, *I had ſupp'd when he enter'd*; which ſhews my Supping was before his Entrance; which however is alſo paſt.

The third Compound Time is that which denotes the Future with reſpect to the Paſt, *viz.* the Future Perfect; as *Cœnavero*, *I ſhall have ſupp'd*; by which I mark my Action of Supping as Future it ſelf, and paſs'd in regard to another Thing to come, that is to follow, as *when I ſhall have ſupp'd*, *he will enter*; which is to ſay, That my Supper (which is not yet come) will be paſt when his Entrance (which is alſo not yet come) will be preſent.

Thus a fourth Compound Time may be added, that is, that which marks the Future with relation to the Preſent, to make as many Compound Futures as Compound Preterits, or Paſt Times, or Tenſes; and perhaps the ſecond Future of the Greeks

[4] *The following Nine are of moſt general uſe,*
And various Meanings in the reſt produce;
Do, will, *and* ſhall, muſt, ought, *and* may,
Have, am, *or* be, *this Doctrine will diſplay.*
For theſe Neceſſity, or Pow'r, or Will,
And Time, or Duty are expreſſing ſtill.

Of *Affirmations*, the following *Nine* are moſt generally us'd, being plac'd before all other *Affirmations*, to ſignifie their *Time*, *Power*, *Will*, *Liberty*, *Neceſſity*, *Duty*, &c. Of theſe therefore it is neceſſary we firſt treat.

Do *does the* Preſent Time *with force expreſs,*
And did *the* Paſſing *ſhews us with no leſs.*

Do is, and denotes the *preſent Time*, which in the *paſſing* Time changes its ending into *did*: Both theſe are us'd to expreſs their ſeveral Times with the greater force, diſtinction, and fulneſs; as, *I do love*, *I do not love.* Thus *did* expreſſes the *paſſing* Time emphatically, except when *whilſt* goes before it, for then 'tis but imperfectly paſt, or paſſing. The Perſonal Endings of this *Affirmation* are, *I do*, *thou doſt*, *he does*, ſingular; *we*, *ye*, and *they do*, plural.

When *do* ſignifies Action, as, *I do ſuch a thing*, it admits theſe other *Affirmations* before it, to denote its Time and Manner of *doing*. *Will* does the ſame when it ſignifies *willing*, as, *I will this to be done*; tho' this is ſeldom found in our preſent way of Writing.

Will *is the* preſent Time, *and* wou'd *the* paſt,
But before other Affirmations *caſt,*
The Time to come by both is ſtill expreſt.

Will

Greeks marks this in its Origin, whence it comes that it almoſt always preſerves the Figurative of the Preſent; nevertheleſs in the uſe of it, it has been confounded with the former; and even the Latin makes uſe of the ſimple Future for that; as, *Cum cœnavero intravis*, *You will enter when I have ſupp'd*; by which I mark my Supper as future in it ſelf, but as preſent when you enter.

This is what has given Riſe to the ſeveral Inflections of *Verbs* or *Affirmations*, that they may diſtinguiſh the ſeveral *Times* or *Tenſes* upon which We muſt obſerve, that the Oriental Tongues have only the *Paſt* and the *Future*, without any of the other Differences of *imperfect*, *preterpluperfect*, &c. which renders theſe Languages ſubject to great and many Ambiguities, not to be met with in others. But theſe Differences of the Times (in our Tongue eſpecially) are clearly denoted by the *Auxiliary Verbs*, and very few Alterations of the Terminations, as in *Latin*; as is ſhown in the *Text*.

Will is the preſent Time, and *wou'd* the paſt, of this *Affirmation*; but they ſignifie the Time to come, when they are plac'd before other Affirmations, as, *I will love, I wou'd love.* Its Perſons are *I will, thou wilt, he will* ſing; *we, ye, they will. Will* implys the Inclination of the Agent.

The ſame Rule holds of ſhall, *and* ſhou'd, *we find,*
Since all the Time to come *alone intend.*

Shall is the *preſent* Time, and *ſhou'd* the *paſt*; but it ſignifies the *Time to come*, when added to other Affirmations; as *I ſhall love, I ſhou'd love. Shall* is ſometimes left out, as, *If he write*, for *If he ſhall write*; *if he have written*, for *if he ſhall have written.*

In the firſt Perſon ſimply ſhall *foretells:*
In will *a Threat, or elſe a Promiſe dwells.*
Shall *in the ſecond and the third does threat*;
Will *ſimply then foretells the future Feat.*

We uſe not *ſhall* and *will* promiſcuouſly for one another, for *ſhall* in the firſt Perſon ſimply foretells, *will* implys a Promiſe, or a Threat. In the ſecond and third Perſon *ſhall* promiſes, or threatens, and *will* only ſimply foretells; thus, *I ſhall burn, you will*, or *thou wilt burn, he will burn, we ſhall, ye will, they will burn*; that is, I foretell this *will* be. *I will, you ſhall*, or *thou ſhalt*; *he ſhall, we will, ye ſhall, they ſhall burn*; that is, I promiſe, or engage, that ſuch a thing *ſhall* be done.

Wou'd and *ſhou'd* foretells what was to come, but with this difference, *wou'd* implys the Will and Propenſion of the Agent; *ſhou'd*, only the ſimple Futurity; as, *I wou'd burn, I ſhou'd burn*; *rather than turn, I wou'd burn*; *if the Fire were about me, I ſhou'd burn.*

Shou'd ſeems likewiſe, in many places, to be the ſame as *ought*; as, *I have been oblig'd to* Roger, *and* ſhou'd *now return the Obligation.* The Perſons of theſe are, *I ſhou'd, thou ſhou'dſt, he ſhou'd*; *I wou'd, thou wou'dſt, he wou'd.*

We, ye, and *they* { *wou'd* / *ſhou'd.*

The Time to come moſt abſolutely note
Both ſhall *and* will; *but* wou'd *and* ſhou'd *do not,*
But with Condition Time to come *expreſs*;
Which Difference they every-where confeſs.

Shall and *will* denote abſolutely the Time to come; *ſhou'd* and *wou'd* do it conditionally.

May

May *does the* Right, *or* Poſſibility;
And can *the* Agents Pow'r *to do, imply.*

May and *can*, with their *paſt* or *paſſing* Times *might* and *cou'd*, imply a Power; but with this diſtinction, *may* and *might* are ſaid of the *Right*, *Poſſibility*, and *Liberty* of doing a Thing; *can* and *cou'd* of the Power of the *Agent*; *I can burn*, *I cou'd burn*; *I may burn*, *I might burn*; that is, *it is poſſible or lawful for me to burn.* The Perſons are, *I may*, *thou may'ſt*, *he may*; *we*, *ye*, and *they may.* *I might*, *thou mightſt*, or *you might*, *he might*; *we*, *ye*, and *they might.* *I can*, *thou canſt*, *he can*; *we*, *ye*, and *they can.* *I cou'd*, *thou cou'dſt*, *he cou'd*; *we*, *ye*, and *they cou'd.* *May* and *can* are us'd with Relation both to the Time *preſent*, and to *come*; *cou'd* from *can*, and *might* from *may*, have Relation to the Time *paſt*, and to *come.*

Muſt *the* Neceſſity *does ſtill denote*,
And ſtill the Duty *we expreſs by* ought.

Muſt implies *Neceſſity*, *I muſt burn*; *ought* implies *Duty*, as, *I ought to burn.* But theſe two *Affirmations* have only the *preſent* Time, and their Perſons are only expreſs'd by the *Perſonal Names*, for it is now quite obſolete to ſay, *thou oughteſt*; for it now changes its Ending no more than *muſt.*

Have (*when with* Qualities *of* ſuff'ring *plac't*)
Denotes the Time that perfectly is paſt;
And thus by had *is moſt directly ſhown*
The Time, that more than perfectly is gone.
Shall, *and* will have, *do ſtill the Time declare*
That will be paſt before ſome others are.

Have (join'd to a *Quality* that ſignifies *ſuffering*) denotes the Time perfectly *paſt*, that is, that which is now *paſt.* *Had* marks the Time that is more than perfectly *paſt*, or ſometime *paſt*, that is, at the Time when it was ſpoken of; as, *I have burn'd*, *I had burn'd.* Thus *ſhall have*, and *will have burn'd*, denote the Time which will be *paſt* before another Thing which is to *come*, *happens*, or *is.* As, *when I ſhall have read a Page*, *I will ſhut the Book.* The Perſons of theſe *Affirmations* are, *I have*, *thou haſt*, *he has*; *we*, *ye*, and *they have.* *I had*, *thou hadſt*, *he had*; *we*, *ye*, or *you* and *they had.*

Whenever have, Poſſeſſion *does denote*,
Theſe Affirmations *it admits*, *elſe not.*

When *have* ſignifies *Poſſeſſion*, as *I have a Horſe*, *I have a Commiſſion*, and the like, it admits ſome of the nine *Affirmations* we have been treating of before it, to expreſs its Times, Manner, &c. elſe not.

Am,

Am, *or* be, *ſtill in their Native Senſe*
Being *import*; *but then they ſtill diſpenſe*
The Affirmation *to the* Quality
(*Without it loſt*) *that* ſuff'ring *does imply.*

Am, or *be* (for they are the ſame) naturally, or in themſelves ſignify *being*; but join'd to, or ſet before a *Quality* ſignifying *ſuffering*, reſtore the *Affirmation* of *ſuffering*, which as a *Quality* it loſt; as *I am burn'd*, *he muſt be burn'd*. It has therefore a double Formation.

	Singular,	Plur.
In the *preſent Time*	*Am, art, is,* / *be, beſt, be,*	*are.* / *be.*
In the *paſſing*, or *paſt Time*	*was, waſt, was,* / *were, wert, were,*	*were.*

I am burn'd, thou art burn'd, he is burn'd, if I were burn'd, I was burn'd, I have been burn'd, I had been burn'd, I ſhou'd be burn'd, I ſhou'd have been burn'd.

All other *Engliſh Affirmations* having no other differing Endings to ſignify all the other different Times, which are in Nature, muſt of neceſſity ſupply that Defect, by making uſe of one or more of theſe nine foregoing Words; for beſides the *preſent* and the *paſſing* Times, which the *Engliſh* diſtinguiſhes by varying the Ending of the *Affirmation*, there is the *future*, or Time to *come*, the Time perfectly *paſt*, and the Time more than perfectly *paſt*; all which theſe little Affirmations eaſily ſupply.

Where'er theſe Affirmations *do precede,*
The Endings of the following have no need
To change at all, but theſe muſt vary ſtill,
The Uſe of Perſ'nal Endings *to fulfil.*

Whenever theſe foregoing *Affirmations* are plac'd before any others, they not only change their own *Perſonal* Endings, but hinder the following *Affirmations* from changing theirs, as *I do love, thou doſt love, he does love, we, ye,* and *they do love*; not *I do love, thou doſt loveſt, he does loves*, &c. But the *Perſonal Name* is often left out when the *Affirmation* implies Exhortation or Command, as *burn*, for *burn thou*, or *ye*.

We have ſhewn, that *Affirmations* form their *paſſing Time* by adding (*d*) to the *preſent*, or by changing (*e*) into (*d*) or (*ed*); as, *I love, I lov'd* or *loved*; *I burn, I burn'd* or *burned*; but the (*ed*) is now almoſt wholly left out, except in *winged*, and a very few more; and therefore it is only on account of ſome old Books, that we mention it here.

Theſe

Theſe Perſonal Endings are not only omitted after the nine Affirmations, but after *if*, *that*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *whether*, &c.

But when the preſent *ends in* (d) *or* (t),
The paſſing Time *the ſame we always ſee.*

When the *preſent Time* ends in (*d*), or (*t*), the *paſſing* has the ſame ending; as, *read*, *ſpread*, *caſt*, *hit*, *knit*, and ſome others, which are diſtinguiſh'd only by the Pronunciation, tho' they were doubtleſs of old *readed*, *ſpreaded*, *caſted*, *hitted*, *knitted*, &c. And if they were ſtill ſpelt with a double Conſonant, it would be much better for the Diſtinction, tho' this Defect is fully ſupply'd by the former nine little *Affirmations* of Time, &c.

Other Exceptions to this Rule we find,
Which to the following Liſt are moſt conſign'd.

There are ſome *Affirmations*, which are irregular in this Matter, or are Exceptions to this Rule, but this Irregularity reaches only thoſe which are Native, and originally Engliſh Words, and of one Syllable, or deriv'd from Words of one Syllable.

The firſt Irregularity, and that which is the moſt general, aroſe from our Quickneſs of Pronunciation, by changing the Conſonant (*d*) into (*t*), as often as by that means the Pronunciation is made the more expeditious; and indeed ſeems rather a Contraction, than an Irregularity; particularly after *c*, *ch*, *ſh*, *f*, *k*, *p*, *x*; and after *s*, and *th*, when pronounc'd hard; and ſometimes after *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, when a ſhort Vowel goes before; for theſe Letters more eaſily admit a (*t*) than a (*d*) after 'em; as, *plac't*, *ſnatch't*, *fiſh't*, *wak't*, *dwelt*, *ſmelt*, inſtead of *plac'd*, *ſnatch'd*, *fiſh'd*, *wak'd*, *dwell'd*, *ſmell'd*.

But (*d*) remains after the Conſonants *b*, *g*, *v*, *w*, *z*, *s*, *th*, when they have a ſofter Sound, and when a long Vowel precedes *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, for they more eaſily unite and incorporate with (*d*) than (*t*), becauſe of the like direction of the Breath to the Noſtrils; as you may find in the Notes to this Grammar on the formation of thoſe Letters, thus, *liv'd*, *ſmil'd*, *raz'd*, *believ'd*, &c. from *live*, *ſmile*, *raze*, *believe*.

Except when the long Vowel is ſhortned before *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*; or when (*b*) and (*v*) are chang'd into (*p*) or (*f*), and the ſofter Sound of (*s*) paſſes into their harder, as, *felt*, *delt*, *dremt*, *ment*, *left*, *bereft*, &c. from to *feel*, *deal*, *dream*, *mean*, *leave*, *bereave*, &c.

But

But when (*d*) or (*t*) go before, and are join'd by (*d*) or (*t*), (in this contracted Form), they incorporate with the radical (*d*) or (*t*), into one Letter; that is, if (*t*) be the radical Letter, they unite into (*t*), but if (*d*) be the radical Letter, then they incorporate into (*d*) or (*t*), according as this, or that Letter is the eaſier to be pronounc'd, as *read, led, ſpred, dread, ſhred, tread, bid, hid, chid, fed, bled, bred, ſped, ſtrid, ſlid, rid*, &c. (which, doubtleſs, were Originally, *read'd, bid'd*, &c. as it were, *read'd, bid'd*, &c.) from to *read, lead, ſpread, ſhed, dread, ſhread, bid, hide, chide, feed, bleed, breed, ſpeed, ſtride, ſlide, ride*, &c. thus, *caſt, hurt, coſt, burſt, eat, beat, ſweat, ſit, quit, ſmit, writ, bit, hit, met, ſhot*, &c. (tho' perhaps theſe Words wou'd for the diſtinction of the *paſſing* Time, from the *preſent*, be better Spelt; *eatt, beatt, bitt, hitt*, &c. as it were *eat't, bit't hit't*, &c.) from theſe WORDS to *caſt, hurt, coſt, burſt, eat, beat, ſweat, ſit, quit, ſmite, write, bite, hit, meet, ſhoot*, &c. thus, *lent, ſent, rent, girt*, &c. for *lend'd, ſend'd*, &c. from to *lend, ſend, rend, gird*, &c.

Tho' this Irregularity be ſometimes loſt, and the regular Spelling obſerv'd, as *plac'd, fiſh'd*, &c. yet 'tis but ſeldom, and in few Words.

There are not a few other irregular WORDS in the *paſſing* Time, but thoſe which are more particular and ſpecial, may be reduc'd to their Claſſes; as,

1. *Won, ſpun, begun, ſwam, ſtruck, ſung, ſtung, flung, rung, wrung, ſprung, ſwung, drunk, ſunk, ſhrunk, ſlunk, hung, come, run, found, bound, ground, wound*; many of them are likewiſe ſpelt with (*a*), as *began, ſang, rang, ſprang, drank, came, ran*, and ſome others, tho' not ſo often; from to *win, ſpin, begin, ſwim, ſtrike, ſtick, ſing, ſting, ſling, ring, wring, ſpring, ſwing, drink, ſink, ſhrink, ſtink, hang, come, run, find, bind, grind, Wind*, &c.

2. *Fought, taught, raught, ſought, beſought, caught, bought, brought, thought, wrought*; from to *fight, teach, reach, ſeek, beſeech, catch, buy, bring, think, work*; yet ſome of theſe ſometimes keep their Regularity; as *reach'd, beſeech'd, catch'd, work'd*, &c.

3. *Took, ſhook, forſook, woke, awoke, ſtood, broke, ſpoke, bore, ſhore, ſwore, tore, wore, wove, clove, ſtrove, throve, drove, ſhone, roſe, aroſe, ſmote, wrote, bode, abode, roſe, choſe, trod, got, begot, forgot, rod*; ſome likewiſe write *thrive, riſe, ſmit, writ, abid, rid*, &c. others form them by (*a*), as *brake, ſpake, bare, ſhare, ſware, tare, ware, clave, gat, begat, forgat*, and perhaps ſome others; but this Way is ſeldom, and very unpolite;

lite; the *preſent* Times of theſe Words are, *take, ſhake, forſake, wake, awake, ſtand, break, ſpeak, bear, ſhear, ſwear, tear, wear, weave, cleave,* (to cling to), *cleave* (to ſplit), *ſtrive, drive, ſhine, riſe, ariſe, ſmite, write, bide, abide, ride, chuſe* (or chooſe) *tread, beget, forget.*

4. *Give, bid, ſit,* having their *paſſing* Times, *gave, bad, ſate.*

5. *Draw, know, ſnow, grow, throw, blow, crow, fly, ſlay, ſee, ly,* make their *paſſing* Times, *drew, knew, ſnew* (or rather *ſnow'd*), *grew, threw, blew* (or rather *blow'd*), *crow,* (or rather *crow'd*;) *flew, ſlew, ſaw, lay, flee* (or *flye*) *fled*; from *go, went.* Theſe are all, or the moſt part at leaſt, of the moſt conſequence of all the irregular WORDS in the *Engliſh Tongue.*

When Affirmations *are together join'd,*
To, *ſtill between them does its Station find.*

When two *Words of Affirmation* come together, before the latter the Sign (*to*) is always expreſs'd or underſtood; as *I love to read, I dare fight*; in the latter, (*to*) is underſtood, for it means, *I dare to fight,* as *do, will, may, can*; with their *paſſing* Times, *did, wou'd, ſhou'd, might, cou'd,* and *muſt, bid, dare, let, help,* and *make.*

CHAP.

[4] In this Place we ſhall alſo add what we have to ſay of the *Moods* or *Forms* of *Verbs*, or *Affirmations.* We have therefore already ſaid, that Verbs are of that kind of Words that ſignify the Manner and Form of our Thoughts, the chief of which is *Affirmation*: And we have alſo obſerv'd, that they receive different Inflections, according as the *Affirmation* relates to different *Perſons* and *Times*; but Men have found, that it was proper to invent other Inflections alſo, more diſtinctly to explain what paſs'd in their Minds. For firſt they obſerv'd, that beſides ſimple Affirmations, as *he loves, he lov'd,* &c. there were others conditional and modify'd, as *tho' he might have lov'd, tho' he wou'd have lov'd,* &c. and the better to diſtinguiſh theſe *Affirmations* from the others, they doubl'd the Inflections of the ſame *Tenſes* or *Times,* making ſome ſerve for ſimple *Affirmations,* as *loves, lov'd*; and others for thoſe *Affirmations* which were modify'd; as, *might have lov'd, wou'd have lov'd*; tho' not conſtantly obſerving the Rules, they made uſe of ſimple Inflections to expreſs *modify'd Affirmations,* as, *etſi vereor,* for *etſi verear*; and 'tis of theſe latter ſort of Inflections, that the GRAMMARIANS make their Mood call'd the *Subjunctive*: Moreover (beſides the *Affirmation*) the Action of our Will may be taken for a Manner of our Thought, and Men had Occaſion to mark what they wou'd have underſtood, as well as what they thought. Now we may will a Thing ſeveral Ways, of which three may be conſider'd as chief:

1. We *would* have Things that do not depend on ourſelves, and then we

we *will* it only by a ſimple Wiſh, which is explain'd in *Latin* by the particle *Utinam*, and in our Tongue by *would to God*. Some Languages (as the *Greek*) have invented particular Inflections for that; which has given Occaſion to the GRAMMARIANS to call them the *Optative* Mood: And there's in *French*, and in the *Spaniſh*, and *Italian*, ſomething like it, ſince there are Triple Tenſes; but in others, the ſame Inflections ſerve for the *Subjunctive* and *Optative*; and for this Reaſon, one may very well retrench this Mood in the *Latin* Conjugations; for 'tis not only the different way of ſignifying, which may be very much multiply'd, but the different Inflections that ought to make Moods.

2. We *will* ſometimes after another manner, when we content our ſelves with *granting* a Thing, tho' *abſolutely* we would not do it; as when *Terence* ſays, *Profundat, perdat, pereat, Let him laviſh, let him ſink, let him periſh*, &c. Men might have invented an Inflection to mark this Movement, as well as they have invented one in *Greek*, to mark a *ſimple Deſire*, but they have not done it, and make uſe of the *Subjunctive* for it; and in *French* and *Engliſh* we add *qu'e, let*. Some GRAMMARIANS have call'd this the *Potential* Mood, *Modus Potentialis*, or *Modus Conceſſionis*.

3. The third ſort of *willing* is, when what we *will* depends on a Perſon of whom we may obtain it, ſignifying to him the *Deſire* we have that he *will* do it. This is the *Motion* we have when we *command* or *pray*. 'Tis to mark this *Motion*, that the Mood call'd *Imperative* was invented: It has no firſt Perſon, eſpecially in the *Singular*, becauſe one cannot properly *command* ones ſelf; nor the third in ſeveral Languages, becauſe we don't properly *command* any but thoſe to whom we Addreſs and Speak. And becauſe the *Command* or *Deſire* in this Mood has always regard to the *Future*, it thence happens that the *Imperative* and *Future* are often taken one for another, eſpecially in the *Hebrew*, as *non occides, you ſhall not kill*, for *kill not*: Whence it comes to paſs that ſome GRAMMARIANS have plac'd the *Imperative* among the *Futures*.

Of all the Moods we have been ſpeaking of, the Oriental Tongues have only this latter, which is the Imperative: And on the contrary, the Vulgar Tongues have no particular Inflection for the Imperative, but our way of marking it in the French, is to take the ſecond Perſon plural, and even the firſt without the Pronouns that go before 'em: Thus *Vous aimez, You love*, is a ſimple Affirmation; *aimez* an Imperative. *Nous aimons, We love*; *aimons* an Imperative: But when we command by the Singular, which is very rare, we do not take the ſecond Perſon, *Tu aimes*, but the firſt, *aime*.

There's another Inflection of a Verb, that admits of neither Number nor Perſon, which is what we call Infinitive; as *eſſe, eſtre, to be*; *amare, aimer, to love*. But it muſt be obſerv'd that ſometimes the Infinitive retains the Affirmation, as when I ſay, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*, I know the Evil is to be avoided; then often it loſes it, and becomes a Noun, eſpecially in Greek and the Vulgar Tongues; as when we ſay, *Le boire, le manger*, and alſo *je vieux boire, volo bibere*; for 'tis as much as to ſay, *Volo potum*, or *potionem*.

This being ſuppos'd, 'tis demanded what the Infinitive is properly, when 'tis not a Noun, but retains its Affirmation; as in this Example, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*. I know of no body that has taken Notice of what I am about to Obſerve, which is, that we think the Infinitive is among the other Moods of Verbs, what the Relative is among the Pronouns; for as the Relative has more in it than the other Pronouns, that it joyns the Propoſi-

tion

tion in which it is to another Propoſition, ſo I believe the Infinitive, beſides the Affirmation of the Verb, may joyn the Propoſition in which it is to another; for *Scio* is as good as a Propoſition of it ſelf; and if you add *malum eſt fugiendum*, 'twou'd be two ſeveral Propoſitions; but putting *eſſe* inſtead of *eſt*, you make the laſt Propoſition but a part of the firſt. And thence it is that in French they almoſt always render the Infinitive by the Indicative of the Verb, *Je ſcay, que le mal eſt fuir*; and then this *que* ſignifies only this Union of one Propoſition to another; which Union is in Latin contain'd in the Infinitive, and in French alſo, tho' rarely, as when we ſay, *Il croit ſcavoir toutes choſes*.

This way of joyning Propoſitions by an Infinitive, or by *quod* and *que*, is chiefly in uſe when we make one part of a Diſcourſe have a relation to another; as if I would report that the King ſaid to me, *Je vous donneray une charge*, I ſhall not generally do it in theſe terms, The King ſaid to me, *I will give thee a Poſt*, le Roy m'a dit, *Je vous donneray une charge*, by leaving the two Propoſitions ſeparate, one for *me*, the other for *the King*, but ſhall joyn 'em together by a *Que le Roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge*; and then it being only a Propoſition, which is of *my ſelf*, I change the firſt, *je donneray*, into the third, *il donnera*, and the Pronoun *vous* (ſignifying *the King* ſpeaking) to the Pronoun *me*, (ſignifying *my ſelf*) who ſpeak.

This Union of the Propoſition is alſo made by *ſi* in French, and by *an* in Latin, in relating an Interrogative; as if any one may demand of me, *Pouvez vous faire cela, Can you do that?* I ſhou'd in relating it ſay, *On m'a demande ſi je pouvois faire cela, I was ask'd if I could do that*: And ſometimes without any Particle, by changing only the Perſon; as, *He ask'd me, Who are you? He ask'd me, who I was.*

But we muſt obſerve, that the Hebrews, tho' they ſpoke in another Language (as the Evangeliſts) make very little uſe of this Union of Propoſitions, but always relate Diſcourſes directly as they were made, ſo that the ὅτι (*quod*) which they frequently us'd, did often ſerve for nothing, and did not joyn Propoſitions: An Example of which is in St. *John*, ch. 1. *Miſerunt Judæi ab Hieroſolymis Sacerdotes & ſcribas ad* Joannem *ut interrogarent eum, Tu quis es? Et confeſſus eſt & non negavit; & confeſſus eſt quia* (ὅτι) *non ſum ego Chriſtus. Et interrogaverunt eum, Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit, Non ſum. Propheta es tu? Et reſpondit, Non.* According to the common uſe of our Tongue, theſe Queſtions and Anſwers would have been related indirectly thus: *They ſent to ask* John *who he was, and he confeſs'd he was not* Chriſt. *And they demanded who he was then, if he was* Elias; *and he ſaid, No. If he was a* Prophet, *and he reply'd, No.* This Cuſtom is even met with in prophane Authors, who ſeem to have borrow'd it alſo from the *Hebrews*: And thence it is that the ὅτι had often among them only the Strength of a Pronoun, depriv'd of its common Uſe of Connection even when Diſcourſe is reported not directly.

We have already ſaid, that Men have, on an infinite number of Occaſions, join'd ſome particular Attribute with the Affirmation, made ſo many *Verbs* different from *Subſtantives*, which are to be found in all Tongues, and that they may be call'd *Adjective*; to ſhew that the Signification, which is proper to each, is added to the Signification common to *all Verbs*, which is that of *Affirmation*. But 'tis a vulgar Error to believe that all theſe Verbs ſignify *Action* or *Paſſion*; for there's nothing a Verb cannot have for its Attribute, if the Affirmation be join'd to the Attribute. Nay, we

ſee that the Verb Subſtantive *Sum, I am*, is frequently Adjective, becauſe inſtead of taking it to ſignify the Affirmation ſimply, the moſt general of all Attributes is join'd to it, which is *Being*; as when I ſay, *I think therefore I am*; *I am* ſignifies *Sum ens, I am a Being, a Thing*; *Exiſto*, ſignifies alſo *ſum exiſtens, I am, I exiſt.*

However that does not hinder, but that the common Diviſion of theſe Verbs into *Active, Paſſive* and *Neuter*, may be retained. Thoſe Verbs are properly call'd *Active*, which ſignify *Action*, to which is oppos'd *Paſſion*; as, *To beat, to be beaten; to love, to be belov'd:* Whether thoſe *Actions* be determin'd *to a Subject*, which is called real Action, as, *To beat, to break, to kill*, &c. or only to an *Object*, which is called intentional Action; as, *To love, to know, to ſee.*

Whence it is that in ſeveral Languages, Men make uſe of the ſame Word, by giving it ſeveral Inflections, to ſignify both the one and the other, calling that a *Verb Active*, which has an Inflection, by which the *Action* is mark'd, and a *Verb Paſſive*, that which has an Inflection, by which the *Paſſion* is mark'd; *Amo, amor*; *verbero, verberor.* This was the Cuſtom in all the Ancient Languages, *Latin, Greek*, and *Oriental*; and moreover, theſe latter gave three Actives to the ſame Verb, with each their Paſſive, and a Reciprocal between both the one and the other; as, *s'aimer* would be, which ſignifies the Action of the Verb, on the Subject of that Verb. But the vulgar Tongues of *Europe* have no *Paſſive*, and inſtead of that, they make uſe of a Participle made of the *Verb Active*, which is taken in a Paſſive Senſe, with the Verb Subſtantive; *Je ſuis, I am*; as, *I am beloved, Je ſuis aime*; *Je ſuis battu, I am beaten*, &c. Thus much for Verbs, *Active* and *Paſſive.*

Neuters, call'd by ſome GRAMMARIANS *Verba Intranſitiva*, are two ſorts; the one does not ſignify the *Action*, but a *Quality*; as, *Albet, it is white; viret, it is green; friget, it is cold*, &c. Or ſome Situation; as, *Sedet, he ſits*; *ſtat, he ſtands*; *jacet, he lies.* Or has ſome relation to Place; *Adeſt, he is preſent*; *abeſt, he is abſent.* Or ſome other State or Attribute; as, *Quieſcit, he is quiet; excellit, he excells; præeſt, he is Superiour*; *regnat, he is King.*

The other Verbs *Neuter*, ſignify *Actions*, but ſuch as do not paſs in a Subject different from him who Acts, or which do not relate to another Object; as, *To dine, to ſup, to march, to ſpeak.*

Nevertheleſs, theſe latter ſorts of Verbs *Neuter*, ſometimes become *Tranſitive*, when a Subject is given them; as, *Ambulare viam*, where the Way is taken for the Subject of the *Action*; often alſo in *Greek*, and ſometimes in *Latin*, a Subject is given it, being a Noun form'd of the ſame Verb; as, *Pugnare pugnam, ſervire ſervitutem, vivere vitam.*

But we believe theſe later Ways of Speaking were occaſion'd only to mark ſomething particular, that was not entirely contain'd in the Verb, as when one wou'd ſay, Man *leads a ſhameful Life*, which is not imply'd in the Word *vivere*; it has been ſaid, *vivere vitam beatam*; as alſo *Servire duram Servitutem.* Thus when we ſay, *vivere vitam*, 'tis without doubt a *Pleonaſm* come from thoſe other Ways of Speaking. For this Reaſon (in all the new Languages) we avoid joining the Noun to the Verb, as *a fault*, and don't ſay, for Example: *To fight a great fight.*

By this that Queſtion may be reſolv'd, whether every Verb not Paſſive, govern always an Accuſative, at leaſt underſtood: 'Tis the Opinion of ſome very able GRAMMARIANS, but for our Parts we don't think it. For firſt, The Verbs that ſignify no Action, but ſome Condition; as, *quieſcit, exiſtit*; or ſome Quality; as, *albet, calet*, have no Accuſative they can govern; and for the

the reſt it muſt be regarded, whether the Action they ſignify has a Subject or an Object, that may be different from that which Acts. For then the Verb governs the Subject, where this Object has the Accuſative. But when the Action ſignify'd by the Verb has neither Subject nor Object different from that which acts, as, *to dine*, *to ſup*; *prandere*, *cenare*, &c. then there is not ſufficient Reaſon to ſay they govern the Accuſative: Tho' thoſe GRAMMARIANS thought the Infinitive of the Verb to be underſtood as a Noun form'd by the Verb, and by this Example, *Curro*, they will have it *curro curſum*, or *curro currere*: However, this does not appear to be Solid enough, for the Verb ſignifies every Thing; the Infinitive ſignifies taken as a Noun; and further, the Affirmation and Deſignation of the Perſon and Tenſe. As the Adjective *candidus*, *white*, ſignifies the Subſtantive drawn from the Adjective (to wit) *candor*, *whiteneſs*, and alſo the Connotation of a Subject, in which is that abſtract; wherefore, there's as much Reaſon to pretend, that when we ſay, *Homo candidus*, *candere* muſt be underſtood, as to imagine that when we ſay *curris*, *currere* is to be underſtood.

The *Infinitive* (which we have been explaining) is what properly ſhould be call'd a Verb Impersonal, ſince it marks the Affirmation, which is the Property of the Verb, and marks it indefinitely, without Number and Perſon, which is properly to be Impersonal.

Nevertheleſs, the GRAMMARIANS generally give the Name of *Impersonal* to certain Defective Verbs, that have hardly any thing but the third Perſon.

There are two ſorts of theſe Verbs, the one have the Form of *Verbs Neuter*, as *Pœnitet*, *pudet*, *piget*, *licet*, *lubet*, &c. the other are made of *Verbs Paſſive*, and retain the Form, as *Statur*, *curritur*, *amatur*, *vivitur*, &c. Now theſe Verbs have ſometimes more Perſons than the GRAMMARIANS think of, as may be ſeen in the *Method. Latin Remarks on Verbs*, Chap. 5. But what we may conſider here, and which few Perſons have taken Notice of, is, that it ſeems they are call'd *Impersonal*, only becauſe implying in their Signification a Subject, which agrees only to the third Perſon. 'Twas not neceſſary to expreſs the Fact, becauſe 'tis mark'd enough by the Verb itſelf; and thus the Affirmation and Attribute have been compriz'd by the Subject in one Word, as *Pudet me*, that is *pudor tenet*, or *eſt tenens me*; *Pœnitet me*, *pœna habet me*; *Libet mihi*, *libido eſt mihi*: Where it muſt be obſerv'd that the Verb *eſt* is not only ſimply the Subſtantive, but ſignifies alſo *Exiſtence*. For 'tis as if 'twas ſaid, *Libido exiſtit mihi*, or *eſt exiſtens mihi*. And thus in other Impersonals reſolv'd by *eſt*; as *licet mihi*, for *licitum eſt mihi*, *Oportet orare*, for *opus eſt orare*, &c. As to Paſſive Impersonals, *Statur*, *curritur*, *vivitur*, &c. they may alſo be reſolv'd by the Verb *eſt*, or *fit*, or *exiſtit*, and the Nouns Verbal taken of themſelves, as *Statur*, that is, *Statio fit*, or *eſt facta*, or *Exiſtit*; *Curritur*, *curſus fit*; *Concurritur*, *Concurſus fit*: *Vivitur*, *vita eſt*, or rather *vita agitur*. *Si ſic vivitur*, *ſi vita eſt talis*, *If Life is ſuch*. *Miſere vivitur cum medice vivitur*. Life is miſerable when 'tis too much ſubjected to the Rules of Phyſick, and then *eſt* becomes a Subſtantive, becauſe of the addition of *miſere*, which makes the Attribute of the Propoſition.

Dum ſervitur libidini, that is, *dum ſervitus exhibetur libidini*, when a Man makes himſelf a Slave to his Paſſions. By this methinks may be concluded the Vulgar Languages have not properly Impersonals; as when we ſay in *French*, *il faut*, *it muſt*, *il eſt permis*, *il me plaiſt*; for *il* is there properly a Relative, which always ſerves inſtead.

ſtead of the Nominative of the Verb, which generally comes after in the Conſtruction, as if we ſay, *il me plait defaire cela*; that is to ſay, *il de faire*, for the *Action or the Motion to do that pleaſes me*, or *eſt mon plaiſir*, 'tis my Pleaſure. However, this *il* (which few People in our Opinion have rightly underſtood) is only a ſort of Pronoun, for *id* that, which ſerves inſtead of the Nominative underſtood, or imply'd in the Senſe, and repreſents *il*, ſo that 'tis properly taken from the Article *il*, of the *Italians*; inſtead of which we ſay *le*; or from the Pronoun *ille*, from whence we alſo take our Pronoun of the third Perſon *il*; *il aime*, *il parle*, *il court*, &c.

For the Paſſive Impersonals, *amatur*, *curritur*, expreſs'd in *French* by *on aime*, *on court*; 'tis certain theſe Ways of Speaking in our Modern Languages, are ſtill leſs Impersonal, tho' Indefinite; this *on*, is there for *Man*, *Homme*, and conſequently ſerves inſtead of the Nominative to the Verb: All this relates particularly to the *French*, and we have leſs of the Impersonal than they, but the ſame Reaſons will remove ours, juſtly apply'd. And one may alſo obſerve, that the Verbs of the Effects of Nature, as, *Pluit*, *pingit*, *grandinat*, may be explain'd by theſe ſame, in both Tongues.

As *Pluit* is properly a Word, in which for brevity ſake the Subject, the Affirmation, and Attribute are included, inſtead of *Pluvia fit*, or *cadit*; and when we ſay *it Rains*, *it Snows*, *it Hails*, &c. it is therefore the Nominative, that is to ſay, *Rains*, *Snows*, *Hails*, &c. included with their Verb Subſtantive *eſt* or *fuit*; as if we ſhould ſay, *il pluie eſt*, *le Neige ſe fait*, for *id quod dicitur pluvia eſt*, *id quod vocatur nix fit*.

This is better ſeen in the Way of Speaking, where the *French* join a Verb with their *il*, as *il fait chaud*, *il eſt tard*, *il eſt ſix heures*, *il eſt jour*, &c. For 'tis the ſame as may be ſaid in *Italian*, *il caldo fa*, tho' in uſe we ſay ſimply *fa caldo*; *Æſtus*, or *Calor eſt*, or *fit*, or *exiſtit*. And *il fait chaud*, that is to ſay, *il chaud* (*il caldo*) or *le chaud ſe fait*, to ſay *exiſtit*, *eſt*. Thus we alſo ſay, *il ſe fait tard*, for *il tardo*, that is to ſay, *il tarde* (*le tard*, or the *Evening*) *ſe fait*. Or as is ſaid in ſome Provinces, *il s'en va tard*, for *il tarde*, *le tard s'en va venir*, that is, the Night approaches: As alſo *il eſt jour*, that is *il jour* (or the *Day*) *eſt*, *is*. *Il eſt ſix heures*, that is, *il temps ſix heures eſt*; The Time or part of the Day call'd ſix a-Clock, is. And thus in other the like Terms.

Tho' we have no *Participles* in *Engliſh*, but what by the beſt Judges are reduc'd to *Qualitys*, yet to carry on this general *Grammar*, we here add ſomething on them: Participles are true Noun Adjectives, and 'twou'd not be proper to diſcourſe of 'em here, if they had not ſuch a near Relation to Verbs. This Relation conſiſts (as we have ſaid) in that they ſignify the ſame Thing as the Verb, except the Affirmation, which is taken away, and the Deſignation of the three different Perſons, which follows the Affirmation. For which Reaſon (when 'tis reſtor'd to it) we do the ſame thing by the Participle, as by the Verb; as *amatus ſum*, is the ſame thing as *Amor*; and *ſum amans*, as *amo*. And this Way of Speaking by Participle, is more uſual in *Greek* and *Hebrew*, than in *Latin*, tho' *Cicero* makes uſe of it ſometimes.

Thus the Participle retains the Attribute of the Verb, and alſo the Deſignation of the Time or Tenſe, there being Participles of the Preſent, the Preterit, and the Future, eſpecially in *Greek*. But this is not always obſerv'd, tho' ſome Participles joyn often all ſorts of Tenſes; as for Example, the Paſſive Participle *Amatus*, which in moſt GRAMMARIANS paſſes for the Preterit, is often of the Preſent and Future; as *amatus ſum*, *amatus ero*. And on the contrary, that of the Preſent; as *amans* is often of the

Pre-

Preterit, Apri ſuper ſe dimicant, indurantes Attritu arborum coſta, Plin. That is to ſay, *poſtquam induravere*, and the like, *Nouv. Meth. Lat. Remarq.* on Participles.

There are Active and Paſſive Participles, the Active in *Latin* end in *ans* or *ens*, *curans*, *docens*; the Paſſive in *us*, *amatus*, *doctus*; tho' there are ſome of theſe that are Active, to wit, thoſe of Verbs Deponent; as *Locutus*. But there are ſome alſo, that add this Paſſive Signification, *que cela doit eſtre, qu'il faut que cela ſoit*, that muſt or ought to be, as are the Participles in *dus*, *amandus*, that *ought to be belov'd*; tho' ſometimes that later Signification is almoſt quite loſt.

The Property of Participles of Verbs Active, is to ſignify the Action of the Verb, as 'tis in the Verb, that is to ſay, in the Courſe of the Action it ſelf; whereas Verbal Nouns that ſignify Actions alſo, ſignify them rather in the Habit, than in the Act. Thence it is that Participles have the ſame Regimen as the *amans Deum*. Whereas Verbal Nouns have the ſame Regimen as Nouns, *amator Dei*. And the Participle itſelf, has the ſame Regimen as Nouns, when it ſignifies rather the Habit than the Act of the Verb, becauſe it then has the Nature of a ſimple Noun Verbal, as *amans Virtutis*.

We have ſeen, that by taking away the Affirmation from Verbs, Active and Paſſive Participles are made, which are Noun Adjectives, retaining the Regimen of the Verb, at leaſt in the Active.

But there are in *Latin* two Noun Subſtantives form'd, one in *dum*, call'd a *Gerund*, which has divers Caſes, *dum*, *di*, *do*; *amandum*, *amandi*, *amando*; but it has but one Gender, and one Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *dus*, *amandus*, *amanda*, *amandum*.

Another in *um*, call'd Supine, which has alſo two Caſes, *tum*, *tu*; *amatum*, *amatu*; but it has no more diverſity either of Gender or Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *tus*; *amatus*, *amata*, *amatum*.

We know very well the GRAMMARIANS are puzzled a little to explain the Nature of the Gerund; and that ſome very able ones have thought 'twas an Adjective Paſſive, whoſe Subſtantive was the Infinitive of the Verb; ſo that they pretend for Example, that *tempus eſt legendi Libros*, or *Librorum* (for both the one and the other is us'd) is as if it were *tempus eſt legendi & legere libros vel librorum*. There are two Speeches, to wit, *tempus legendi & legere*, which is the Adjective and Subſtantive, as if it was *legenda lectionis*, *& legere Libros*, which is the Noun Verbal that then governs the Caſe of the Verb, as well as a Subſtantive governs the Genitive, when we ſay *librorum* for *Libros*. But conſidering every thing, we don't ſee that this Term is neceſſary.

For 1. As they ſay of *legere*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Subſtantive, which as ſuch may govern either the Genitive, or even the Accuſative, as the Ancients ſaid, *curatio hanc rem*; *Quid tibi hanc tactio eſt?* Plaut. We ſay the ſame Thing of *legendum*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Subſtantive, as well as *legere*, and that conſequently it may do all that's attributed to *legere*.

2. There is no Ground to ſay that a Word is underſtood when 'tis never expreſt, and cannot be expreſt without appearing abſurd: Now never was an *Infinitive* join'd to its *Gerund*; and if one ſhou'd ſay *legendum eſt legere*, it wou'd appear altogether abſurd therefore, *&c.*

3. If the Gerund *legendum* were an Adjective Paſſive, it wou'd not be different from the Participle *legendus*; for what Reaſon therefore did the Ancients, who underſtood their Tongue, diſtinguiſh Gerunds from Participles? We believe therefore the Gerund is a Noun Subſtan-

tive, which is always Active, and which differs from the Infinitive, only conſider'd as a Noun; becauſe it adds to the Signification of the Action of the Verb, another of the Neceſſity or Duty; as if one wou'd ſay, the Action that is to be done, which ſeems to be mark'd by the Word Gerund, which is taken from *gerere*, to do; whence it comes that *pugnandum eſt*, is the ſame Thing as *pugnare oportet*; and the *Engliſh* and *French*, which have not this, render it by the *Infinitive*, and a Word which ſignifies *ought to be*. *Il faut combattre*; and in *Engliſh*, *we ought to fight*.

But as Words do not always preſerve the Force for which they were invented, this Gerund in *dum* often loſes that *Oportet*, and preſerves only the Action of the Verb; *Quis talia fando Temperet a Lacrymis?* That is to ſay, *in fando*, or *in fari talia*.

As for the *Supine*, we agree with thoſe GRAMMARIANS, that it is a Noun Subſtantive which is Paſſive, whereas the Gerund in our Opinion is always active.

CHAP. IX.

Of PARTICLES, *or* Manners *of* WORDS.

By PARTICLES *theſe ſeveral Things are done*;
Circumſtance *and* Manner *of* Words *are ſhown*,
And then to every Part of Speech are flown;
Or elſe they do denote of Words *the State*,
And how each Word *to other does relate*:
Or Sentence, *elſe to* Sentence *they unite*,
And their Dependance *on each other cite*.

[1] PARTICLES (that is little WORDS) or *Manners* of WORDS, have theſe ſeveral Offices: 1*ſt*, They expreſs or ſignify the Circumſtance or Manner of *Words*; as, *I love you dearly*; explaining (when join'd to an *Affirmation*) *how*, *when*, *where*, or *whether* or *no* one is, does, or ſuffers; as, *he reads* well; *he dances* ſcurvily; *he ſings* now; *the Play is acted* here; *it is a doubt* whether *he ſings or* not. It is join'd to a QUALITY; as *he is* very *happy*; *he is* always *fortunate*; *a Woman* truly *loving*, *is ever diſappointed*; *a Wife* ſeldom *ſcolding*, *is very rare*, &c. 'Tis ſometimes join'd to it ſelf; as, *I live* very *comfortably*. They farther denote, or ſhew the *State* of *Words*, and their *Reference* or Relation to each

[1] We have already obſerv'd, that Caſes and Prepoſitions, or *Foreplac'd Words*, were invented for the ſame Uſe; that is, to ſhew the Relations that Things have to one another. In all Languages theſe Relations are ſhewn by Prepoſition.

[2] The

each other; as, Stephen *goes* over *Highgate-hill*; James *went* under *Temple-bar*; Mary *went* through *the Hall*; Suſan *went* to *Weſtminſter*, from *St. James's Park*; *the Queen dwells* at *St. James's*; Henry *lives* in *the Town*, *but* Matthew without, *or* out of *it*, &c. It connects Sentences; as, Roger *went* to *his Country-houſe*, and *ſtudy'd there the whole Seaſon*; Peter alſo *accompany'd him*; nor *was there any thing wanting*; neither *did* Ralph *ſtay long behind*.

[2] They are therefore divided into three ſorts, or rather rang'd under theſe three Heads; the firſt ſhewing, the *Manners*, or *Qualities* of *Words*, by being added to them; the ſecond denotes ſome Circumſtances of *Actions*, and joins Words to Words, and little Members of a Sentence to each other; the third joins Sentence to Sentence, as greater Members of a Period.

Theſe from the other Parts of Speech are known,
Becauſe before them they do ſtill diſown
By, with, for, through, from, of; *and all*
Thoſe Names *which we the* Perſonal *do call.*

[2] The Deſire Men have to ſhorten Diſcourſe, gave Riſe to *Adverbs*; for the greateſt part of theſe *Particles*, are only to ſignify in one Word, what cou'd not elſe be done without a *Preposition* and a *Noun*; as *Sapienter*, for *cum ſapientia*, *with Wiſdom*; *hodie*, *to Day*, for *in hoc die*, *in this Day*.

And this is the Reaſon, that in the vulgar Languages the greateſt Part of the *Adverbs* are generally more Elegantly explain'd by the *Noun* and the *Preposition*; thus we rather ſay (we ſpeak generally, for it holds not always) *with Wiſdom*, *with Prudence*, *with Pride*, *with Moderation*, than *wiſely*, *prudently*, *proudly*, *moderately*; tho' in *Latin* it is generally more Elegant to uſe the *Adverbs*.

Thence it is that a *Noun* or *Name*, is often taken for an *Adverb*; as *Inſtar* in *Latin*, *primum*, or *primo*, *partim*, &c. Thus in *French* *Deſſus*, *deſſous*, *dedans*, which are indeed *Nouns*. Theſe two ſorts of Particles, which we have juſt remark'd on, are concern'd in the Objects of the Mind, not in the Actions or Judgment.

The ſecond ſort of Words, which ſignify the Form of our Thoughts, and not properly their Objects, are the *Conjunctions* or *Joining-Words*, as *et*, *non*, *vel*, *ſi*, *ergo*, &c. *and*, *nor*, *or*, *if*, *therefore*, becauſe if we conſider well, and reflect juſtly, we ſhall find that theſe Particles ſignify nothing but the very Operation of the Mind, which joyns or disjoyns Things which we deny, or which we conſider abſolutely or conditionally; for Example, There is no Object in the World lies out of our Mind; which anſwers the Particle *Non*; but it is plain, that it denotes nothing but the Judgment which we make to ſhew, that one thing is not another.

Thus *Ne*, which in *Latin* is a Particle of Interrogation, as *Aiſne? Do you ſay it?* is not the Object of our Mind, but only marks the Motion of our Soul, by which we deſire to know ſomething. And the ſame may be ſaid of all Words of Interrogation, as *quis*, *que*, *quod*.

Interjections are Words that ſignify nothing without us, but they are Words, or rather Sounds, which are more Natural than Artificial, which expreſs the Emotions of our Souls; as *alas! woe's me! oh!* &c.

This

This Part of Speech is eaſily diſtinguiſh'd from the Reſt, becauſe in good Senſe they cannot admit theſe Words, *of, to, for, O, with, by, from, through*; nor the *Perſonal Names, I, thou, he, we, ye, they*; for we cannot ſay, *of fooliſhly, to fooliſhly, from fooliſhly*, &c. nor *I fooliſhly, thou fooliſhly, he fooliſhly.*

This firſt, *with* Affirmation *and its* Name,
Makes perfect Senſe, as Peter ſlowly came;
And by its anſwering to the Queſtions How,
(*And in what manner*) do they ſteer the Plough?

You may know the firſt, by its making compleat Senſe with one *Affirmation* and its *Name*; as, *A Philoſopher ſpeaks* **wiſely**; *A Wiſe Man lives* **happily.** And by anſwering the Queſtion *How?* or *after what Manner?* This *Part of Speech* is ſometimes join'd to a *Name* or *Quality* to expreſs their Manner, as, *too much a Philoſopher*; *egregiouſly impudent.* But here indeed, and in moſt Caſes, a *Word* is expreſs'd or underſtood, to which this alſo relates.

This ſort the Manner, Time, *and* Place *imply,*
As by the following Scale you will deſcry.

This ſort relates either to the *Manner, Place,* or *Time*: The firſt expreſſes the Manner of *being, doing,* or *ſuffering, Abſolutely,* or *Comparatively.*

I. *Abſolutely.*

By
1. Certainty; as, *Verily, truely, undoubtedly.*
2. Contingence; as, *Happily, perhaps, by chance, perchance.*
3. Negation; as, *Not, in no wiſe.*
4. Natural Powers, or Habits; as, *Wiſely, liberally, juſtly.*
5. Senſible Impreſſions; as, *Brightly, naſtily, bitterly, loudly, ſmoothly.*
6. Paſſions of the Soul; as, *Merrily, joyfully*; as, *Ha! ha! he! wondringly*, as, *Lo! O! oh! Scornfully*, as, *Tuſh*; *lovingly*, as, *Ah! hatefully*, as, *Fob*; *ſorrowingly*, as, *Alas! ah! wo's me!*

II. *Comparatively.*

By
1. Exceſs; as *very, exceedingly, too much, more, moſt*; as *more hardly, moſt ſofily.*
2. Defect; as *almoſt, well nigh, little leſs, leaſt of all.*
3. Likeneſs, or Equality; as *ſo, alike, as it were, as.*
4. Unlikelineſs, or Inequality; as *otherwiſe, differently, far otherwiſe.*

III. *Of*

III. *Of Place.*

Denote
1. Preſence in a Place, anſwering to the Queſtion **where?** as, *here, there, elſewhere, every where, no where, ſomewhere elſe, above, below, within, without*; or to the Queſtion, **with whom?** as, *together, at once, apart, ſeverally.*
2. Motion from a Place; as *whence, hence, thence.*
3. Motion towards a Place; as *Whitherwards, hitherwards, thitherwards, otherward, toward, upward, backward.*
4. The Way to a Place; as *Whitheraway, this, that,* or *another way.* Tho' theſe are ſcarce to be allow'd Particles, or Manners of Words.
5. The Term or End of Motion; as *whither, hither, thither, whitherto, hitherto.*

IV. *Of Time.*

Denote
1. Being in Time; as, **when?** either the Preſent, as *now, to day*; the Paſt, as *already, yeſterday, before, long ſince, heretofore*; the Future, as *to morrow, not yet, after, hereafter, henceforward.*
2. Duration and Continuance; **how long?** *a long while, ſlowly, quickly, ſhortly, hitherto.*
3. Viciſſitude, or Repetition; **how often?** *often, ſometimes, ſeldom, dayly, yearly*; *by turns, alternately*; *once, twice, thrice, ten times*, &c.

Thoſe that are deriv'd from *Qualities*, which admit degrees of Compariſon, do the ſame; as *hardly, more hardly, moſt* or *very hardly.*

The ſecond ſort that ſhew of Words the ſtate,
And how each Word to Others does relate,
You in the following Catalogue *you'll find,*
And how its Uſe *and* Meaning *is to each aſſign'd.*

OF] denotes Relations betwixt the Word that goes before, and the Word that follows it, whether that Word be *Name, Quality*, or *Affirmation*; as, *the Son of Adam*; but this properly belongs to *Conſtruction*, to which we refer you.

It ſignifies *concerning*, or the Object, or Matter about which you ſpeak or write; as, *a Treatiſe of Virtue*, or *on*, or *concerning* Virtue.

The

The Matter; as, *a Cup of Gold.*

The Means, (or WITH) to *die of Hunger.*

It ſignifies AMONG; as, *of five Horſes four were blind.*

THROUGH; *'tis of God's great Mercy*: But this is a Vulgariſm, and ſcarce worth Notice.

FROM, *South of* Windſor.

OFF] ſignifies Separation and Diſtance, and has its Oppoſite in ON, which implys Continuation; as, *to put off, to put on; He put off his Hat, he ſtood off to Sea.* It ſignifies Delay; *He put me off from Day to Day, he is off and on with me.*

FROM] implys the Term *from which*, or Motion, and is oppos'd to TO; as, *He went* from *Hackney* to *London*; *from Head to Foot, from firſt to laſt, from hence, from thence*, &c.

It ſignifies OFF; as, *He took me from the Ground*, or *from off the Ground.* Out of Sincerity, *I ſpeak it from my Heart.*

TO (*Unto*, not much us'd) ſignifies Motion *to*, *I go to* Windſor; Relation, *faithful to his Soveraign.*

IN] *to* Day, *i. e.* in *this Day, to morrow.*

FOR] *ſhe had a Thouſand Pounds to her Fortune.*

BEFORE] *you promis'd me to my Face.*

ABOUT, or concerning] *Speak to the Head we agreed on.*

TOWARDS] *I thank you for your Kindneſs to me.*

TILL, or Until] *The Meeting is put off to* November.

In Compariſon OF] *He is nothing* to *Hercules*, or *in compariſon of* Hercules.

MAY, can or will] *I have nothing to comfort me*; *i. e.* that may, can, or will comfort me.

TILL, or Until] is only ſpoke of Time; *He play'd till eight a-Clock.*

Before] *He wou'd not remove his Quarters* till (or until) *his Contributions were paid.*

FOR] denotes the *Purpoſe, End*, or *Uſe*, Benefit or Damage for, &c. George *got a Houſe* for *Stephen*; *the Advocate pleads for his Client.*

Oppos'd to *againſt.*] William *is* for *me*, John *is* againſt *me.*

Fitneſs, Inconvenience] as, *This Hat is too little* for *me.*

Ex-

Exchange, or trucking] as, *He had Barley* for *his Hops.*

In place, or inſtead of] *Harry did Duty* for *John.*

Diſtribution] *I appointed one Room* for *every Company.*

In regard or conſideration of] as, *He liv'd high enough* for *his Eſtate.*

In conſideration of] *James was rewarded* for *his Valour.*

During] *He was Captain of the Fort,* for *Life.*

Notwithſtanding] For *all his conceited Wiſdom, he was a Fool.*

BY] The ſeveral Meanings of this Word is ſeen in this Sentence: *He was ſlain* by *his Enemy, by* (near, or beſide) *a Spring of Water, but wounded firſt* by *his own Fear, and then* by *his Enemy's Sword.*

In] *By Day, by Night.*

WITH] ſhews the Inſtrument, or Means, and Concomitance; *He was ſlain* with *a Sword*; *he abides* with *me*; *he purg'd* with *Jollop.*

THROUGH] implys the Cauſe, Means, or Medium, but chiefly the local Medium, tho' it ſignifies the Moral and Natural likewiſe; as, *The Beams of the Sun with incredible Speed paſs from Heaven,* through *the Air to the Earth, endu'd with Light, and Heat, by* (with, through) *which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants, which God has prepar'd for us, and given to us, for our Uſe, and his Glory.*

AFTER] oppoſes *before,* relates to Time and Place, the Poſteriority of the former, and Inferiority of the later: *After* Chriſtmas *comes* Hilary *Term*; *the Sheriff is* after *the Mayor.*

For] *She pines* after *Melons.*

IN, INTO] denotes Time, Place, the Manner of being, thinking, doing; with the Motive, Cauſe, or Means of doing. John *lives* in *the Caſtle*; William *goes* into *the Country*; in *Winter*; in *the City.*

Poſture Diſpoſition] *To ſtand* in *a decent poſture*; *he is* in *his Cloak.*

The Motive] *He did it* in *Revenge.*

Among] Harry *has not Sobriety* in *all his Meditations.*

Manner of Change] *He changes Water* into *Wine.*

AT]

AT] implys nearneſs to a Place, Time, Price; the Inſtrument, Cauſe, Manner, &c. At *School*, at *Weſtminſter*, at *the beginning*, at *the bottom*.

Near, cloſe by] *He watches* at *the end of the Street*.

For.] *He diſpos'd of his Tickets* at *a good Rate*: *What do you ſell this* at?

With.] *He plays* at *Bowls*, at *Cards*, at *Dice*.

According to.] *At my Pleaſure*.

On, *or* Upon.] Baniſter *is good* at *the Flute*; Peter *is a Marksman* at *Shooting*.

Employment.] *To be* at *Study*, at *Supper*, at *Prayers*.

WARD] is always put after a Word; as, *toward*, *homeward*, *Heav'nward*, and implys *to*.

There are many more of this ſort, but we ſhall be content with theſe, as well as Dr. *Wallis*, ſince abundantly ſufficient for our End: For the reſt, we ſhall refer you to a Treatiſe of our *Engliſh Particles*, which We ſhall publiſh as a Supplement to the Study of the *Engliſh Tongue*; as *Turſelinus*, and others, have done to that of the *Latin*.

By the third ſort of Particles is ſhown
How Sentences Dependance may be known,
And to each other Sentences we join.

The third ſort of theſe *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, joyn *Sentences* together, and let us ſee by that the Relation of one Notion to another, and the Dependance of one Sentence on another; as, *and*, *alſo*, *ſo as*; *nor*, *neither*, *but*, *unleſs*, *nevertheleſs*, *however*, *otherwiſe*; *if*, *ſave*, *except*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *as*, *namely*, *to wit*, *why*, *wherefore*, *for*, *becauſe*, *that*, *therefore*, *whereas*, *ſince*, *likewiſe*, *thereupon*, &c.

What elſe is neceſſary to be known in *Grammar*, concerning theſe *Particles*, will be ſhewn in the following Part of our Diviſion of *Grammar*, under the Title of *Sentences*.

Here we think it proper to add ſome Proprieties in Writing, which make Words more beautiful, becauſe more diſtinct, and expreſſive. All *Proper Names* (and indeed all *Names*) ought to be written with the initial Letter a *Capital*. The ſame muſt be done by any other Part of Speech, when there's a Force or Emphaſis laid on it: Otherwiſe *Qualities*, *Affirmations*, *Particles*, are always written with ſmall Letters. The firſt Word of every Epiſtle, Book, Chapter, Verſe, &c. begins with a Capital; but ſome Sentences of Importance are expreſs'd all in Capitals, as *Inſcriptions*, &c.

The End of the Third Part.

Part

Part IV.

CHAP. X.

Of SENTENCES.

At leaſt, three Words a Sentence muſt contain,
Which muſt ſome Sentiment or Thought explain.

A Sentence comprehends at leaſt *three* Words, by which ſome Sentiment or Thought of the Mind is expreſs'd: Nor can it be without one *Affirmation*, and a *Name* ſignifying the Subject of that *Affirmation*, i. e. a *Name* of which ſomething is affirm'd; as, *a Lie is abominable*.

[1] The Conſtruction of this Sentence, is the regular Connection of the Words in the Form of Nature, which is generally more regarded by the *Engliſh*, and other Modern Languages, than by thoſe of the Ancients.

A

[1] As we have done in our Notes on the Parts of Speech, or Words, ſo we ſhall here add the general Notions of *Grammar* in the Syntax, or Conſtruction of Words together in a Sentence, according to thoſe Principles of the Art, which we have drawn from Reaſon eſtabliſh'd.

The Conſtruction of Words, is generally diſtinguiſh'd into *Concord* and *Government*; the firſt, by which the Words ought to agree among themſelves, and the ſecond, when one cauſes any Alteration in the other.

The firſt, generally ſpeaking, is the ſame in all Languages, becauſe it is the natural Order, which is in the general Uſage, the better to diſtinguiſh our Diſcourſe.

Thus the diſtinction of the two Numbers, Singular and Plural, is the Reaſon why the Adjective is to agree with the Subſtantive in Number; that is, that one be put either in the Singular or Plural, as the other is. Becauſe the *Subſtantive* is the Subject that is confuſedly, tho' directly mark'd by the *Adjective*. If the *Subſtantive* marks *many*, there are *many* Subjects of the Form, mark'd by the *Adjective*, and by Conſequence it ought to be in the Plural Number, as *Homines docti*, *learned Men*. But there being no Termination in the *Quality* in *Engliſh*, to diſtinguiſh the Number, it is only imply'd in Reaſon, the ſame Word ſignifying the Singular, as well as Plural Number.

The diſtinction of the Maſculine and Feminine Gender, obliges the Languages, which have diſtinct Terminations, to have a Concordance or Agreement between the

Name and *Quality*, or *Subſtantive*, and *Adjective* in *Gender*, as well as Number.

The *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, for the ſame Reaſon are to agree with the *Nouns* and *Pronouns*, or *Names*, and *Perſonal Names* in *Number* and *Perſon*.

But if at any time, in Reading, you meet with any Thing that may appear contrary to theſe Rules, it is by a Figure of Diſcourſe, that is, by having ſome Word underſtood, or by conſidering the Thoughts more than the Words themſelves, as we ſhall ſee anon.

The Conſtruction of Government on the contrary, is entirely Arbitrary, and for that very Reaſon, is different in all Languages. For one Language forms their Government or *Regimen* by *Caſes*; others make uſe of little Signs or Particles in their Place, which yet do not mark all the Caſes, as in *French* and *Spaniſh*, they have only *de* and *a*, which mark the *Genitive* and *Dative Caſes*; the *Italians* add *da*, for the Ablative, the *Engliſh* have *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *by*, &c. yet none for the Accuſative, and the ſame ſometimes for two Caſes. Here you may look back to what has been ſaid on the Caſes, and forward to what may be added in the *Appendix of Prepoſitions*, to the ſhort Remark on them in their Places.

Yet it will not be amiſs to obſerve ſome general Maxims, which are of great Uſe in all Languages.

The *Firſt*, That there is no *Nominative Caſe*, or *firſt State of the Name* in any Sentence, which has not a Reference to ſome *Verb* or *Affirmation*, either expreſs'd or underſtood; becauſe we never talk meerly to mark the bare Objects of our Conception, but to expreſs our Sentiments of what we conceive, which is the Office of the *Verb* or *Affirmation* to mark.

The *Second*, That there is no *Verb* or *Affirmation*, which has not its *Name* or *Nominative Caſe*, either expreſs'd or underſtood; becauſe it is the proper Office of the Verb to affirm, and therefore it muſt have ſomething to affirm of, which is the *Subject* or the *Nominative* of the *Verb*; tho' before an Infinitive, there is an Accuſative, (not a *Nominative Caſe*) as *Scio Petrum eſſe doctum*, *I know Peter to be learned*. But this of the Accuſative relates only to thoſe Languages which have that Caſe.

The *Third*, That there can be no *Adjective* or *Quality*, which has not a Reference to ſome *Subſtantive* or *Name*, becauſe the Adjective marks confus'dly the *Subſtantive* or *Name*, which is the Subject of the Form that is diſtinctly mark'd by the Adjective or Quality; as *Doctus*, learn'd, muſt have regard to ſome Man who is *learned*.

The *Fourth*, That there never is a *Genitive Caſe*, which is not govern'd by ſome other *Name* or *Noun*, becauſe that Caſe continually marks that which is as the Poſſeſſor, ſo that it muſt be govern'd by the Thing poſſeſs'd. For this Reaſon, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, this *Caſe* is never govern'd properly by a *Verb*. This Rule is with more difficulty apply'd in the Vulgar Tongues, becauſe the Particle or Sign *of*, which properly is the Sign of the *Genitive Caſe*, is ſometimes put for the Prepoſition *of*, and *de French*, for *ex* and *de*.

The *Fifth*, That the Government of Verbs is oftentimes taken from divers ſorts of References, included in the Caſes according to the Capriciouſneſs of Cuſtom or Uſage, which yet does not change the Specifick Reference of each Caſe, but only ſhews, that Cuſtom has made choice of *this* or *that*, according to Fancy.

Thus in *Latin* we ſay, *Juvare aliquem*, and *Opitulari alicui*, for theſe are two Verbs of *Aid*, becauſe it pleas'd the *Latins* to regard the Government of the firſt Verb, as the Form, to which the Action paſſes; and that of the ſecond, as a Caſe of Attribution, to which the Action of

A Sentence is, or ſimple, *or* compound,
Still in the firſt, One AFFIRMATION's *found,*
And of the Subject too, One NAME *expreſs'd,*
Or underſtood, as is by all confeſs'd.

Sentences are twofold, *ſimple* and *compound*; a *ſimple Sentence* is, where there is but one AFFIRMATION and one NAME of the *Subject* of that *Affirmation*, either *expreſs'd* or *underſtood*.

A compound Sentence is of two compos'd,
Or more, by Particles *together cles'd*;
Or by conjunctive Qualities *combin'd,*
As in th'Examples you may quickly find.

A compound Sentence is made up of *two*, or *more* ſimple Sentences join'd to each other by ſome *Particle* or *conjunctive* QUALITY; as, *I ride*, and *thou walkeſt*. *This is the Man*, who *did the Savage kill*.

Of the Conſtruction *of* NAMES.

The NAME, the Subject of the AFFIRMATION, Before it generally aſſumes its Station.

The *Name*, or *Perſonal Name*, of which the *Affirmation* affirms ſomething, is generally plac'd in *Conſtruction* before the *Affirmation*; as, *I am happy*. Suſan *loves* Roger. *The* Parſon *preaches*. *The Book is read*.

Except Command, or Queſtion be imply'd;
Then to the Name *Precedence is deny'd.*
Bnt if may, can, ſhall, will, ought, wou'd, *and* do,
Before the principal Affirmation *go,*
Then does the Name *between them take its place.*
Elſe will the Style want all its proper Grace. Ex-

of the Verb has a Reference.

Thus in *French* they ſay *Servir Quelqu'un*, and *Servir a quelque Choſe*, to *ſerve one*, *to ſerve for*, *or to a Uſe*.

Thus in *Spaniſh* the greateſt part of the *Verbs Active* govern indifferently a *Dative*, and an *Accuſative Caſe*.

Thus the ſame Verb may receive ſeveral Governments; as *Præſtare alicui*, or *aliquem*; and thus they for Example ſay, *Eripere Morti aliquem*, or *Aliquem a Morte*, and the like.

Sometimes theſe different Regimens of the Verbs cauſe an alteration in the Senſe, in which the uſe of a Language muſt be conſider'd; as for Example in *Latin*, *Cavere alicui*, to watch, or be careful of the Preſervation of one; but *cavere Aliquem*, is to be aware of him. But in this we muſt always have a particular regard to the Uſage of all Languages.

We have in the Text ſaid what is neceſſary for the Knowledge of the Figures of Speech, to which we refer you.

Except when a *Queſtion*, *Command*, *Permiſſion*, or *Conceſſion* be imply'd, for then the *Name* is put after the *Affirmation*, or betwixt one of the *nine Affirmations*; *Do*, *may*, *can*, *will*, *ſhall*, *ought*, &c. as, *does* Stephen *write? will you depart? burn I? burnſt thou?* or *doſt thou burn?* &c.

If of the Nine, *two do at once precede*
The principal Affirmation, *take heed*
The Name *between thoſe two obtain its Lot*,
Cou'd I have gone? cou'd *Cælia* have forgot?

But if the *principal Affirmation* have two of the nine before it, then the Name is ſet between them; as,

Cou'd Cælia *have forgotten me, ſoon*
Might Roger *have gone out of Town?*
When the Command *the* ſecond Perſon *takes*
The Pers'nal Name *then no appearance makes.*

When the *Command*, *Permiſſion*, *Conceſſion*, &c. is in the *ſecond Perſon*, the *Perſonal Name*, which uſually goes before the *Affirmation*, is often omitted or underſtood; as, *burn*, for *burn thou?* or *you*, or *ye*.

In other Perſons there is frequently a Circumlocution by the Affirmation *let*; as, *let me burn*; *let him burn*; *let them burn*. *Let him ask as often as he will, he never ſhall obtain. Let me do what I will, it is to no purpoſe.* As for *ask I*, or *ask he*, &c. *never ſo often*, &c. it is Barbariſm, and never us'd by any good Author.

When did, might, ſhou'd, wou'd, cou'd, *and* had & were,
If *do imply*; *and alſo after* there
The Affirmation *goes before the* Name;
By Way of Emphaſis *it will do the ſame.*

When the paſſing, or paſt Times of *do*, *may*, *can*, *will*, *ſhall*, *have*, *am*, ſupplies the place of, or implies *if*, the *Name* is ſet after the *Affirmation*, and alſo *there* is us'd; as, had *he* (for if he had) *ask'd, he had obtain'd*. Had *I* (for if I had) *heard this, I wou'd not have been ſo complaiſant*. Were *I a Prince, I wou'd govern better*. There *fell a Thouſand Men on the ſpot*. There *is cold in the Ice* (*or cold is in the Ice*). The ſame is likewiſe done by Way of *Emphaſis*; as, *it was* Mordaunt, *who conquer'd*. *It was the Church, that fell.*

This happens ſometimes, when there are none of theſe Conſiderations; as, *ſaid I*; *ſaid he*; *then follow'd Belvidera.*

To,

To, *and an* Affirmation *oft we know*
Will for the Name *to th'*Affirmation *go*;
And to a Sentence *we the ſame allow.*

Inſtead of the *Name* that goes before the *Affirmation*, and of which the later affirms ſomething, ſometimes another *Affirmation*, with *to* before it, ſupplies its place, as having ſomething affirm'd of it; as, *to Dance* is *wholſom*; *to Play* is *delightful*. *To Conſider* is *uſeful*.

A whole Sentence is the ſame; as, *That the Day is broke, is evident, ſince the Sun ſhines*. In ſhort, whatever will anſwer to the Queſtions *who?* or *what?* will ſupply the Office of the *Name* to the *Affirmation*.

The Pers'nal Name, *or follows, or precedes,*
Ev'n as the Name *it ſelf purſues, or leads.*

The *leading State* of the *Perſonal Name* is ſet before, or after the *Affirmation*, according to the foregoing Rules of Names; as *I read, heareſt thou?* &c.

That Affirmation, *which its Act extends*
To ſomething elſe, ſtill after it commands
A Name, *to which that Action does relate*;
As, Roger ſpurns me with his uſual Hate.

As the *Name*, when it ſignifies the *Subject* of which ſomething is affirm'd by the *Affirmation*, goes before the *Affirmation*, (except before excepted) ſo a *Name* is always plac'd after the *Affirmation*, which ſignifies the Thing to which the Action of the *Affirmation* immediately relates; as, *I read a Book*; *the Fire burns* Robert.

Thus the *following State* of the *Perſonal Names* generally are ſet after the *Affirmation*, and the Particles *to, for, of*, &c. tho' *whom* generally goes before the *Affirmation*; as Martin *is the Man* whom *I ſaw laſt*.

Theſe Names *diſtinguiſh'd are by* what *and* who?
And whom *and* what? *as the Examples ſhew.*

Theſe two *Names* are eaſily known, or diſtinguiſh'd by asking the Queſtion *who?* or *what?* and *whom?* and *what?* the firſt Name anſwers to the Queſtion *who?* or *what?* as who *reads?* anſw. *I*; what *burns? the Fire*: on the contrary, what *do I read?* anſw. *the Book*; whom *does the Fire burn?* anſw. *Robert*.

But when the Action don't at all relate
T'another, but in the Subject terminate

No Name *the* Affirmation *then requires*
To follow it, but in it ſelf expires.

All the Buſtle ſome GRAMMARIANS have made about *Verbs Neuter*, is diſpatch'd in theſe four Lines, that is in this one Rule; that when the Action of the *Affirmation* does not extend or relate to any other Perſon or Thing, but terminates in the Subject, there is no *Name* requir'd after it; as, *I grieve, I rejoyce, I ſit, I run, I ſtand*, &c.

Of the Conſtruction of AFFIRMATIONS.

This very nearly relating to the former, ſeems to demand our next Conſideration, both indeed being interwoven with each another.

The Affirmation *always muſt agree*
In Number and Perſon with the Name *you'll ſee.*

The *Affirmation* muſt agree with the *Name* of which it affirms ſomething in *Number* and *Perſon*: That is, if that be of the Singular, or Plural, this muſt be ſo too; if that be of the firſt, ſecond, or third Perſon, this muſt be of the ſame, whether the Number or Perſon be expreſt by the Ending or Termination, or by the nine *Affirmations* diſcours'd of under the Head of Affirmations; as, *I write or do write, thou writeſt or doſt write, he writes or does write*; *we, ye*, and *they write*, or *do write*: Not *I writeſt, he write*, &c.

When of two Names (*tho' each be* Singular)
We ought affirm, *the* Affirmations *are*
Moſt juſtly in the Plural *ſeen t'appear.*

But when the *Affirmation* relates to, or affirms of two 'foregoing *Names*, tho' they are both of the *Singular* Number, muſt be of the *Plural*; as, *the King and Queen* are *happy*, not *is* happy.

It is a lame Allowance of a late Author of *Grammar*, That it may be alſo of the *Singular* in Engliſh, ſince he is forc'd to ſalve the Soleciſm, by underſtanding other Words to make up the Defect; as in this, *His Juſtice and Goodneſs was great*; that is, ſays he, *His Juſtice was great, and his Goodneſs was great.*

An Affirmation *may be* (*at your Eaſe*)
Or Singular, *or* Plural, *as you pleaſe,*
When to a NAME *of* Number *it is join'd,*
Tho' ſtill the NAME *you Singular do find.*

A

A *Name* of *Number*, or whoſe Meaning implys more than one, or many, tho' it be it ſelf of the *Singular Number*, the *Affirmation* may yet be in the *Plural*; as, *the MOB* is *unruly*, or *the MOB* are *unruly*; *the* Convocation *are debating*, or *is debating*. The Affirmation agreeing ſometimes with the Number of the *Name*, and ſometimes with the Signification.

When two Affirmations *are together ſeen,*
Then muſt the Particle (to) *be ſet between,*
Except let, bid, dare, help, *and all the* Nine.

When two *Affirmations* follow one-another, the Particle *to* ought to be ſet between 'em, except *do*, *will*, *ſhall*, *may*, *can*, with their *paſſing* or *paſt* Times, *did*, *ſhou'd*, *wou'd*, *cou'd*, *might* and *muſt*. Add to theſe *let*, *bid*, *dare*, and *help*, and perhaps ſome few others.

Have, am, *or* be, *with paſſive* Qual'ty *join'd,*
Or with a Quality *that Being does intend,*
All Suffering *and* Being *does expreſs*
That the Britannic Language *will confeſs.*

Have, *am*, or *be*, join'd to a Quality, expreſs all manner of Being, or Suffering, in our Tongue, which has no other way of doing it. They are ſet before *Qualities* of all ſorts, and even *Names*.

There is no change of the Perſonal, or Numeral Terminations, when the Affirmation ſignifies Command, or is preceded by *if*, *that*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *whether*, and ſometimes by other Particles.

Of the Conſtruction of QUALITIES.

The Qualities *in Engliſh moſtly claim*
The Place immediately before their Name.

Tho' in Nature we think of the *Name* before the *Quality*, yet in *Engliſh*, *Qualities* are generally plac'd before the *Names* to which they belong, or of which they expreſs the Manner,

Except an Affirmation *come between*;
As in the following Example's ſeen.

Unleſs when an Affirmation comes between the *Quality* and the *Name*; as, *Juſt* art *thou*, *O! God! and righteous* are *thy Judgments*; or, GOD *is juſt, and his Judgments are righteous*. Otherwiſe when it comes alone, without its Attendants, which it governs, it always goes immediately before its *Name*; as, *A* good Man *is rarely to be found*, *a* good Woman

man *much more rarely.* Good Men *are valuable Jewels in a Commonwealth,* good Women *make* good Wives. Good Things *are only so in Opinion.*

Poetic Diction with peculiar Grace
Allows the Name (*not Prose*) *the foremost place.*

The *Quality* rarely in Prose is set after the *Name,* but in Verse 'tis beautiful and harmonious; as, *Hail Bard divine!*

But when there are more Qualities *than one*
That come together, or together join;
Or else one Quality *with its govern'd Train;*
Then do they follow the preceding Name.

But when there are more *Qualities* than one come together, tho' collaterally join'd, or one *Quality* with its depending Words, it generally comes after the *Name*; as, *a Man both wise and valiant,* a Man *exceeding wise and valiant*; a Man *skilful in many things.* But then we likewise say, *a wise and valiant Man, an exceeding wise Man, a skilful Man in many things.*

A Name *and all its* Qualities *unite,*
And form one Word, as all the Learned write;
But when these several Words in one conspire,
They then some other Quality *require.*

A *Name,* with its *Qualities,* (or any governing Word, with its Attendants) is as one compounded Word; on which these join'd *Names* and *Qualities* assume another *Quality,* as if they were one Word, (and these being join'd, another; and so onward) as, *a Man, an old Man*; *a wise old Man, a very wise old Man, three wise old Men.* Here to the NAME *Man* is prefix'd *a,* which is of the *Quality* kind; and then to the Quality *old* is added; and to that, *an*; then *wise, very wise*; and to all these aggregated or incorporated Words the Quality *a,* or *three,* is prefix'd.

Two sorts of Qualities *from* Names *do flow,*
And both before their Names *directly go.*

There are two sorts of *Qualities* (as we have observ'd under that Head) which are deriv'd immediately from *Names,* and go immediately before 'em, supplying the place of almost all the Manners of *Words* or *Particles*; the first we call *Possessives:* And this is form'd from almost all *Names,* Singular or Plural. By adding (*s*) or (if the Pronunciation requires it) (*'s*) it implys the same as the Particle *of*; as,

Man's

Man's Nature, the Nature of Man; *Mens Nature*, or *the Nature of Men*; Virgil's *Poems*, &c.

The ſame is done when an aggregated *Name* occurs, (that is, a primary Name with its Attendants;) for the formative (*s*) of the *Poſſeſſive* is put after the whole aggregate; as, *the King's Court*, or *the Court of the King*; *the King of* Spain's *Court*, or *the Court of the King of* Spain: For the (*s*) is put after the whole aggregate (*the King of* Spain) as after one ſingle *Name*.

A, *or* an, *immediately we place*
Before the NAME, a Man, an Hour, a Face.
But if another QUALITY *come in,*
'Tis moſtly plac'd the a *and* Name *between.*

The Quality *a*, or *an*, is generally plac'd immediately before the Name; as, *a Man, an Arm, a Mountain*: But if any other Quality comes with it, it muſt be plac'd generally between the *a* and the Name; as, *a good Man, a black Horſe*. But *a* is ſometimes ſet between the other Quality and the Name, as, *many a Man, never a Man*. (*A*) is always before the Singular Number, but (*the*) before both Singular and Plural.

The Conſtruction of PARTICLES; *or, the* Manners of WORDS.

We have ſhewn under the Head of *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, that beſides *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*, there is another Part of Speech, which denotes the Reference and Relation of *Names* to *Names*, *Names* to *Affirmations*, and the Connections of *Sentence* to *Sentence*: For this Reaſon we have divided them into three ſorts; the Firſt ſhew the Circumſtances or Manners of Words, which are join'd to every Part of Speech.

Theſe after Affirmations *we admit,*
But before Qualities *we moſtly ſet.*

This firſt ſort are generally put after the Affirmation whoſe Manner it does expreſs; as, Cynthia *danc'd* admirably; Peter *ſpoke* learnedly; Dorothy *acted* finely; Harry *fought* lately. But it is ſet before Qualities; as, *Robert was* very lucky; John *is* extreamly rich, very rich.

[*] Secondly, All *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations* have various States, Relations, and References to each other, which are moſtly expreſs'd by theſe Particles, *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *O!* *by*, *with*, *through*, &c. Theſe are at leaſt of the moſt frequent Uſe, the reſt we ſhall treat of in a Diſcourſe by it ſelf, as we have before obſerv'd under *Particles*: An Example will render the Uſe more plain; as, O! *God!* *the Memorial* of *thy Love* to *the Sons* of *Men*, from *the Beginning* of *the World* to *this Day*, *is recorded* with *Thankfulneſs* in *the Hearts* of *the Righteous*. All theſe Particles in this Sentence ſhew the Relation or Reference of *Name* to *Name*, and their Connection, in that Manner, with each other.

Between the Words whoſe Ref'rence they expreſs,
Theſe Particles *demand the certain Place.*

Theſe *Particles*, which denote the Dependance of one thing on another, or the Reference or Relation of one Word to another, muſt naturally be plac'd betwixt them whoſe Relation

[*] Theſe ſeveral States or Relations of *Name* to *Name*, are expreſs'd in *Latin* by varying the Terminations, or Ending of the *Name*, five ſeveral Ways, which were call'd *Caſes*, *a cadendo*. So that there were threeſcore various Endings in the *Latin*, and double the number in *Greek*, all expreſs'd by theſe few *Engliſh Particles*; the firſt State of, or the Name it ſelf is call'd the *Nominative Caſe*. If things were always conſider'd ſeparately from one-another, *Names* wou'd have only the two Changes of *Number*, and *Gender* to the QUALITIES.

But ſince they are often conſider'd with Regard to the Relation they have to one-another, the giving of divers Terminations or Endings to *Names*, which are call'd *Caſes*, are made uſe of in ſome Languages, to expreſs theſe Relations.

It muſt be confeſs'd, that the *Greek* and the *Latin* are (we think) almoſt the only Languages, in which the Names have what are properly call'd Caſes, that is, in which theſe Relations are expreſs'd by the different Endings of the ſame Words; but as there are ſome ſort of Virtual Caſes, or State in all Languages, (eſpecially in the Pronouns or Perſonal Names, as we have obſerv'd) and becauſe without that the Connection of Diſcourſe, which is call'd Conſtruction, wou'd not be well underſtood; 'tis in a great meaſure neceſſary for the right underſtanding of any Language whatſoever, to know what is meant by the *Caſes*, or States of the *Names*; which we ſhall here endeavour to Explain with all the Perſpicuity we are able, keeping to the old *Names* of them, and applying them to the new.

Of the firſt State, or Nominative Caſe.

The ſimple Poſition of the *Name*, is call'd the *Nominative*, which indeed is not properly a Caſe, (tho' it be a State) but the Matter from which the Caſes are form'd, by the various Changes of the firſt Termination, or Ending of the *Name*. Its chief Uſe is to be ſet before the *Verb* or *Affirmation*, to be the Subject

ject of the Propoſition in Diſcourſe; *Dominus regit me*, the Lord governs me; *Deus exaudit me*, God hears me, or my Prayer.

Of the Vocative.

When we name the Perſon to whom we ſpeak, or any other Thing to which we apply our ſelves, as if it were a Perſon, the Name does by that acquire a new Relation, which is ſometimes mark'd by a Termination, different from that of the *Nominative*, and which is call'd *Vocative*, from *Vocare*, to call; and thus from *Dominus* in the *Nominative*, they make *Domine* in the *Vocative*; of *Antonius*, *Antoni*. But as that was not very neceſſary, ſince the *Nominative* might be us'd in the place of the *Vocative*, it has happen'd, 1*ſt*, That this different Termination of the *Nominative*, is not us'd in the Plural Number. 2*dly*, That even in the Singular Number, it is only us'd in the ſecond Declenſion of the *Latin* Tongue. 3*dly*, That in the *Greek* (where it is more common) the *Nominative* is often us'd for the *Vocative*, as may be ſeen in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pſalms*: From whence St. *Paul* in his Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, cites theſe Words to prove the Divinity of CHRIST, Θρόνος σῦ, ὁ Θεὸς; where 'tis plain, that ὁ Θεὸς is a Nominative for a Vocative, ſince the Senſe is not, *God is thy Throne*, but *thy Throne, O God*! &c. 4*thly*, In fine, Nominatives are ſometimes join'd to Vocatives; as *Domine, Deus meus! Nate mea vires, mea magna Potentia ſolus!*

All theſe Difficulties in this and other Caſes, in the *Latin* and *Greek* are avoided by the Signs expreſs'd with Eaſe, without ſtudying the various Terminations of ſo many Thouſands of Names; which are inſiſted upon, only for the Information of the Student in the general Notion of the *Grammar* of the Ancient Tongues, and the Analogy of Ours to them.

Of the Genitive Caſe.

This Caſe is ſo call'd from *Genus*, Kindred or Family, becauſe 'tis us'd to expreſs Alliances of Blood between Perſons; beſides, it imports great Variety of other Relations between Things, as well as Perſons. For the Relation of one Thing to another, in any manner whatever, has occaſion'd in the Languages that have *Caſes*, a new Termination in the *Names* or *Nouns*, which is call'd the Genitive (as we have ſaid) to expreſs that general Relation, which is after diverſify'd into ſeveral *Species*, ſuch as the Relations are of the *whole* to its *Parts*, as *Caput Hominis*; of *Parts* to the *whole*, as *Homo craſſi capitis*; of the *Subject* to the *Accident* or *Attribute*, as *Color Roſæ*, *Miſericordia Dei*; of the *Accident* to the *Subject*, as *Puer optimæ Indolis*; of the *Efficient Cauſe* to the *Effect*, as *Opus Dei*, *Oratio Ciceronis*; of the *Effect* to the Cauſe, as *Creator Mundi*; of the *final Cauſe* to the *Effect*, as *Potio Saporis*; of the Matter to the Compound, as *Vas Auri*; of the *Object* to the Acts of the Soul, as *Cogitatio Belli*, *Contemptus Mortis*; of the Poſſeſſour to the Things poſſeſs'd, as *Pecus Melibœi*, *Divitiæ Craſſi*; of the *Proper Name* to the *Common*, or the *Individual* to the *Species*, as *Oppidum Londini*.

And as amongſt all theſe Relations there is ſome Oppoſite, which ſometimes occaſions Equivocal Terms, (for in theſe Words, *Vulnus Achilles*, the *Genitive Achilles* may ſignify either the Relation of the Subject, and then 'tis taken paſſively for the Wound that *Achilles* has receiv'd; or the Relation of the *Cauſe*, and then 'tis taken actively for the Wound which *Achilles* gave;) ſo in that Paſſage of St. *Paul*, *Certus ſum qui a neq; Mors neque Vita*, &c. *poterit nos* ſe-

ſeparare a Charitate Dei *in* Chriſto Jeſu, *Domino Noſtro*, &c. The Genitive *Dei*, has been underſtood two different Ways by Interpreters; thoſe who have aſcrib'd to it the Relation of the Object, believing, that in this Paſſage was meant the Love which the Elect bear to God, in *Jeſus Chriſt*; whilſt Others (who have aſcrib'd to it the Relation of the Subject) do underſtand by the Paſſage aforeſaid, the Love of God to the *Elect* in *Jeſus Chriſt*.

Tho' the *Hebrew* Names are not declin'd by *Caſes*, the Relation expreſs'd by the *Genitive*, does notſtanding cauſe a change in the *Names*, tho' quite different from that of the *Greek* and *Latin*, for in theſe Languages the change is in the Word *governed*, but in the *Hebrew*, in the Word *governing*.

In the Vulgar Tongues they make uſe of a Sign to expreſs the Relations of this Caſe, as *of* in *Engliſh*, *de* in *French*, &c. as *Deus, God, of God*; *Dieu, de Dieu*.

What we have ſaid (that the *Genitive* was made uſe of) to denote the Relation between the *Proper Name* and the *Common*, or which is the ſame Thing, between the *Individual* and the *Species*, is much more common in the Vulgar Tongues. For in *Latin*, the *Common* and the *Proper Name*, are frequently put in the ſame *Caſe*, by Appoſition, as 'tis call'd, as *Urbs Roma*, *Fluvius Thameſis*, *Mons Parnaſſus*, but we ordinarily ſay, the City of *Rome*, the Hill of *Parnaſſus*; but we ſay the River *Thames*, as well as of *Thames*.

Of the Dative Caſe.

There is yet another Relation, which is that of the Thing to the Benefit or Damage of which other Things have a Relation. This in the Languages which have Caſes is call'd the *Dative Caſe*, which is alſo us'd ſo many other Ways, that 'tis hardly poſſible to mention the Particulars: *Commodare* Socrati, *to lend to* Socrates; *Utilis Reipublicæ, uſeful to the Commonwealth*; *Perniciosus Eccleſiæ, pernicious to the Church*; *Promittere Amico, to promiſe a Friend, or to a Friend*; *Viſum eſt* Platoni, *it ſeemed good to* Plato; *Affinis Regi, related to the King*, &c.

In Engliſh we expreſs this Caſe, or that which is equivalent to it, by the Sign *to*, or *for*, which uſually do or may come before it, tho' the ſame Signs are likewiſe us'd to what is the Accuſative and the Ablative in the Latin.

Of the Accuſative.

The Verbs or Affirmations that expreſs Actions which paſs from the Agent, as *to beat, to break, to heat, to love, to hate*, have Subjects that receive theſe Things or Objects which they regard: For if I beat, I muſt beat Something; and ſo of the reſt. So that it is plain, that theſe Verbs or Affirmations require after 'em a Name, to be the Subject or Object of the Action they expreſs. And hence it is that in the Languages which have Caſes the Names have a Termination they call *Accuſative*; as *amo Deum, I love God*; Cæſar *vicit* Pompeium, Cæſar *vanquiſh'd* Pompey.

There is nothing in Engliſh to diſtinguiſh this Caſe from the Nominative, or rather to diſtinguiſh this State of the Name from the firſt; but as we almoſt ever plac'd the Words in their natural order, they are eaſily diſcover'd, becauſe the Nominative (or firſt ſtate) is generally before, and the Accuſative after the Verb or Affirmation: as *The King loves the Queen*; and *the Queen loves the King*: The King is the Nominative in the firſt place, and the Accuſative in the ſecond; and the Queen the Accuſative in the firſt, and the Nominative in the ſecond.

Of

Relation and Dependance it is to expreſs; as we may obſerve in the following Liſt.

OF *has this peculiar Eminence,*
Always to bound of *Words the general Senſe.*

As *of* ſignifies the Relation between the Name that follows it, and that which goes before it, and joins the following *Name* to the foregoing, as, *the Sons of* Adam, ſo in all the following Inſtances, and all others that may be thought of, it is obſervable, that *of* has the Property of limiting and determining the general Signification of the Word on which it depends.

1. Of *the Part to the Whole.*
The Tail of the Lion.
2. Of *the Subject to the Accident.*
The Splendor of the Sun.

or

The Whole to the Part.
A Man of a thick Skull.
The Accident to the Subject.
A Boy of a good Underſtanding.

3. Of

Of the Ablative Caſe.

Beſides the five Caſes already mention'd, the *Latins* have a ſixth, which was not invented to expreſs alone any particular Relation, but to be join'd with ſome of the Particles, call'd *Prepoſitions*: For the firſt five Caſes, not being ſufficient to expreſs all the Relations that Things have to one-another, they have in all Languages had Recourſe to another Invention, which is that of contriving *little Words* to be put before *Names*, which for that Reaſon are call'd *Prepoſitions*. And ſo as the Relation of a Thing, in which another is contain'd, is expreſs'd in *Latin* and *Engliſh* by (*in*), it is in *French* by (*dans*), as *Vinum* in *Dolio*, *le Vin* dans *le Muid*, *the Wine in the Veſſel*. But in the Languages which have Caſes, theſe Prepoſitions are not join'd with the firſt Form of the *Name*, which is the *Nominative*, but with ſome of the other Caſes: And tho' in *Latin*, there are ſome join'd with the *Accuſative*, as *Amor erga Deum*, *love towards God*; they yet have invented another Caſe, call'd the *Ablative*, to be join'd with ſeveral other *Prepoſitions*, from which it is inſeparable in Senſe; whereas an *Accuſative* is often ſeparated from its *Prepoſitions*, as when it is after a *Verb Active* or an *Infinitive*.

That Caſe in Propriety of Speech is wanting in the Plural Number, ſince it never has there a different Termination, from that of the *Dative*: But becauſe it wou'd too much confound the Analogy, to ſay that the Prepoſition govern'd an *Ablative* in the *Singular*, and a *Dative* in the *Plural*, it has been judg'd fitter to ſuppoſe an *Ablative* in the Plural Number, tho' always the ſame with the *Dative*.

And for the ſame Reaſon it is, that they have given an *Ablative* to the *Greek Names*, which are always like the *Dative*, for preſerving the greater Analogy between theſe two Languages, which are commonly learn'd by one-another.

3. Of *the Efficient to the Effect.* The Temple of *Solomon.*		*The Effect to the Efficient,* The Creator of the World.
4. Of *the End to the Means.* The Preparations of the Feast.		*The Means to the End.* The Death of the Cross.
5. Of *Material to Materiate.* A Cup of Silver.		*Materiate to Material.* The Stones of the *Temple.*
6. Of *the Object to the Act.* The Love of God.		*The Act to the Object.* The Delight of the Eye.
7. *Offices Political.* The King of *England.*	of	*Relations Oeconomical.* The Master of the House.
8. Of *the Possessor to Possession.* The Flock of *Mœlibeus.*		*Possession to the Possessor.* The Shepherd of the Flock.
9. Of *Time to the Event.* The Time of War, the Hour of Supper.		*Event to Time.* The Luxury of the Age. The Silence of the Night.
10. Of *the Contents to the Continent.* The Fish of the Sea.		*Continent to the Contents.* A handful of Flowers.

Two Names *without a Word between,*
Of *betwixt both most frequently is seen.*

When two Names come together, *of* generally goes before the later; as may be seen in all the foregoing Examples. But when this *of* signifies Possession, then it may be left out, and *s*, or *es* put at the end of the first *Name*, by which it becomes a *Quality*; as we have sufficiently prov'd already, *The House of* Roger, or *Roger's House.*

Except they to the same Thing do relate,
For then the middle of *is out of date.*

For Names that relate to the same Things have no Particle between them; as the *River Thames, Christopher Columbus, London City*; tho' we likewise say, the *River* of *Thames*, the *City* of *London*, &c.

Between Superlatives *and following* Names
OF (*by Grammatic Right*) *a Station claims.*

All Superlatives may have the Particle *of* before the following *Name*; as *the greatest* of *Villains, the most Wise* of *Philosophers, the Best* of *Princes.*

Qualities *that do* Partition *signify,*
Affection, Vice, *or* Virtue *do imply*
Any Desire or Passion of the Mind,
Follow'd by of *we generally find.*

Such

Such as want Knowledge, Ignorance *declare,*
Forgetfulneſs, *or* Mem'ry *in this Rule are.*

Qualities that ſignify Partition, generally have *of* after them; as *One* of *the French Priſoners, none* of *theſe, the third* of *Family*, &c. and thoſe which ſignify Affection, Paſſion, or Deſire of the Mind; any Knowledge, Ignorance, Memory, Forgetfulneſs, Vice, Virtue, or any ſuch Diſpoſition of the Soul, have *of* between them and the Word to which they relate; as *Coveteous* of *Gold, fearful* of *Thunder, anxious* of *Glory, void* of *Grace, empty* of *Senſe, conſcious* of *Guilt, ignorant* of *all things, forgetful* of *his Friends, mindful* of *his Children, guilty* of *Bribes, weary* of *the Journey, free* of *the Corporation, needy* of *Money*, &c. we ſay alſo, *forſaken* of *all Men; worthy* of *Happineſs, born* of *Royal Race, naked* of *Friends, depriv'd* of *Eſtate, robb'd* of *Money.* Thus after ſome AFFIRMATIONS, as, to *repent* of *Sin*, to *treat, talk, write* of *Happineſs*, &c.

Where Benefit or Hurt comes from the Name,
TO, *to direct you whither 'tis aim'd, do's claim.*

TO or FOR import the Thing or Perſon *to* or *for* whom any Convenience or Inconvenience is meant by the NAME, QUALITY, or AFFIRMATION; as, *a Friend* to *the Muſes, good* for *the Stomach, yielding* to *his Betters.* Hence all Words that ſignify the *uſe, Relation, likeneſs, doing*, or *giving* of one Thing to another, muſt have *to* or *for* after it. Tho' *to* is ſometimes left out, as *give me, like me, tell me, near me*; where *to* is underſtood much better than expreſs'd.

In Invocations we prefix an O!
O! God, our Frailty thou doſt ſurely know.

When we call on God, the King, or any one elſe, in a ſolemn manner, we put O! before the Name of him we addreſs to; as *O! King, remember that thou art a Man!*

When you the Inſtrument or Manner how,
By which, wherewith *expreſs, allow*
Theſe Particles to be always ſeen
By, with, *and* through, *and* from *and alſo* in.

When we expreſs the Inſtrument, the Medium by which, wherewith, or the Manner how a Thing is done, you make uſe of *by, with, from, through, in* and the like; as, *the Beams of the Sun* with *incredible ſpeed, paſs* from *Heav'n*, through *the Air, to the Earth, endu'd* with *Light and Heat by* (with, through)

through) *which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants which God has provided* for *us, and given to us for our Use, and his Glory. He was slain* with *his Sword. He abides* with *me.*

By is us'd for the Efficient Cause, (as well Principal as Instrumental and Moral) and also signifies *near to*, &c. as, *he was slain* by *his Enemy*, by (beside or near) *a Spring of Water, but wounded first* by *his own Fear, then* by *his Enemies Sword.*

In signifies, as it were, Presence in a Place, and is us'd when we wou'd either express *Rest*; as, Mary *lives* in *the Cellar*, in *the City*, in *the Winter*, in *a strange Posture*, in *an ill state of Health*, in *Battle Array*; in *act to strike*, in *his Cloak*, in *Favour*, in *War*, *rich* in *Land or Money*, in *Fear*, in *Doubt*, in *good Part*; *he is* in *Esteem*, *he did it* in *Revenge*, in *Hope*, in *my Thoughts.*

These are the several Senses in which the Particle IN is us'd.

The third sort of *Particles* which connect *Sentence* to *Sentence*, we have only this Remark:

That they between those Sentences take site,
Which by the joining Vertue they unite.

They are plac'd between the two Propositions, or Sentences which they unite; as for their Names, see *Particles* the third sort. 'Tis true, we might here give, or might there have given you several Denominations of them, as *Copulative*, *Disjunctive*, *Comparative*, and the like, as some others have done, and so given a several Head or Term to every other *Particle* of this Kind, but we seeing no Advantage accrue from such a multiplying of Terms, but the Burthen very much encreas'd to the Learner, have thought fit to leave out all that unnecessary Jargon.

What more may be said of *Particles*, and their various Meanings and Use, shall be found in our forecited Treatise of *Particles.*

We shall not conclude this short Discourse of *Construction*, without adding a few Words of a *Period*, and of *Figurative Construction*; tho' we are of Opinion, that the first is more proper to fall under the consideration of *Rhetoric*, and that the Use of the later is in English the Effect of Custom, not Art: Yet since we find others have thought fit to deliver Rules relating to both, we shall not omit them entirely.

To compose therefore a Period, or to express a Sentence, that is compos'd of two or more Sentences, with Art, we must first take care that the Expressions be not too long,

long, and that the whole Period be proportion'd to the Breath of the Speaker. The Expreſſions of particular Sentences, that are Members of the Body of a Sentence, ought to be equal, that the Voice may repoſe at the end of theſe Members by equal Intervals. The more exact this Equality is, the more Pleaſure it will produce, and the more excellent the Period.

A Period ought to conſiſt at leaſt of two Members, and at moſt but of four. A Period is at leaſt to have two Members, becauſe its Beauty proceeds from the Equality of the Members, and Equality ſuppoſes at leaſt two Terms. To have a Period perfect, there ſhould not be four Members crouded into one Period, becauſe being too long, the Pronunciation muſt be forc'd, which muſt by conſequence be diſpleaſing to the Ear, becauſe a Diſcourſe that is incommodious to the Speaker, can never be agreeable to the Hearer.

The Members of a Period ought to be join'd cloſe, that the Ear may perceive the Equality of the Intervals of Reſpiration: For this cauſe the Members of a Period ought to be united by the Union of a ſingle Sentence, of that Body of which they are Members. This Union is very diſcernable, for the Voice repoſes at the end of every Member, only the better to continue its Courſe, it ſtops not fully, but at the end of the whole Sentence.

Variety may be two ways in a Period, *i. e.* in the Senſe, and in the Words. The Senſe of each Member of the Period ought to differ with each other. We cannot expreſs the different Thoughts of our Minds, but by different Words of different ſignification: Equal Periods are not to follow one another too near.

An Example of a Period of two Members: As, (1). *Before I ſhall ſay thoſe Things (O Conſcript Fathers) about the Public Affairs, which are to be ſpoken at this time*; (2.) *I ſhall lay before you, in few Words, the Motives of the Journey, and the Return.* The next conſiſts of three Members; as, (1.) *Since, by reaſon of my Age, I durſt not pretend to aſſume the Authority of this Poſt,* (2.) *And had fix'd it as a Maxim that nothing ought here to be produc'd but what was perfected by Induſtry and labour'd by the Underſtanding*; (3.) *I thought that my whole Time and Pains ſhould be tranſfer'd to thoſe of my Friends.* The laſt conſiſts of four Members, of which this is an Example: (1.) *If Impudence ſhould have as great Prevalence in the Court,* (2.) *as Inſolence has found in the Country and deſart*

Places, (3.) Aulus Cæcinna *wou'd not less in this Tryal give way to the Impudence of* Æbutius, (4.) *than he has already in Violence given place to his Insolence.*

This is sufficient to give a full Idea of the Nature and Beauties of a Period, which we have inserted meerly in compliance with Custom, being sensible that the Learner will be so far from being able to make his Advantage from it, till he has arriv'd much beyond the Province of Grammar, that there will be few *Masters* found, who have the Education of Children, that know any thing of this Matter.

Custom, produc'd by the general Inclination of Men to short Speaking, has introduc'd several Figures or Forms of Construction, by which Words are transpos'd, left out, one put for another, and the like. The Figures therefore of Construction are these:

I. *Transposition*, which is the placing of Words in a Sentence out of their Natural Order of Construction, to please the Ear in rendring the Contexture more agreeable, elegant, and harmonious: For when the concurrence of rough Consonants, and gaping Vowels, renders the Sound and Pronunciation inelegant, this Figure may be us'd, but never but upon such an Occasion, except in Verse, where *Transposition* is generally more elegant and harmonious than in Prose.

II. *Suppression*, which is an Omission of Words in a Sentence, which yet are necessary to a full and perfect Construction; as, *I come from my Father's*; that is, *from my Father's House*; but *House* is omitted. Words are suppress'd for Brevity or Elegance, but their number in English is too great to be enumerated; but for our direction, we may mind these Rules: 1*st*, That whatever Word comes to be repeated in a Sentence oftner than once, to avoid the inelegant repetition of the same Word, it must be left out; as, *This is my Master's Horse*; or, *This Horse is my Master's*; for, *This Horse is my Master's Horse*. 2*dly*, Words that are necessarily imply'd need not be express'd; as, *I live at* York: *Life* is necessarily imply'd, and therefore need not be express'd. 3*dly*, All Words that Use and Custom suppress in any Language, are not to be express'd without some particular Reason; as, *A good Man leads a* good Life; where the Quality *Good* is necessary to the Name *Life*.

III. *Sub-*

III. *Substitution*, is the using one Word for another, or the Mode, State, Manner, Person, or Number of a Word for another: And the Construction indeed often lies in the Sence, and not in the Words; as, *The whole Nation were in an Uproar*; where *the whole Nation* is put for *all the People* of the Nation. *Part of the Men are kill'd*; *Part* and *Nation* signifying Number, (tho' the Name be of the Number signifying one) it puts the Affirmation in the Plural, or the Number signifying many, but it may be in either.

Chap. XI.

Of Stops or Pauses in Sentences; the Use of Marks in Writing, and Abbreviations of Words.

From what has been said of Sentences 'tis plain, that in a full Sentence there may be four Members, *viz.* Comma (,) Semicolon (;) Colon (:) and Period, or full-Stop (.) and these bear a kind of Musical proportion of Time one to another: For a *Comma* stops the Readers Voice, while he may privately tell one; the *Semicolon*, two; the *Colon*, three; and the *Period* four.

The Use of these Points, Pauses or Stops, is not only to give a proper Time for Breathing, but to avoid Obscurity and Confusion of the Sense in the joining Words together in a Sentence. After a *Comma* always follows something else which depends upon that which is separated from it by a *Comma*; as,

If Pulse of Verse a Nation's Temper shows
In keen Iambics *English Metre flows.*

Where the Sense is not compleat in the first Verse, and the second has a plain Dependance on the first. A *Semi*, or *half Colon*, is made use of when half the Sentence remains yet behind; as,

Tho' God bids Peace with Promises of Life,
Men only Reason arm for deadly Strife;

By bloody Wars Earth making desolate,
And sacrificing Thousands to their Hate, &c.

A *Colon*, or two Points, is made when the Sense is perfect, but the Sentence not ended; as,

O Lord! in thee do I put my Trust: save me from all those, that persecute me, and deliver me: &c.

The *full-Point* is when the Sentence is compleat and ended; as,

O Shame! O Curse! O more than hellish Spight!
Damn'd Devils! with each other never fight.

Besides these Points, there is a Mark that signifies a Question is ask'd, and is put when the Sense of that Question is compleat; this is the Figure of it (?) as,

Why so Frolick? Why so Merry?
Is your Noddle full of Sherry?

When we express our Wonder, or Admiration of any thing after the Sentence, we put this Point (!), which is call'd a Point of Admiration; as, *O Times! O Manners!*

In Sentences there is sometimes occasion to interpose another distinct Sentence, which being left out, the Sense of the Sentence is entire, and it is thus mark'd ( ), and is call'd a *Parenthesis*; as, *For to their Power (I bear Record) they were willing.*

When Words cannot be written entirely in the Line, the Syllables are parted, one ending the Line, and another of the same Word beginning the next; and this is mark'd at the end of the first Line thus (-)

The (*e*) is often left out as well as other Vowels, for the sake of the Sound, and that is call'd an *Apostrophe*, and is thus express'd (') as, *I am amaz'd*, for *amazed*; Henry *lov'd me*, for Henry *loved me*, &c.

Accent (`) being plac'd over any Vowel in a Word, notes that the tone, or stress of the Vowel in pronouncing, is upon that Syllable.

Breve (˘) is a *curve*, or crooked mark over a Vowel, and denotes that the Syllable is sounded quick or short.

Dialysis (¨) being two Points plac'd over two Vowels of a Word, that wou'd otherwise make a Diphthong, parts 'em into two several Syllables.

Index (☞) the Fore-finger pointing, signifies that passage to be very remarkable against which its plac'd.

Asterism (*) guides to some Remark in the Margin, or at the foot of the Page. Several of 'em set together signify that

that there is ſomething wanting, defective, or immodeſt in that paſſage of the Author, thus, * * *.

Obelisk (†) a Dagger, is us'd as well as the *Aſteriſm*, to refer the Reader to the Margin.

Section (§), or *Diviſion* is us'd in ſubdividing of a Chapter into leſſer parts.

Caret (^), when any Letter, Syllable or Word happens, by Inadvertence, to be left out in Writing or Printing, this mark (^) is put under the Interlineation in the exact place where it is to come; as *when* ^ *Alice was gone*, &c.

Circumflex (ˆ) is the ſame in ſhape as the *Caret*, but is always plac'd over ſome Vowel of a Word, to denote a long Syllable; as, *Eu-phrâ-tes.*

Hyphen (-) *Connexion*, is us'd to join or compound two Words into one, as, *Male-contents*, *Male-adminſtration*; or when Names or Words are purpoſely left out, a ſtroke or ſmall Line is thus put —— to ſignify the Name or Word underſtood, with the *initial* and *final* Letters at the beginning, or end, or both. Being plac'd over a Vowel, it is not then call'd *Hyphen*, but a *daſh* for *M* or *N*.

Paratheſis [ ], or *Brackets* include Words or Sentences of the ſame value and ſignification with thoſe they are join'd to, and may be us'd in their ſtead.

Quotation ("), or a double *Comma* turn'd, is put at the beginning of ſuch Lines as are recited out of other Authors; as, " LOOK UPON ME THAT I MAY BE SEEN.

N. Note.
N. B. *mark well.*
v. vid. *ſee.*
viz. *to wit.*
i. e. *that is.*
ſ. c. *to wit.*
etc. *the reſt.*
&c. *and ſo forth.*
dit. ditto, *the ſame.*
Cent. *an Hundred.*
e. g. *example for.*
v. g. *the ſame.*
MS. Manuſcript.
p. *page.*
li. *Line.*
l. *Book.*

fol. folio, *Books of the largeſt ſize, or a half Sheet.*
q. 4to. quarto, *a quarter of a Sheet.*
8vo. Octavo, *having eight leaves to a Sheet.*
12mo. Duodecimo, Twelves, *or a Sheet divided into* 12 *parts, as this* Grammar.
A Column is half a ſide of a Leaf, *as in the* Notes *of this Book.*
P.S. Poſtſcript.
CC. Two hundred.
D. or IↃ. Five hundred.
DC. Six hundred.

M. or CIↃ. One Thouſand.
IↃↃ. Five thouſand.
CCIↃↃ. Ten thouſand.
IↃↃↃ. Fifty thouſand.
MDCCXII One thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve.

Pr. Prieſt.
Deac. Deacon.
Cur. Curate.
Cl. *Clergyman.*
Bp. Biſhop.
ABp. Archbiſhop.
S. S. T. D. } *Doctor of Divi-*
or D. D. } *nity.*
L. L. D. } *a Doctor of Laws.*
J. D. }
M. D. *a Doctor of Phyſic.*

A. B. *Batchelor of Arts.*
A. M. *Maſter of Arts.*
F. R. S. Fellow of the Royal Society.
Aſtr. P. G. Aſtronomy Profeſſor of *Greſham College.*
P. M. G. Profeſſor of Muſic, *at Greſham College.*
C. C. C. Corpus Chriſti College, *at Oxford.*
C. S. *the Keeper of the Seal.*
C. P. S. *Keeper of the Privy-Seal.*
V. D. M. *Miniſter of the Word of God.*
IHS. Jeſus, *the three firſt Letters of his Name in Greek.*

The End of the GRAMMAR.

The Art of POETRY.

CHAP. I.

Of Accents and Quantities.

THE Art of Pronunciation is reckon'd a part of *Grammar*, and is the true Utterance of Words, according to their *Quantity* and *Accent*. *Quantity*, is the Length or Shortneſs of Syllables; and the Proportion, generally ſpeaking, betwixt a long and ſhort Syllable is two to one; as in *Muſic*, two *Quavers* to one *Crotchet*.

In Engliſh, as well as in Latin and Greek, there are not only theſe long and ſhort Syllables, but thoſe which are either long or ſhort, as the Meaſure requires; as, *Rĕcŏrds* and *Rĕcōrds*.

[a] *Accent* is the raiſing and falling of the Voice, above or under its uſual Tone, but an Art of which we have little Uſe, and know leſs, in the Engliſh Tongue; nor are we like to improve our Knowledge in this Particular, unleſs the Art of *Delivery*, or *Utterance*, were a little more ſtudy'd.

Of

[a] There are three ſorts of Accents, an *Acute*, a *Grave*, and an *Inflex*, which is alſo call'd a *Circumflex*. The *Acute*, or *Sharp*, naturally raiſes the Voice; and the *Grave*, or *Baſe*, as naturally falls it. The *Circumflex* is a kind of Undulation, or Waving of the Voice; as in pronouncing *amare*, *to love*, you ſhould pronounce it as if ſpelt *aamare*, riſing at the firſt *a*, and falling at the ſecond. But tho' the *Latins* (in imitation of the *Greeks*) have ſome Signs to expreſs theſe Marks, yet the Uſe of them is not known, except in the diſtinction of Adverbs: Nay, ſhould ſome old *Roman* ariſe from the Dead, if we believe *Quintilian*, the Rules of them could not be deliver'd in Writing. Some of our Moderus (eſpecially Mr. *Biſh*, in his Art of Poetry) and lately Mr. *Mattaire*, in what he calls *The Engliſh Grammar*, erroneouſly uſe *Accent* for *Quantity*, one ſignifying the Length or Shortneſs of a Syllable, the other the raiſing or falling of the Voice in *Diſcourſe*; which indeed moſt People have naturally, except ſuch who have the Misfortune of a Monotony, or of Speaking always in the ſame Tone of Voice; which is a great Vice in Utterance, and what few are guilty of, but ſuch as have a ſmall and acute Voice; for thoſe of a groſſer Conſtitution ſeldom are fixt to one Tone.

Of this long and ſhort Syllable are all *Poetic Feet* in Engliſh (as well as all other Languages) form'd; and tho' *Horace* himſelf makes uſe of no leſs than twenty-eight ſeveral ſorts of Feet, yet do they all, and many more, ariſe from the various Compoſitions of long and ſhort Syllables.

Before we come to the different Feet that are in uſe in our Mother Tongue, it will be proper to lay down ſome Rules of Quantity, by which we may in ſome meaſure arrive at ſome Certainty in this particular.

In Words whoſe Letters ſtill appear the ſame,
By differing Senſe yet gaining different Name,
The Senſe 'tis, ſtill diſtinguiſhes the ſound
In Names *that's ſhort, in* Words *which long is found.*

In Words that differ in the *Senſe*, but not in the *Spelling*, the firſt Syllable of the *Name* is long, but the laſt Syllable of the *Affirmation* is ſhort; as the following Examples will ſhew; for no Words of different ſenſe are exactly ſpelt alike, unleſs the *Name*, and the *Affirmation*.

Names.		Words of Affirmation.	
The firſt Syllable is pronounc'd long.	*Abſent*	The laſt Syllable is pronounc'd long.	*Abſent*
	Accent		*Accent*
	Cement		*Cement*
	Collect		*Collect*
	Conduct		*Conduct*
	Conſort		*Conſort*
	Convert		*Convert*
	Conteſt		*Conteſt*

The

A very Learned and Ingenious Author gives us this familiar and eaſie Diſtinction betwixt *Quantity* and *Accent*: 'It may be obſerv'd, 'that the Variations of the Voice, 'by *high* and *low*, *long* and *ſhort*, '*loud* or *ſoft*, (however they happen to be confounded by ſome) are 'all of as different Nature and Effects, as the Beats of a Drum are 'from the Sounds of a Trumpet, or 'the Reading in one unvaried Tone 'is from Singing. All the poſſible 'Diverſities of Poetic Feet, together 'with the Changes of *loud* and *ſoft*, 'the Drum expreſſes to a wonder: 'But while yet there is μονοτονία 'in the Sound, there can be no 'place for Accents: This plain Inſtrument does indeed in one ſingle 'Tone ſhew what a Power there is 'in Muſical Numbers, and of the 'various movement of *Poetic Feet*, 'and how the Ear is affected with 'the ſudden intermixture of *loud* 'and *ſoft* Notes; but let the Trumpet tell how far ſhort all theſe are 'of well-turn'd and rightly-plac'd 'Accents: In theſe conſiſt the Life 'of Language, theſe being the Enchantments, which being juſtly 'apply'd to well-choſen Words, 'lead all the Paſſions captive, and 'ſurprize the Soul itſelf in its inmoſt Receſſes (b) But

Names.		Affirmations.	
The first Syllable is pronounc'd long.	*Ferment*	The last Syllable is pronounc'd long.	*Ferment*
	Frequent		*Frequent*
	Incense		*Incense*
	Object		*Object*
	Present		*Present*
	Project		*Project*
	Record		*Record*
	Subject		*Subject*
	Torment		*Torment*
	Unite.		*Unite.*

and some others. But the following Rules of Quantity will be of some Use; as,

When Endings to One-Syllab'-Words *are join'd,*
Long the first Syllable you always find.

(1.) When an Ending is join'd to a Word of one Syllable, the first Syllable is long; as, *Peace-able, sin-ful, self-ish, good-ness, toil-some, faith-less, heav-y, godly,* &c.

When (er), (or), (ure) *two* Syllab'-Words *do end,*
Of the first Syllab' *they the sound extend.*

(2.) In Words of two Syllables which end in *er, or,* or rather *our* and *ure,* the first is long, as *enter, Honor,* or *Honour, venture,* &c. but we must except *defer, refer, prefer,* which indeed belong to the Rule of *Particles.*

When (le), *or* (en) *obscure do end a Word,*
To the first Syllable they Length afford.

As for Example, *Trouble, double, Fiddle, Garden,* &c.

When Particles *with other Words compound,*
The last *still lengthen their own proper Sound.*

(3.) When *Particles* are compounded with Words of one Syllable, the *Word* it self is long; as, *allure, collegue, pollute,* except *object, adjunct, Advent, Aspect, Compass, Concourse, Conduit, perfect, Perfume, Prelate, Profit, Progress, Prologue, Reliques, Respit, Succour, Substance, Suburbs, Surplice.* Note, that *perfect* and *Perfume,* when they are Affirmations, relate to the 'foregoing Rule, not the Exception.

If to two Syllab'-*Words an* Ending's *bound,*
That which before was long maintains its Sound.

If an Ending be added to a Word of two Syllables, that Syllable which was originally long continues ſo; as, *Profit*, *profitable*, except *proteſt*, *Proteſtant*.

When many Syllables compoſe a Word,
That Vowel's long, that from the laſt is third;
Except Poſition *give the laſt but one*
(By crouding Conſonants) *a longer Tone.*

(4.) In Words of many Syllables (as we call all that conſiſt of more than two) the third Vowel from the laſt is long, as, *Salvation*, *Damnation*, &c. except when the laſt Syllable but one is long by *Poſition*, that is, by the coming together of many Conſonants, and bearing the Vowel hard upon 'em; as, *abundance*, *accompliſh*, *illuſtrate*, to which we may add *Aſſiance*, *Affidavit*, *antecedent*, *Armado*, *Balconey*, *Bravado*, *Carbonado*, *Cathedral*, *Dandalion*, *Horizon*, *obdurate*, *Opponent*, *pellucid*, *Precedent*, tho' erroneouſly too often ſpelt *Preſident*) *Recuſant*, *Vagary*. In theſe that follow the laſt Syllable is long; as, *acquieſce*, *comprehend*, *condeſcend*.

Some Words of many Syllables are found
Ev'n of two Vowels to extend the ſound;
The fourth, or fifth, and of the laſt but one;
But ſtill the laſt is of a weaker Tone.

(5.) Some Words of many Syllables have two long Syllables, the fourth or fifth Vowel from the laſt, and the laſt but one; tho' the Quantity of the laſt be not ſo loudly ſounded in the Delivery; as, *Academy*, which yet is often pronounc'd *Academy*, *acceſſary*, *Acrimony*, *admirable*. Tho' it may be doubted whether *admirable*, as uſually pronounc'd, be not more properly one long and three ſhort. *Adverſary*, *Antimony*, *Alimony*, *ambulatory*, *amicable*, *anniverſary*, *antiquated*, *Apoplexy*, *arbitrary*, *Auditory*, *habitable*, *Hierarchy*, *Ignominy*, *neceſſary*, *Necromancy*, *refractory*, *ſedentary*.

Four or more Syllables, that end in neſs,
The firſt and laſt long Syllables confeſs.

But *Temperament*, and all Words of four or more Syllables ending in *neſs*, have the firſt and laſt Syllables long; as, *Righteouſneſs*, *Tediouſneſs*, &c. except *Forgetfulneſs*, *Deſpightfulneſs*.

Some are of doubtful Quantity by Uſe,
And ſhorten now, and now the ſame produce.

Some are of a doubtful Quantity, according to the Will or Occasion of the Writer or Speaker; as, *acceptable, contribute, corruptible, Confessor, Successor*, &c. and indeed some of the former.

Back to the Vowels now convey your Eye,
And there the Rules of Quantity you'll spy,
In Words that many Syllables deny.
For Common most they short, and long are found,
But those that to such Consonants are bound
As close the Lips, can ne'r extend their Sound.
Emphatic Words we justly still produce;
But every Sign *is short by sacred* Use.

The Rules of the Vowels will be found at the beginning of the *Grammar*; and we here may add to these Observations, that most Words of one Syllable are common, except they end with silent (*e*), whose nature it is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. All the Signs are short, without an Emphasis, which they seldom have; as, *a, the, an, for, by, with, to, from*, &c. but whatever Word of one Syllable ends with a Letter that closes the Mouth, can never be long; as all such as end in (*m*), or the sound of (*m*), and in most *Mutes*.

Two Syllables our English Feet *compose,*
But Quantities *distinguish them from Prose.*
By long *and* short *in various stations plac'd*
Our English Verse harmoniously is grac'd.
With short *and* long *Heroic Feet we raise,*
But these to vary is the Poets Praise.
For the same *Sounds perpetually disgust:*
DRYDEN *to this* Variety *was just.*

Having given these Rules for *Quantities* in the *English* Tongue, we must observe, that two Syllables make a Poetic Foot, which hitherto will not admit a greater number, tho' in the *Latin* and *Greek* a Foot might contain six, and those might be resolv'd into the simple Feet of two or three Syllables. *Heroic Verses* consist of five *short*, and five *long* Syllables intermixt, but not so very strictly, as never to alter that Order. Mr. *Dryden* has vary'd them with admirable Beauty, beginning his Heroic Verse sometimes with a *long* Syllable, follow'd by two *short*, and other Changes, which a Master only must venture on.

From hence 'tis plain, that the Learner can never imagin that any number of Syllables is sufficient to make any kind

of Verse, for by that means there could be no Prose; so that to constitute a Verse, variety of Numbers is necessary.

In *English*, the Metre or sorts of Verse are extreamly various and arbitrary, every Poet being at liberty to introduce any new Form he pleases. The most us'd are, first the *Heroic*, consisting of five long and five short Syllables generally speaking; Verses of four Feet, and of three Feet, and three Feet and a Cesure, or one Syllable. *Stanza*'s have been endeavour'd to be introduc'd, but never yet have been able to establish themselves.

[b] To help the Learner to some Means or Examples of forming new Feet in the *English Tongue*, we shall here set down the Variations made by the Ancients, of a long and a short Syllable.

A *Spondee*, Two long Syllables.
Pirric, Two short Syllables.
Trochee, A long and short Syllable.
Iambic, A short and a long Syllable.
These are of Two Syllables.

A *Molos*, Three long Syllables.
Tribrach, Three short Syllables.
Dactyl, One long and two short Syllables.
Anapest, Two short and one long Syllable.

[b] But as many Ways as Quantities may be varied by Composition and Transposition, so many different Feet have the Greek Poets contriv'd, and that under distinct Names, from two to six Syllables, to the number of 124. But it is the Opinion of some Learned Men in this Way, that Poetic Numbers may be sufficiently explain'd, by those of two or three Syllables, into which the rest are to be resolv'd.

Of those eight here set down, the *Spondee* and the *Dactil* are the most considerable, as being the Measures us'd in the Heroic Verse by *Homer*, *Virgil*, &c. These two Feet are of equal Time, but of different Motion: The *Spondee* has an even, strong, and steddy Pace, like a Trot, as I may say; but the *Dactil* resembles the nimbler strokes of a Gallop. An inverted *Dactil* is an *Anapest*, a very spritely Trot, and a Motion proper to excite and enrage. The *Iambic* is also of a light and spritely nature, and reigns most in our English Verse. The *Trochee* is quite contrary to the *Iambic*, fit to express weak and languid Motions; as all those Measures are which move from long to short Syllables. The *Pirric* and *Tribrach* are very rapid, as the *Molos* is slow and heavy.

Tho' Rhime has been (by the Ignorance of our Fore-fathers) thought the only Essential of English *Verse*, yet it is in Reality the most inconsiderable Part of it, and may be left out without any Detriment; as is plain from the Great *Milton*. But if you resolve to write in Rhime, you must take a peculiar Care of observing them exactly, for a Botch in this is unpardonable. My Lord *Roscommon*, tho' he was an Enemy to Rhime, yet was most exact in it, when he vouchsafed to make use of it. This Niceness must be observ'd in double or treble Rhimes, which yet are never properly us'd, but in *Burlesque*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The Art *of* POETRY *in General; and first, of* Epigram, Paſtoral, Elegy, *and* Lyric.

HAving in the foregoing Chapter laid down the Rules of the Mechanic part of *Poetry*, which is as far as the *Grammar* generally goes, tho' with great Abſurdity, we ſhall now proceed to the Art it ſelf, which (by we know not what Infatuation) has never been yet taught in our Schools. For if *Poetry* is to be baniſh'd our Studies entirely, to what purpoſe does every Petty School teach the Rules of *Quantity*? But if we are allow'd to read the Poets, nay, if we are ſo fond of them, as to teach them to Children before they are Maſters of the Tongue they ſtudy, why muſt not the Beauty and Excellence of their Works be ſhown? By the firſt we teach Boys to be meer *Verſifyers*, *Poetaſters*; by the ſecond we form their Judgment, and let them ſee the Difficulty of being a good *Poet*; which wou'd deter them attempting an Act for which they find no true Genius, and at the ſame time give them a juſt value for the Books they read. The common *Proſodia*'s make Scriblers, which is a Scandal; the preſent Rules inſtitute a Poet, which is an Honour.

For the Learner muſt not fancy, that to write a Verſe, or conclude a Rhime, gives the Title of Poet; no, he muſt underſtand the Nature of his Subject throughly; and let his Copy of Verſes or Poem be never ſo ſhort, he muſt form a Deſign, or Plan, by which every Verſe ſhall be directed to a certain End, and each have a juſt Dependance on the other; for only this can produce the Beauty of Order and Harmony, and ſatisfy a rational Mind. For to jumble a Company of Verſes together without any Deſign, let them be never ſo ſmooth and flowing, is an Undertaking of no Value, and incapable of any thing *Great* and *Noble*. A *Blockhead* with a good Ear, and a tolerable Knowledge of the Language, may do theſe, but nothing but a *Poet* the other.

But if a Deſign be neceſſary in the ſhorteſt and leaſt of our Poems, it is vaſtly more neceſſary in thoſe of greater length; which without this will infallibly prove intolerably te-

tedious, and a rude indigeſted Heap. Fix this, therefore, in the *Learner's* Mind, that a VERSIFYER and POET are two different Things; the firſt is Contemptible, and has been ſo theſe 2000 years, but the later Honourable in the Opinion of the Men of Senſe and Learning, in all Ages and Nations, ſince the Birth of this Heav'nly Art.

Before we come to the Rules of the ſeveral Parts of *Poetry*, we muſt premiſe a Word or two to the Teachers. The *Maſter*, or *Miſtreſs*, who inſtructs the Young in this Art, ſhou'd thoroughly know its Nature and Parts, not only in this, which is but an Abridgment of a larger Diſcourſe, that will be publiſh'd ſoon after it, but the full diſplay of this Art in a much greater Volume.

They ſhou'd likewiſe read themſelves, with Application, all the beſt Tranſlations of the old *Latin* and *Greek* Poets; and direct their Scholars to Read and Study the ſame. For tho' theſe Tranſlations are far ſhort of the Originals, yet are they capable, as they are, of fixing a juſt and true Taſte and Reliſh of the Nature of *Poetry* in the *Engliſh* Student; which has not been kept ſo much in View in moſt of our Modern Compoſitions, but as they depart from Nature, want her Regularity of Order and Beauty. *Ovid*'s Metamorphoſis ſhou'd be firſt read thoroughly, becauſe it furniſhes all the Hiſtories of the *Heathen Gods*, and their Notions about them. To theſe you may add my Lord *Bacon*, *Danet*, and other Books on that Subject. *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Horace*, *Homer*, we have in part in pretty good Verſions: And in ſome of theſe the Scholar ſhou'd every day take a Leſſon, beſides that which he takes in the Rules of the Art; by which he may come to join the Theory and Practic, which only can make a Poet, or Judge of Poetry.

We now come to the *Rules* of POETRY, in which I ſhall begin with the moſt inferiour Kind, and ſo aſcend by degrees up to the higheſt Performance in the Art.

Epigram is the loweſt Step of the Temple of the MUSES, or rather the Ground neareſt to the firſt Step of its *Aſcent*.

Of *EPIGRAM*.

The Epigram *in Shortneſs takes delight,*
And tho' all Subjects are its proper Right,
Yet each *of* one *alone can only write.*

An *Epigram* is a ſhort Copy of Verſes treating of one only Thing, with *Beauty* and *Point*: All Things are allow'd to be

be treated of in the *Epigram*, provided that *Brevity*, *Beauty* and *Point* are preserved.

Two Parts this little whole *muſt ſtill compoſe*,
Recital of the Subject, *and the* Cloſe:
To make this Poem perfect, be your Care
That Beauty, Point *and* Brevity *appear.*

The *Epigram* conſiſts of two Parts, the *Recital of the Subject*, and the *Concluſion*. *Beauty* runs through the whole, but the *Point* is for the *Concluſion* only.

That you this needful Brevity *may claim*,
Let one Thing only be your careful Aim;
And in few Words that only *Thing expreſs*,
But Words that Force *and* Energy *confeſs.*

To attain this *Brevity*, you muſt not aim at many Things through the whole *Epigram*, and then take care to expreſs that *Little* as conciſely as poſſibly you can; that is, in ſuch Words, as that to extend them into more, wou'd enervate and loſe the Force and Strength of the Thought, and the *Point* or *Acumen*.

Beauty's *harmonious Symetry of Parts*,
Which to the whole *an Excellence imparts*,
Adorn'd with ſweet Simplicity *and* Truth,
The Diction *ſtill polite, and ne'r uncouth.*
This BEAUTY Sweetneſs *always muſt comprize*,
Which from the Subject, well expreſs'd, will riſe.

The next Quality is *Beauty*, that is, an exact and harmonious Formation of the *whole*, and the apt Agreement of all the Parts of the Poem, from the beginning to the end, with a ſweet *Simplicity* and *Truth*. The Language muſt be *Polite*, not *Ruſtic*: The *Beauty* muſt always be accompany'd with *Sweetneſs*, which varys according to the Subject; if that be delicate, ſoft, tender, amorous, &c. thoſe Qualities will ariſe from the well expreſſing of the Subject, that will give *Beauty* and *Sweetneſs*. But this muſt not be too viſibly ſought after; avoid rather what is harſh, and an Enemy to *Sweetneſs* in the Language, than ſtudy too much to encreaſe it.

The POINT *in the* Concluſion *takes its Place*,
And is the Epigram's *peculiar Grace*;
Some unexpected, *and ſome* biting *Thought*
With poinant Wit, and ſharp Expreſſion fraught.

The

The third neceſſary Quality of the *Epigram* is the POINT; and it is much inſiſted on by the *Epigrammatical* Critics, and is chiefly in the *Concluſion*; where it muſt end with ſomething biting and unexpected. There are others who ever exclude the *Point* from *Epigram*, becauſe *Catullus* has it not ſo frequently as *Martial*; but here, as in other Things, we muſt be guided by the majority, and if we here exclude the *Point*, we may have it ſpread ſtill through greater Work, where it is abominable.

From two to twenty Verſes it extends,
But beſt when two, or four, it not tranſcends.

The number of Verſes in an *Epigram* is from two to twenty, or even to fifty; but the ſhorter the better, becauſe it comes neareſt to the Perfection of *Brevity*. We have not many formal *Epigrams* in *Engliſh*, but then we run into a worſe Error, by ſcattering the *Epigrammatic Point* through all our Verſes, to the ſcandal of the *Engliſh Poets*, ſince that wholly belongs to *Epigram*. One Example ſhall ſuffice, and that is from Mr. *Brown*,—on a Gentleman who took the Oaths, and made three Gods of the Trinity.

The ſame Allegiance to two Kings he pays,
Swears the ſame Faith to both, and both betrays:
No wonder, if to Swear he's always free,
Who has two Gods to Swear by, more than we.

Here is the *Brevity*, *Point* and *Beauty* of an *Epigram*, expreſs'd by a Domeſtic Example: You may find ſeveral *Epigrams* of *Martial* tranſlated by the ſame Author, and by Mr. *Cowley*, and ſome out of *Catullus*, which are too long to inſert in this Abridgment.

Of *PASTORAL*.

The Paſtoral, that ſings of happy Swains
And harmleſs Nymphs that haunt the Woods and Plains,
Shou'd through the whole diſcover every where
Their old ſimplicity and pious Air.
And in the Characters of Maids *and* Youth,
Unpractic'd Plainneſs, Innocence, *and* Truth.

As every ſort of *Poetry* is an Imitation of ſomething, ſo is the *Paſtoral* an Imitation of a *Shepherd*'s Life, conſider'd under that Character, or rather an Imitation of rural Actions. For this Reaſon there ought to be an Air of Piety, on all occaſions,

sions, maintain'd through the whole Poem; the Persons introduc'd being Innocent and Simple, without Corruption; such as *Shepherds, Goatherds, Cowherds, Pruners*, and the like. The Characters therefore shou'd represent that ancient Innocence, and unpractic'd Plainness, which was then in the World, and which is visible in *Theocritus* and *Virgil*, as may be seen in the Translations of those *Poets*.

Each Pastoral *a little* Plot *must own,*
Which as it must be simple, must be one;
With small Digressions it will yet dispense,
Nor needs it always Allegoric *Sense.*

Every *Pastoral Poem* shou'd have a little *Plot* or *Fable*, which may deserve the Title of a *Pastoral Scene*; it must be simple, and one, yet not so as to refuse all manner of Digressions, provided they be little. Nor is the Poet oblig'd always to make it *Allegoric*, that is, to have some real Persons meant by those fictitious Shepherds which are introduc'd. This Rule of the *Plot* is every where observ'd by *Virgil*, particularly in his first, which is the Standard of *Pastorals*. The Plans, or Arguments of this and two or three more, will make this plain: Of the *first*.

Melibœus, *an unfortunate* Shepherd, *is introduc'd with* Tityrus, *one more fortunate; the former addresses his Complaint of his Suff'rings and Banishment to the later, who enjoys his Flocks and Folds in this public Calamity, and therefore expresses his Gratitude to the Benefactor from whence this Favour flow'd: But* Melibœus *accuses Fortune, Civil War,* &c. *bidding Adieu to his Native Home.* This is therefore a Dialogue—the next—Is a *Pastoral* Complaint without any Dialogue; for CORYDON *in a Courtship wholly* Pastoral, *complains of the Coyness of* Alexis, *recommends himself for his Beauty, and Skill in playing on the rural Pipe; invites him into the Country, promising him the Pleasures of the Place, with a Present of* Nuts *and* Apples. *But finding all in vain, he resolves to quit his Amour, and betake himself again to his Business.* Here is a visible *Plan* or *Design*, which makes every thing depend upon the other.

In the third *Menalcas, Damœtas*, and *Palæmon* are introduc'd in this manner. —— Damœtas *and* Menalcas, *after some Country Railery, agree to try which has the best Skill at Song, and that their Neighbour* Palæmon *shall be judge of their Performance; who, after hearing both, declares himself unfit to decide the Controversie, and so leaves it undetermin'd.*

We

We need give no more Examples here of the little *Plot* or *Fable* of a *Paſtoral*; you may conſult Mr. *Dryden's Virgil*, and the ſeveral Tranſlations of *Theocritus*, by which you will confirm the Rule abundantly.

Connections, and Tranſitions, *pray take Care*
They are not made too ſtrict *and* regular.

The *Connections* ſhou'd be negligent, and the *Tranſitions* eaſy; as may be obſerv'd in thoſe of *Virgil*.; for a too ſtrict Regularity in theſe, will make the Poem ſtiff and formal.

The Paſtoral *admits of Vows and Praiſe,*
Of Promiſes, Complaints, of Mirth and Joys,
Congratulations, Singing, Riddles, Feſt,
Of Parables, Sentences, and the reſt.

Philoſophic Queſtions, Riddles, Parables, ought to be eminent in this Poem, which gives a peculiar Reliſh of the ancient Manner of Writing; and the Writer ſhou'd ſhow ſome competent Skill in the *Subject-Matter*, which makes the Character of the Perſons introduc'd; as *Virgil* every where does, but the Moderns ſeldom or never.

The Style muſt ſtill be natural and clear,
And Elegance in every Part appear;
Its humble Method nothing has of fierce,
But hates the Rolling of a lofty Verſe.

The Style ought to be natural, clear and elegant, but nothing ſublime or lofty, or ſet off with ſuch Ornaments as are not at all agreeable to the Humility of the Subject. The Sentences ſhou'd be ſhort and ſmart, and the Verſification ſmooth, eaſy and harmonious, without Affectation of Grandeur and Majeſty, but when akin to the Subject; as in one of *Virgil's* to *Pollio*.

Oppos'd to this another low in Style,
Makes Shepherds *ſpeak a Language baſe and vile.*

This *Randal* has done in his *Paſtorals*, and ſeveral others; changing *Dæmon* and *Phillis* into *Tom* an *Beſs*. Nor muſt Battles and War be treated of in a *Paſtoral*: We muſt either feign Names according to the Subject, or borrow thoſe which we find already in good Authors. This Poem ought never to exceed one hundred Verſes; the beſt of *Virgil's* is but fifty, that is (in *Engliſh*) about ſeventy.

Of

Of ELEGY.

The Elegy *demands a ſolemn Style,*
It mourns with flowing Hair at Funeral Pile,
It paints the Lover's Torments and Delights,
A Miſtreſs flatters, threatens, and invites.

Elegy was firſt made on Melancholy Subjects, as on the Death of Friends, *&c.* as *Ovid* on *Tibullus*, which is tranſlated. In Proceſs of Time, Joy, Wiſhes, and almoſt every Subject, was made free of the *Elegy*, as Complaints, Expoſtulations, Prayers, Love, Vows, Praiſes, Congratulations, Admonitions, Reproaches.

The Model of this Poem ſhou'd be made,
And every ſtep of all it's Progreſs laid;
And all directed to ſome certain End,
And Verſe on Verſe perpetually depend.

This and all other Poems ought to have a Plan made of the whole Deſign before a Line is written: For elſe the Author will not know where to begin, and where to end, but ramble in the Dark, and give us Verſe which have no Relation to each other, or at leaſt have not any Dependance on each other. This is the Fault of thoſe who are ignorant of Art, and are only *Verſifyers*.

No glittering Points, nor any nice Conceit
Muſt load the Elegy *with Foreign Weight;*
Paſſion and Nature here avow their Right,
And with Diſdain throw back that mean Delight.

The *Epigrammatic Point* muſt never be here admitted, 'tis abominable; none of the fine things that ſome are ſo fond of in all places, no Conceits, nor the like: Theſe give place to the Paſſions, which muſt here ſpeak with Nature.

Remember that the Diction every where
Be gentle, clean, perſpicuous, and clear;
Correct; the Manners all along expreſs,
In every place the Paſſions ſtill confeſs.

The Diction to the *Elegy* ſhould be ſtandard, correct, clean, gentle, perſpicuous, clear, expreſſive of the Manners tender, full of Paſſions, or pathetic; but never oppreſs'd or deboch'd with fine Sayings and exquiſite Sentences. It is wonderfully adorn'd with frequent Commiſerations, Complaints, Exclamations, Addreſſes to Things or Perſons,

Words

Words of feign'd Perſons, or Things inanimate made to ſpeak, ſhort Digreſſions, yet pertinent to the Subject; not does it receive a little Beauty from Alluſions to Sayings Examples not only from the *like*, but *unlike*, and Contrary Sometimes Compariſons are made, ſmart and ſhort Sentences are thrown in, to confirm what is propos'd.

No cutting off the Vowels *muſt be found,*
That wou'd deſtroy that ſmooth, that flowing Sound
Which in the Elegy muſt ſtill abound.

There ſhould be no Apoſtrophe's, by which when one Vowel ends a Word, and the next begins with another, the former is cut off; for that begets a ſort of Roughneſs which is not agreeable to this kind of Poeſie.

Some to two Verſes will the Senſe confine,
Conſummate in the cloſe of every other Line.

The Reaſon of this Opinion ſeems to be the ſort of Verſe this Poem makes uſe of in the Latin, which ſeems to require a Full-point or Period at the end of every *Diſtich* compoſed of a Verſe of ſix Feet, and another of five, and ſo begin again like a ſhort *Stanza*. But this Rule will not always hold in Engliſh, nor is it always obſerv'd in Latin.

The *LYRIC.*

Sweetneſs *is moſt peculiar to the Ode,*
Ev'n when it riſes to the Praiſe of GOD.

The Characteriſtic of this ſort of Poeſie from all others is *Sweetneſs*: For as Gravity rules, and moſt prevails in *Heroic* Verſe, Simplicity in *Paſtoral*, Tenderneſs and Softneſs in *Elegy*, Sharpneſs and Poinancy in *Satire*, Humor and Mirth in *Comedy*, the Pathetic in *Tragedy*, and the Point in the *Epigram*, ſo in this ſort of Poeſie the Poet applys himſelf entirely to ſooth the Minds of Men by *Sweetneſs* and Variety of the Verſes, and the exquiſite Elegance of the Words of the whole *Song* or *Ode*, in the Beauty and Agreeableneſs of Numbers, and the Deſcription of Things most delightful in their own nature.

The Expreſſion ſhou'd be eaſie, Fancy high,
That not ſeem to creep, nor this *to fly:*
No Words tranſpos'd, but in ſuch Order all,
As tho' hard wrought, may ſeem by Chance to fall.
But Obſcene Words do always give Offence,
And in all Poetry debaſe the Senſe.

Song

Songs are a Part of *Lyric* Poetry, for *Ode* indeed ſignifies a *Song*; tho' our common *Madrigals* degenerate much from their Original the *Ode*; yet, that we may have better for the future, we here take Notice of them, and they ſhou'd be moſt exact in the Propriety of Words and Thoughts; but here, as well as in all manner of true Poeſie, Obſcurity ſhou'd with the utmoſt Care be avoided.

Variety of Numbers ſtill belong
To the ſoft Melody of Ode *or* Song.

The Verſe of the *Lyric* Poetry in the beginning, was only of one kind, but for the ſake of Pleaſure, and the Muſic to which they were ſung, they ſo vary'd the Numbers and Feet, that their ſorts are now almoſt innumerable.

Pindaric Odes *are of a higher Flight,*
And happier Force, and fierce is the Delight:
The Poet here muſt be indeed inſpir'd
With Fury too, as well as Fancy fir'd;
For Art and Nature in this Ode *muſt join,*
To make the wondrous Harmony Divine.
But tho' all ſeem to be in Fury done,
The Language ſtill muſt ſoft and eaſy run;
The bright Tranſitions, *and* Digreſſions *riſe,*
And with their natural Returns ſurprize.

As the Language, or Expreſſions ſhou'd be elegantly ſoft, ſo an ill or low Expreſſion cloggs and debaſes the Beauty and Brightneſs of the Thought. This Poem is diſtinguiſh'd from all other *Odes* by the happy Tranſitions and Digreſſions which it beautifully admits, and the ſurprizing and naturally eaſy Returns to the Subject; which is not to be obtain'd without great Judgment and Genius. The ſuppos'd Irregularity of *Pindar*'s Numbers, has made our ignorant Imitators pretend to be *Pindaric* Poets, by their wild irregular Verſes alone, tho' very falſely. Here the Poet that wou'd excel, ſhou'd draw the Plan of his Poem, and mark out the Places where theſe elegant Wandrings may properly be, and how the Returns may juſtly be made to the Subject; for without that it muſt be Chaos and Confuſion in bold Sonorous Verſes. Conſult and ſtudy *Pindar*'s *Odes*, tranſlated by Mr. *Cowley*; and a Poem entitled, *The Female Reign*; in which the Tranſitions and Returns are excellent. [a]

CHAP.

[a] The *Ode* Originally had but one *Strophe* or *Stanza*, but was at laſt divided into three Parts; the *Strophe*, *Antiſtrophe*, and *Epode*.

For the Priests went round the Altar singing the Praises of the *Gods*, or *Goddesses* in Verse: So they call'd their first Entrance to the Left, *Strophe*, or *turning to*; the second, returning to the Right, they call'd *Antistrophe*, or the *Returning*; and the Songs they call'd *Ode*, or *Antode*; as they call'd their *Entrance* and *Return Strophe*, and *Antistrophe*: At last standing still before the Altar, they sung the rest, and that they call'd the *Epode*. The *Strophe* and *Antistrophe* consisted of the same number and kind of Verses, nay, almost of Syllables, but the *Epode* of Verses of a different kind, which were sometimes more in number, sometimes less; and if the *Ode* contain'd several *Strophes*, and *Antistrophes*, and *Epodes*, the same Rule was follow'd in all the rest.

The *Odes* of *Horace* are compos'd of two, three or four sorts of Verse, after which the *Stanza*'s, or *Strophes* begin again, *&c.*

CHAP. III.

Of SATIRE *and* COMEDY.

Satire and *Comedy* being both directed to lash and ridicule Folly and Vice, may (we think) properly come into one Chapter.

Folly and Vice of every Sort and Kind
That wound our Reason, or debase the Mind;
All that deserves our Laughter or our Hate,
To biting SATIRE's *Province do relate.*
The sloathful Parasite, affected Fool,
Th' Ingrateful, and the pert loquacious Tool,
The Lustful, Drunkard, th' avaritious Slave,
The noisy Bravo, and the tricking Knave.
Satire, *by wholsom Lessons, would reclaim,*
And heal their Vices, to secure their Fame.

Satire, like the old *Comedy*, takes Cognizance of, and has for its Subject *Turpitude*, or such things as are worthy our *Laughter*, or our *Hatred*. Whatever therefore is not ridiculous or odious, is not the Subject of *Satire*; as any thing that is full of Grief, Terror, Pity, or other Tragical Passions. *Satire* derides and falls on the Sloathful, the Parasite Affectation, the Loquacious or Talkative, the Ingrateful, Libidinous, Drunkards, the Avaritious Usurers, Bravo's, public Robbers, Adulterers, *&c.* He was in the Right, that subjected the Distempers of the Mind to *Satire*, since it is as much employ'd in this, as the Physician in curing the Body.

Body. Both propose to themselves the Health of the Patient, *Satire* by Discourse, the Physician by his Potions and Pills. The Medicines of both are in themselves unsavory and disagreeable to the Palate of the Distemper'd on whom they make Incisions, whom they cauterize and spare not. The Physician gilds his Pill, that it may go down glibly, the *Satiric* Invectives must be sweeten'd with the mixture of Pleasantry and Wit, and agreeable Railery, till both the Medicines are swallow'd, and in the Bowels perform their Operation. The Railery and biting of *Satire* correct the Perverse, and deter others from falling into Folly and Vice.

The Latin Writer's Decency neglect,
But Modern Readers challenge more Respect;
And at immodest Writings take offence,
If clean Expression cover not the Sense.
Satire *shou'd be from all Obsceneness free,*
Not Impudent, and yet preach Modesty.

The *Satiric Poet* shou'd not expose Vice and Lewdness as *Horace* and *Juvenal* have done, in Words and Expressions that may corrupt the Innocent, whilst they strive to correct the Guilty. He must, therefore, carefully avoid all obscene Words and Images.

Tho' Vice and Folly be keen Satire's *aim,*
It must not on their Nature here declaim.

Tho' the Business of *Satire* be to call Men from Vice and Folly, and invite them to Wisdom and Virtue, yet it is by no means to waste it self on Disquisitions on the Nature of Virtue and Vice; which is the proper Business of *Moral Philosophy*. In short, this Poem requires for its Author, a Man of Wit and Adress, Sagacity and Eloquence; and a Sharpness that is not opposite to Mirth and Pleasantry.

No Parts distinct do's biting Satire *know,*
And without certain Rules its Course will go.
Oft by Insinuation *it begins,*
* *And oft* abruptly *falls upon our Sins,*
But this Abruptness *must regard the* Whole,
Which must its Words, and Manner too, controul.

Satire has no certain nor distinct Parts; sometimes it begins by insinuating it self by degrees; but more commonly abruptly, and with Ardour. But tho' the beginning be a-

* *See the first* Satire *of* JUVENAL.

brupt, yet it ought to have a Reference and Regard to the the Compoſition of the whole Body of the Poem. Examples you may ſee in *Juvenal*, tranſlated by Mr. *Dryden*.

Of well-choſe Words ſome take not Care enough,
And think they ſhou'd be (like the Subject) rough.
But this great Work is more exactly made,
And ſharpeſt Thoughts in ſmootheſt Words convey'd.

Here, as well as in all Poems, there ought to be care taken of the ſmooth flowing of the Verſe, which Mr. *Dryden* in his *Mac Fleckno* has perfectly obſerv'd, and ought to be the Model of our Verſe in all *Engliſh Satires* [b]

Of *COMEDY*.

We come now to the *Drammatic* Poetry, which is much the moſt uſeful and difficult, as well as delightful of any: We can ſcaree except a juſt *Epic Poem*, which has not been ſeen theſe 1700 years; for tho' that be more difficult becauſe of its Length and Variety, yet it is, beyond Controverſie, leſs uſeful, and leſs capable of giving that ſtrong and lively Pleaſure which is to be found in a juſt *Tragedy*: But we begin with *Comedy*.

In Comic Scenes *the common Life we draw,*
According to its humorous Actions Law,
And Vice *and* Folly *laughing, keep in awe.*
But what is yet a nobler, juſter End,
To all the Charms of Virtue *do's commend.*

Comedy imitates common Life in its Actions and Humors, laughing at, and rendring Vice and Folly ridiculous; and recommending Virtue. It is indeed an Imitation of Life, the Mirrour of Cuſtom, and the Image of Truth; and whatever *Comedy* follows not this Track, is unworthy of the Name.

To

[b] *Satire* is allow'd to be an urbane, joceſe, and biting Poem, form'd to reprehend corrupt Manners, and expoſe Improbity of Life; but yet there is no certainty of the Etymology of its Name. Some draw it from a ſort of *Plate* or *Charger*, in which the various ſorts of *Firſt-fruits* were offer'd to *Ceres*; thus, ſay they, in *Satire* are handled various and different ſorts of Things or Subjects, with which it is as it were fill'd to Satiety; ſo from Fulneſs or Satiety they draw *Satire*. Others derive it from the Dances of the *Satyrs* leaping from *ſide* to *ſide*, skipping and jumping this way, and that. Or perhaps from the *Satyrs* themſelves, thoſe Gods having of old been often introduc'd into this ſort of *Poetry*.

To four eſſential Things w'aſſign a Part
In every Comedy *that's writ with Art*;
The Fable, Manners, Sentiments *are theſe,*
And proper Diction, *that muſt all expreſs.*
The Fable *is the* Plot *that is deſign'd*
To imitate the Actions of Mankind.
But without Manners *thoſe cannot be drawn*
In them the Temper, and the Humours ſhown;
As by the Sentiments *theſe are made known.*
The Diction *is the Language that do's ſhow*
In Words, the Sentiments *that from them flow.*

COMEDY has Parts of *Quality*, and Parts of *Quantity*. Of the firſt kind there are four eſſential, the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*; to which two are added which only relate to the *Repreſentation*, viz. the *Muſic* and *Decoration*; without the firſt four Parts no *Comedy* can be written. For the *Poet* muſt neceſſarily invent the *Matter*, or *Subject* on which he writes, and that is what we call the *Fable* or *Plot*: But ſince the *Fable* imitates, there is a neceſſity that it ſhou'd have the *Manners*, that is, nicely and juſtly expreſs the *Tempers*, *Humours* or *Manners* of the ſeveral *Dramatic Perſons* that are repreſented in *Comedy*. The *Sentiments* are added, becauſe we muſt diſcover by them the Senſe and Opinion of them in Words; and becauſe the *Sentiments* are, and muſt be expreſs'd more plainly by Words, the *Diction* obtain its place in theſe four Parts of *Comedy*.

The difference of the *Perſon* much alters the *Manners*, and differences them from one-another. For theſe *Manners* which are Praiſe-worthy in one, are far from being ſo in another, being not at all convenient to his Character, and therefore to be diſprais'd. Thus we find in Arts themſelves, for one of the Vulgar gains Reputation by being a good *Fidler* or *Piper*; but this in a King is ridiculous and diſagreeable to his Dignity. A *Woman* has a juſt Praiſe for ſowing well, and working finely with her Needle; but this being no Manly Quality, is diſpicable in a *Man*. The *Manners* muſt therefore be agreeable to every Man's Station, Quality, or Years, and the like. And Life is the beſt Book to ſtudy theſe in, when we are once Maſters of the Rules of Art. In the mean while, learn theſe following Verſes out of *Horace*, of what is proper to the ſeveral Ages and Stations of Man, that you may not err againſt them: They are found thus in blank Verſe, in my Lord *Roſcommon*'s Tranſlation.

One that has newly learn'd to speak and go,
Loves Childish Plays; is soon provok'd and pleas'd,
And changes every Hour his wavering Mind.
A Youth, *that first casts off his* Tutor's *Yoke,*
Loves Horses, Hounds, and Sports, and Exercise;
Prone to all Vice, impatient of Reproof;
Proud, careless, fond, inconstant, and profuse.
Gain, and Ambition rule our riper Years,
And make us Slaves to Interest and Power.
Old Men are only walking Hospitals,
Where all Defects, and all Diseases croud,
With restless Pain, and more tormenting Fear,
Lazy, morose, full of Delays, and Hopes,
Oppress'd with Riches, which they dare not use;
Ill-natur'd Censors of the present Age,
And fond of all the Follies of the past.
Thus all the Treasure of our flowing Years
Our Ebb of Life for ever takes away.
Boys must not have th' ambitious Cares of Men,
Nor Men the weak Anxieties of Age.
Observe the Characters of those that speak,
Whether an honest Servant, or a Cheat,
Or one whose Blood boils in his Youthful Veins,
Or a grave Matron, or a busie Nurse,
Extorting Tradesmen, careful Husbandmen.

These are the general Rules for those Characters that fall under them; but *Humour* being essential to English *Comedy*, we must see what that is.

Subordinate Passion we Humour *name,*
By which our Bards have gain'd peculiar Fame.
Each Passion does a double Face confess,
The strong *is* Tragic, Comic *is the* less.
Here Affectation *some to* Humour *add,*
By that are some ridiculously mad.
Whatever Humours you at first bestow,
Those to the end your Persons still must show,
Those must be uppermost in all they do.

Humour is said by the Critics to be a subordinate, or a weaker Passion, and that in Persons of a lower degree than those who are fit for Tragedy; and it is more visible in the lower sort of People, whose Characters are therefore fitter for *Comedy*. Every Passion has two different Faces; one that

that is ſerious, great, terrible, ſolemn, that is for *Tragedy*; and another that is low, comical, ridiculous.

Affectation is thought alſo to be a Character fit for *Comedy*, as being highly ridiculous, and capable of being corrected by it. Your Characters muſt always retain the ſame Humour through the Play, which you give them at firſt, or elſe 'tis abſurd and prepoſterous.

Expoſe no ſingle Fop, but lay the Load
More equally, and ſpread the Folly broad;
The other Way is vulgar: Oft we ſee
A Fool *derided by as great as he:*
Ill Poets ſo will one poor Fop *devour.*
But to collect, like Bees, from every Flour
Ingredients to compoſe this precious Juice,
Which ſerves the World for Pleaſure, and for Uſe,
In ſpight of Faction, will our Favour find,
And meet with the Applauſe of all Mankind.

The Poet ſhould not pick out any one particular Fop he may meet with in his Converſation, but form the general Follies from a Character that may be of Uſe to many, and a Diverſion to all.

All Fools in this ſpeak Senſe, as if poſſeſt,
And each by Inſpiration *breaks his Jeſt.*
If once the Juſtneſs of each part be loſt,
We well may laugh, but at the Poet's coſt.
That ſilly thing Men call Sheer-Wit *avoid,*
With which our Age ſo nauſeouſly is cloy'd:
Humour *is all,* Wit *ſhou'd be only brought*
To turn agreeably ſome proper Thought.

'Tis a Breach of Character to make the Coxcombs ſpeak Wit, and fine Raillery, and therefore good for nothing. *Humour* is the true Wit of Comedy, the fine Things, the *Sheer-Wit* is only for *Epigram.*

The Parts of Quantity are likewiſe four;
The Entrance *does the Characters explore:*
And to the Action ſomething does proceed,
The Working up, Action *and* Warmth *does breed.*
The Counter-turn *does* Expectation *croſs,*
But the Diſcovery *ſettles all i'th' cloſe.*

The Parts of Quantity of a *Comedy* are four; the *Entrance*, which gives Light only to the Characters, and proceeds very little into any part of the Action. 2*dly*, The *Working up* of the

the *Plot*, where the Play grows warmer, and the Design or Action of it is drawing on, and you see something promising. 3*dly*, The *full Growth* of the Plot, which we may properly call the *Counter-turn*, destroys the Expectation, and embroils the Action in new Difficulties, leaving you far distant from the Hopes, in which it found you. 4*thly*, The *Discovery* or *Unraveling* of the Plot, where you see all things settling again on their first Foundation. The Obstacles, which hinder'd the Design or Action of the Play, once remov'd, it ends with the Resemblance of Truth, and Nature and the Audience are satisfied with the Conduct of it.

But our Plays being divided into Acts, I shall add a word about them. There must be no more, nor less, than five Acts; this is a Rule of 1700 Years standing at the least.

The first contains the Matter or Argument of the Fable, with the shewing the principal Characters. The second brings the Affairs or Business into Act. The third furnishes Obstacles and Difficulties. The fourth either shews how those Difficulties may be remov'd, or finds new in the Attempt. The fifth puts an end to them all, in a fortunate Discovery, and settles all as it should be.

CHAP. IV.
Of TRAGEDY.

ONE only Action, *that's* entire *and* grave,
And of just length, *the* Tragic Muse *must have*
The Object of its artful Imitation,
And that without the Help of the Narration,
By the strong Pow'r of Terrour and Compassion.
All sorts of Passion perfectly refines,
And what in us to Passion else inclines.

As all the other Parts of *Poetry* are *Imitations*, so is *Tragedy*; for the best Critics define it thus: — "*Tragedy* is "the *Imitation* of one grave, and entire Action, of a just "length, and which, without the Assistance of *Narration*, "by the Means of Terrour and Compassion, perfectly re- "fines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever is like "them.

Thus *Tragedy* is the Imitation of some one Action, and not of all the Actions of a Man's Life; and 'tis equally plain, that there is no room for any thing in this Poem, (the

(the moſt uſeful and noble of all Poeſie) but what is grave and ſerious. This Action muſt be *entire*, it muſt have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. The *Beginning* is that before, which we have no need to ſuppoſe any neceſſary Cauſe of it; the *Middle* is all that this *Beginning* produces, and the *End* is that after which nothing is neceſſarily ſuppos'd to compleat the Action. It muſt be of a juſt *length*, that is, it muſt not be ſo long as that of an Heroic Poem, nor ſo ſhort as a ſingle Fable. The excluding *Narration*, and the confining it to Terror and Compaſſion, diſtinguiſhes it from an Heroic Poem; which may be perfect without them, and employs *Admiration*. By the refining the Paſſions, we mean not Extirpation, but the reducing them to juſt Bounds and Moderation, which makes them as uſeful as neceſſary. For by ſhowing the Miſeries that attend the Subjection to them, it teaches us to watch them more narrowly, and by ſeeing the great Misfortunes of Others, it leſſens our Own, either preſent or to come.

There is no Action that do's not proceed
From Manners, *and the* Sentiments *indeed.*
And therefore theſe, in this ſublimer Art
Of Tragedy, *muſt claim eſſential Part.*

As *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an Action, not of Inclinations or Habits, ſo there is no *Action* that does not proceed from the *Manners* and the *Sentiments*, and therefore the *Manners* and the *Sentiments* are eſſential Parts of *Tragedy*; for nothing but theſe can diſtinguiſh an *Action*. The *Manners* form, and the *Sentiments* explain it, diſcovering its Cauſes and Motives.

All Tragedies *four Parts do claim,*
Fable *the firſt, and* Principal *we Name;*
The Manners *and the* Sentiments *ſucceed,*
The laſt *place to* Diction *is decreed.*

There is no Subject of a *Tragedy* where theſe following Parts are not to be found; the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*. Some add the *Decoration*, becauſe that denotes the Place; and every *Action* requiring ſome Place, the *Decoration* is in ſome meaſure the Object of the Poets Care, that the Place may be proper for the *Repreſentation*. The chief and much moſt conſiderable, is the *Fable*, or the Compoſition of the *Incidents*, which form the Subject of the *Tragedy*. For *Action* being the Object of the Imi-

Imitation of this ſort of Poetry, muſt be the moſt conſide rable; but the *Action* conſiſts of the *Incidents* and their Con duct, which is the *Fable*: The *Fable* muſt be the moſt con ſiderable; and all the Beauties of *Manners*, *Diction*, and *Sen timents*, can't make amends for the Defects of this. Th general End that Mankind propoſe, is, to live Happily, bu to live Happily is an *Action*; for Man is either Happy o Miſerable by his *Actions*, not *Manners*. *Tragedy* only add them for the Production of *Actions*. The *Fable* being there fore the End of *Tragedy*, as being the Imitation of the *Action* it muſt be of the greateſt Importance; for ſo is the End i all Things.

The Manners *next, by the* Dramatic *Laws,*
As they of Action *are the Source and Cauſe,*
Demand our Study, and our utmoſt Care;
By thoſe the Perſons, their Deſigns declare,
And from each other beſt diſtinguiſh'd are.

The *Manners* are the moſt conſiderable next to the *Fable* For as *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an *Action*, ſo there are n *Actions* without the *Manners*; as no Effect without a Cauſe The *Manners* diſtinguiſh Character from Character, an diſcover the Inclinations of the Speaker, and what Part Side, or Courſe he will take on any *important* and *difficul* Emergence, know how he will behave himſelf before we ſee the Actions. If Pride, Choler, Piety, or the like, be th *Manners* of the Hero, we may know that he will follow the Dictates of the prevailing Paſſion of his Character.

The Sentiments *obtain the next Degree,*
Tho' leaſt in Excellence of all the Three.
The Sentiments *the* Manners *do expreſs,*
But muſt with Truth *and* Likelihood *conſeſs.*

The *Sentiments* are next in degree of Excellence to the *Fable* and the *Manners*: For theſe are for the *Manners*, wha the *Manners* are for the *Fable*. The *Action* cannot be juſtly imitated without the *Manners*, nor the *Manners* without the *Sentiments*. In theſe we muſt regard *Truth* and *Verſimilitude* As when the Poet makes a *Madman* ſpeak juſt as a *Madman* does; or as it is probable he wou'd do. For this ſee King *Lear* in *Shakeſpear*.

The Diction *muſt the* Sentiments *unfold,*
Which in their proper Language muſt be told.

The

The *Diction*, or Language of *Tragedy*, can demand but the fourth Place in the eſſential Parts, and is of the leaſt importance of any of them; yet muſt peculiar Care be likewiſe taken of this, that every Paſſion ſpeak in ſuch Words and Expreſſions as is natural to it.

Having thus ſeen the ſeveral Parts of *Tragedy*, and their Excellence in regard of each other, we ſhall now proceed to give Directions neceſſary to the making each of them perfect, and to the knowing when they are ſo in what we read.

Firſt on a Plot *employ thy careful Thoughts,*
And guard thy ſelf againſt its uſual Faults.
Turn it with Time a thouſand ſeveral ways
That (as it ought) gives ſure Succeſs to Plays.

As the *Plot*, or *Fable*, is the chief Thing in a *Tragedy*, ſo our firſt and principal care ought to be employ'd in contriving this Part with that care, that each may produce and depend upon the former. This Part being perform'd with Skill, has given Succeſs to thoſe Plays which have been defective in all the other Parts.

Beſides the main Deſign compos'd with Art,
Each moving Scene *muſt have a* Plot *apart.*
Contrive each little Turn, mark every Place;
As Painters *firſt chalk out the future Face.*
Yet be not fondly your own Slave *for this,*
But change hereafter what appears amiſs.

As the main *Plot*, or *Fable*, conſiſts of many *Incidents* or *Scenes*, the Poet muſt make a Draught of theſe before he begins to write; which will appear more plainly when we come to diſcourſe of the *Incidents*. In this Scheme we muſt mark all the fine Touches of the Paſſions, and all the admirable Turns that produce them. But when we come to write, we may diſcover Faults in the firſt Draught, which we muſt correct.

Each Tragic Action *muſt be both* entire,
And of that length *which* Tragedies *require.*
Beginning *it muſt have, and* Middle, *and* End,
Each to produce the other ſtill muſt tend.
The Cauſe of Undertaking and Deſign
Of Action, *to* Beginning *we confine;*
All the Effects and Obſtacles we find
In th' Execution, to Middle *are aſſign'd*
Th' unravelling and diſſolving of the ſame,
With Juſtice we the End *do always name.*

E-

Every *Action*, that is fit for a *Tragic Imitation*, ought not only to be *entire*, but of a *juſt length*; that is, muſt have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. This diſtinguiſhes it from *momentaneous Actions*, or thoſe which happen in an inſtant, without Preparation or Sequel, which, wanting Extenſion, may come into the *Incidents*, not build a *Fable* on. The Cauſe or Deſign of undertaking an *Action* is the *Beginning*; and the Effects of thoſe Cauſes, and the Difficulties we find in the Execution, are the *Middle*: The unravelling and diſſolving theſe Difficulties, is the *End*.

An Explanation of this will beſt appear by an Example, which we will take from the *Plot* of the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*. *On the Death of the two Brothers*, Eteocles *and* Polynices, Creon, *who ſucceeds them in the Kingdom of* Thebes, *prohibits the burying the Body of the later, becauſe he invaded his Native Country with Foreign Troops: This Decree makes* Antigone, *who was betrothed to* Hæmon *the Son of* Creon, *bury him, is diſcover'd, and condemn'd to be bury'd alive*: Creon *cou'd not be brought to relent by* Hæmon, *or* Tereſias; *and ſo* Hæmon *kills himſelf with her: This makes* Eurydice, *his Mother, deſtroy herſelf*; *and* Creon, *in theſe Miſeries ſeeing the fatal Conſequence of his Decree, repents too late, and becomes miſerable.*

The *Beginning* of this *Action* has no neceſſary Conſequence of the Death of *Polynices*, ſince that Decree might have been let alone by *Creon*, tho' it cou'd not have been without that Death; ſo that the *Action* naturally begins with that Decree. The *Middle* is the Effects produc'd by that Decree, the Deaths of *Antigone*, *Hæmon*, and *Eurydice*, which produce the *End* by breaking the Obſtinacy of *Creon*, and making him repent, and miſerable. Thus the Poet cannot begin or end his *Action* where he pleaſes (which is the fault of moſt of our old Plays) if he wou'd manage his Subject with true Oeconomy and Beauty. For there muſt be the *Cauſe* or *Beginning*; the *Effect* of that *Cauſe*, which is naturally the *Middle*; and the unravelling or finiſhing of it, which is the *End* produc'd by the *Middle*, as that by the *Beginning*. The *Middle* ſuppoſes ſomething before it, as its *Cauſe* and following, as its *Effect*; the *Beginning* ſuppoſes nothing before, and the *End* nothing to follow, to make the *Action* compleat.

The Unities *of* Action, Time, *and* Place,
If well obſerv'd, give Plays a perfect Grace.

The

The Subject of a *Tragedy* shou'd be of a just extent, neither too large, nor too narrow, but that it may be seen, view'd, and consider'd at once, without confounding the Mind, which if too little or narrow, it will do; nor make it wander to distract it, as it will do if it be too large and extensive. That is, the Piece ought to take up just so much *Time* as is necessary or probable for the introducing the Incidents with their just *Preparation*. For to make a *good Tragedy* that is a *just Imitation*, the *Action* imitated ought not, in Reality, to be longer than the *Representation*; for this makes the *Likeness* greater, and by consequence more perfect. But since there are *Actions* of ten or twelve Hours, we must bring some of the Incidents into the Intervals of the *Acts*, the better to deceive the Audience.

Next, the *Unity of Action* is such, that it can never be broke without destroying the Poem. This *Unity* is not preserv'd by representing of several Actions of *One Man*; as of *Julius Cæsar*, of *Anthony*, or *Brutus*; for then the Poet has no Reason to begin at any certain place; and *Shakespear* might have brought his Play down to the last Emperor of *Rome*, as well as to the Death of *Brutus*.

But this *Unity of Action* does not exclude the various *under-Actions*, which are perfectly dependent on, and contribute to, the chief; and which without it are nothing. Nor does this Exception make for our silly *under-Plots*, which have nothing to do with the main Design, but is another *Plot*; as *Adrastus* and *Eurydice* in *Dryden*'s *Oedipus*, which are abominable. In the *Orphan* the *Action* is *One*, and every Part or *under-Action* carries on and contributes to the *main Action*, or *Subject*. Thus the different Actions of different Men are not more distinctly different Actions, than those of *One Man* at different Times. Whatever can be transpos'd, or left out, without a sensible Maim to the *Action*, has nothing to do there.

The Tragic Person *is no certain Man,*
The Bard PARTICULARS *won'd draw in vain;*
For to no Purpose is that useless *Draught,*
By which no moral Lessons can be taught.
Great Homer, *in th'* Achilles, *whom he drew,*
Sets not that one sole *Person in our view;*
But in that Person to explain did choose
What Violence and Anger wou'd produce.

The Poet is not oblig'd to relate Things just as they happen'd, but as they might, or ought to have happen'd: That is, the *Action* ought to be *general*, not *particular*; for *particular Actions* can have no *general Influence*. Thus *Homer*, in *Achilles*, intends not the Description of that *one individual Man*, but to shew what *Violence* and *Anger* wou'd make all Men of that Character say or do: And therefore, *Achilles* is a *general* and *Allegoric* Person, and so ought all *Tragic Heroes* to be, where they shou'd speak and act necessarily, or probably, as all Men so qualify'd, and in those Circumstances wou'd do; differing from *History* in this, that *Tragedy* consults not the Truth of what any particular Person did say, or do, but only the general Nature of such Qualities, to produce such *Words*, and such *Actions*. 'Tis true, that *Tragedy* sometimes makes use of true Names, but that is to give a Credibility to the *Action*, the Persons still remaining *general*. The Poet may take Incidents from History and Matter of Fact, but then they must have that Probability and Likelihood which Art requires; for there are many Actions which have really been done, which are not probable; and then History will not justify the Poet in making use of them.

The Tragic *Action, to be just and right,*
Terror *and* Compassion *must excite.*

The Action that must be imitated in *Tragedy*, besides the former Properties, must excite *Terror* and *Compassion*, and not *Admiration*; which is a Passion too weak to have the Effect of *Tragedy*. *Terror* and *Pity* are rais'd by Surprize, when Events are produc'd out of Causes, contrary to our Expectation; that is, — when the Incidents produce each other, and not meerly follow after each other. For if it do not necessarily follow, it is no Incident for *Tragedy*.

Two Kinds of Fables, Tragedy *allows,*
The simple *this, the* implex *that avows.*
The simple *does no* Change *of Fortune know,*
Or in the End *does no* Discovery *shew.*
The implex *either one or both contains,*
So greater Beauty and Perfection gains.

As the *Actions* which *Tragedy* imitates, so are all its *Fables*, *simple* or *implex*. The *simple* is that, in which there is neither a *Change* of the Condition or State of the principal Person or Persons, or a *Discovery*; and the *unravelling* of the *Plot* is only a single Passage of Agitation, of Trouble, or Repose

poſe and Tranquility. The *implex Fable* in which the principal Perſon or Perſons have a Change of Fortune, or a *Diſcovery*, or both; which is the moſt beautiful and leaſt common. In the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*, the Argument of which we have before given you, there is the Change of the Fortune of *Creon*, and that produc'd by the Effect of his own Decree and Obſtinacy; but in his *Oedipus* and *Electra* there is both a *Change* and *Diſcovery*; the firſt to *Miſery*, the later to *Revenge* and *Happineſs*. *Oedipus*, with his Change of Fortune, diſcovers, that he is the Son of *Jocaſta* and *Laius*, and ſo is guilty of Inceſt and Parricide. But *Electra* diſcovers *Oreſtes* to be her Brother, and by that changes her Miſeries into Happineſs, in the Revenge of her Fathers Death. In the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of *Euripides* (written by Mr. *Dennis* in *Engliſh*) *Iphigenia* making a Diſcovery that *Oreſtes* is her Brother, changes both their Fortunes from Deſpair to a happy Eſcape from the barbarous Altars of *Taurica*. But the *Change* can neither be neceſſary nor probable (without which Qualities it is of no Value) if it be not the natural Reſult, or at leaſt the Effect of the foregoing Actions, or of the *Subject* it ſelf. As in *Oedipus*: For *Ægeon*, who comes to bring him agreeable News, and which ought to have deliver'd him from thoſe Apprehenſions into which the Fear of committing Inceſt with his Mother had thrown him, does quite the contrary, in diſcovering to him who and what he is. The Fact is thus—*A Meſſenger from* Corinth *brings* Oedipus *Word of the Death of* Polybus, *and invites him to take Poſſeſſion of that Kingdom; but he afraid of committing the Inceſt the Oracle had told him of, believing* Polybus *to be his Father, declar'd he wou'd never go to the Place where his Mother was. The* Corinthian *told him, that he did not know himſelf, and ſo diſturb'd himſelf about nothing; and ſo thinking to do* Oedipus *a ſignal Piece of Service, by delivering him from his Fears, informs him, that* Polybus *and* Merope *were not his Father or Mother*, which began the Diſcovery; that caſt him into the moſt terrible of his Misfortunes.

What in the Drama *we* DISCOVERY *call,*
May in the Notion of Remembrance *fall.*
For, by remembring, *the chief Perſons move*
From Ignorance to Knowledge, which or Love
Or Hatred in them always muſt produce,
And all their Happineſs or Miſery induce.

Diſcovery being here us'd for a Term of Art, and therefore ſignifying more than in its vulgar Acceptation, you muſt know, that here it means a Diſcovery, which is made by the principal Characters; by remembring or calling to Mind either one-another, or ſomething of Importance to their Change of Fortune, and is thus defin'd. — *The* DISCOVERY *is a* CHANGE, *which bringing us from Ignorance to Knowledge, produces either* LOVE *or* HATRED *in thoſe whom the Poet has a Deſign to make either Happy or Miſerable.* That is, it ought not to be in vain, by leaving thoſe who remember one-another in the ſame Sentiments they were in before; it muſt produce either *Love* or *Hatred* in the Principal, not inferiour Characters. But thoſe Diſcoveries which are immediately follow'd by the Change of Fortune, are the moſt Beautiful; as that of *Oedipus*, for the Diſcovery of his being the Son of *Jocaſta* and *Laius*, immediately makes him of the moſt Happy, the moſt Miſerable. And this *Cataſtrophe* or Ending, which has a *Change* of Fortune immediately after the *Diſcovery*, will always produce *Terror* and *Pity* in the End and Aim of *Tragedy*. We ſhall ſay ſomething of the ſeveral ſorts of Diſcoveries, after the *Manners*, on which they have ſome kind of Dependance.

Reject that vulgar Error, which appears
So fair, of making perfect Characters.
There's no ſuch Thing in Nature, and you'l draw
A faulty Monſter, *which the World ne'er ſaw:*
Some Faults muſt be, which his Misfortunes drew,
But ſuch as may deſerve Compaſſion too.

The next Thing which we are to conſider, are the *Characters*. Thoſe which are to compoſe a perfect *Tragedy*, muſt be neither *perfectly virtuous and innocent*, nor *ſcandalouſly wicked*. To make a perfectly virtuous and innocent Character unfortunate, excites *Horror*, not *Terror*, nor *Compaſſion*. To puniſh the Wicked, gives indeed a ſort of Satisfaction, but neither *Terror* nor *Pity*; which are the Buſineſs of *Tragedy*. For what we never think our ſelves capable of committing, we can never Pity. But the *Characters* of a *perfect Tragedy* ſhou'd be the Medium between both, but rather *good* than *bad*. Thus the *Dramatic Perſon* ſhou'd not draw his Misfortunes on himſelf by *ſuperlative Wickedneſs*, or Crimes *notoriouſly Scandalous*, but by involuntary Faults, that is Frailties proceeding from the Exceſs of Paſſion. We call them *involuntary Faults*, which are committed either by Ignorance,

norance, or Imprudence againſt the natural Temper of the Man, when he is tranſported by a *violent Paſſion*, which he cou'd not ſuppreſs; or by ſome greater or external Force, in the Execution of ſuch Orders, which he neither cou'd nor ought to diſobey. The Fault of *Oedipus* is of the firſt ſort, tho' he be alſo guilty of the ſecond. That of *Thyeſtes*, in the murdering his Nephews of the ſecond, *viz.* a violent Paſſion of Anger and Revenge. That of *Oreſtes*, in the killing of his Mother for the Death of his Father, of the third; being order'd to do it by the *Oracle* of the Gods. 'Tis true, our *Oedipus* is made ſovereignly Virtuous; but all that *Sophocles* gives him, are *Courage*, *good Fortune*, and *Judgment*; *Qualities* equally common to the *good* and the *bad*, and to thoſe who are made up of Virtues and Vices. *Sophocles* has indeed ſhewn him a Character that has a mixture of Virtue and Vice. His Vices plainly are, Pride, Violence, Anger, Raſhneſs and Imprudence; ſo that it is not for his Parricide and Inceſt that he is puniſh'd, for they were the Effect of his Curioſity, Raſhneſs, Pride, Anger, and Violence, and the Puniſhment of them. And thoſe are the Vices *Sophocles* wou'd correct in us by his Example.

Two ſeveral Ends the Fable *may obtain,*
Either the Perſons happy may remain,
Or ſink beneath the cruel Hand of Fate;
Or elſe it may obtain a double State.
Good *for the* Good, *and* Bad *for thoſe who err,*
The ſingle and unhappy ſtill prefer.

The *Fable* may have either a ſingle *End* or *Cataſtrophe*, or one that is *double*; one that is happy, or one that is unhappy; or one that is happy for the *Good*, and unhappy for the *Guilty*; but that which is beſt is the ſingle and unhappy, for that will moſt likely produce *Terror* and *Pity*.

As Incidents *the* Fable *do compoſe,*
So ſtill we muſt conſider moſt in Thoſe
Which Pity *will, and* Terror *moſt diſcloſe.*
All ſuch Events 'twixt Friends *are only found,*
From Others nothing Tragic *can redound.*
When the Friend's *Hand againſt a* Friend *is arm'd,*
We find our Hearts on either ſide alarm'd.
Thus when we ſee the Son's *unhallow'd Knife*
With impious Rage aſſault a Parent's *Life;*

When Ignorance *or* Rage *the* Parent *move*,
To point the Steel againſt the Child *they love*,
Fear *and* Compaſſion *every Breaſt will prove.*

Terror and *Compaſſion* being the chief End of *Tragedy*, and that being only produc'd by the *Fable*, let us conſider what Incidents (for ſuch compoſe every *Fable*) are the moſt productive of thoſe two Paſſions.

All *Incidents* are Events that happen between ſome-body or other; and all *Incidents* that are terrible, or pitiful, happen between Friends, Relations, or the like; for what happens betwixt Enemies, can have no Tragical Effect. Thus when a *Brother* is going to kill (or kills) a *Brother*; a *Father* his *Son*, or a *Son* his *Father*; the *Mother* the *Son*, or the *Son* the *Mother*; it is very terrible, and forces our Compaſſion. Now all theſe Actions or Events may be thus divided, — into thoſe which the Actor performs with an entire Knowledge of what he does, or is going to do; as *Medea*, when ſhe kill'd her Children; or *Oreſtes*, when he kill'd his Mother, and the like: Or thoſe, where the Actor does not know the Guilt of the Crime he commits, or is going to commit, till after the Deed is done, when the Relation of the Perſons they have deſtroy'd is diſcover'd to them. Thus *Telegonus* did not know it was his Father *Ulyſſes* whom he mortally wounded, 'till he had done it. The third ſort of *Incidents*, and which is the moſt beautiful, is when a Man or Woman is going to kill a Relation, who is not known to him or her, and is prevented by a Diſcovery of their Friendſhip and Relation. The *firſt* is the worſt, and the *laſt* beſt; the *ſecond* next in Excellence to the *third*, becauſe here is nothing flagitious, and inhumane, but the Sin of *Ignorance*; for then the Diſcovery is wonderfully pathetic and moving; as that of *Oedipus* killing his Father *Laius*.

In Manners *four Qualities we ſee*;
They muſt good, like, convenient, equal *be.*
The Manners *fully mark'd, we here call* good,
When by their Words their Bent is underſtood;
What Reſolutions they will ſurely take,
What they will ſeek, and what they will forſake.
LIKENESS *to well-known Characters relates,*
For Hiſtory no Quality abates.
Convenient *Manners we thoſe ever call*
Which to each Rank, Age, Sex, *and* Climate *fall.*
Thoſe Manners *Poets always equal name,*
Which thro' the Drama always are the ſame.

We

We come now to the *Manners*, which are in the next degree of Excellence to the *Fable*. The *Manners* diſtinguiſh the *Characters*; and if the *Manners* be ill expreſs'd, we can never be acquainted with them, and conſequently never be terrified by foreſeeing the Dangers they will produce to the *Dramatic Perſons*, nor melt into Pity by ſeeing their Sufferings. All *Dramatic* Perſons therefore ought to have the *Manners*; that is, their Diſcourſe ought to diſcover their Inclinations, and what Reſolutions they will certainly purſue. The Manners therefore ſhould have four Qualities, and they muſt be, (1.) *good*; (2.) *like*; (3.) *convenient*, (4.) *equal*. *Good* is when they are mark'd; that is, when the Diſcourſe of the Perſons makes us clearly and diſtinctly ſee their Inclinations, and what good or evil Reſolutions they are certain to take. *Like* only relates to known and public Perſons, whoſe Characters are in Hiſtory, with which our Poetic Characters muſt agree; that is, the Poet muſt not give a Perſon any Quality contrary to any of thoſe which Hiſtory has given him. We muſt remember, that the evil Qualities given to Princes, and Great Men, ought to be omitted by the Poet, if they are contrary to the Character of a Prince, *&c.* but the Virtues oppoſite to thoſe known Vices ought not to be impos'd, by making him generous, or liberal in the Poem, who was avaritious in the Hiſtory. The Manners muſt likewiſe be *convenient*; that is, they muſt be agreeable to the Age, Sex, Rank, Climate, and Condition of the Perſon that has them: For this you may look back to what is quoted out of my Lord *Roſcommon*'s Tranſlation of *Horace*, in what we have ſaid of Comedy. You muſt indeed ſtudy Mankind, and from them draw the Proprieties of Characters or Manners: It would be well if you ſtudied *Moral Philoſophy*, to lead you into the Study of Mankind.

They muſt be *equal*; that is, they muſt be conſtant, or conſiſtent, through the whole Character; or the Variety or Inequality of the Manners (as in Nature, ſo in this Draught) muſt be *equal*. The *Fearful* muſt not be *brave*, nor the *Brave* fearful: The Avaritious muſt never be liberal, and the like. *Shakeſpear* is excellent in this Diſtinction of Characters, and he ſhould be throughly ſtudied on this Head.

One Quality eſſential does remain,
By which the greateſt Beauty they obtain.

The Manners *muſt ſo regularly flow,*
That to Neceſſity their Birth they owe.
No Vicious Quality muſt be their Lot,
But what is needful to promote the Plot.

Beſides the four Qualities we have mention'd, there is a fifth eſſential to their Beauty, that is, that they be *neceſſary*: That is, that no vicious Quality or Inclination ought to be given to any Poetic Perſon, unleſs it appear to be abſolutely neceſſary, or requiſite to the carrying on of the Action; as all thoſe mention'd in *Oedipus* were, to the promoting that Fable.

Three ſorts of Diſcoveries *are found*
In the Dramatic Poets *to abound*;
The firſt *by certain* Marks *the Buſineſs do,*
Whether from Chance or Nature they accrue;
As Scars, *or* Moles, *that in the Body lye,*
Or certain Tokens *which thoſe Marks ſupply.*

Having run through the Manners, I now return to the Diſcoveries, becauſe (well manag'd) they add a wonderful Beauty to the Piece, tho' it is indeed a Beauty almoſt entirely unknown on our Stage. The *firſt* ſort of *Diſcovery* is by certain Marks in the Body, either *natural*, or *accidental*. Thus *Ulyſſes* having formerly, before the *Trojan* War, receiv'd a Wound in his Thigh, by a Boar, in the Mountain of *Parnaſſus*, when he return'd incognito home, the Nurſe who waſh'd his Legs diſcover'd him by the Scar of that Wound. Tho' theſe be the leaſt beautiful Diſcoveries, yet they may be us'd with more or leſs Art: As that we have juſt mention'd of *Ulyſſes*, was artful and fine; but when he is fain to ſhew it himſelf to the Shepherds, to confirm them that he is *Ulyſſes*, it is leſs artful.

The ſecond Way is by *Tokens*; as, the Casket of Things which the Prieſt had found with *Ion*, when he was expos'd, diſcovers *Creuſa*, whom he was going to kill, to be his Mother. And *Oreſtes*, when he had found out *Iphigenia* by her Letter, which ſhe was going to ſend to him by *Pylades*, is fain to tell particular Tokens in her Father's Palace, to make himſelf be believ'd to be *Oreſtes*. For theſe Tokens are no great matter of Invention, ſince the *Poet* might have made them twenty other ways.

Third

Third *from Remembrance takes its pleaſing Riſe,*
And forces the Diſcovery from the Eyes.
The fourth *ſort we do in Reaſoning find,*
Which brings the Unknown Object to the Mind.
Thus when Oreſtes *ſaw the fatal Knife*
With impious Blow directed at his Life,
Thus to the Goddeſs in Deſpair did call,
Ah! muſt I then like Iphigenia *fall?*

The third ſort of Diſcovery is what is made by Remembrance; that is, when the ſight, or hearing, of any thing makes us remember our Misfortunes, *&c.* Thus when *Ulyſſes* heard *Domodocus* ſing his Actions at *Troy*, the Memory of them ſtruck him, and drew Tears from his Eyes, which diſcover'd him to *Alcinous*. The fourth ſort of Diſcoveries are made by Reaſoning; as *Iphigenia* in *Æſchylus*, *Hither is a Man come like me; no body is like me but* Oreſtes, *it muſt therefore be* Oreſtes. And in the *Iphigenia* of *Polyides*, a Greek Poet, *Oreſtes* kneeling at the Altar, and juſt opening his Boſom to receive the ſacred Knife, crys out, *'Tis not ſufficient that my Siſter has been ſacrific'd to* Diana, *but I muſt be ſo too.*

The fineſt ſort is that which ariſes from the Subject, or Incidents of the Fable; as that of *Oedipus* from his exceſſive Curioſity, and the Letter that *Iphigenia* ſent by *Pylades*; for it was very natural for her on that Occaſion to ſend that Letter. We have been forc'd to make mention of Greek Plays, becauſe we have not yet had any thing of this kind, but in thoſe taken from thoſe Poets; but our *Oedipus* and *Iphigenia* will ſhew this in ſome meaſure.

The Sentiments *here next aſſume their Place,*
To which to give their juſt and proper Grace,
The Poet ſtill muſt look within to find
The ſecret Turns of Nature in the Mind.
He muſt be ſad, be proud, and in a Storm,
And to each Character his Mind conform.
The Proteus *muſt all Shapes, all Paſſions wear,*
If he wou'd have juſt Sentiments *appear:*
Think not at all where ſhining Thoughts to place,
But what a Man wou'd ſay in ſuch a Caſe.

Having done with the *Fable*, *Incidents*, and *Manners*, we come now to the *Sentiments*.

The *Poet* here muſt not be content to look into his Mind, to ſee what he himſelf wou'd think on ſuch an Occaſion, but

but he muſt put himſelf into the Paſſion, Quality, and Temper of the Character he is to draw; that is, he muſt aſſume thoſe *Manners* he gives each Dramatic Perſon, and then ſee what Sentiments or Thoughts ſuch an Occaſion, Paſſion, or the like, will produce. And the *Poet* muſt change the Habit of his Mind, and aſſume a new Perſon, as a different Character or Perſon ſpeaks, or he will make all ſpeak alike, without any diſtinction of Character. But this can't be done, but by a ſtrong Imagination, and great Genius.

We ſhall ſay no more of the *Sentiments* here, becauſe they are to be learnt from the Art of *Rhetoric*; for the *Sentiments* being all that makes up the Diſcourſe, they conſiſt in proving, refuting, exciting, and expreſſing the Paſſions, as *Pity, Anger, Fear*, and all the others, to raiſe or debaſe the Value of a Thing. The Reaſons of *Poets* and *Orators* are the ſame, when they would make Things appear worthy of Pity, or terrible, or great, or probable; tho' ſome Things are render'd ſo by Art, and ſome by their own Nature.

Wiſe Nature by Variety does pleaſe,
With differing Paſſions in a differing Dreſs:
Bold Anger in rough haughty Words appears,
Sorrow is humble, and diſſolves in Tears.
Make not your Hecuba *with Fury rage,*
And ſhew a canting Spirit on the Stage:
There ſwoln Expreſſions, and affected Noiſe,
Shews like ſome Pedant that declaims to Boys.
In Sorrow you muſt ſofter Methods keep,
And, to excite our Tears, your ſelf muſt weep.
Thoſe noiſie Words which in ill Plays are found
Come not from Hearts that are in Sadneſs drown'd.
To pleaſe, you muſt a hundred Changes try;
Sometimes be humble, then muſt ſoar on high;
In natural Thoughts muſt every where abound,
Be eaſie, pleaſant, ſolid, and profound.
To theſe you muſt ſurprizing Touches join,
And ſhew us a New Wonder in each Line.

The *Diction*, or Language, is that which next comes under our conſideration; and tho' it is confeſs'd, that it is of the leaſt importance of all thoſe Parts, yet when the Elocution is proper and elegant, and varies as it ought, it gives a great, and advantageous Beauty to a Play; and therefore we will not paſs it over in ſilence. Some have been betray'd by their Ignorance of Art and Nature, to imagine that *Milton's*

on's Stile, becauſe noble in the *Epic*, was beſt for *Tragedy*, never reflecting that he himſelf varied his Stile in his *Samſon Agoniſtes*. If you would therefore merit Praiſe, you muſt diverſifie your Stile inceſſantly; too equal, and too uniform a Manner then is to no purpoſe, and inclines us to Sleep. Rarely are thoſe Authors read, who are born to plague us, and who appear always whining in the ſame Ungrateful Tone. Happy the Man, who can ſo command his Voice, as to paſs without Conſtraint from that which is *grave*, to that which is *moving*, and from that which is *pleaſant*, to that which is *ſevere* and *ſolemn*. Every Paſſion has its proper Way of Speaking, which a Man of *Genius* will eaſily derive from the very Nature of the Paſſion he writes. *Anger* is proud, and utters haughty Words, but ſpeaks in Words leſs fierce and fiery when it abates. *Grief* is more humble, and ſpeaks a Language like it ſelf, *dejected*, *plain*, and *ſorrowful*.

Soliloquies *had need be very few,*
Extreamly ſhort, and ſpoke in Paſſion too.
Our Lovers talking to themſelves, for want
Of others, make the Pitt their Confidant.
Nor is the Matter mended yet, if thus
They truſt a Friend only to tell it us.
Th' Occaſion ſhou'd as naturally fall
As when Bellario *confeſſes all.*

There is nothing more common in our *Plays*, tho' nothing ſo inartificial and unnatural, as the Perſons making long Speeches to themſelves, only to convey their Intentions and Actions to the Knowledge of the Audience: But the *Poet* ſhou'd take care to make the Dramatic Perſons have ſuch Confidants, as may neceſſarily ſhare their inmoſt Thoughts, and then they would be more juſtly, and with more Nature, convey'd to the Audience. A lively Picture of the abſurd Characters and Conduct of our *Plays*, take from the Duke of *Buckingham*'s *Eſſays on Poetry*; which being in Verſe, may be got by hart, and remembet'd, and ſo always about you, for a Teſt of any new Hero.

First a Soliloquy *is calmly made,*
Where every Reaſon is exactly weigh'd;
Which once perform'd, moſt opportunely comes
A Hero, frighted at the Noiſe of Drums,
For her ſweet ſake, whom at firſt ſight he loves,
And all in Metaphor his Paſſion proves.

But ſome ſad Accident, tho' yet unknown,
Parting this Pair, to leave the Swain alone,
He ſtrait grows jealous, *yet we know not why,*
And, to oblige his Rival, needs will dye:
But firſt he makes a Speech, wherein he tells
The abſent Nymph how much his Flame excels,
And yet bequeaths her generouſly now
To that dear Rival, whom he does not know,
Who ſtrait appears, (but, Who can Fate withſtand?)
Too late, alas! to hold his haſty Hand,
That juſt has given himſelf a cruel Stroke:
At which this very Stranger's Heart is broke.
He more to his new Friend than Miſtreſs kind
Moſt ſadly mourns at being left behind;
Of ſuch a Death prefers the pleaſing Charms
To Love, and living in his Lady's Arms.

Of the EPIC, or HEROIC POEM.

An Epic Poem, *is a Diſcourſe invented with Art, to form the* Manners *by Inſtructions, diſguis'd under the* Allegory *of an* Action *which is important, and which is related in Verſe in a delightful, probable, and wonderful manner.*

That is, it is a *Fable* which conſiſts of two Parts, firſt of *Truth*, its *Foundation* and *Fiction*, which diſguiſes that *Truth*, and gives it the Form of a *Fable*. The *Truth* is the *Moral* and the *Fiction* of the *Action* that is built upon it. Its Importance diſtinguiſhes it from the *Comedy*, and its Relation from the *Tragic Actions*. The *Action* here, as in *Tragedy*, muſt be *One*, and all its *Epiſodes*, or *under-Actions* are to be dependent on the *main Action*. It muſt be *entire*, that is, have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. It muſt have the *Manners*, that is, the Characters muſt be diſtinguiſh'd, and *Manners* muſt be neceſſary, and have thoſe Qualities inſerted already in *Tragedy*. The *Incidents* ought to be *delightful*, and to that End *various*, and rightly diſpos'd, and ſurprizing. The *Epiſodes* ſhou'd be pathetic. The *Sentiments* will fall under the ſame Rules as thoſe of *Tragedy*, but the *Diction* is allow'd to be more lofty, and more figurative, as being a *Narration*, and having *Admiration*, not *Terror* and *Pity*, for its End.

We need ſay no more of this Poem, the Rules at large wou'd be too extenſive for this Treatiſe, and but of little Uſe; the Poem being not to be undertaken but by a *Maſter*, and by a *Genius* that does not appear once in a Thouſand Years.

RHETORIC;

RHETORIC;
OR,
The ART *of* PERSUASION.

§ 1. RHETORIC *is the Faculty of diſcovering what every Subject affords of Uſe to* PERSUASION. And as every Author muſt invent, or find out Arguments to make his Subject prevail, diſpoſe thoſe Arguments, thus found out, into their proper Places, range them in their juſt Order, and to the ſame End give them thoſe Embelliſhments and Beauties of Language which are proper to each Subject; and, if his Diſcourſe be to be deliver'd in public, to utter them with that Decency, and Force, which may ſtrike the Hearer; So this *Art of Perſuaſion* is generally divided into four parts, *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Elocution* or Language, and *Delivery* or Pronunciation.

§ 2. *Invention* is the finding out ſuch Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments as are adapted to *perſuade*, or gain the *Aſſent* or *Belief* of the *Hearer* or Reader.

Theſe Arguments may be divided into *artificial*, and *inartificial*. The *former* are the proper Object of the Invention of him who writes; the *later* the Author or Writer does not invent, but borrowing them from abroad, applys and accommodates them to his Subject.

The *artificial* Arguments are of three ſorts, *Reaſons* or Argumentations, the *Manners*, and the *Paſſions*. The firſt are to inform the *Hearer*'s Judgment; the ſecond, to ingratiate with him, or win his *Inclination* or *Favour*; the third, to *move*.

The *Student*, or *Writer*, is abundantly aſſiſted in finding out theſe *Arguments*, *Reaſonings*, or *Argumentations*, by conſulting ſuch *Heads*, as contain, by general Conſent, or the Rules of Art, ſuch *Proofs* or *Evidences* under them.

Some of theſe HEADS are *general*, others *particular*: The *General* contain thoſe Propoſitions which are common to all *Subjects* or *Cauſes*; and theſe the Maſters of this *Art*

have agreed to be *two* in number, under theſe two Titles; the firſt, *Poſſible*, or *Impoſſible*; for whether we *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe*, *accuſe* or *defend*, we muſt prove that the Fact or Subject, has been, or is *poſſible* or *impoſſible* to be done.

The other Title is *Great* or *Small*, and to this all *Compariſons* relate; as when we ſhew, that *This* is more or leſs beneficial or pernicious, more uſeful or unuſeful, more honourable or diſhonourable, more juſt or equitable, unjuſt and illegal, than *That*.

Every Subject has, beſides theſe *general Heads* common to all, others *particular* to themſelves, from whence all Arguments are drawn, which are *peculiar* to each *Subject* or *Cauſe*; and for that Reaſon vary according to the Variety of *That*.

All *Cauſes*, or *Subjects* of any Weight, are recommended to the *Reader* or *Hearer* in one of theſe three Ways, *viz.* either by *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*; *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*; *Accuſation* or *Defence*. *And indeed, a Man can ſcarce write on any* Subject *that requires or falls under* Perſuaſion, *but in a more or leſs* important, *or* extenſive Degree, *falls under one of theſe Heads.*

But theſe differ from each other, as in the *Parts*, and *Office* or *Duty*, as we have juſt ſeen; and in the *End* doubly, (1.) In regard of the *Thing it ſelf*; (2.) and the *Hearer*. (1.) In regard of the *Thing*; for the *End* propos'd by the *Perſuaſive*, or *Diſſuaſive Diſcourſe*, is *Profit*, *Advantage* or *Benefit*; by the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*, *Honour*; and *Right* and *Equity* by the *Accuſation* or *Defence*. (2.) In regard of the *Hearer*, becauſe the Object of him who writes in *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*, is *Hope* and *Fear*; in *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*, *Pleaſure* and *Delight*; in *Accuſation* and *Defence*, *Clemency* or *Severity*.

The firſt has to do with the *future*, or *Time to come*; the ſecond moſt commonly with the *Preſent*; and the third with the *Paſt*. The *Hearers*, in the important Subjects of each Kind, may be conſider'd thus: a *Man*, or Men of *Power* in a State hear the *firſt*; *Men of Pleaſure*, or ſuch as are chiefly led by the Ear, the ſecond; and a *Judge*, or *Senate* the *laſt*.

§ 3. When the Deſign of our Diſcourſe is to *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, we muſt conſider the *Matter* or *Subject* of our Diſcourſe, or the Thing we wou'd render eligible or odious; and thoſe *Heads* from whence Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments are to be drawn, to bring about what we propoſe.

The

The *Subject*, or *Matter*, is whatever can be done either in a public or private Capacity. Thoſe Subjects which have Regard to a *public Capacity*, have been divided into five Heads. (1.) *Funds*, *Revenues*, and *Pecuniary Matters*. (2.) *Peace* or *War*. (3.) *Garriſons* or *Forces*, which are the Defence of Countries. (4.) *Trade* in Commodities, exported or imported: And, (5.) the Propoſal of *Laws* to be eſtabliſh'd or abrogated.

Private Subjects are whatever may be of Advantage or Detriment to *Particulars*.

The *Heads* from which Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments are to be drawn under this Diviſion of the Art of PERSUASION, are *ſix*. The chief and moſt peculiar to this, is the *Profitable*, or *Beneficial*. It farther borrows from the next *Kind*, the *Honourable*; and from *Accuſation* and *Defence*, the *Rightful* or *Legal*; and from the *common*, or *general Heads* the *Poſſible*; and frames from all theſe a Judgment, or Conjecture of the *Event*.

§ 4. We come now to *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*: And this ſort of Diſcourſe is threefold; the firſt of *Perſons* real, or imaginary; the ſecond of *Facts* or *Deeds*; and the third of *Things*.

In the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe* of *real Perſons*, the Order is either *Natural* or *Artificial*.

The *Artificial* is, when, without Regard to Time, we refer what we ſay to certain *Heads*; as the *Goods* of *Mind*, of *Body*, or of *Fortune*.

But the *Natural Method* is, when we ſtrictly confine our ſelves to the obſervation of the Order of Hiſtory. And this is divided into *three Times*. (1.) That which preceeded the Birth of the *Perſon*, who is the Subject of our *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*. (2.) The Time of his Life; and, (3.) What follows, his Death.

In the firſt *Time* we muſt conſider the *Prognoſtics*, *Omens*, *Prophecies*, and the like, if any ſuch there were, and his *Family* and *Country*; from which ariſes a twofold Praiſe: For if theſe were really illuſtrious, we ſay, that ſuch a Perſon has come up to the Ancient Honour of his *Country* and *Family*; or has done Deeds worthy ſuch a *Country* and ſuch a *Family*. On the contrary, if his *Country* or *Family*, or both were obſcure, we muſt ſhew, that he has ennobled and rais'd the Obſcurity of both, by his own proper *Virtues* and *Worth*.

In the next *Time*, which is that of his Life, we have four Things to conſider; firſt, The Nature of his *Body*, as *Health*, *Robuſtneſs*, *Activity*, *Beauty*; and of his *Mind*, as

Wit, Capacity, Judgment, Memory, &c. The ſecond is his *Fortune*, or *Riches*. The third his *Education, Inſtitution*, and *Conduct* of Life. The fourth his *Actions*, and their *Circumſtances* and *Rewards*.

In the laſt place, comes the *Manner* and *Kind* of his Death, the *Funeral Pomp*, and the like; chiefly the Loſs, and the Grief that attended that Loſs; to which may be ſubjoin'd a *Conſolation* for it. This is the Praiſe of the *Perſon*, let it be of an *Alexander*, a *Marlborough*, a *Peterborow*, or the like. From hence we may eaſily gather the Praiſe of what we call an *imaginary Perſon*; as of *Bucephalus*, or the like; but this is of little uſe, except a Sport of Fancy.

When we undertake to praiſe Deeds or Actions, we are to make uſe of thoſe *Heads* of Arguments which are recurr'd to in the former Diviſion; ſince we praiſe that here, which we wou'd recommend or perſuade in the other.

There are here eight *Heads*, from which we draw Materials of amplifying and ſetting off the Subject; for to the praiſe of *Deeds* or *Actions*, it very much imports, that the *Subject* of our Praiſe, *did* it either *firſt, ſingly* or *alone*, or with *few*, or *chiefly*, or *principally*, or at a neceſſary *Exigence* of *Time, Place*, or *juncture* of Affairs, or *often*: Or that the *Action* has a great Regard to the Benefit, Reputation, and Glory of his Country; or that he, firſt of all Men, gain'd his Country new, or freſh Honours, Dignity, Power, *&c.*

When Things are the Subject of our Praiſe, the Method is not the ſame in all: For in the *Praiſe* of *Countries, Cities*, and the like, we purſue very near the ſame Method, as in that of Perſons; for that which in *Men* is *Country* and *Family*, is in *Places*, are the *Founders*, and the *Princes* who have there govern'd; that which in the former is *Beauty* of *Body*, is in theſe the *Situation*: What in *thoſe* is the *Virtue* of the *Mind*, is the *Fertility, Wholſomneſs, wiſe Laws*, &c.

But in the Praiſe of *other Things*, as of *Arts* and *Sciences*, we have recourſe to the ſame Heads of Argument as in the Praiſe of *Actions*. The *Honourableneſs* is ſhewn in the efficient, or productive Cauſes and Antiquity; and the *Utility* or *Benefit* from the *Effect* and *Aim*.

§ 5. The laſt Kind or Sort of Subject of RHETORIC, is that which *Accuſes* or *Defends*, and the *Heads* of Arguments or Proofs in this, vary according to the variety of the State of the Cauſe, which is the Subject of our *Accuſation* or *Defence*.

There

There are four *States*; the firſt enquires *whether it be ſo, or not*; the ſecond, *what it is*; the third, *its Nature*; the fourth, *its Magnitude*, or *how great any Crime is*.

Every Speech, or Oration of this Kind, has one, or more of theſe *States*. If there be more than *One*, they muſt either be of the ſame Kind, as if they all enquire *whether it be or not*, or they muſt be of ſeveral ſorts; as, one of the firſt, and another of the ſecond.

§ 6. There are three *Heads* of Argument, which we conſult for Proofs in the firſt *State*, which we may call the *State of Gheſs*, or *Preſumption*, viz. The *Will*, the *Power*, and *Signs*, or *Tokens*.

The *Will* contains the *Motives* and *Reaſoning*. The *Motives* contain the *Affections* or *Paſſions*, which are urg'd as the *efficient Cauſe*. The *Reaſoning* is drawn from the *final Cauſes*; as from the Hope of Advantage, and the like: And to the *Power* or *Faculty*, the Strength of Body, the Inclinations of the Mind, Riches, Capacity, Time, Place, the Proſpect or Hopes of concealing the Fact, when committed, relate. Some of the *Signs*, or *Tokens* precede; ſome attend, and ſome follow the Fact.

§ 7. In the *State*, which enquires by *what Name* the Fact is to be call'd, we muſt endeavour to confirm and make out our own *Definition* of it, and confute that of the Adverſary. As when the *Accus'd* ſhall acknowledge that he had *taken* ſuch Goods from ſuch a Place, but not *ſtole* them; that he *ſtruck* ſuch a Perſon indeed, but made no *Aſſault* and *Battery*. Or ſhou'd he confeſs the Robbery, but deny the Sacrilege, and the like; in all ſuch Caſes the Nature of the Fact muſt be defin'd, and the Adverſary confuted on that Head by a Confirmation of your own *Definition*.

§ 8. The *State* which enquires into the *Nature of the Fact*, *Crime* or *Cauſe*, is twofold; the firſt treats of *what is to come*, and is therefore proper to *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*. The later of what is already done, and is therefore agreeable to Courts of *Judicature*, or *Accuſation* and *Defence*. That which is properly *juridical*, has its Place either in *Judgment*, or before it; we divide the firſt into *Rational* and *Legal*: The *Rational* relates to the Fact, the *Legal* to the Senſe of the Laws, Statutes, or written Authorities.

The *Rational* is divided into the *Abſolute* and *Aſſumptive*. The *Abſolute* plainly, and ſimply defends the *Fact*; as when we allow it *done*, and aſſert it *laudibly done*. The *Aſſumptive* is when the Defence in it ſelf is weak, but is ſupported

or aſſiſted by ſomething Foreign, or out of the Cauſe aſſum'd. And this is done four Ways, by *Compariſon*, *Relation*, *Removing* and *Conceſſion*. *Compariſon* is when we ſhew, that there was a neceſſity of doing *One* of two Things; and that what was done was juſter, and more juſtifiably eligible than the *other* wou'd have been. *Relation* is when we throw the Fault on the very Perſon who has receiv'd the Injury. The *Removing* is, when we throw the Fault on ſome other Perſon than he who has receiv'd the Injury, or on a Thing that cannot come before the Court, as not falling under its Juriſdiction, as on the *Law*.

Conceſſion is uſually divided into *Purgation* and *Deprecation*. *Purgation* is when we defend not the *Fact*, but the *Will* or *Intention*; as when the Guilt or Fault is thrown on *Neceſſity*, *Fortune*, *Ignorance*, or *Inadvertence*.

Deprecation is when we acknowledge the Fault, or plead Guilty, and fly to *Pity* and *Mercy*.

§ 9. There are four *States* which enquire into the Nature of the Crime, or what it is. The firſt is of the *written Letter*, and the *Opinion* or *Intention*; as, when the *Writing* is one Thing, and the *Intention of the* Writer another; and one inſiſts on the *Letter*, and the other on the *Intention* of the *Writer*. Here *Equity* and the *Rigour* of the Law contend.

The next is *Reaſoning*, when from what *is* written, we gather another Thing that is *not* written, becauſe founded on the ſame Reaſon.

The third is the *Contradiction of the Law*; that is, when the Law either is contrary to it ſelf, or to ſome other Laws.

The fourth is *the Ambiguity of the Diſcourſe*; which ariſes either from the Change of the Tone or Accent, or from the Diviſion of the Diction; or the various Significations of the Words. To this we may add a Species of it, the examining the Force of the Word, which differs from the former *State*, which enquires into the Nature of the *Fact* and *Crime*, to ſee what Name is its due. We may here farther conſider Exceptions to the Court it ſelf: Firſt, the *Perſon*; as when he acts who ought not to act, or with him with whom he ought not. Secondly, the *Place*; as when the Action is brought in a wrong Court. Thirdly, to the *Time*; as when we ſay, we cou'd formerly have accus'd one whom we cannot at *this Time*. And, Fourthly, to the *Thing*; as when we deny that the *Indictment* can be grounded on this Law, or requires ſuch a Puniſhment for ſuch a Crime.

§ 10. The

§ 10. The *State*, which enquires into the *Magnitude* or *Greatneſs* of the Crime, examines and informs us what are the *greateſt* and moſt *heinous* Injuries, and which are the *leaſt*. They are ſhewn to be *great*, either becauſe done on very ſlight *Grounds*, or *Provocation*; *or* becauſe they have drawn on in their Conſequences very great Damages; *or* becauſe he who receiv'd the Injury, was a Man of great Merit; *or* becauſe the *accus'd* was the firſt who did commit it, or the *only*; or *with a few*; or *often*; or on *Purpoſe*; or on many other Cauſes.

§ 11. Having thus curſorily ran over the *Artificial Arguments*, we come now to thoſe which are call'd *Inartificial*; which are ſuch as are not deriv'd from this *Art of Perſuaſion*, but being preſs'd in from abroad, are, however, *artificially* treated of: And theſe in the Accuſation and Defence, are five. (1.) The *Laws*. (2.) *Witneſſes*. (3.) *Contracts* or *Agreements*. (4.) *Queſtions*. (5.) *Oaths*. From all which, according to the Nature of the Cauſe, there are different Ways of arguing.

§ 12. We come now to the other Part of *Rhetorical Invention*, and that treats of the *Paſſions*. *The* Paſſions *are Commotions of the Mind, by means of which thoſe who are mov'd, judge differently from thoſe who are not; and this is attended either with Pleaſure or Pain.*

We muſt neceſſarily know three Things to be able to move the *Paſſions*. — *Who*, and *to whom*, and *for what Cauſes* or *Reaſons* Men are us'd to be mov'd by this, or that *Paſſion*.

§ 13. *Anger is a certain Deſire of Revenge, accompany'd with Pain, which we ſeem to ourſelves able to execute, caus'd by a diſagreeable Contempt of our ſelves, or of ours.*

But this Contempt is of three ſorts: *Deſpiſing*, *incommoding*, and *Contumelious*. The firſt is a meer ſimple *deſpiſing*; the *Others* require that *One* oppoſe an *Other*, not to advantage *himſelf*, but meerly to oppoſe the *Other*. And *incommoding* is in Deſign, or by depriving him of, or hindring his Advantage; but the End of *Contumelies*, is *Shame* and *Ignominy*.

§ 14. The Oppoſite of *Anger* is *Lenity*, which is the *Ceaſing*, or *Remiſſion of Anger*.

§ 15. *Love* is a Paſſion by which we wiſh heartily well to ſome *One*, and wou'd do all the Good we cou'd to that *One*, not for our own ſake, but for his, or hers.

§ 16. *Ha-*

§ 16. *Hatred* and *Enmity* are oppos'd to *Love* and *Friendſhip*: But theſe differ from *Anger* in many Particulars. We are *angry* on account of Things which relate to our ſelves; but we *hate* without any Regard to our own Affairs, Intereſt or Advantage: *Anger* is directed to *Particulars*; but *Hatred* rages againſt *whole Kinds*; *Anger* is a ſhort-liv'd Fury, but *Hatred* and *Enmity* are laſting. He that is *angry* endeavours to give Pain to the Perſon with whom he is *angry*; for he wou'd have *him* feel Evil, on *whom* he wreaks his *Revenge*. He that *hates*, ſtudies to bring Damage or Ruin; but is not in Pain whether his Enemy feel it, or not.

§ 17. *Fear* is a certain Pain and Trouble of Mind ariſing from the Imagination of ſome impending Evil, which may either be attended with Deſtruction, or Inconvenience, or Trouble.

§ 18. *Boldneſs*, or *Confidence*, is oppoſite to *Fear*; it is a Hope join'd with an Imagination of Advantages, as if they were near, and all Things and Perſons, that might ſtrike us with Fear, being far remov'd, or not at all in Being.

§ 19. *Shame* is a ſort of *Grief*, *Pain*, or *Trouble* ariſing from an Opinion of *Infamy*, when the *Evils* are either *preſent* or *paſt*, or *imminent*. And *Impudence* is that by which we deſpiſe ſuch Things, and receive no Trouble from them.

§ 20. *Favour* is that, by which any one is ſaid to do a *Favour* or *Grace* to any one, who wants it; not for any Proſpect whatever, or that he may get any Thing by it, but that he whom he relieves, may receive a Benefit. *Favour* is amplify'd or enlarg'd on three Ways; from the Perſon who beſtows the *Favour*, from the Perſon to whom it is done; and from the Thing or Gift it ſelf. And the ſame is leſſen'd three Ways; firſt from the *Effects*; ſecondly, from the *Gift* it ſelf, and its *Qualities*; and, thirdly, from the Tokens and Signs of a Mind not truly benevolent.

§ 21. That *Pity*, which we here only define, is the *Pain* of *Good Men*, from the Opinion of an Evil that may bring Deſtruction or Trouble to one that does not deſerve it; and ſuch as any one may think may befal himſelf or his, and that ſeen to be impending over him, or coming upon him.

§ 22. *Indignation* is a *Pain* or *Trouble* for another's *Succeſs* or *Happineſs*, who does not ſeem to deſerve it.

In this it differs from *Pity*; *that* proceeding from the Sight of the *ill Fortune* of the *Good*; *this* from the *good Fortune* of the *Bad*.

§ 23 *En-*

§ 23. *Envy* is a Pain or Grief on account of real Honours or Benefits another enjoys, or which we can't obtain, exiſting between thoſe who are alike in Temper or Nature; not that another has them, but that we have them not.

It is contrary to *Contempt*, with which any one is affected againſt thoſe, in whom he ſees not thoſe *Goods*, or *Advantages*, which either he has himſelf obtain'd, or endeavours to attain.

§ 24. Having thus gone through a ſuccinct Account of the Paſſions, we come to the *Third Part of Invention*, which conſiders the *Manners*. That *Diſcourſe* therefore, or *Speech*, in which the *Manners* are well mark'd, we call *Moral*; for it diſcovers the *Habits of the Mind*, and the *Will* or *Inclination*. In this are ſeen *Convenience* and *Probity*.

The *Manners* regard either the *Perſon himſelf* who ſpeaks, the *Audience* to whom he ſpeaks, or the *whole City* or *Nation* in which he delivers his Diſcourſe.

The *Manners*, which ought to be conſpicuous in the *Speaker*, are threefold; *Prudence*, *Probity*, and *Benevolence*.

The *Manners* of the *Nation* are known by the Form of the Government: *Liberty* is in a *Democracy*; the *Diſcipline of the Laws* in an *Ariſtocracy*; *pompous Wealth* in an *Oligarchy*; *Guards* and *Arms* in a *Monarchy*.

The *Manners* in regard of the Audience vary four ſeveral ways, according to their fourfold Diſtinction: 1*ſt*, When they differ in the Paſſions, as in *Anger*, *Lenity*, *Fear*, *Pity*, &c. 2*dly*, When they differ in the *Habits*, as in *Virtues*, or *Vices*. 3*dly*, In *Years* or *Age*, which is threefold, *Youth*, *Man's Eſtate*, *Old-age*. 4*thly*, In *Fortune*, by which they are either Noble or Ignoble, Powerful or without Power, Rich or Poor, Fortunate or Unhappy.

§ 25. Beſides theſe *Seats* or *Heads* of Arguments, which are peculiar to each *Kind* of Cauſe, we muſt have Recourſe to thoſe which are common to *All*; and thoſe, as we have before obſerv'd, are two, *Poſſible* and *Impoſſible*, *Great* and *Small*, or of *Importance* and of little *Conſequence*.

We muſt conſider the *Head* of *Poſſible* and *Impoſſible* three ſeveral ways, — for we muſt ſhew a Thing *done* or *not done*, that *can* be done, or *can not* be done; or that *will* be done, or *will not* be done.

Done or *not done* is the Subject of our Proof moſt in that kind where we *accuſe* or *defend*; but in *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion* our Buſineſs is chiefly to prove, whether it *can* or *can not*, or *will* or *will not* be done.

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The *Important* or *Great*, and *Small* and of *little Conſequence*, belongs chiefly to *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*.

§ 25. Having given the foregoing Rules for the *Invention of Arguments*, we naturally now proceed to deliver the Method of diſpoſing or marſhaling the whole in their proper Places and Order; for *Diſpoſition*, the ſecond Diviſion of this Art, is a proper placing, or ranging of the ſeveral Parts of the *Speech* or *Diſcourſe*. Theſe Parts are four in number, the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the Diſcourſe, the *Propoſition*, the *Proof*, and the *Concluſion*. Others make ſix Parts; as, the *Beginning*, *Narration*, *Propoſition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, and *Concluſion*: Of which, the firſt is to *ingratiate* with the *Hearers*, the laſt to *move them*, and the middle to *inform* them.

The Order of theſe are either *Natural* or *Artificial*. We call that *Natural*, when the Parts are diſpos'd in the Order we have laid down.

The *Artificial* is, when the Nature of the Cauſe requires us to depart from this *Natural Order*.

§ 26. In the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the Diſcourſe we ſet forth the Aim and Scope of what we have to ſay; and the Minds of the Hearers are prepar'd for the reſt that is to come.

The Method of all *Beginnings* is not the ſame, but vary according to the Quality of the *Cauſe*.

For that is either *honourable* or *diſhonourable*, *doubtful* or *mean*, or *plain* or *clear*, or *obſcure*.

In an *honourable Cauſe* the *Goodwill*, *Attention*, and *Docility* of the *Hearers* are prepar'd plainly, and without Diſguiſe or Inſinuation.

In a Cauſe that is *diſhonourable*, we muſt take care to inſinuate into the *Hearers* Minds, and ſubtily prepare them to give us a Hearing: And this *Beginning* they call *Inſinuation*. But this kind of Beginning is ſometimes made uſe of in an *honourable Cauſe*, and that when the *Hearers* are either *tir'd* with hearing, or *prepoſſeſs'd* by the Diſcourſe of him who ſpoke firſt.

In the *dubious* or *doubtful* we make uſe of a Beginning drawn from the Nature of the Cauſe it ſelf; that is, from that Face of it which is *honourable*.

In a *low* or *mean Cauſe* we muſt endeavour to raiſe *Attention*; and in an *obſcure Cauſe*, a *Willingneſs* or *Deſire* to be inform'd.

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The Method of *Beginnings* is not the ſame in the three ſorts of Subjects, on which we may ſpeak: For in *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe* it muſt be taken from the five *Heads* of Arguments proper to that; from the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*; from *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*; and from thoſe Things which relate to the *Hearers*.

In *Accuſation* and *Defence* there are four *Heads*, from which the Beginning is taken: For the Mind of the *Hearer* is prepar'd, as it were, by certain Medicines, taken either from the *Speaker* himſelf, or from the *Accuſed*; or from the *Hearer*; or from the *Accuſer*; or from the *Thing*.

They are taken from the *Accuſed*, or the *Adverſary*, by objecting, or diſproving a Crime; from the *Hearer*, by rendring him our *Friend*, or *angry*, *attentive* or *not attentive*, or *willing* to be inform'd: Laſtly, from the *Thing*, by declaring its *Nature*.

§ 27. The *Narration* is a Recital of the Things done, or that ſeem to be done, adapted to *Perſuaſion*.

This we make uſe of in *Accuſation* and *Defence*, when we do not agree with the *Adverſary* about the Manner of the *Fact*: But when we *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, there is ſeldom any Occaſion for this Part; nor is there any in *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*, but what has its place in the *Confirmation*.

The *Narration* ought to be *perſpicuous*, that it may be underſtood; *likely* or *probable*, that it may be believ'd; diſtinguiſh'd by the *Manners*, that it may be heard with the greater *Willingneſs*: But to be ſo, it ought to expreſs thoſe Things which relate to the Proof of our own *Virtue*, and the *Improbity* of the *Adverſary*.

Care muſt likewiſe be taken, that what is ſaid may be pleaſing to the Judges; and it ought, beſides all this, to move the *Paſſions*.

This Part does not always follow the Beginning, but is ſometimes defer'd to another place, and muſt always be ſhorter for the Defendant than Plaintiff. We ſometimes ſupport the *Narration*, by giving it on the Credit of others, which promotes Security. Sometimes we make uſe of *Aſſeverations*, which ſtill procures Belief much ſtronger; and ſometimes we make uſe of *both*.

§ 28. The *Narration* being over, we propoſe the *State* of the *Speech* or *Diſcourſe*; and divide the Cauſe into certain Parts, if it conſiſt of *many States*.

This Diviſion is made either by *Separation* or *Enumeration*.

In

In the *Separation* we lay open *in what we agree* with our Adverſary, and what is yet remaining in *Controverſie.*

In the *Enumeration* we ſum up the ſeveral Heads, and Kinds of Things, of which we are about to ſpeak.

The *Beauty* of the *Partition* or *Diviſion* is, that it be *full*, and *perfect*; *plain*, and *perſpicuous*; *ſhort*, and *certain*; containing not more than three, or at moſt more than four Parts.

§ 29. The *Confirmation*, and *Confutation*, are ſometimes plac'd under the *Head*, or *Title* of *The Contention.* The firſt confirms our own Cauſe by Arguments; the laſt deſtroys or confutes thoſe of the Adverſary. We muſt in the *Confirmation* have Regard to the Diſpoſition, as well of the Arguments, as Reaſoning or Argumentation.

The ſtrongeſt Arguments are to be plac'd in the Front, or Beginning; when the *Hearers*, being fir'd by the *Narration*, are deſirous to know what we have to offer for the Proof or Defence of our Cauſe. And we muſt take care to place a Part of the moſt forcible Arguments at the end, becauſe what we hear laſt makes the ſtrongeſt Impreſſion: But thoſe Arguments which carry the leaſt Weight, are to be rang'd in the middle, that thoſe which by their Weight may be inconſiderable, may by their number ſeem of importance.

Farther,—— If the Strength of our Cauſe depend on an Argument that is alien to it, we muſt introduce it in ſuch a manner, as may make it appear to be proper to the Cauſe; but we muſt ſhew, that what is offer'd by our Adverſaries is indeed foreign to it.

But we muſt take heed that we do not throng our Arguments, for when the Paſſions are mov'd, *Sentences* are more taken notice of than *Arguments.*

If the End and Aim of the *Argumentation*, or *Reaſoning*, be more to *move* than *inform*, it is call'd *Amplification*, or *Enlarging.* And ſince this is imploy'd partly in lengthning or drawing out the *Speech*, and partly in exaggerating the *Matter*, the later is the Chief or Principal in this Place: And this is done by *Argumentation*, *Compariſon*, *Reaſoning* on the Magnitude or Quantity of the *Thing*, or *Guilt*, &c.

The Confutation is not always made in the ſame manner; ſometimes we ſhew, that *Falſhoods* are taken for *Truth*; ſometimes allowing the Premiſes, we deny the Conſequence drawn from them; ſometimes againſt a firm and ſtrong Argumentation we oppoſe another, at leaſt of equal, or if we

can,

can, of a ſuperiour Force and Energy; ſometimes we debaſe a Thing, and laugh at the Arguments of the *Adverſary*.

But in *General*, we firſt attack the moſt firm and valid of the Adverſaries Arguments; that having deſtroy'd them, the reſt may fall of courſe.

§ 30. The *Concluſion* has two Parts; the *Enumeration*, or *Recapitulation*, and the *Paſſions*.

The *Enumeration* repeats the *principal* Arguments. But this is ſeldom made uſe of in *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*; more often in ſuch Speeches, or Diſcourſes which are directed to *Perſuade* or *Diſſuade*, but moſt commonly in *Accuſation* and *Defence*; and there the *Plaintiff* makes more uſe of it than the *Defendant*. We make the chief uſe of this when we are apprehenſive, that the *Hearers* may (by reaſon of the length of the Speech) not ſo well remember them, or their Force; and when the heaping together of Arguments may add Weight to the Diſcourſe.

The *Paſſions* ought to be *here* more *ſtrong* and *vehement*. There are two Virtues of a *Concluſion*, *Brevity* and *Vehemence*.

§ 31. Before we proceed to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, we ſhall here add ſome other *common Heads*, or *Places*, whence the Artiſts uſe to draw Arguments.

The firſt of theſe is the *General*, or *Kind*; that is to ſay, we muſt conſider in every Subject, what it has in common with all other Subjects of the ſame *Kind* or *Nature*. If we ſpeak of the War with *France*, we may conſider *War* in *general*, and draw our Arguments from that *Generality*.

The ſecond *Head*, or *Place*, is call'd *Difference*; by which we conſider whatever it is peculiar to the *Queſtion*, or *Cauſe*.

The third is *Definition*; that is to ſay, we muſt conſider the whole Nature of the Subject. The Diſcourſe, which expreſſes the Nature of a Thing, is the *Definition* of that Thing.

The fourth is the *Enumeration of the Parts*, contain'd in the Subject of which we ſpeak.

The fifth is the *Derivation* of the Name of the Subject.

The ſixth, *What are deriv'd from the ſame Head*, or *Service*, which are the Names that have Connection with the Name of our Subject; as the Word *Love* has Connection with theſe other Words — *to love*, *loving*, *Friendſhip*, *lovely*, *Friend*, &c.

We may likewiſe conſider the *Likeneſs*, or *Unlikeneſs* in the Things of which we treat; and theſe make the ſeventh and eighth *Places*, or *common Heads*.

We may likewiſe make *Compariſon*, and in our Compariſon introduce every thing to which our Subject is oppos'd; and this *Compariſon* and *Oppoſition*, are the ninth and tenth *Places*, or *Heads* of Arguments.

The eleventh is *Repugnance*, i. e. In diſcourſing upon a Subject, we muſt have an Eye upon thoſe Things that are repugnant to it, to diſcover the Proofs, with which that Proſpect may furniſh us.

'Tis of Importance to conſider all the *Circumſtances* of the Matter propos'd; but theſe Circumſtances have either *preceeded*, or *accompany'd*, or *follow'd* the Thing in Queſtion. So theſe *Circumſtances* make the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth *Places*. All the Circumſtances that can accompany an Action, are comprehended in theſe Words; *who? what? where? with what Help or Aſſiſtance, or Means? Why? how?* and *when?* That is to ſay, we muſt examin who *is the Author of the Action?* what *the Action is?* where *it was done?* *by* what *Means?* for *what End?* how? *and* when?

The fifteenth *Place* is the *Effect*; and the ſixteenth is the *Cauſe*: i. e. we muſt have regard to the *Effect*, of which the Thing in Diſpute may be the *Cauſe*; and to the Things of which it may be the *Effect*.

§ 32. We come now to what we call *Elocution*, or the *Language*, or *Diction* in which proper *Words* are adapted to the juſt Expreſſion of the Things which we have invented. It conſiſts of *Elegance*, *Compoſition* and *Dignity*: The firſt is the Foundation of this Structure; the ſecond joins, or ranges the Words in ſuch a manner, that the Speaker may riſe with Equality; the laſt adds the Ornaments of Tropes and Figures, to give Importance and Solemnity to what is ſaid.

Elegance comprehends the *Purity* of the *Language*, and the *Perſpicuity*: In the choice of Words we muſt have peculiar Regard to their *Purity*; that is, we muſt take Care that they be *genuine*, that is, free of our Tongue, not Foreign; that they be not Obſolete, or quite out of Uſe; for both theſe will not only affect the Perſpicuity of what you deliver, but diſcover either Ruſticity, or great Affectation, and often give a uncouth and rough Cadence to your Sentences, which a good Style refuſes; and Care muſt be taken to avoid vulgar and low Words, (the Language of the Mob.) This robbs what you ſay of that Dignity you ſhou'd aim at. Sir *Roger L'Eſtrange*, and ſome of our Divines too, have been guilty in Subjects of Importance and Majeſty. But as you muſt

muſt not affect too great Brevity on one ſide, ſo on the other, you muſt not aſpire to too great a Loftineſs; both being Enemies to that Perſpicuity, which muſt always be your particular Care.

Elegance is gain'd by reading the beſt, or moſt polite Authors, by keeping the beſt Company, and by Practice; Uſe in all things being the beſt Inſtructor.

Compoſition is the apt and proper Order of the Parts adhering to each other; and this teaches partly Things that are common to Speakers in *public*, *Hiſtorians*, and *Poets*, and partly thoſe Things which are peculiar to a *public Speaker*.

The firſt *Compoſition* regards as well the artificial joining of the *Letters*, by which the Style is render'd *ſoft* and *ſmooth*, *gentle*, and *flowing*; or *full* and *ſonorous*, or the contrary of all theſe; as the *Order*, which requires, that we place the Grave after the Humble or Low; and that we ſet that which is of greater Dignity, and firſt in Nature, before that which is leſs, and of more inferiour Conſideration.

Compoſition relates to the *Period*, but having treated at the End of GRAMMAR on that Head, and forgot to put it in its right Place in this Second Edition, we ſhall refer you to that.

Dignity produces a figurative manner of Speaking, both in the *Words*, and in *Sentences*; thoſe which affect *Words alone*, have been ſo long call'd *Tropes*, that the Word is known almoſt to the very *Fiſhwives*. Thoſe which affect Sentences have been as long, and generally known to be call'd *Figures*.

§ 33. We ſhall begin the *Tropes* with *Tranſmutation*, or the exchange of one Name for another; as if we ſay, Peterborow *conquer'd* Spain; *every one reads* Milton; London *is in an Uproar*. 'Tis plain we mean, that Peterborow's *Army conquer'd* Spain, or *he with the help of his Army*; *every one reads* Milton's *Works*; *the People of* London *are in an Uproar*. The Relation is ſo ſtrong betwixt a General and his Army, an Author and his Works, a Town and its Inhabitants, that the Thought of one excites the Idea of the other, and ſo changing of Names produces no Confuſion.

The next is *Comprehenſion*. This is ſomething related to the former; for by this we put the Name of a *Whole* for a *Part*; as if we ſhou'd ſay *England* for *London*, or *London* for *England*; as, *the Plague is in* England, *when only in* London. Thus by this *Trope* we have the Liberty of putting the Name of a *Part* for the *Whole*, and that of the *Whole* for a *Part*; and to this we may likewiſe refer the Uſe of a certain Num-

ber, for an uncertain Number; as *an Hundred Avenues to the Houſe convey*, when there may be more or leſs; *an Hundred years old*, when he may want ſome Months, or perhaps Years.

Exchange of Names is another *Trope*, and akin likewiſe to the firſt call'd *Tranſmutation*; for by this we apply a Name proper to one, to ſeveral, and common Names to particular Perſons; as when we call a Luxurious Prince a *Sardanapalus*, or a cruel one a *Nero*. On the contrary, when for *Cicero*, we ſay the *Orator*; or for *Ariſtotle*, the *Philoſopher*; for *Virgil*, the *Poet*; and the like.

Metaphor is ſo well known, a Word in our Tongue now, that we ſcarce have need to explain it by *Tranſlation*. It is a *Trope*, by which we put a ſtrange and remote Word for a proper Word, by reaſon of its reſemblance with the Thing of which we ſpeak. Thus we call the King the Head of his Kingdom; becauſe as the Head commands the Members of the Natural, ſo the King commands the Members of the Political Body. Thus we ſay, the Vallies ſmile, or laugh upon us; becauſe there is a ſimilitude between the agreeable Appearance of one and the other.

Allegory is the joining of ſeveral *Metaphors* together, and ſo extends to ſeveral Words; 'tis likewiſe call'd *Inverſion*. But great Care muſt then be taken in an *Allegory*, that it ends as it begins; that the *Metaphors* be continu'd, and the ſame things made Uſe of to the laſt, from whence we borrow our firſt Expreſſions. The famous Speech of our celebrated *Shakeſpear*, is extreamly faulty in this particular.

> *To be, or not to be, that is the Queſtion;*
> *Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to ſuffer*
> *The* Slings *and* Arrows *of Outragious Fortune,*
> *Or to take Arms againſt a Sea of Troubles,*
> *And by oppoſing, end them?*

Here the Poet begins the *Allegory* with *Slings* and *Arrows*, and ends it in a *Sea*, beſides the taking Arms againſt a Sea.

When theſe *Allegories* are obſcure, and the natural Senſe of the Words not obvious, they are call'd *Enigma*'s, or *Riddles*.

Diminution, or *Leſſening*, is the next *Trope*, and by this we ſpeak leſs than we think; as when we ſay, *you are not indeed to be commended*, it implies a ſecret Reproach, or Reprehenſion.

Hyperbole, or *Exceſs*, repreſents things greater or leſs than really they are; as, *This Horſe is ſwifter than the Wind*; *he goes ſlower than a Tortoiſe*.

By

By *Irony* we ſpeak contrary to our Thoughts, but 'tis diſcover'd by the Tone of our Voice; as when we ſay, Robert *is a very honeſt Man*, when we mean a *Rogue*.

By the *Trope*, call'd *Abuſe*, we may borrow the Name of a Thing, tho' quite contrary to what we wou'd ſignify, becauſe we can't elſe expreſs it; as when we ſay, an *Iron Candleſtick*, or a *Silver Inkhorn*.

Theſe are the moſt conſiderable *Tropes*, and to one or other of theſe, all others may be reduc'd. But before we diſmiſs this Point, we muſt give a few Rules to be obſerv'd in the Uſe of them. Firſt, therefore, we muſt uſe *Tropes* only where we cannot expreſs our ſelves perfectly without them; and, ſecondly, when we are oblig'd to uſe them, they muſt have two Qualities. (1*ſt*,) They muſt be clear, and contribute to the Underſtanding of what we intend; (2*dly*,) That they hold a Proportion to the Idea we wou'd paint to our *Readers*, or *Hearers*.

A *Trope* loſes its Perſpicuity three Ways: (1.) When 'tis too *remote*, not helping the Hearer to the Intention of the Speaker; as to call a *lewd Houſe* the *Syrtes of Youth*; the *Rock of Youth*, is nearer and more obvious; the former requiring our Knowledge and Remembrance, that the *Syrtes* were dangerous Banks of Sand on the Coaſt of *Africa*. A *Metaphor* is, therefore, beſt taken from ſuch ſenſible Objects as are moſt familiar to the Eye, which Images are apprehended without Enquiry or Trouble. The ill Connexion of theſe is the *ſecond* Thing that brings Obſcurity on the *Metaphor*, by uſing Words which are not commonly known, but relate to Places, perhaps at the fartheſt Parts of the Globe, from Terms of Art, Antiquities, or the like, which ought to be avoided. This *Connexion* is either *Natural* or *Artificial*. That we call *Natural*, when Things ſignify'd by their Proper and Metaphorical Names, have Natural Reſemblance to, or Dependance on each other; as when we ſay, *a Man has Arms of Braſs*, to ſignify their Strength, this Reſemblance between the *Trope* and proper Name, we may call *Natural*. The *Artificial* comes from *Cuſtom*; a wild untractable Temper has by *Cuſtom* been given to the *Arab*, which makes the Name *Arab* awake the Idea of an untractable Man.

The *third* Thing which renders *Tropes* obſcure, is a too frequent Uſe of them. Laſtly, *Tropes* muſt always be proportion'd to the Ideas they wou'd give.

§ 34. Having ſaid all that we thought neceſſary about the *Tropes*, their Nature, Virtues, Vices and Uſe, we now come to the Language of the *Paſſions*; which is of peculiar Uſe both in *Oratory* and *Poetry*, both which make Uſe of them in a particular manner.

We ſhall begin with the *Exclamation*, becauſe by that our Paſſions firſt flie out, and diſcover themſelves in Diſcourſe. *Exclamation*, therefore, is a violent extenſion of the Voice; as, *O Heavens! O Earth! good God! alas!* and the like.

Doubting is the next, or *Irreſolution*, is the Effect of Paſſion, as *what ſhall I do? ſhall I apply to thoſe I once neglected?* or, *ſhall I implore thoſe who now forſake me?* &c.

Correction is a Figure by which one in Paſſion, fearing he has not expreſs'd himſelf full enough, endeavours by a ſtronger Phraſe to correct that Error; as, *Nor was thy Mother a Goddeſs, nor perfidious Man was* Dardanus *the Author of thy Race, but rugged Rocky* Caucaſus *brought thee forth, and the* Hyrcanian *Tygreſs nurſt thee up.*

Omiſſion, in a violent Paſſion, permits us not to ſay all that we wou'd. When our Paſſions are interrupted, or directed another Way, the Tongue following them, produces Words that have no Reference to what we were ſaying before; as, *of all Men* —— meaning, *the worſt of all Men.*

Suppreſſion, is a ſudden ſuppreſſion of the Paſſion, or rather the Threats of a Paſſion; as—*which I*—— *but now we muſt think of the preſent Matter.*

Conceſſion ſeems to omit what we ſay; as, *I will not ſpeak of the Injury you have done me*; *I am willing to forget the Wrong you have done me*; *I will not ſee the Contrivances that you make againſt me*, &c.

Repetition is made two Ways: (1.) When we repeat the ſame Words, or (2.) the ſame Thing in different Words The former, as —— *You deſign Nothing, Nothing that is not viſible to me, what I do not ſee*, &c. The ſecond, as—— *of our ſelves we can do nothing Well, whatever Good we do, is by the Divine Grace.*

Redundance makes us uſe more Words than are abſolutely neceſſary, and is emphatical, *I heard thee with theſe Ears, I ſaw thee with theſe Eyes.*

Like Meanings, are Words of the ſame Senſe, and put together to expreſs one Thing; as, *he departed, he went out, he's gone.*

Deſcription figures the Thing in ſuch lively Colours, as to make its Image appear before us.

Di-

Diſtribution is a kind of *Deſcription*, in which we enumerate the Parts of the Object of our Paſſion; as——*their Throat is an open Sepulchre, they flatter with their Tongues, the poiſon of* Aſps *is under their Lips; their Mouth is full of Curſing and Lyes, and their Feet are ſwift to ſhed Blood.*

Oppoſites place Contraries againſt one-another; as, *Flattery begets Friends, Truth Enemies.*

Similies bring a Likeneſs to the Thing we are ſpeaking of—as, *he ſhall be* like *a Tree plac'd by the Water-ſide*, &c.

Compariſon. The difference is not great between this and the former Figure, only this later is more ſprightly and emphatic——as, *the fineſt Gold to them looks wan and pale*, &c. But two Things are to be conſider'd in *Compariſons*; firſt, that we are not to expect an exact proportion betwixt all the Parts of the Compariſon, and the Subject of which we ſpeak; as when *Virgil* compares the young *Ligurian* to a Pigeon in the Claws of an Hawk; adding what relates more to the Deſcription of a Pigeon torn to pieces by a Hawk, than to the Subject compar'd. The ſecond Thing to be obſerv'd, is, That it is not neceſſary that the Thing compar'd to, be more elevated than the Thing compar'd; as the quoted Inſtance from *Virgil* ſhews.

Suſpenſion keeps the Hearer in ſuſpenſe, and attentive, by Expectation of what the Speaker will conclude in; as, *O God! Darkneſs is not more oppoſite to Light, Froſt to Fire, Rage and Hatred to Love, Tempeſts to Calms, Pain to Pleaſure, or Death to Life, than Sin to thee.*

Repreſentation gives a Tongue to Things inanimate, and makes them ſpeak in Paſſion; as, *Hear, thou ſtupid Creature, hear the very Walls of this ſacred Pile complaining of thy Wickedneſs: Have we*, ſay they, *ſo many hundred Years been conſecrated to the ſacred Rites of the Immortal Gods, and now at laſt to be polluted with thy Impieties? Have the moſt Valiant, and the moſt Wiſe, enter'd here with Awe and Veneration, and ſhall one ſo Worthleſs dare to contemn the Sanctity of this Place?* &c.

Sentences are but Reflections made upon a Thing that ſurprizes, and deſerves to be conſider'd; as, *Love cannot long be conceal'd where it is, nor diſſembled where it is not.*

Applauſe is a Sentence or Exclamation, containing ſome Sentence plac'd at the end of a Diſcourſe; as, *Can Minds Divine ſuch Anger entertain!*

Interrogation is frequently produc'd by our Paſſions to them we would perſuade, and is uſeful to fix the Attention of the Hearers; as, *Let me ask you, the Men of* Athens, *is*

it

it worthy the Glory of your City, or is it fit that Athens, *once the Head of* Greece, *ſhould ſubmit to* Barbarians, *take Meaſures from a foreign Lord?* &c.

Adreſs is when in an extraordinary Commotion a Man turns himſelf to all ſides, and adreſſes Heaven, Earth, the Rocks, Fields, Things ſenſible and inſenſible; as, *Ye Mountains of* Gilboa, *let there be no Dew,* &c.

Prevention is a Figure, by which we prevent what might be objected by the Adverſary; as, *But ſome will ſay, How are the Dead rais'd up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou ſoweſt is not quickned, unleſs it die,* &c.

Communication is when we deſire the Judgment of our Hearers; as, *What would you, Gentlemen, do in the Caſe? Would you take other Meaſures than,* &c.

Confeſſion is the owning of our Fault, ariſing from a Confidence of Forgiveneſs of the Perſon to whom it is acknowledg'd; as, *I confeſs my ſelf to have err'd, but I am a Man, and what is humane, is what we are all ſubject to; let him that is free from humane Error caſt the firſt Stone.*

Conſent makes us grant a Thing freely that might be deny'd, to obtain another Thing that we deſire; as, *I allow the* Greeks *Learning; I grant them the Diſcipline of many Arts, the Brightneſs of Wit, the Copiouſneſs of Diſcourſe; I will not deny them any thing elſe they can juſtly claim: But that Nation were never eminent for the Religion of an Oath in their Teſtimonies, or for Truth and Faith,* &c. And here it has always a Sting in the Tail; but on the contrary it has ſometimes a healing Cloſe; as, *Let him be Sacrilegious, let him be a Robber, let him be the Chief of all Wickedneſs and Vice, yet ſtill he is a good General.*

By this Figure we ſometimes invite our Enemy to do all the Miſchief he can, in order to give him a Senſe and Horrour of his Cruelty. 'Tis alſo common in Complaints between Friends; as, when *Ariſtæus*, in *Virgil*, complains to his Mother:

Proceed, inhumane Parent, in thy Scorn;
Root up my Trees, with Blites deſtroy my Corn,
My Vineyards ruin, and my Sheepfolds burn,
Let looſe thy Rage, let all thy Spight be ſhown,
Since thus thy Hate purſues the Praiſes of thy Son.

Dryd. Virg.

Circumlocution is us'd, to avoid ſome Words whoſe Ideas are unpleaſant, or to avoid ſaying ſome things which may have an ill Effect; as, when *Cicero* is forc'd to confeſs that *Clodius* was ſlain by *Milo*, he did it with this Adreſs: "The "Servants of *Milo* (ſays he) being hinder'd from aſſiſting "their Maſter, whom *Clodius* was reported to have kill'd, "and believing it true, they did in his abſence, without his "Knowledge or Conſent, what every body would have "expected from his Servants on the like Occaſion. In which he avoids mentioning the Words *kill*, or *put to Death*, as Words ingrateful or odious to the Ear.

Thus much we have thought fit to ſay of the Figurative Expreſſions of the *Paſſions*; but they are indeed almoſt infinite, each being to be expreſs'd a hundred ways. We ſhall conclude this Diſcourſe of the *Art of Perſuaſion* with a few Reflections on *Style*, and fewer Remarks on other Compoſitions, in which the Learner ought to be exercis'd.

§ 35. What we mean by *Style*, is the Manner of expreſſing our ſelves, or of cloathing our Thoughts in Words: The Rules already given, as to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, regard (as we may ſay) only the Members of Diſcourſe, but *Style* relates to the entire Body of the *Compoſition*.

The *Matter* ought to direct us in the Choice of the *Style*. Noble Expreſſions render the *Style* lofty, and repreſent Things great, and noble; but if the Subject be *low* and *mean*, ſonorous Words and pompous Expreſſion is Bombaſt, and diſcovers Want of Judgment in the Writer. *Figures* and *Tropes* paint the Motions of the Heart, but to make them juſt, and truly ornamental, the Paſſion ought to be reaſonable. There's nothing more ridiculous than to be tranſported without Cauſe, to put one's ſelf in a Heat for what ought to be argued cooly: Whence 'tis plain, that the *Matter* regulates the *Style*. When the *Subject*, or *Matter*, is great, the *Style* ought to be ſpritely, full of Motion, and enrich'd with *Figures*, and *Tropes*; if our *Subject* contain nothing extraordinary, and we can conſider it without Emotion, the *Style* muſt be plain.

The *Subjects* of Diſcourſe being extreamly various in the Nature, it follows, that there muſt be as great a Variety in the *Style*: But the Maſters of this Art have reduc'd them all to *three* Kinds, which they call the *Sublime*, the *Mean*, or the *Indifferent*.

§ 36 Let

§ 36. Let the Subject of which we deſign a lofty *Idea* be never ſo noble, its Nobleneſs will never be ſeen, unleſs we have Skill enough to preſent the beſt of its Faces to the View. The beſt of Things have their Imperfections, the leaſt of which diſcover'd, may leſſen our Eſteem, if not extinguiſh it quite: We muſt therefore take care not to ſay any thing in one place, which may contradict what we have ſaid in another: We ought to pick out all that is moſt great and noble in our Subject, and put that in its beſt light, and then our Expreſſion muſt be noble and ſublime, capable of raiſing lofty Ideas: And 'tis our Duty to obſerve a certain Uniformity in our *Style*; tho' all we ſay have not an equal Magnificence, ſo far at leaſt as to make all the Parts of a piece, and bear a Correſpondence with the whole.

The Danger here is, leſt you fall into a puffy Style, which ſome call *Inflation*, or ſwell'd; for if you ſtretch Things beyond their Nature, and hunt only after great and ſounding Words, you ſeldom mind their Agreeableneſs to the Nature of the Subject. And this has been the Fault of many of our modern Tragic Writers, who yet with the Vulgar have gain'd Applauſe, and ſetled a Reputation.

§ 37. We come next to the *plain* Style; and this ſimple and plain Character of Writing is not without its Difficulties, not in the Choice of *Subjects*, thoſe being always ordinary and common, but becauſe there is wanting in this Style that Pomp and Magnificence which often hide the Faults of the Writer, at leaſt from the general Reader or Hearer. But on common and ordinary Subjects there is little room for *Figures* and *Tropes*, ſo we muſt make choice of Words that are proper and obvious.

When we call this *Style* ſimple and plain, we intend not *Meanneſs of Expreſſion*; that is never good, and ſhould always be avoided: For tho' the *Matter* or *Subject* of this Style have nothing of Elevation, yet ought not the Language to be vile and contemptible; Mob Expreſſions, and Vulgariſms, are to be avoided, and yet all muſt be clean and natural.

§ 38. The *mean* or *middle* Style conſiſts of a participation of the *ſublime* on one ſide, and of *ſimplicity* of the *Plain*, on the other. *Virgil* furniſhes us with Examples of all the three; of the *Sublime* in his *Æneids*, the *Plain* in his *Paſtorals*, and the *Mean* (or Middle) in his *Georgics*.

§ 39 Tho'

§ 39. Tho' the *Style* of an Orator, or one that ſpeaks in Public, of an Hiſtorian and Poet, are different, yet there are ſome Differences in Styles of the ſame Character; for ſome are ſoft and eaſie, others more ſtrong; ſome gay, others more ſevere. Let us reflect on the Differences, and how they are diſtinguiſh'd.

The firſt Quality is *Eaſineſs*, and that is when Things are deliver'd with that Clearneſs and Perſpicuity that the Mind without any Trouble conceives them. To give this *Eaſineſs* to a *Style*, we muſt leave nothing to the Hearer's or Reader's deciſion; we muſt deliver things in their neceſſary extent, with Clearneſs, that they may be eaſily comprehended; and here Care muſt be taken of the Fluency, and to avoid all Roughneſs of Cadence.

The ſecond Quality is *Strength*, and it is directly oppoſite to the firſt; it ſtrikes the Mind boldly, and forces Attention. To render a Style ſtrong, we muſt uſe ſhort and nervous Expreſſions, of great and comprehenſive Meaning, and ſuch as excite many Ideas.

The third Quality renders a Style pleaſant and florid, and depends in part on the firſt; for the third is not pleas'd with too ſtrong an Intention. *Tropes* and *Figures* are the Flowers of Style; the firſt give a ſenſible Conception to the moſt abſtruſe Thoughts; *Figures* awaken our Attention, and warm and animate the Hearer or Reader, by giving them Pleaſure. Motion is the Principle of Life and Pleaſure, but Coldneſs mortifies every thing.

The laſt Quality is *Severe*: It retrenches every thing that is not abſolutely neceſſary; it allows nothing to Pleaſure, admitting no Ornaments or Decorations. In ſhort, we are to endeavour that our Style have ſuch Qualities, as are proper to the Subject of which we diſcourſe.

§ 40. Having ſaid thus much of *Styles*, we ſhall only add a Word or two about other Exerciſes, in which the Learner ſhould be train'd up: The firſt and moſt general is the writing of *Letters*. Here an eaſie and genteel way of conveying our Mind in the ſhorteſt and moſt expreſſive Terms, is the greateſt Excellence. *Buſineſs* requires no Ornaments, and a plain and ſuccinct Information is all that is requir'd. Letters of *Complement* muſt have Gaiety, but no Affectation. *Eaſineſs* muſt ſhine thro' all, and a clean Expreſſion; here is no room for the Luxuriance of Fancy, or the Embelliſhments of longer Diſcourſes. The ſame may be ſaid of *Condoleance*, and even of *Perſuaſion*. The moſt poignant

poignant and coercive Reaſons muſt be us'd, and thoſe that by want of Native Force require the Help of Art to recommend them, laid aſide.

ESSAYS have, in theſe later Ages, mightily prevail'd; and here, as in *Letters*, all muſt be eaſie, free, and natural, and written juſt as you think, ſometimes leaving the Subject, and then returning again, as the Thoughts ariſe in the Mind. At leaſt this has hitherto been the Practiſe; and *Montaigne*, who has got no ſmall Reputation by this Way of Writing, ſeldom keeps many Lines to the Subject he propoſes: Tho' it is our Opinion, that my Lord *Bacon* is a much better Pattern; for indeed they ſeem to us to be ſudden Reflections on ſome one particular Subject, not very unlike the common Themes given to Scholars in the Schools, with this difference, that the Author of theſe is ſuppos'd to have gain'd much from Obſervation and Reflection on thoſe Heads, and that therefore his Diſcoveries may be of Value; whereas the propoſing ſuch particular Moral Subjects to Boys, is requiring Impertinencies from them, who have no Fund of Obſervation to furniſh out the Entertainment.

As for the Subjects of Poetical Exerciſes, we have given ſufficient Rules for them, in our *Art of Poetry*.

The End of the Art *of* Perſuaſion.

Logic;

LOGIC;

OR,

The ART *of* REASONING.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Of *Particular* IDEAS.

LOGIC *is the Art of* Reaſoning. The Art is divided into four Parts; the firſt treats of *Ideas*; the ſecond of *Judgments*; the third of *Method*; and the fourth of *Reaſoning*, or *Argumentation*.

An *Idea*, in General, we define—*The immediate Object of the Mind; or that Thought or Image of any Thing which is immediately ſet before the Mind.*

All *Ideas* become the Objects of our Mind, or are preſented to the Judgment by the Perception of the Senſes, which we call *Senſation*; or by the Meditation of the Mind, which we call *Reflection*.

1. *Ideas* are either *Simple* or *Compound*: We call thoſe *Simple*, in which the moſt ſubtile Penetration of the Mind it ſelf cannot diſcover any Parts, or Plurality; and we call thoſe *Compounded* which are made up, or compos'd of *two* or *more* of thoſe which are *Simple*. Examples of both we ſhall ſee hereafter.

2. There are *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, we know not what obſcure Subject, in which there are the Properties of Things which we know; and *Ideas* of *Modes* or *Manners*, which are the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of *Subſtances*, which we cannot conceive capable of ſubſiſting alone without their *Subſtances*.

3. There are certain *Relations* between *Subſtances* and *Subſtances*; *Modes* and *Modes*; and *Modes* and *Subſtances*; the Conſideration of one including the Conſideration of the other, from whence theſe *Relations* derive that Name.

4. There are *Ideas* which are to be conſider'd as the Images of ſomething Exiſtent, and which convey themſelves

to, and fix themſelves in the Mind, without any Operation of its own. But there are others, which by the *Mind* are join'd to new *Ideas* at Pleaſure, and ſeparated from them by Abſtraction.

5. Farther, there are *Ideas* of a larger, or leſs extent; or join'd to more or fewer *Ideas*, whence we call them *Singular*, *Particular*, or *Univerſal*.

6. There are ſome *Ideas* that are *clear* and *plain*, and others that are *obſcure*. All *clear Ideas* are *ſimple*, as are thoſe of the *compounded*, all whoſe Parts are diſtinctly plac'd before, or repreſented to, the Mind.

7. There are ſome *Ideas* that are *perfect*, or *adequate*; and others that are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*. Thoſe we call *perfect*, or *adequate*, which contain all the Parts of the Things whoſe Images they are, and offer them ſo to the *Mind*; thoſe are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*, which only contain and offer ſome Parts of the Things of which they are the Images. We call *Ideas* Images of the Things, becauſe there are ſome Things without us, which are like, and anſwers to them.

To theſe *particular Heads* of *Ideas* all others may be refer'd. Theſe therefore we ſhall particularly examine.

CHAP. II.
Of ſimple Compound IDEAS.

1. VEry many of the *ſimple Ideas* we have from, or by our *Senſes*, and very many from the Attention of the Mind turn'd inwards on it ſelf, without regard to *Senſation*.

2. To the *firſt* we muſt refer all our *Senſations*; the chief of which may be reduc'd to *five* Claſſes, Forms, or Heads, according to the *five* Parts of the Body, which are affected by them. For they come to us by the Means of our *Eyes*, our *Ears*, our *Noſe*, our *Tongue* or *Palate*, and by the *Touch*, or *Feeling* of all the other Parts of the Body. *Colours* are *ſimple Ideas* (we mean Colours themſelves, and diſtinct from colour'd Bodies which have Parts) as *Blue* for Example, of which the Mind can diſcover no Manner of Parts.

3. The *Ideas* of Sounds are likewiſe *ſimple*, as well as thoſe of *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Touch*. We ſpeak here of *One ſimple particular* Senſation conſider'd diſtinctly from the Variety of *Sounds*, *Smells*, *Taſtes*, and *Touches*. Thus——if any one ſmell to a Roſe without mixing any other Scent he will have a *Senſation*, in which he can diſtinguiſh no Parts; and this holds of the other *Senſations*.

4. *Pain*

4. *Pain* and *Pleaſure* are the chief, and moſt eminent *Senſations* we have, whoſe Kinds and Sorts vary according to the *Part* or *Member* affected; but there are no Parts to be diſtinguiſh'd in *Pain* and *Pleaſure*, which we can conceive to be ſeparated from each other. We ſpeak not of the *Duration* of *Pain* or *Pleaſure*, which evidently has Parts; but of the *ſimple* Senſation *of a prick with a Needle*, for Example, none can conceive any Parts of it, the concourſe of which ſhou'd produce *Pain*.

5. In the *Idea* of *Motion*, which comes to us by our *Senſes*, when conſider'd in *general*, we can conceive no Parts, tho' we may of its *Duration*, of the Line it deſcribes, and its Quickneſs or Slowneſs.

6. Thus in many *ſimple Ideas*, which ariſe from *Reflection*, we ſhou'd in vain ſeek for Parts, as in *Volition*, or *Willing*, &c. The ſame may be ſaid of *Exiſtence* conſider'd in *general*; tho' there are viſible Parts in the *Duration*.

7. *Compound Ideas*, we have ſaid, contain or comprehend ſeveral *ſimple Ideas*, which may be diſtinguiſh'd and ſeparately conſider'd. Thus the *Ideas* of all Bodies are *compound*; becauſe in them we can conſider ſome Parts without the others, or diſtinctly from the others. If we conſider a Body, we clearly and plainly diſtinguiſh the *higher* and *lower*, the *fore* and *hind*, the *left* and *right* Parts of it; and can diſtinctly think of one without the others. If we conſider the *Idea* of *Pity*, we find that it conſiſts of the *Ideas* of *Miſery*, of a miſerable Perſon, and of one who grieves for him. Such are the *Ideas* of all *Virtues* and *Vices*, tho' they come to us by *Reflection* of the Mind.

8. Tho' we ſhall not, in this Part of *Logic*, or *the Art of Reaſoning*, treat of thoſe *Judgments* we paſs upon *Ideas*, yet it is of importance to remember never to pretend to define what cannot be defin'd without making it more obſcure; for a Definition ought always to be made uſe of to make the Subject of our Diſcourſe more plain and clear, than the bare Name of the Thing wou'd make it; but in *ſimple Ideas*, we cannot better explain them, than by their very Name, or ſome Synonymous Words, the Knowledge of which depends on the Tongue we uſe, and the Senſe of him we ſpeak to. The contrary Method has made the *Ariſtotelians* fill us with unintelligible Jargon; as defining of *Motion*, they ſay, *'tis an Act of a Being in Power, as in Power*; nor have the *Moderns* much mended the Matter, by defining it the *change of Situation*. The firſt labours with inexplicable Obſcurity,

and the Terms of the later are not more clear or known, than the Word *Motion* it ſelf.

9. *Definition*, indeed, has only to do with *compound Ideas*, for its an Enumeration, or reckoning up of the ſeveral *ſimple Ideas*, of which that conſiſts.

CHAP. III.

Of IDEAS *of* Subſtances *and* Modes.

1. ANother ſort of *Ideas* are thoſe of *Subſtances* and *Modes*, for we conſider all Things ſeparately, and by themſelves, or elſe as exiſting in other Things ſo much, that we can't allow them Exiſtence without 'em. The firſt we call *Subſtances* and *Subjects*, the later *Modes* and *Accidents*; as when we reflect on *Wax* and *ſome Figure*, as Roundneſs, we conſider the *Wax* as a Thing which may ſubſiſt without that Roundneſs, or any other particular Figure; we therefore call *Wax* a *Subſtance*. On the contrary, we conſider *Roundneſs* ſo inherent to the *Wax* or ſome other Subſtance, that it can't ſubſiſt without it, for we are not capable of conceiving *Roundneſs* diſtinctly and ſeparately from a round Body. This therefore we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*.

2. We always conſider Bodies cloath'd, as I may ſay, in ſome certain *Modes*, except when we reflect on the Abſtract, or General. The *Subſtances* the *Grammarians* expreſs by the *Name*; the *Modes* may be render'd by the *Qualities*; as *Wax* and *Roundneſs* is expreſs'd by *round Wax*.

3. We have beſides, certain compound *Ideas*, which conſiſt only of *Modes*; and others which are compounded, or made up only with a ſort of Species, or kind of *Modes*. As a *Furlong*, as far as it expreſſes a Menſuration of the Road; for it comprehends uniform *Modes*, as *Paces* or *Feet*: Others conſiſt of ſeveral ſorts of *Modes*; as the *Idea* of *Pity*, which has been already defin'd, and of the other Paſſions, and Virtues and Vices.

4. We have, farther, *Ideas* compounded of a Collection of Subſtances of a like Nature, ſuch is the *Idea* of an *Army*, of a *City*, of a *Flock*; conſiſting of many *Soldiers*, *Citizens*, or *Sheep*, &c. or they are compos'd of a Collection of *Ideas* of unlike Subſtances; ſuch is the *Idea* of the Matter of which a *Houſe*, a *Ship*, or a *Deſert* is compounded. And in theſe *Ideas* we conſider not only Subſtances, as they are ſuch, but alſo as attended with certain *Modes*, which produce *Ideas* that are very much compounded.

5. We

5. We define Subſtances in *general*, *Things ſubſiſting by themſelves*, but then they are conſider'd abſtractly, or without regard to any particular Subſtance actually exiſting; and in that Senſe it is ſufficiently plain what is meant by the Word *Subſtance*; but ſince there is no Subſtance conſider'd in general which has any Exiſtence, but in our *Ideas*, where we conſider exiſting *Subſtances*, the Matter is alter'd. The *Ideas* of ſingle or particular Subſtances, are very obſcure; nor do we underſtand any thing by their ſeveral Names, but certain we know not what unknown Subjects, in which there are certain Properties which conſtantly coexiſt. Thus if any one ſhou'd ask what that Subſtance is which we call Body, we can only ſay, that it is an unknown Subject, in which we always diſcover *Extenſion*, *Diviſibility*, and *Impenetrability*.

6. 'Tis plain, that nothing more obſcure can be meant, than what is expreſs'd by theſe Terms, *extended Subſtances*. For all that is here meant, is, that there is an *unknown Subject*, one of whoſe Properties is to conſiſt of other unknown Subjects, or Subſtances plac'd cloſe to each other, and of that Nature, that we have no *Idea* of any one of thoſe Subſtances of which we ſay a Body conſiſts. For we cannot affirm of any *Idea*, that it is the *Idea* of any one Subſtance, of which a Body is compos'd, ſince we have no *Idea* of corporeal Subſtance, which do's not comprehend or contain innumerable Subſtances. If therefore we expreſs what we underſtand by the Name of *corporeal Subſtance*, we muſt ſay, that *it is a Compoſition of unknown Beings, ſome of whoſe Properties we know*.

7. The ſame we may ſay of other Subſtances, as of the *Spiritual* (we examine not here whether or not there be any more) as whoever will conſider with Attention, and not ſuffer himſelf to be amus'd and deceiv'd by empty Words, will experience. We find in our Mind various Thoughts, whence we form the *Idea* of Spirits; but we are ignorant of what that Subject, is in which theſe Thoughts are.

8. It will be of great Uſe to as perfect a Knowledge of Things as we are capable of obtaining, to diſtinguiſh in thoſe Subjects which we call Subſtances, thoſe Things, without which we can conceive thoſe Subjects or Modes from thoſe without which we cannot conceive them. For when we think with Attention on thoſe Subjects, we ſhall find that there are ſome Things ſo eſſential to them, that we can't deprive them of, without changing their Nature; and *other* Things which may be taken away from the Subject, and deſtroy its Nature.

9. *Modes* are commonly divided into *internal*, which we conceive, as it were, inherent in the Subſtance; as, *Roundneſs*, &c. Or *external*, as when we ſay any Thing is *deſir'd*, *lov'd*, *beheld*, and the like; which we call *Relations*.

10. There are likewiſe *Modes*, which are alſo *Subſtances*; as, *Apparel*, *Hair*, &c. without which the *Subject* can ſubſiſt, and they can likewiſe be without the *Subject*. As for theſe *Ideas*, which are compos'd of *Modes* and *Subſtances* variouſly join'd together, ſome are call'd *real*, as being the *Ideas* of Things that either realy *do*, or are at leaſt believ'd to exiſt; others *rational*, that is, when the Mind compounds various *Ideas* together; as when we conſider a Stick reaching up to the Stars themſelves.

11. In compound *Ideas* we ought carefully to obſerve how manifold, and of how many *Ideas* they conſiſt; as we ſhall more plainly ſee under the Head of the *Obſcurity* and *Perſpicuity* of *Ideas*.

CHAP. IV.

Of RELATIONS.

1. THere are, beſides *Subſtances*, and *Modes* which are inherent in *Subſtances*, certain external Denominations, which tho' they add nothing to the Subſtance, yet depend on ſome Mode or Manner of it; and theſe we call *Relations*, by which the Conſideration of one Thing includes the Conſideration of another. Thus when we call any one a *Father*, on this Expreſſion depends this, that he whom we call ſo has begot Children, and ſo comprehends and includes the Conſideration of Children.

2. Every *Idea*, conſider'd in a certain manner, may be the Foundation of a *Relation*, that is, may lead us by ſome Property of its own to the Conſideration of ſome other *Idea*. So that all Exiſtence may be divided into the *Creator* and the *Creature*; for the Name of the *Creator* includes the Thought of the *Creature*; and ſo on the contrary.

3. *Relations* are innumerable; for they may be between Subſtances and Subſtances, Modes and Modes, Modes and Subſtances, Relations and Subſtances, Relations and Modes, Relations and Relations; for there is nothing that cannot excite our Thoughts on ſomething elſe, ſince we can compound or join our *Ideas* together as we think fit. But avoiding too nice a Scrutiny, we ſhall only make our Obſervations

ons on thoſe of the greateſt moment, which regard *Relations* conſider'd in *general*.

4. We very often conſider *Ideas* as *abſolute*, or including no *Relations*, which yet have neceſſarily a Reference to Others. Thus we cannot call any thing *Great* or *Large*, but that the *Idea* which anſwers that Word, muſt be *relative*. For we call thoſe Things *great*, in a certain Kind, which are the *greateſt* among thoſe Things of the ſame Nature, which we have known. We call that *Hill* or *Mountain great*, which is as *great* as any *Hill* that we have ever ſeen. That Kingdom is *large*, which exceeds the Bounds of our own Country, or of thoſe Countries we have known, &c. That Tower we call *high*, which is higher than moſt of the ſame kind that we have known. In Number we call that *great*, than which there is not many greater in the ſame Kind: Thus ſixty Thouſand Men in Arms in *Greece* was call'd a *great* Army, becauſe *Greece* ſcarce ever had a greater; but it had been little in *Perſia*, where much larger were aſſembled. Thus likewiſe as to *Time*, we call it long or ſhort with Reference to another. We call a hundred Years Life, a long Life; *Jacob* call his (a 130) ſhort, becauſe his Anceſtors liv'd ſo many longer. Sickneſs, Pain, and Expectation, make that *Time* ſeem long, which to one in Action, Health, or Pleaſure, ſeems ſhort. That Burthen is heavy to a Child, a weak Woman, an old Man, the Sickly, which is light to a Man in Health and Vigour. Thus in the Ornaments of the Mind, we call that Wit great, that Learning profound, that Memory tenacious, that Prudence conſummate, which we find excel, after the Manners of our Country, all that we know among us; tho' by Foreigners they may be thought but of a moderate ſize. Thus *Great Learning* has a very different Signification in the Mouth of a Man of Letters, and of an ignorant Perſon; it is of a much larger extent in the former, than in the later.

5. In ſhort, all the Modes both of Mind and Body that admit of Encreaſe or Diminution, are the Prototypes of Relative *Ideas*. But this is to be obſerv'd with the utmoſt Attention, becauſe their Number is very large, which if confounded with *abſolute Ideas*, will give riſe to great Errors, and render us incapable of underſtanding the Diſcourſe of Others.

6. Here we muſt, in ſhort, remark, that the Judgments that we make are only the Perceptions of the *Relations* between various *Ideas*; in which *Relations* our Mind do's acquieſce,

quieſce. Thus when we judge that two times two make four, or that two times two do not make five: our Mind obſerves the *Relation* of Equality which is between two times two and four, and the Inequality which is between two times two and five; in which Perception, as evident, the Mind does acquieſce or is beſt ſatisfy'd, or gives it ſelf no farther Trouble to conſider of its Truth. But of this more at large in the ſecond Part.

7. *Reaſoning* alſo is a like Perception of the *Relations* join'd with that Acquieſcence of the Mind. But it is not a Perception of the Relations which are among various Things, but of thoſe Relations which the Relations themſelves have among themſelves. Thus when we gather from this, that 4 is a ſmaller Number then 6, and that twice 2 equals 4, that twice 2 is a leſs Number than 6; we perceive the Relation of Inequality, which is between the Relation of the Number twice 2 and 4, and the Relation of 4 and 6; acquieſcing in which Perception, we conclude it a leſs Number than 6. But this belongs to the third and fourth Parts. yet we thought it proper to make this ſhort remark here, that the Diſtinction we brought in the beginning of various Relations ſhou'd not be look'd on as empty and vain; for unleſs we retain this, we know not what our Mind do's in Judging and Reaſoning. All our *Ideas* may be referr'd to *Subſtances*, *Modes* and *Relations*.

CHAP. V.

Of IDEAS *which are offer'd to the Mind without any Operation of its own; and of thoſe, in the forming which, ſome Operation of the Mind does intervene.*

1. THere are certain *Ideas* which are only conſider'd by the Mind, without any manner of addition; ſuch are all *Simple Ideas*, which have not any Dependance on the Will and Pleaſure of the Mind, and in ſpight of that, are always the ſame. Thus the Mind has no Command over Pleaſure, or Pain. Now the other ſimple *Ideas*, which we have enumerated before, we find to be of that nature, as that if the Mind endeavour to detract any thing from them, they utterly periſh, and ceaſe to be; nor can it add any thing, without the deſtruction of their Simplicity.

2. To

2. To this ſame Head we may refer thoſe *Compound Ideas* which offer themſelves to the Mind, without our thinking of the Matter, ſuch as the Ideas of Things that exiſt; which Things affect our Senſes, and excite certain Ideas of themſelves in our Mind.

3. Theſe *Ideas* are term'd *Real*, becauſe they proceed from Things exiſting without us. On the contrary, there are other *Compound Ideas*, which are not brought to the Mind from abroad, but are compounded by that, according to its Pleaſure. Thus, by joining the Ideas of *half a Man*, and *half a Horſe*, the *Idea* of a *Centaur* is form'd; which is done in no other manner, than by the Mind's Will to have the Image of a *Centaur* the Object of its View; or by conſidering at once the Body of a *Man* from the Waiſte to the Head, and the Body of a *Horſe* with the Head and Neck cut off: For ſuch is the Force of the Humane Mind, that it can joyn whatever is not contradictory, by its Contemplation, and reſcind whatever it pleaſes. Theſe *Ideas*, thus compounded by the Mind, we call *Phantaſtic*.

4. As the Mind can conſider thoſe Things together, which in Reality, and without it ſelf, are not joyn'd together in one Exiſtence; ſo can it conſider thoſe Things ſeparately, which do not in Reality exiſt ſeparately. And this ſort of Contemplation, which is call'd *Abſtraction*, is of great Uſe to the accurate Conſideration of *Compound Ideas*. For we cannot, if they conſiſt of a larger number of Parts, diſtinctly ſee them in our Mind all together; 'tis therefore an Advantage to us, that we can examine ſome of them ſeparately, a little delaying the Conſideration of the reſt.

5. *Abſtraction* is made principally three ways: *Firſt*, Our Mind can conſider any one Part of a Thing really diſtinct from it, as a *Man*'s *Arm*, without the Contemplation of the reſt of his Body. But this is not properly *Abſtraction*, ſince the *Arm* is, without the Interpoſition of the *Mind*, ſeparated diſtinct from the *Body*, tho' it cannot live, that is, be nouriſh'd, encreaſe, or move in that Separation.

6. *Secondly*, We think by *Abſtraction* of the *Mode* of a *Subſtance*, omitting the Subſtance it ſelf, or when we ſeparately conſider ſeveral Modes, which ſubſiſt together in one Subject. This *Abſtraction* the *Geometricians* make uſe of, when they conſider the Length of a Body ſeparately, which they call a *Line*, omitting evidently the Conſideration of its Breadth and Depth. And then its Length and Breadth together, which they call the *Surface*. By the ſame *Abſtraction* we can

can diſtinguiſh the determination of a Motion, towards what Place directed, from the Motion it ſelf.

7. *Thirdly*, We, by *Abſtraction*, omit the *Modes* and *Relations* of any particular Thing, if from it we form a *Univerſal Idea*. Thus, when we wou'd underſtand a *Thinking Being* in general, we gather from our ſelf Conſciouſneſs what it is to *Think*, and, omitting the Conſideration of thoſe Things which have a peculiar Reference to the Humane Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general. By this means particular *Ideas* become general.

8. That we may not err in judging of the *Ideas* mention'd in this Chapter, we muſt make theſe Obſervations. *Firſt*, That thoſe *Ideas* which offer themſelves to the Mind without any Operation of its own, muſt of neceſſity be excited by ſome external Cauſe, and ſo are plac'd before the Mind as they are. But we muſt take heed that we do not think that there is always in thoſe Things themſelves which excite thoſe *Ideas*, any thing like them, becauſe it may happen that they are not the true and real Cauſes, but only the Occaſions by which thoſe *Ideas* are produc'd. And this Suſpicion ought to heighten by what we experience in our Dreams, when by the occaſion of the Motion of the Brain there are the Images of Things ſet before us, which are not preſent themſelves, and often have no Exiſtence in Nature. Whence we may gather from ſuchlike *Ideas*, that the *Cauſe* or *Occaſion* of their Production has an external Subſiſtence, and not in the Mind.

9. *Secondly*, As to thoſe *Ideas* which are compounded by the Mind, we eaſily imagine, firſt, that the Originals of ſuch *Ideas* may poſſibly ſomewhere exiſt; and then, that they realy do, unleſs we are manifeſtly convinc'd by Experience, that they never did realy exiſt conjunctly, and ſo join'd together. And on the contrary, that thoſe Things which the Mind conſiders ſeparately by *Abſtraction*, do realy exiſt in that ſeparate State. As the Mathematical *Point* without any Parts; and *Lines* conſiſting only of thoſe *Points* join'd together, without Breadth or Depth, and *Surfaces* without Depth; whereas Demonſtration ſhows the contrary, and thoſe Terms are only made uſe of by the Mathematicians for the ſake of the Inſtruction of the Learners of that Art.

10. We muſt here farther warn you againſt another Error too frequent among the *School Men*, that is, not to make thoſe realy diſtinct Things, or different Beings, which we have diſtinguiſh'd by *Abſtraction*,

of

CHAP. VI.
Of Individual, Particular, and Univerſal IDEAS.

1. WHat we have ſaid of *Abſtractions* leads us to the conſideration of *Ideas*, as they are *individual*, *particular*, and *univerſal*, for they are made *particular* and *univerſal* from *individual*, by *Abſtraction*; in which Matter we proceed in this manner. When we conſider our ſelves, in our Mind, or any one Man before us, then we have the *Idea* of an *Individual*, or an *Individual Idea*. But if we omit thoſe Things which are peculiar to us, or that one Man, and conſider what is common to us and many others; ſuch as to be born in the ſame Country, to be of the ſame Party, and the like, then is the *Idea* of ſome *Particular* Nation, or Family, *&c.* plac'd before us: But laſtly, if omitting theſe particular Diſtinctions common to us and a certain number of Men, we conſider what is common to us and all Mankind, we have then an *Univerſal Idea*.

2. The Names that ſignify *individual Ideas*, are call'd *proper*; as, *Alexander*, *Cæſar*. But thoſe which ſignify *particular* and *univerſal Ideas*, are call'd *Appellative*, or *Common*; as, a *Briton*, a *Chriſtian*, a *Man*.

3. Farther — We may diſtinguiſh in thoſe *Ideas* certain Properties which are conſtantly united in them, and external *Subjects* agreeable to thoſe *Ideas*, or ſuch as the *Ideas* agree with. Thus in the *Idea* of Man we diſcover or ſee a thinking Mind and a Body conſiſting of certain Organs; but this *Idea* agrees with the Inhabitants of *Europe*, *Aſia*, *Africa* and *America*.

CHAP. VII.
Of the Perſpicuity and Obſcurity of IDEAS.

1. BEfore we can paſs any certain Judgment of an *Idea*, it is firſt neceſſary that it ſhou'd be *clear* or *perſpicuous*, otherwiſe if we ſhou'd happen to paſs a right Judgment on a Thing that is not known, or at leaſt not ſufficiently clear, it muſt be attributed to Chance, and not to Knowledge. The Obſcurity and Clearneſs of *Ideas* are therefore worthy our Conſideration in the *Art of Reaſoning*.

2. We call that a *clear Idea*, when all it comprehends is ſo diſtinctly plac'd before our Mind, that we can eaſily diſtinguiſh it from all others.

3. All

3. All *ſimple Ideas* are *clear*, ſuch as *Senſations*; ſuch therefore is the *Idea* of Light: For when we have that *Idea* before us, we ſee all that is in it, nor can we confound it with any other. We may ſay the ſame of Sounds, Scents, Taſtes, Pleaſure, Pain, *&c.* which can never be confounded or mingled with each other. And theſe *Senſations* encreaſe in their Clearneſs in proportion to the Livelineſs of their ſtriking on the Organ proper to them; for by how much more vehemently the Mind is ſtrook, with ſo much the more Attention it applies to the Subject, and ſo this lively *Idea* is more clearly diſtinguiſh'd from all others.

4. Theſe *ſimple Ideas* are alſo *perſpicuous* or *clear*, which the Mind receives without the Interpoſition of the Body: Examples of which we have given under the Head of *ſimple Compounded Ideas*. But as we can conſider the Parts of a *compound Idea* ſeparately, ſo we view them ſingly, or one by one as *ſimple Ideas*, of which they are compounded: Thus alſo all *abſtract Ideas* are *clear*, tho' the Subject in which they exiſt be unknown. We can in all Subſtances, of which we know any Properties, ſelect ſome Property, which being by *Abſtraction* ſeparated from all the reſt, becomes *ſimple*, and by conſequence *clear*, altho' it exiſt in a Subject which we do not know. Thus *Humanity* generally conſider'd, is made a *ſimple Idea*, and therefore indiviſible.

5. But theſe ſame *Ideas* are often made obſcure when they are conſider'd without *Abſtraction*, together with other *Ideas* that are obſcure, and co-exiſt in the Subject. Thus when the Queſtion is not, what Humanity or Reaſon is in general, but what Reaſon is in *Stephen*, or in *Thomas*, and what is its numerical Difference.

6. Thoſe *compounded Ideas* are clear, *all* whoſe Parts, or *ſimple Ideas* of which they are compounded, are perfectly known to us. But thoſe we call obſcure of which we only know ſome Parts. Thus when we know all the *Unites* of which any Number conſiſts, we certainly know the Number, but if we have gone through but ſome of the *Unites*, we cannot know how much the whole is; and have therefore a confus'd *Idea* of it.

7. Whenever, therefore, we are to judge of any Thing, we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh all its Parts, if it conſiſt of Parts, and then give Judgment: Elſe we ſhall do as if we ſhou'd give the Sum Total of an Accompt, and not know the particular Numbers or Figures which make it up. But more of this in the *Third Part*.

8. But

8. But if in the Things which fall under our Conſideration we cannot ſufficiently diſtinguiſh their Parts, and give a certain Enumeration of them, we muſt then fairly confeſs, that either they are not in the number of thoſe Things to which the Knowledge of Man can extend, or that it requires more Time to examine into the Matter.

9. It much conduces to the *clearneſs* of an *Idea* compounded by our ſelves or others, if the Parts which compoſe it are always of the ſame Number, and in the ſame Order; otherwiſe, if the Number of the *ſimple Ideas* of which it's compos'd, can be encreas'd or leſſen'd, or their Order inverted, the Memory, and ſo the Mind, is confounded. Thus if any one has with Care caſt up any Sums, and plac'd them in any certain Order, as often as he has a Mind to remember them, he eaſily does it, if there has been no Abſtraction or diſplacing in the Accompt. But on the contrary, the former Computation and Diſpoſition is deſtroy'd if the Numbers are diſturb'd, and thrown out of their Places.

10. In ſhort, the Nature of *Perſpicuity* or *Clearneſs*, is ſuch when it is at its height; that is, compels our Aſſent. We cannot have the leaſt doubt but that Pleaſure is different from Pain, or that twice two make four. On the contrary, we find a Power in our Minds of ſuſpending our Judgment when there is any Obſcurity in the *Ideas*. But 'tis certain, that we often raſhly yield our Aſſent to obſcure *Ideas*, but ſtill we have Liberty to deny it; which we cannot do to an *Idea* which has a compleat *Perſpicuity* or *Clearneſs*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Adequate and Inadequate, or Perfect or Imperfect IDEAS.

1. WE have obſerv'd in the firſt Chapter, that *Ideas* are the Images of Things which are without us, by the Force or Occaſion of which they are excited in us; but they may be the Images of the whole Thing that excites them, or only of a part. When they repreſent the whole, they are call'd *Adequate*, or perfect; when but a part, they are call'd *Inadequate*, or imperfect. Thus if we ſee only the ſquare Surface of a *Cube*, then the Idea of a ſquare Figure, not of a *Cube*, is in our Mind; which, therefore, is call'd an *inadequate* or *imperfect Idea*. On the contrary, if

we behold a Triangle drawn on a piece of Paper, and think of a Triangle in Plane, we have an *adequate* or *perfect* Idea in our Mind.

2. All ſimple Ideas are *adequate* or *perfect*, becauſe the Faculty (be it what it will) that excites them repreſents them entire. Thus the Pain that we feel ſignifies, that there is ſome Faculty of ſome Being without us, which excites that Idea in us againſt our Will. But we muſt proceed no farther, for a *ſimple Idea* repreſents a *ſimple Object*, but it does not inform us where it is, or whether that Faculty be united to any others. We may therefore, without fear of Error, gather from any Senſation, that there is ſomething out of our Mind which is by Nature adapted to excite it in us.

3. The *Ideas* of *Modes* are alſo *adequate* or *perfect*, except of thoſe *Modes* which are likewiſe Subſtances. For when we underſtand no *Modes* ſeparately exiſting, they are only conſider'd by us ſeparately from the Subſtances by way of *Abſtraction*; but all *abſtract Ideas* are *adequate* or *perfect*, ſince they repreſent all that Part of the Subject which we then conſider. Thus the *Idea* of *Roundneſs* is *perfect* or *adequate*, becauſe it offers to our Mind all that is in *Roundneſs* in general. The *Idea* of a *Triangle* in general is *adequate* or *perfect*, becauſe when it's before my Mind, I ſee all that is common to Triangles that can be.

4. Of the ſame kind are all *Ideas*, of which we know no original or external Object realy exiſting out of them, by the occaſion of which thoſe *Ideas* are excited in us, and of which we think them the Images. Thus, when a Dog is before us, it is the external Object without us, which raiſe the *Idea* in our Mind; but the *Idea* of an *Animal* in general has no external Object to excite it; 'tis created by the Mind it ſelf, which adds to, and detracts from it whatever it pleaſes; whence it muſt of neceſſity be *adequate* or *perfect*.

5. But here again, we muſt take heed of what we have before caution'd, that is, that we do not ſuppoſe that there are any ſuch Objects realy exiſting without us, becauſe the Mind has been pleas'd to entertain it ſelf with the *Ideas*: For that wou'd be as if a Painter that had drawn a *Centaur*, or Hundred-handed *Ecculades*, ſhou'd contend, that there were ſuch Beings realy exiſtent in Nature.

6. The *Ideas* of all Subſtances are *inadequate* or *imperfect*, which are not form'd at the pleaſure of the Mind, but gather'd from certain Properties which Experience diſcovers in them. This is ſufficiently evident from what we have

ſaid

ſaid of *Subſtances* in the third *Chapter*. For there we have ſhown that we only know ſome of the Properties of *Subſtances*, not all; and therefore their *Ideas* muſt be *imperfect*, or *inadequate*. Thus we know that Silver is white, that it can be melted, and be diminiſh'd by the Fire as it melts; that it can be drawn up to Wire, and diſſolv'd by *Aqua fortis*, &c. but we are wholly ignorant of the inward Diſpoſition or Conſtitution of the Particles of which Silver conſiſts, and from whence thoſe Properties proceed. Thus the *Idea* of Silver not repreſenting to the Mind all the Properties of Silver, is *inadequate* or *imperfect*.

7. Here the greateſt Danger is leaſt; we confound *inadequate* or *imperfect Ideas* with the *adequate* or *perfect*. For we are too apt to fancy, that when we know a great many Properties of any Thing, and cannot diſcover any more by all our Induſtry, we have the whole Subject. Thus ſome ingenious Men of our Times, imagin'd they had diſcover'd all the Properties of the Mind, becauſe they cou'd find nothing in it but Thoughts, and therefore ſaid, that the Mind was only a *Thinking Subſtance*; and ſo they contend that there is nothing elſe in Body but *Extenſion*, *Impenetrability*, and *Diviſibility*, becauſe they cou'd diſcover nothing elſe; but they cou'd never yet ſhew us what thoſe *Subſtances* were whoſe Properties were to think, to have Parts, &c. There is no Exiſtence of *Subſtance* in general; and tho' we underſtand this Word in *General*, it does by no means follow, that we underſtand it when 'tis ſpoke of any particular Subject, which we muſt be ſure to have a particular Regard to.

The End of the Firſt Part *of the* Art *of* Reasoning.

The Second Part *of* LOGIC;
OR,
The Art *of* REASONING.

of JUDGMENTS.

CHAP. I.
Of Judgment *in the* Mind, *and expreſs'd in* Words.

1. HAving conſider'd *Ideas* and their Properties particularly, we come now to treat of *Judgments*, in which various *Ideas* are compar'd with each other. We muſt firſt accurately diſtinguiſh the *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, from the Words in which it is expreſs'd, if we wou'd know what it is.

2. *Judgment*, as it is in the Mind and unwritten, is a Perception of the Relation that is between two or more *Ideas*. Thus when we judge that the Sun is greater than the Moon; having compar'd the two *Ideas* of the Sun and Moon, we find that the *Idea* of the Sun is greater than that of the Moon, and our Mind perfectly acquieſces in this Perception, nor makes any farther Enquiry into the matter. When we judge two Members to be unequal, by having obſerv'd the inequality of their *Ideas*, our Mind gives it ſelf no farther Trouble in their Examination in that reſpect, but only confines to its Memory, that thoſe two Members were found to be unequal.

3. We muſt here obſerve, That our Mind can give its Aſſent to *obſcure Ideas*, as well as to thoſe which are *clear*; or acquieſce in a Thing as perfectly diſcover'd, which yet it has no perfect Knowledge of, and can commit this to the Memory as a Thing perfectly known. Thus we may judge the fix'd Stars leſs than the Moon, by comparing the *obſcure Ideas* of thoſe Stars and the Moon, and then take it for a point

point not to be argu'd againſt, as clear and evident. The Mind has alſo a Faculty of ſuſpending its Aſſent, till by an accurate Examen of the *Ideas*, the Subject becomes clear and evident; or if it be of ſuch a Nature that we cannot arrive at a perſpicuous Perception, we continue in Doubt or Suſpenſe, and commend it to the Memory as a dubious matter. This *Faculty* which we obſerve in our Mind, of giving our Aſſent to *obſcure Ideas*, or denying it, is call'd *Liberty*.

4. But we cannot make uſe of this *Faculty* when the Subject of our Thoughts has the laſt and greateſt Perſpicuity that can be. For Example, we can by no Means in the World perſuade our ſelves, that twice two do not make four, or are equal to four; or that the Part is not leſs than the whole, and the like Maxims of the moſt evident Truths; for as ſoon as ever we hear them, the Mind cannot deny its Aſſent, but neceſſarily acquieſces, without finding in it ſelf the leaſt Deſire or Inclination of making any farther Enquiry into the Matter.

5. This is a *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, which when expreſs'd in Words, we call a *Propoſition*, in which ſomething always is affirm'd or deny'd. That part of the Propoſition of which ſomething is affirm'd or deny'd, is call'd the *Subject*; the other Part, which is ſaid by the Negation or Affirmation, is call'd the *Attribute*. Thus when we ſay that *Poverty is to be reliev'd*; or *Poverty is no Vice*; the Word *Poverty* is the *Subject*; *to be reliev'd*, and *Vice*, are the *Attributes*. But beſides theſe two Parts, we muſt conſider the *Copula*, or *connective Word*, by which, when 'tis alone, 'tis affirm'd that there is ſome Relation between the *Subject* and the *Attribute*, but by adding a Negative Particle, that ſome Relation is deny'd: In the preſent Inſtances we affirm in the firſt, that there is a Relation between the Idea of *Poverty*, and the Idea of *Relief*, ſo that the Idea of *Poverty* in our Mind includes the Idea of *Relief*; and in the later Inſtance we deny that the Idea of *Poverty* excites in us the Conſideration of any thing baſe or wicked.

6. *Propoſitions* are ſometimes expreſs'd in many Words, and ſometimes in few. *Henry rages*, is an entire Propoſition, for 'tis the ſame as if we ſhou'd ſay *Henry is raging*.

7. *Propoſitions* are either *Simple* or *Compound*, the *Simple* are expreſs'd in one Word; as, *God is good*: the *Compound* in many, as *God, who is good, cannot delight in the Miſery of Man*.

CHAP. II.

Of Univerſal, Particular, and Singular Propoſitions.

1. WE have in the former Part divided Ideas into *Univerſal*, *Particular*, and *Singular*, and ſaid that the Words by which they were expreſs'd, might be rang'd under the ſame Heads. Hence the *Propoſitions* have the ſame threefold Diviſion.

2. When the Subject is *Univerſal*, or taken in its whole extent, without excepting any ſubordinate Species or Sort, or any other Individual which is contain'd under it, then is the *Propoſition* call'd *Univerſal*. This *Univerſality* is expreſs'd by the Word *All* when the *Propoſition* is affirmative; and by that of *None* or *No*, when it is negative; *All Men are free*, is an univerſal affirmative Propoſition, and *No Man is free*, is an univerſal Negative.

3. But the *Subject* has ſome mark or note by which we ſhew, that not all the Sorts or Species, or Individuals, which are compriz'd under that Word, are meant; then is the Propoſition *Particular*; as, *ſome Man is free*. By the Word *ſome* we intimate that we do not here underſtand all that is ſignify'd by the general Word *Man*, but that we only deſign a Part by the Word *ſome*

4. *Singular* or *Individual Propoſitions* are thoſe in which we affirm only of ſome one individual Perſon or Thing; as, *Alexander was choleric*. Theſe Propoſitions have a great Affinity to the *Univerſals* in this, that the Subject of both is taken in its full and whole extent. Hence the Individual Propoſitions in the common Rules of Argumentation are taken for Univerſals.

5. To paſs over the trifling of the Schools, which make *Logic* the *Art of Diſputing*, not *Reaſoning*, and have more Regard to make the Student talk of any thing *Pro* and *Con*, than to find out the Truth, we muſt obſerve, that an Obſervation flowing from what we have before ſaid of Subſtances, is of more Importance for the diſcovery of the Truth, the only juſt End of *Reaſoning*. That is, that Univerſal Propoſitions, when of the Kinds or Species, or of the Generals and Particulars of Subſtances, cannot be with any certainty made agreeable to the Things themſelves; becauſe ſince

we

we do not know the Eſſences of them, we cannot affirm that all Subſtances in which we diſcover ſome certain Attributes equaly to co-exiſt, are in thoſe of which we know nothing alike, or the ſame. As for Example, We diſcover and obſerve that there are certain ſingular Attributes conſtantly co-exiſting in all Men, yet who can aſſure us whether all their Minds are alike, ſo far as that, what difference betwixt Particulars is viſible, ariſes from external Cauſe in reſpect of the Mind, as from the Body, from Education, and the like; or that there is realy ſome real difference between them in the Subſtance of the Mind itſelf. The difference of the Wit and Genius of Men ſeem to perſuade the later Opinion, which is obſervable in two Brothers who have had the ſame Education; but ſince we know not whether the Brain in both is diſpos'd in the ſame manner, the Diverſity of the Wit and Ingenuity may proceed from that Cauſe.

5. Thus ſuch as with Aſſurance affirm, that the inmoſt Eſſence of all Bodies is the ſame; if they are in the right, they owe that more to Chance than to any clear Knowledge of the Matter: For there might be a plain difference betwixt the inmoſt Eſſence of various Bodies, altho' they agree in having ſeveral of the ſame Attributes, which we do know. We ſhou'd therefore take a particular Care, as to theſe general Propoſitions of Subſtances, not to give up our Aſſent to ſuch who pretend to have a perfect and clear Knowledge of their inmoſt Eſſence.

6. The *Modes*, whoſe entire Eſſence is known to us, fall under a different Conſideration; for we may form general Aſſertions of them, of indubitable Truth. Hence it is that *Geometry*, which is wholly converſant with the *Modes*, is built on the moſt certain Foundation, and delivers Univerſal Rules of all Figures and Magnitudes, which cannot be deſtroy'd or oppos'd.

CHAP. III.

Of what is Truth and Falſhood, and whether there be any certain Difference between them.

1. BY Reaſoning to find out the Truth, being the juſt Aim of this our Art, we ſhall paſs over the ſeveral Claſſes of Propoſitions ſet down by the common *Logicians*, and which are of little conſequence in any thing, but of no man-

manner of uſe to this more important End. We ſhall therefore here treat of the Truth and Falſhood in general of all Propoſitions, that we may learn to diſtinguiſh the one from the other.

2. That Propoſition is true which is agreeable, or anſwers to the Nature of the Thing, of which any thing is affirm'd or deny'd. Thus when we ſay that 4 is the one fourth part of twice 8. That Propoſition is true, becauſe agreeable to the Nature of theſe Numbers. If we ſay twice 4 is equal to twice 3, the Propoſition is falſe, becauſe it is not anſwerable to the Nature of thoſe Numbers.

3. Whoever will ſpeak ſeriouſly what he thinks, will confeſs, that he neceſſarily believes that there is no Medium between *Truth* and *Falſhood*. It is certain, that all Propoſitions, conſider'd in themſelves, appear to us either true or falſe; for 'tis a *Contradiction to be agreeable or conſentaneous, and not conſentaneous and agreeable to the Things*. There are indeed ſome probable Propoſitions, or ſuſpected of Falſity, but this has nothing to do with the Nature of Propoſitions, which is in it ſelf determinately true or falſe; but to our Knowledge, which is not (in reſpect of theſe Propoſitions) ſufficient to enable us to determine with certainty. Of which hereafter.

4. There have been ſome who have aſſerted, that this only was certain, *that nothing was certain*, and that *Truth* had no Criterion or certain Mark to be known from *Falſhood* in any thing elſe but that one Maxim. But ſince they cou'd not deny but that they held this Maxim for a certain *Truth*, there muſt be, ev'n according to them, ſome mark of *Truth*, by which they excepted that Maxim from the uncertainty of all other Propoſitions. And they were of Opinion, that they had found the Marks of Uncertainty in all theſe Things, which the other Philoſophical Sects held for undoubted *Truths*. They therefore determin'd poſitively of all Things at the ſame Time that they pretended to doubt of all Things, while they aſſerted, that all that was ſaid by others, was uncertain. We cannot therefore condemn the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, as denying that Truth was not at all known to us, while they thought they did truly judge of the Uncertainty of all Things, in which they were as dogmatic and poſitive as any of the other Philoſophers.

5. But that we may ſatisfy our ſelves, we muſt make it the Object of our Enquiry to know, that what we affirm of Things is conſentaneous or agreeable to their Nature. If

we

we will give our ſelves the Trouble to look into our own Minds, we ſhall find, that there are ſome Things which compel our Aſſent; but other Things of which we can ſuſpend our Judgment. When we clearly and diſtinctly diſcover the certain Relation between two Ideas, we cannot but acquieſce in that Perception, or think our ſelves oblig'd to make farther Enquiries about it. Thus the Relation of Equality between twice 4 and 8, is ſo manifeſt and evident, that we cannot entertain the leaſt doubt of the matter.

6. But ſhou'd any Man affirm, *that there were Inhabitants in the Moon*, after a long conſideration of this Propoſition we ſhall find that we are by no means compell'd to give our Aſſent to it; the Reaſon of which is, that we do not diſtinctly and plainly diſcover any neceſſary Relation between the Moon, and any manner of Inhabitants, but that we can doubt of that Relation, till it be made evident to our Underſtanding.

7. Hence we may gather, that *Evidence* alone can remove all our Doubts. What remains is, that we enquire, whether it follows, that that Propoſition is true, of which we have no Reaſon to doubt?

8. We muſt firſt in this Queſtion obſerve, that it is entirely ſuperfluous among Men, becauſe whatever Judgment we make of it, we cannot change our Nature. We neceſſarily give our Aſſent to thoſe Things which are *evident*, and we ſhall always preſerve our Faculty or Pow'r of doubting in thoſe Things which are obſcure.

9. *Secondly*, If Evidence ſhou'd be found in Propoſitions that are falſe, we muſt neceſſarily be compell'd into Error, ſince we neceſſarily give our Aſſent to Evidence. Hence wou'd follow this impious Poſition, That God, who made us, is the Author of our Errors, ſince he has thus put us under a Neceſſity of falling into 'em. But it is only conſiſtent with a wicked Nature to oblige us to be deceiv'd, which in the leaſt to ſuſpect God, wou'd be the height of Impiety.

10. *Thirdly*, We neceſſarily love Truth, and hate Error; for there is no body who is not deſirous of knowing the Truth, and no body is willingly deceiv'd. But who can prevail with himſelf ſo much as to ſuſpect, that we are made in ſuch a manner by a Beneficent Deity, that we ſhou'd love that with the greateſt Vehemence, which we either cou'd not obtain, or not know whether we obtain'd it or not, which is much the ſame.

11. *Fourthly*,

11. *Fourthly*, If we shou'd err in Things that are evident, as well as in those which are not so, we shou'd sometimes in the evident Propositions find Contradictions, which are commonly found in those which treat of Things that are obscure. On the contrary, evident Things are always agreeable to each other, when frequently evident Things disagree with those that are obscure: Whence we may conclude, that Evidence can not deceive, but Error is confin'd to Obscurity.

12. *Evidence* is, therefore, the Criterion or Mark of *Truth*; and those Things we ought to think true, to which we necessarily give our Assent. For this is likewise the Mark or Characteristic of Truth, that it necessarily compels our Assent. Whatever, therefore, we see *evidently* agreeable to the Things of which we speak, that we must think true. On the other hand, when we find any Proposition evidently contrary to the Nature of the Thing under our Consideration, we may justly declare that to be false.

13. But to decide peremptorily in a Matter that is obscure, is very rash and inconsiderate, as we have observ'd in the First Part, of the *clearness* or *obscurity* of *Ideas*, which we shall not repeat. But since those Things which are realy obscure are often asserted to be evident, whoever wou'd avoid that Error, ought as much as he can to suspend his Judgment; and nicely to examine whether he be not influenc'd by some Inclination, or Passion, or Party, when the finding out the Truth ought to be his whole Aim; and then he will never give his Assent to Things that are false or obscure.

CHAP. VI.

Of the several Steps or Degrees of Perspicuity in Propositions, and of Verisimilitude, or Probability.

1. BEcause all that we believe is not built on any evident Knowledge, the Philosophers have observ'd in our Knowledge several Degrees, all which however may be reduc'd to these two, *Science* and *Opinion*.

Science is a Knowledge deriv'd from the Introspection or looking into the Thing it self of which we discourse, and which

which exclude all manner of Doubt. But it may arise from a simple Intuition or View of the Ideas; as, when we consider this Proposition—*The whole is greater than a Part*, and the like; whose Truth is known by Evidence alone, without any Reasoning on the Point. Or by deducing certain Consequences, and those more remote, from evident Principles, such as are innumerable Geometrical Demonstrations, necessarily deduc'd by a long Chain of Arguments from their first Principles.

3. *Opinion* is the Assent of the Mind to Propositions not evidently true at the first sight, nor deduc'd by necessary Consequence from those which are evidently true, but such as seem to carry the face of Truth. Thus 'tis probable that the Writers of the Life of *Alexander* magnify'd too much his Exploits. 'Tis not probable, or likely, that he ever receiv'd the Queen of the *Amazons*, or pass'd the Mountain *Caucasus*.

4. Some here add *Faith* or *Belief*, which is an Assent given to any one that tells us any Thing which we have not seen our selves, nor found out by any Argument, or Ratiocination. But that Faith or Belief depends either on some necessary Conclusion deduc'd from evident Arguments, or only on a probable Opinion, and so may be referr'd to one of the two Heads already mention'd.

5. To these we might add *Doubting*, or a *doubtful Assent*, tho' this be likewise a Species or sort of *Opinion*, and uses to be contain'd under the general Name of Opinion. For the Assent is *doubtful* when the Probability is weak, which when strong, produces *firm Opinion*. But to make these clearer to the Understanding, we will make a gradual Rising from Probability to Evidence.

6. Since, as we have seen in the former Chapter, those are call'd true Propositions, which agrees with the Nature of the Things of which they are spoken; and those probable which only seem to agree to the Nature of the Thing under Consideration; that Probability may be greater or less, and so produces either a stronger or weaker Opinion. But it is built, summarily consider'd, on our Knowledge and Experience, whether True or False.

7. But to rise from the lowest to the highest Probability, we must first observe, that the lowest Degree of Probability is built on the Relation of another where that is the only Motive of Belief; in which yet many things are to be consider'd.

8. If

8. If the Perſon who gives the Relation be wholly unknown to us, altho' what he tells is not incredible, yet we cannot give an entire Credit to him, when there are no other Circumſtances to add a Weight to his Narration, becauſe we have had no other Experience of his Credibility; or whether he be worthy of Belief or not. But if we have ſome ſlight Knowledge of him, we are the more ready to believe him, eſpecially if he be a noted Man of great Authority with many, tho' we know not whether he has gain'd that Fame and Authority by his Merits or not. Nay, we rather believe a rich Man of indifferent Qualifications, than a poor Man, becauſe we ſuppoſe the former more converſant with Perſons skill'd in Affairs, than the later. An honeſt Countenance, and Diſcourſe full of Probity, eaſily win our Aſſent.

9. If any one with whom we are better acquainted, tells us any thing, the more known that is, the more Inſtances we have of his Veracity, the more ready he finds us to have aſſurance in the Truth of what he tells us, tho' he may deceive us ev'n in that very Narration. 'Tis with difficulty we can perſuade our ſelves, that we are deceiv'd by a Perſon whom we have known generally to be a Man of Veracity, ſince Men who have got a Habit of ſpeaking Truth, or any other Habit, ſeldom act contrary to the conſtant Diſpoſition of their Mind.

10. There are beſides, various Circumſtances which add Force to the Teſtimony of others, as if it were a Thing of that kind in which he cou'd ſcarce be deceiv'd; as if Men of Sobriety and Temper ſhou'd tell us, that they had ſeen, touch'd, and accurately examin'd ſome particular Thing, and not with a tranſient curſory View. The Probability is heighten'd, if the Belief of their Hearers be of no Advantage to them; or if they incurr a conſiderable Danger by telling it, which they might avoid by ſaying nothing of the Matter; if to theſe the number of the Witneſſes be encreas'd, the *Probability* will be ſo ſtrong, that unleſs the Narration be oppoſite to the Nature of the Thing, we can ſcarce be able to deny our Aſſent.

11. *Secondly*, what here affects our Minds, is drawn from the very Nature of the Thing, and our own Experience. Whoever will tell us Stories that are impoſſible, can never gain our Belief, as long as the Narration labours under that Character; for that is the Mark of Falſhood.

12. 'Tis

12. 'Tis firſt of all Things neceſſary, that what is ſpoken ſhou'd be thought poſſible: If we have never ſeen it, nor heard that any other has experienc'd the like, tho' the Matter it ſelf be not actually impoſſible, yet it will find but little Credit with us: For Example —— If any one ſhou'd tell us, That he had ſeen in the *Indies* a Brillant Diamond as big as a Man's Head; tho' in this our Mind can diſcover nothing plainly impoſſible, or contradictory, yet ſhou'd we ſcarce believe it, becauſe we never our ſelves ſaw one ſo large, or ever heard of any one elſe who had.

13. When we our ſelves have ſeen any Thing like it, or have known others who have ſeen the like, we then conſider how ſeldom, or how often it has happen'd, for the more frequent a Thing has been to our Eyes, or thoſe of others to our Knowledge, the eaſier Credit it finds with us; and on the contrary, the ſeldomer, the more difficultly believ'd. Thus if any one tell us, that he has ſeen a Stone Bridge over a River one or two hundred Paces long, he will find no difficulty in gaining our Belief: But we give Credit more hardly to him who ſhall tell us, that has ſeen a Bridge of ſolid Marble four mile in length, over an Arm of the Sea, and another Bridge of four hundred Foot in length, of only one Arch, as they ſay there are in *China*.

14. By the Teſt of the ſame Experience we examine the Circumſtances of the Manner of doing any thing, the Circumſtances of the Perſons, Place and Time, and if theſe agree with what we know, they add a Force to the Relation. We farther are apt to conſider and weigh the Cauſes or Motives which mov'd him to whom the Action is attributed to do it. For if the Thing be ſingular, uncommon, and out of the Way, we can ſcarce believe that it ſhou'd be done without ſolid and weighty Reaſons, of which, while we are ignorant, the Matter of Fact muſt at leaſt remain dubious in our Minds. But if theſe ſolid and cogent Reaſons are known, we ceaſe to doubt, or at leaſt, we eaſily believe the Matter of Fact, if withal it appear, that the Agent knew theſe Reaſons and Motives. Thus we eaſily believe the many Prodigies or Miracles of the Old Teſtament, done by God, becauſe they were of the moſt momentous Importance to preſerve at leaſt one Nation uncorrupted by Idolatry, which cou'd not have been done without thoſe Miracles. But we can ſcarce perſuade our Minds to believe, that God, after the Chriſtian Religion was eſtabliſh'd, ſhou'd work Miracles on every trifling Occaſion, as the Legends of the old Monks and modern Papiſts pretend.

15. We muſt ſeek the third Motive of our Belief in our ſelves: For there are ſome Events, the Truth of which cannot appear to any, but ſuch whoſe Minds are firſt qualify'd by ſome certain Knowledge: As for Example, theſe are ſome Events of Ancient Hiſtory. *There was a King of* Macedon, *whoſe Name was* Alexander, *who ſubdu'd* Aſia, *having vanquiſh'd King* Darius. Theſe are ſo well known to thoſe who are converſant with the *Greek* and *Roman* Hiſtory, that they can have no doubt of the Truth; but it is not ſo evident to a Man who is wholly unacquainted with Hiſtory; for the former has read many Writers of various Nations and Times, all concurring in the ſame Account; he knows the Series of the whole Hiſtory with which theſe are connected, and came to that Knowledge by degrees, by much Reading: To ſatisfy another in this Point, he muſt lead him up the ſame Steps by which he mounted, elſe he will find it difficult to make one obſtinate believe him.

16. In this Probability of Relations, the fewer or more of theſe Circumſtances occurring, makes it the weaker or ſtronger. Nay, when they all, or the greateſt part meet, ſo great is the Force of the joining of thoſe Circumſtances, that they affect our Mind like the *higheſt Evidence*. For Example; he who reads the *Roman* Hiſtory, can no more doubt, but that there was ſuch a Man as *Julius Cæſar*, and that he vanquiſh'd *Pompey*, than that two Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference are equal.

17. As *Evidence* is the Criterion, or Characteriſtic of Truth in Things of Speculation, which depend on Reaſoning, ſo in *Matters of Fact* the Concourſe of ſo many Circumſtances is an undoubted Proof and Mark of Truth. 'Tis certain, that we can no more deny our Aſſent to theſe concurring Circumſtances, than to the *higheſt Evidence*; they therefore either perſuade and recommend the Truth, or (which is abſurd) God has ſo form'd us, that we muſt neceſſarily be deceiv'd.

18. There is likewiſe a *Probability* which depends only on our own *Reaſoning*, or *Experience*, without the intervention of any elſe, and omitting thoſe Circumſtances, which we have enumerated. And here we may diſtinguiſh ſuch various Steps and Degrees of *Probability*, that when we come to the higheſt, it is no longer a meer *Probability*, but manifeſt Truth, and compels our Aſſent without any Reſerve or Doubt.

19. I. When

19. I. When we conſider Things, of which we have ſome manner of Knowledge, but not a clear and perfect one, we may make a probable Judgment of them, better than if we were wholy ignorant of the Subject; but this Probability is ſo weak, that we may be perſuaded we have been in an Error. But when the Subject is perfectly known to us, by Experiment, we may make more certain Judgment of ſome Property of that Subject, which is not ſo thoroughly underſtood by us. Thus a Goldſmith, or Refiner, who has often melted Gold, and work'd in it in diverſe Ways, can make better Judgment of ſome things which belong to that Metal, than a Man who has never been employ'd about it.

20. II. He who has ſome time doubted of a Thing, and judges not of it, but after a ſerious and long Scrutiny, will make juſter Judgment of it than he who (without Experience) gives a raſh and precipitate Judgment. 'Tis certain, we believe our ſelves more, after we have made a thorough Enquiry into it, than when we are oblig'd to make a haſty and unpremeditated Judgment. We call not that a diligent Enquiry or Scrutiny, which leaves us in no manner of Doubt; for the Nature of the Thing of which we judge, do's not always allow ſo nice an Introſpection, as to free us from all manner of Doubt; but ſuch an Enquiry we call diligent, which is all that the Nature of the Thing will admit. Thus we can examine few, or rather no Subſtances, ſo far, as to aſſure our ſelves that we have a certain Knowledge of moſt of its Properties. This makes all Natural Philoſophy (which is not built on Experiments) a meer conjectural Amuſement.

21. III. If we have been us'd to ſuch Experiments before we give our Judgment, and have frequently given the like Judgments of other Things which have been approv'd by Experiments, taking thence a certain Aſſurance of a particular Faculty of finding out the Truth, we hope that with little Pains we have hit the Point; yet this Aſſurance is often very fallacious, and leads us into Errors.

22. IV. Our Judgments of Things are either more certain or uncertain, as the Experiments were made a ſhorter or longer time, from that in which we call them to Mind. For when our Memory of any Experiment is freſh, as well as the whole Courſe and Reaſons of the Operation, our Judgments then ſeem more probable to us. But when we retain but a faint Memory of the Enquiry, then we are apt to entertain Doubts of our Diligence in the Courſe of the

Operation, and we dare not maintain our Judgments with any manner of Confidence.

23. V. When Experience has diſcover'd certain Properties in the Thing which we examine, which are commonly unknown, and only can be found out by Ratiocination, our Gheſs ſeems to us the more probable, or likely, the more it agrees with thoſe known Properties. If our Enquiry be which of the three Hypotheſes of the Diſpoſition of the Solar Vortex in which our Earth is, be moſt probable, that of *Ptolomy*, *Tycho*, or *Copernicus*; that of the laſt is preferr'd to the other two, becauſe it accounts for all the Appearances in the Planets and fixt Stars about us; whereas the other two leave many unaccounted for. In ſuch Enquiries as theſe, the Simplicity of the Hypotheſis is of very great weight; for the fewer Things we are oblig'd to ſuppoſe, for giving an account of the Appearances, ſo much the more plauſible is the Hypotheſis, provided that by it we are able to account for all Things relating to it.

24. VI. When the Subject of our Enquiry is the Object of our Senſes, when we have apply'd our Senſes rightly diſpos'd, then it is no longer a ſimple Probability, but an indubitable Truth. There are ſeveral Cautions to be us'd in this Affair, which are to be learn'd in Natural Philoſophy. We muſt farther obſerve, that our Senſes were given us, not to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of Objects, but only of what is neceſſary to the Preſervation of our Lives.

25. But we give more Credit to ſome of our Senſes, than to others; thus we confide more in our Sight than our Hearing, becauſe the Objects of our Eyes ſtrike ſtronger on them, than thoſe of the Hearing on the Ears. But when ſeveral Senſes concur in the diſcovery of any Thing, as when we not only ſee, but hear and touch, then there can be no other Doubt remain of the Truth. Thus if we ſee, hear, and embrace our Friend, we cannot have the leaſt Doubt of the Truth or Reality of what we do. Therefore, this Conviction of the Senſes is no more to be reſiſted, than the Evidence ariſing from *Reaſoning*.

26. From all that we have ſaid it is plain, that there is this difference between a ſlight or weak Probability, and its ſtrongeſt or higheſt Degree; that we cannot deny our Aſſent to this, but we may in that ſuſpend our Judgment, or give it.

27. But

27. But the Uſe of theſe probable Propoſitions is different in common Life, and in Philoſophical, and meerly Speculative Enquiries. For in common Life we very rarely depend on evident Arguments, but eſteem it a ſufficient Warrant of our doing any Thing, if back'd by no contemptible Probability. For, ſhou'd we not undertake any Action till we had the utmoſt Evidence of what we ought to do, we might ſoon periſh; and yet common Prudence will not allow us always to act on the lighteſt Probabilities. We ought, as much as poſſibly we can, diligently to examine all Things, and to contract ſuch a Habit of judging rightly, that we may judge with all the Diſpatch and Adreſs imaginable. We ought to chooſe, of two Things that are not certain, that which may do us the leaſt damage, if we ſhou'd be deceiv'd.

28. But, in Philoſophical Things, we proportion our Aſſent to the Degree of Probability, ſo that to a weak Probability we give a weak Aſſent, a ſtronger to one that is of greater force, and a full and perfect one to that which comes up to Evidence. For to acquieſce entirely, as in Truth, in a Propoſition which is obſcure, by reaſon of ſome Appearance of Truth, is to throw our ſelves into manifeſt danger of Error.

29. But we muſt not in all Things require a *Mathematical Evidence*, ſince that can only have Place in abſtracted or general, and adequate or perfect Ideas; all whoſe Relations and Parts we know: But we ought in *Matters of Fact* to acquieſce in a *Moral Evidence*, or the higheſt Step or Degree of Probability, as we have deſcrib'd it in this *Chapter*.

CHAP. V.

Of doubtful, ſuſpected of Falſity, and falſe Propoſitions.

1. THoſe Things are *Dubious* in general, in which there are no evident Marks of Truth or Falſhood. We ſometimes diſcover ſome few Circumſtances in Things which uſe to produce Probability, without being join'd to any others which may excite any Suſpicion in us. Such are many ancient Hiſtories, which we cannot reject, becauſe we find in them ſome things which have the Appearance of Falſhood; nor yet admit as undoubted, becauſe they have not Evidences enow of Truth. Thus the *Chineſe* Hiſtory of

their moſt ancient Kings, eſpecially of *Fohi*, who liv'd ſoon after *Noah*, we cannot be certain of its Truth, nor accuſe them of Falſhood. In like manner we cou'd neither condemn as falſe, or aſſert as true, that there are in the Univerſe many Inhabitants more than Mankind, and that ſome Planets are the Reſidence of happier, and others of more unhappy Natives.

2. There are ſometimes certain Circumſtances which uſe to attend a Falſhood mixt with others, that are not improbable; but in ſuch a manner, that the later are either more numerous, or of greater weight. There occur in the Fables of the *Greeks*, the moſt ancient Account or Reports of that Nation; there are many manifeſt Lyes or Falſhoods, yet if we narrowly enquire into them, we ſhall obſerve many Circumſtances which ſhew, that it is highly probable that moſt of thoſe things happen'd to the old Inhabitants of ancient *Greece*, which gave occaſion to the Riſe of thoſe Fables; ſo that thoſe Things which are told by the Poets are not all Falſe, but that it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the Truth from the Falſhood.

3. There are other Things in which the Reaſons for our believing their Truth or Falſhood are equal. Many Authors paſs this Judgment of the *Giants* and Gigantic Bones, which are ſaid to be found in many Places. Of the ſame kind are moſt of thoſe Stories of the Apparitions of Evil Spirits, *&c.*

4. Secondly, Thoſe Propoſitions are ſuſpected of Falſhood, in which there are more and more weighty Marks or Signs of Falſhood than of Truth, tho' ev'n thoſe Signs be not forcible enough to compel our Aſſent. Theſe Signs are oppoſite to thoſe of Probability, from whence they may be eaſily gather'd.

5. We muſt obſerve here the ſame Cautions; which we have deliver'd about the probable Propoſitions: That is, that we doubt of the doubtful, and maintain our Suſpicion of thoſe which are ſuſpected of Falſhood. It wou'd be equaly raſh and inconſiderate to confound them either with thoſe which are evidently falſe, or evidently true. Nor ought they to be confounded with each other, as if where-ever there were any light occaſion of Doubt, there were a neceſſity of ſuſpecting Falſhood.

6. We may juſtly call in doubt thoſe Propoſitions, which are oppoſite to any *Mathematical*, or *Moral Evidence*. It is therefore falſe, that a Humane Body, ſome feet in length, can be

be contain'd in a thin bit of Bread; and of the ſame Nature wou'd that Propoſition be, which ſhou'd deny that there ever were ſuch a City as *Rome*.

7. But tho' this be the Nature of *falſe Propoſitions*, yet is it not always equaly known; and for that Reaſon, miſled by the liberty of giving our Aſſent to obſcure Ideas, we often aſſert that as a Truth, which is Falſe: Yet we can never own that for a Truth, the Falſity of which is fully known to us; for *Truth* and *Falſhood* are oppoſite.

8. The Univerſal Origin of the Error (and in which all others are contain'd) of believing that which is falſe to be true, is deriv'd from that Liberty we have mention'd, by means of which we give our Aſſent to Things that are obſcure, as if they were perſpicuous or plain: But there are other particular Cauſes of this Error, which are ſomething leſs general, and which are worth our notice, that we may be aware of them.

9. *Firſt*, Sometimes thoſe who are to deliver their Judgment think not of ſuch Reaſons, or Arguments, which yet are in the Nature of the Thing. If Judgment be given then, it is four to one but he errs. Thus, ſhou'd any one attempt to judge of the Elevation of the Pole, without proper Inſtruments, unleſs he had Information of it ſome other way, he may well be deceiv'd; or if he hit on the Truth, it will be more by Chance than any Certainty deriv'd from his Art. The ſame may be ſaid of determining of Nations without knowing the Hiſtory of them, and the like.

10. *Secondly*, The Ignorance of thoſe who argue, is another occaſion of Error, who often have not improv'd their Wit and Judgment by Study and Application. Theſe will not give their Aſſent, tho' the moſt weighty and forcible Reaſons are produc'd, which wou'd prevail with Men of Judgment and Skill, becauſe they have never learnt to reaſon well, nor ever apply'd their Minds to underſtand the Rules of Art. Thus we every day find, that moſt Mechanic Tradeſmen, who employ their Time in Manual Operations for the ſupport of Life, reaſon very fooliſhly on thoſe things which are out of their own Employments, admitting very ſilly and trifling Arguments, as ſolid; rejecting thoſe which are realy ſo, as vain and of no force. This is moſt obſervable in Religion and Party-matters, in which the Mob liſtens to any thing that is prodigious with thirſty Ears. Nay, Men of higher Stations, Men of Quality, who waſte their Lives in Luxury and Pleaſure, neglect their Judgment

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ſo far, that they ſcarce know or remember any thing beſides what they learn from that Inſtructreſs of Fools, *Experience*; and are eaſily drawn into the moſt abſurd Opinions, by the Adreſs of cunning Men, who have Art and Knowledge; of which we have too frequent Examples, both Ancient and Modern.

The third Cauſe of Error is, that Men often will not make Uſe of thoſe Arguments of *Truth* and *Falſhood*, that are, or may be known, which ariſes from Paſſions. *Impatience of Labour* (for Example) will not let them give themſelves the Fatigue of obſerving the long Connection of various Reaſons and Arguments, which all make their dependance on each other, or wait for the neceſſary Number of Experiments, which a thorough Knowledge requires; and ſo they paſs their Judgment before they are thoroughly acquainted with the Subject. Another Reaſon of this precipitate Judgment, is our *Luſt of Fame and Reputation*, which we are over-haſty to enjoy, while we wou'd ſeem to be Learned, before we realy are ſo. The *Hate* of ſome particular Man or Sect, makes us condemn them, without Enquiry, or Hearing their Arguments on any Account whatever. Of this (not to go ſo far back as the Heathens) we have frequent Examples, both among the Ancient and Modern *Chriſtians*.

12. The fourth Source of Error is the fallacious Rules of Probability, which may be principally refer'd to four Heads or Claſſes, which we tranſiently noted in our Diſcourſe of *Probability*.

13. The firſt is *doubtful Opinions*, which when admitted as certain, produce various other Errors, when they prove to be falſe themſelves. Thus, allowing that thoſe were real Miracles which are told us by the Monks of former Ages, as being done at the Tombs or Images of ſome Saint, it follows, that they are in the right who make Pilgrimages to ſuch Shrines, and Worſhip ſuch Images. And from theſe many more Errors wou'd enſue, for many Conſequences are deduc'd from one Principle.

14. The ſecond is of *receiv'd Opinions*, which are ſuppos'd to be evidently certain, from our having found them from our Childhood admitted by all thoſe with whom we have liv'd or convers'd, and whom we have lov'd. For 'tis no eaſy matter to eradicate, or ev'n render doubtful, an Opinion that has taken Root in us in our moſt tender years, before we cou'd form a Judgment of them. But Experience has

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ſhown us, that very many Opinions, which have been generally, ev'n univerſally receiv'd, by the greateſt and moſt extenſive Nations and People, are guilty of the greateſt Falſhood; and whence by conſequence is born a numerous Race of Fictions. Thus when moſt of the *Romans* believ'd that *Romulus* and *Remus* were nurs'd by a Wolf; that Folly being admitted, it prepar'd their Minds for the Reception of many other ſuch Trifles. Thus *Trogus Pompeius* wou'd enforce the Belief, that one of the moſt ancient Kings of *Spain* was ſuckled by a Hart, from what the *Romans* held about *Romulus* and *Remus*.

15. The third may be refer'd to the *Paſſions*, which prepare us for the Belief of certain Opinions, or arm us againſt giving Credit to others. That often ſeems to us probable, to have which true, may be of Conſequence to our Intereſt; for we eaſily believe what we deſire, and as eaſily hope that others think as we do. This is eaſily diſcover'd in our Wars; we ſcarce ever believe the Blunders of our own Generals, or the Defeats of our own Armies; on the contrary, we magnify our Victories, and the Sloath or ill Conduct of our Enemies. And in theſe things we are ſo poſſeſs'd with Paſſion, that we grow angry at thoſe who wou'd gently endeavour to ſhew us, on how weak a Bottom we have built thoſe Opinions. Thus in pannic Fears, or any general Terror, every little Report is ſufficient to throw a People into Conſternation and Deſpair.

16. In *Speculative Opinions*, we believe thoſe true from the Truth of which we derive Advantage, or imagine we do. There are, and have been, many among the *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Mahometans*, and not a few *Chriſtians*, who pretend to believe, or realy do, ſeveral things, the belief of which conduces to their Benefit. If any Doubts or Scruples ariſe in their Minds about theſe Opinions, which we cannot diſbelieve without Trouble or Danger, we ſtifle them in their very birth, by turning our Mind to, and employing it on, ſome other Object. We eaſily are perſuaded to believe thoſe things which will bring us Honour and Reputation, but with greater difficulty the contrary: Nay, Men are apt to betray this Paſſion of the Mind ſo far in Diſcourſe, that tho' they profeſs that they ſee and know the Truth, yet they diſcover a Willingneſs to believe the contrary, provided they cou'd be defended by any Authority.

17. When any ſuch Opinion is admitted by the choice of any Paſſion, that ſame Paſſion will eaſily perſuade us, that whatever

whatever is agreeable to that Opinion, and of Uſe to its Confirmation, is moſt true. Thus the *Romans* having allow'd and receiv'd the Superſtitious Opinion of Prodigies, they believ'd any thing of the ſame kind, eſpecially in Times of Diſtreſs or Difficulty: And the *Papiſts* having declar'd for Image-Worſhip, or the *Popes* Supremacy, with eagerneſs catch hold of any Opinion which may conduce to the Proof of them. But there are infinite numbers of this ſort of Error, which has its Source from our Paſſions.

18. The fourth ill Reaſon of *Probability*, is drawn from *Authority*, in our too great Credulity in that. We frequently find Men, who indeed ought to know perfectly well the Humane Underſtanding, and the Humane Faculties, giving Credit to another who aſſumes an Infallibility, tho' he has but very vain and empty Reaſons for his raſh Preſumption. Certainly Men ought never to yield their Aſſent to ſimple Authority, unſupported by Reaſon, when the Point is of Things which we can only know by their Relation, ev'n when that Relation has the Marks of Truth.

19. We muſt laſtly obſerve in all theſe Particulars, that there is a certain heap or complexion of Cauſes, which throw us into Error; and that we rarely fall into it by the Force of one alone. *Want of Arguments*; *Ignorance in our Enquiries* into thoſe which we have; a *Neglect* of them, by which we are unwilling to conſider them; *fallacious Reaſons* of Probability; *taking dubious* Opinions on Truſt for evident Truths; *Vulgar receiv'd* Opinions; the *Paſſions* of the Mind; *weak Authorities*; all theſe ſometimes break in upon our Mind at once, and ſometimes in divided Bodies, and ſo with Eaſe bear us down into Error.

20. Againſt all this there is one general Caution, which we have already laid down, and that is, That we never give our full Aſſent to any Propoſition whilſt it is dubious or obſcure, but we ſhou'd, as long as we can, deny our Aſſent, and proportion our Belief of Probability to the Degree, or Approach to Certainty or Truth.

21. But there are ſome other particular Antidotes to be drawn from our Conſideration of the Cauſes which lead us into Error; that is, we ought, with our utmoſt Care and Application, to examine, on our enquiry into the Truth or Falſhood of any Propoſition, whether our Inclination do admit or reject it, on account of ſome of thoſe Cauſes which we have laid down. If we find then never ſo little Reaſon to ſuſpect any ſuch thing, we ought to ſuſpend our Judgment

ment as long as poſſibly we can, and examine farther into the matter, and to conſult ſome other, who has not allow'd of this Opinion, from which alone great Help has been deriv'd.

CHAP. VI.

Of Faith, or Belief.

1. WE have ſaid that *Faith* or *Belief* may be referr'd to *Science* or *Opinion*, ſo that what we have ſaid of theſe two, may likewiſe be apply'd to *Faith*.

2. *Faith* or *Belief* in general, is ſaid to be that Aſſent we give to a Propoſition advanc'd by another, the Truth of which we gather not from our own immediate Reaſoning or Experience, but believe it diſcover'd by another. It may be diſtinguiſh'd into *blind* and *ſeeing*. That we call *blind Faith*, by which we give our Aſſent to a Propoſition advanc'd by another, of whoſe Veracity we have no certain and evident Reaſon or Proof; and this Belief or Faith is altogether unworthy of a Wiſe Man. The *ſeeing* Faith is that by which we give our Aſſent to a Propoſition, advanc'd by one who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd; but the more evident the Proofs of this is, ſo much the more ſtrong and vigorous is the Faith or Belief.

3. Faith has likewiſe been diſtinguiſh'd into *Divine* and *Humane*. By the firſt we believe what is affirm'd by *God*; by the later, what is told us by *Man*. When we are equally convinc'd they are the Words of God, as of Men, the *Divine* Faith is ſtronger than the *Humane*; becauſe we have vaſtly ſtronger Reaſons to believe, that God can neither deceive or be deceiv'd, than thoſe which wou'd perſuade us the ſame of any Man. But when there is any Doubt, whether or no any Propoſition is declar'd by God; or that God has commanded, that we ſhou'd believe ſuch a Thing; the Faith can be no ſtronger than the Reaſons on which it is founded. Yet ſometimes the Reaſons or Motives of believing Men are of ſuch Weight and Force, that being perfectly underſtood, they equal a Mathematical Evidence, and then the *Humane Faith* is as ſolid and unſhaken as the *Divine*, becauſe, on both ſides, we find an equal neceſſity of giving our Aſſent.

4. But ſince that which is properly call'd *Divine Faith* is immediately directed to God himſelf affirming ſomething,

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no Man can pretend to ſuch a Faith, but a Prophet, to whom God has immediately ſpoken. But all our preſent Faith depends on the Teſtimony of Men, of whoſe Veracity, however, we have the moſt certain Proofs, tho' much of their Force depend on our Knowledge of Hiſtory.

5. From hence we find, that all Faith or Belief has its Foundation on Reaſoning, which cannot deceive us when it neceſſarily compels our Aſſent. Thoſe to whom God immediately reveal'd his ſacred Will, believ'd him for certain Reaſons, and not with a *blind* Aſſent; that is, becauſe they knew he cou'd not deceive: We at this Day believe them, or rather their Writings, for certain Reaſons, which oblige us to believe all undoubted Hiſtories.

6. We might here go to farther Particulars about Faith in Revelations, which are neither unprofitable nor unpleaſant, but ſince they more properly belong to Divinity, we ſhall paſs them by.

CHAP. VII.

Of Diviſion.

1. WHen we diſcourſe of any compounded Thing, or Idea, we ought to conſider its Parts ſeparately, elſe while we confound the diſtinct Parts and Properties, we produce *Obſcurity*: But this is avoided by *Diviſion*, which enumerates the diſtinct Parts of the Thing that is the Subject of our Conſideration.

2. *Diviſion* is defin'd, *The Diſtribution of the* Whole *into all it contains*; but the *Whole* has a double Signification, whence alſo *Diviſion* is double.

3. That is a *Whole* which conſiſts of integral Parts, as thoſe Subſtances which are compos'd of various Parts, ſuch as the *Humane* Body, which may be divided into its ſeveral Members; and this *Diviſion* is call'd *Partition*.

4. But there is another *Whole*, which is properly a certain abſtract Idea, which is common to more Things than one, as the *Univerſals*; or a compounded Idea, which comprehends the Subſtance and its Accidents, or at leaſt moſt of its Accidents. The Parts of this *Whole* are call'd *Subjective*, or *Inferiour*.

5. This *Whole* has a triple *Diviſion*. The firſt is, when the *Kind* or *General* is decided by its *Species*, or *Particulars*, or *Differences*; as when *Subſtance* is divided into *Body*, and *Spirit*

Spirit into *Extended* and *Thinking*. The ſecond, when any Thing is divided into ſeveral Claſſes or Forines, by oppoſite Accidents; as when the Stars are divided into thoſe which give their own proper and unborrow'd Light; and thoſe of Opake Bodies, which reflect the Light of the Sun. The third is when the Accidents themſelves are divided according to the Subjects in which they inhere; as when *Goods* are divided into the Goods of the Mind, Body, and Fortune.

6. There are three Rules of a good *Diviſion*: The firſt is, *That the Members of the* Diviſion *entirely exhauſt the whole Thing that is divided*. Thus, when all Numbers are divided into *equal* and *unequal*, the *Diviſion* is good.

7. The ſecond Rule is, *That the Members of the* Diviſion *ought to be oppoſite*; as the Numbers *equal* and *unequal* are. But this Oppoſition may be made by a ſimple Negation; as, *corporeal, not corporeal*; or by poſitive Members; as, *extended, thinking*. And this laſt *Diviſion* is eſteem'd the better of the two, becauſe by it the Nature of the Thing is better made known.

8. The third Rule is, *That one Member of the* Diviſion *ought not to be ſo contain'd in another, that the other can be affirm'd of it*; tho' otherwiſe it may be in ſome manner included in it, without any Vice or Fault in the *Diviſion*. Thus *Extenſion* (Geometrically conſider'd) may be divided into a *Line*, *Surface* and *Solid*; tho' the *Line* be included in the *Surface*, and the *Surface* in the *Solid*; becauſe the *Surface* can't be call'd the *Solid*, nor the *Line* the *Surface*. But Numbers wou'd be very faultily divided into *equal*, *unequal*, and the *ſixth*, becauſe ſix is an equal Number.

9. For the ſake of Order and Perſpicuity, when we have found the *Diviſion*, we muſt take care to conceive it ſo, that it do not produce Confuſion and Obſcurity. When we examine into the Nature of any Thing,—*The* Diviſion *muſt not be made into too many, or too general Members*; for by this means diſtinct Things wou'd be confounded together. Thus ſhou'd any one, who was about to enquire into the Nature of all the Bodies which are known to us, divide them into thoſe which are in this our Earth, thoſe without it, and then, without any other Subdiviſion, proceed to his Enquiry into their Nature, he muſt without doubt find himſelf confounded.

10. *The Members ought by no means, unleſs the Subject neceſſarily require it, to be too unequal*. Such a Diviſion is theirs who divide the Univerſe into *Heaven* and *Earth*; for

the Earth, in compariſon of that vaſt Expanſe in which the Planets and fixt Stars are contain'd, which is call'd Heav'n, is leſs than a Point: For 'tis plain, that ſuch a Diviſion wou'd diſturb the Mind, whether we were ſearching after Truth, or teaching Truth diſcover'd to another.

11. But we muſt take heed on the other hand, *leſt, while we endeavour to make the Parts equal, we do not, as we may ſay, offer violence to the Nature of Things, by joining thoſe which are realy ſeparate, and ſeparating thoſe which are realy join'd together.* We muſt, therefore, have a nice Regard to the Connection of Things, leſt we violently break aſunder thoſe Things which are cloſely united; and join thoſe together which have no manner of Connection with one another.

12. We muſt farther take Care not to make our Diviſion too minute, leſt the Number of the Parts burthen the Memory, and deſtroy the Attention; which is a Vice utterly to be avoided by thoſe who wou'd Reaſon well.

13. Another Fault of *Diviſion* is, when inſtead of dividing real Parts of a Thing, we only enumerate the different Signification of Words.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Definition; *and firſt, of the* Definition *of the* NAME.

1. *Definition* is double; one of the *Thing*, and one of the *Name*. The firſt we eſteem the Nature of the *Thing*; the ſecond explains what Signification we give to any *Word* or *Name*; of the laſt here, referring the firſt to the next Chapter.

2. Since we do not always think to our ſelves only, but are oblig'd frequently to convey the Sentiments of our Minds to others, either in Words ſpoken or written, or be inform'd in the ſame manner of thoſe of other People, which otherwiſe we know not; we may lead others, or be led our ſelves, by others, into Errors, by the ambiguity of the Terms or Words that are made uſe of by either, unleſs we explain what we mean by ſuch ambiguous Words, by others that are not ambiguous.

3. We mean not here by Definition of the *Name*, the declaring the Uſe, or Signification of Words according to Cuſtom: We ſeek not in what Senſe others uſe any Word, but in what Senſe we ſhall make uſe of it in our future Diſcourſe.

4. We

4. We shall observe, that the Signification which we design to give to any Word, depends entirely on our Will and Pleasure; for we may affix what Idea we please to any Sound, which in it self signifies nothing at all. But the Definition of the Thing signify'd by any Sound, has not this dependance on our Will and Pleasure; for since its Nature is certain and determin'd in it self, our Words cannot make any manner of Alteration in it.

5. *Secondly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is entirely at our Will and Pleasure, it cannot be call'd in Question by any one else. But then we are to give always the same Sense to the same Word, to avoid Mistakes, for which End we define our Terms.

6. *Thirdly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is not to be call'd in Question, 'tis plain, it may be made use of, like an undoubted or self-evident Maxim, as the *Geometricians* do, who, more than all Men beside, make use of such Definitions; but we must take care, left we think, therefore, that there is any thing in the Idea affix'd to that defin'd Term which may not be controverted. It is an undoubted Principle, that some one has defined some Word in such a manner; but what he thinks of the Thing, is no undoubted Principle. Thus, if any one shou'd define *Heat to be that which is in those Bodies which heat us, and that it is like that Heat which we feel*, no Man cou'd find fault with the Definition, as far as it expresses what he means by the Word *Heat*; but this does not hinder us from denying, that there is any Thing in the Bodies that warm us like what we feel in our selves.

7. From what has been said, 'tis plain, that the Definition of the Name is of great Use in Philosophy; yet we cannot conclude from thence that all Words ought, or indeed can possibly be defin'd; for there are some so clear (to such who understand the Language we use) and of such a Nature, that they cannot be defin'd; as the Names of all simple Ideas, as we have shown under that Head.

8. Moreover, where the receiv'd Definitions are sufficiently clear, they ought not to be chang'd, because those who are accustom'd to the receiv'd Use, will understand us better and we our selves run not so great a Risque of Inconstancy, in not preserving our Definition. It is manifest, that those Words are better understood, to which we have been long us'd to affect certain Ideas, than those to which new ones are to be join'd; and we better remember the Sense of One, than of Two.

9. From hence likewise it follows, that we should, as little as possible, depart from the receiv'd Sense, when we are necessarily oblig'd to forsake it in some measure; for we sooner, and with more ease, accustom our selves to Significations of Words which are near, or related to those which are already admitted, than to those which are plainly remote, or us'd in a quite contrary Sense.

10. But this, as we have hinted, must be observ'd above all Things, that we always keep to the Definition which we have once made; else we confound our Hearers or Readers, and fall into seeming Contradiction, which renders our Discourse unintelligible.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Definition *of the* THING.

1. THE *Definition* of the *Name* depends entirely on our Will and Pleasure, but the *Definition* of the *Thing* we have no Power over; for we can by no means affirm that to be in a Thing or Idea which we consider, which is not in it. *Definition* is usually divided into *accurate*, and *less accurate*; the first is properly *Definition*, the second *Description*.

2. A *Definition*, properly so call'd, explains the Nature of the Thing defin'd by an Enumeration of its principal Attributes; of which those that are common to others, with the Thing defin'd, is call'd the *Kind* or *General*; but those which are peculiar the Thing defin'd, the *Difference*. Thus a Circle may be defin'd, *a Figure whose Circumference is every where equi-distant from the Centre*; the Word *Figure* is the *Kind* or *General*, as being a Name common to all other different Figures, as well as to a Circle; the rest are the *Difference*, since they distinguish a Circle from all other Figures.

3. But *Description* is an Enumeration of many Attributes, and ev'n those which are accidental. Thus, if any one is describ'd by his Deeds or Actions, or his Sayings or Writings, as if we shou'd instead of naming *Aristotle*, say, *The Philosopher, who obtains a Monarchy among the School-men without a Partner*.

4. Individuals cannot be defin'd, because tho' we know not their essential Properties by which they differ from others

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of the ſame Species, we muſt remember likewiſe, that the inmoſt Nature of Subſtances is unknown, and therefore they cannot be defin'd. Hence 'tis plain, that only the *Modes* whoſe whole Nature is known to us, can only be explain'd by a certain and properly call'd Definition.

5. There are three common Rules of a *Definition*, the firſt is, *That the Definition ſhou'd be adequate to the Thing defin'd*; that is, agree to all thoſe Things which are contain'd in the Species which is defin'd. The ſecond, *That the Definition ſhou'd be proper to the Thing defin'd*; for when the Definition makes us know the Thing defin'd from all other Things, it muſt be proper and agreeable to the Thing defin'd. The third, ſince we make uſe of a Definition to make known a Thing to another which he knew not before, *The Definition ought to be clear, and more eaſie and obvious than the Thing defin'd.*

6. Here we muſt again admoniſh the Reader, not to confound the receiv'd Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing. For this Reaſon the Definition of the Thing cannot be expreſs'd in Words plainly ſynonymous; as if any one ſhou'd ask what is the Supream Deity? and we ſhou'd anſwer, the Supream God; ſince the later explains no more the Nature or Attributes of that God than the former.

7. From theſe Obſervations we find, that Definition can only have place in compound Ideas, and is only the Enumeration of the chief ſimple Ideas of which they are compounded; but ſimple Ideas cannot be defin'd, becauſe there can be no Enumeration. He who knows not what that is which we call *Heat*, will only learn it by Experience, or ſome ſynonymous Word, or ſome Word of another Language, or by Circumlocution, by which the Thing is ſhown, not defin'd; as if we ſhou'd ſay, *That it was a Senſation, which we find when we ſit by the Fire, or walk in the Sunſhine*: By this we ſhou'd ſhew what Thing it was to which we gave that Name, but never explain its Nature. For, ſhou'd any one want that Senſe by which we have that Senſation, he wou'd no more underſtand what we meant, than a Man born Blind what was a Green Colour, by telling him it was that Senſation we have when we behold the Graſs in the Fields.

The Third Part *of* LOGIC;

OR,

The Art *of* REASONING.

CHAP. I.

Of METHOD, *both of* Reſolution *and* Compoſition.

1. HAving conſider'd our ſimple Perceptions, and the ſeveral ſorts of our Judgments, and ſhewn how in them we ſhou'd conduct our ſelves to avoid Errors; it remains, that we ſhew in what manner our Judgments ſhou'd be diſpos'd, that we may the ſooner, and with the greater ſafety, arrive at the Knowledge of Truth. This Part of *Logic* is call'd *Method*, which, contrary to the Cuſtom of the Schools, I ſhall treat with Diligence, as more conducive to the Knowledge of Truth than the following Part of Argumentation, on which, however, they were more prolix.

2. Since moſt Truths which fall under our Examination depend on the Knowledge of Others, from whence they are deduc'd by a certain Chain of Conſequences, it is not ſufficient to have deliver'd the Rules by which we know to what Propoſitions (ſeparately conſider'd) we may give our Aſſent; we muſt alſo ſhew how they are to be diſpos'd among themſelves, in regard of each other, that by them we may deſcend as it were by ſo many Steps to Truth, plac'd according to the old Proverb, in the bottom of a Well.

3. *Method* is twofold, one is of *Reſolution*, by which Truth is generally ſought after; the other of *Compoſition*, by which the Truth now found out is taught or imparted to another.

4. In

4. In the Method of *Reſolution* we proceed from ſome particular known Truth, to others which belong to ſome particular or ſingular Thing. In the Method of *Compoſition* we propoſe ſome certain general Truths, from which we deduce particular Truths.

5. If in the Method of *Reſolution* we propoſe any Maxims, it is not immediately in the beginning, and all together, and but once, but only as they are neceſſary for the finding out the Truth; on the contrary, in the Method of *Compoſition* they are propos'd all together in the beginning, before there is any need of them.

6. Theſe two Methods differ from each other, as the Methods of ſearching our Genealogy, deſcending from the Anceſtors to their Poſterity; or on the contrary, by aſcending from the Poſterity to the Anceſtors. Both of them have this in common, that their Progreſſion is from a Thing known, to that which is unknown. Thoſe Things which are known, by both are ſet in the Front, or firſt Place, that by them we may (by certain Conſequences deduc'd from them) be able to arrive at thoſe which are not known; and then all this Chain of Conſequences in both, conſiſt of Propoſitions connected with each other.

7. And theſe following Things are ſummarily requir'd in both, that Error may be avoided. Firſt, That no Propoſition be admitted as true, to which you can deny your Aſſent, or which is not evident. Next, The Connection of the following Propoſition to the foregoing, in every Step of the Progreſſion be likewiſe evident or neceſſary; otherwiſe, if in a long Chain of Propoſitions we admit but one Propoſition or Conſequence that is doubtful or falſe, whatever was directly deduc'd from thence, muſt of neceſſity be either dubious or falſe.

8. To make this plainer, we ſhall firſt propoſe an Example of the Method of *Reſolution*, and then one of that of *Compoſition*. Let us ſuppoſe this to be the Queſtion, *Whether on the Suppoſition of Man's Exiſtence, we can prove, that God does exiſt?* To reſolve this, our Method muſt be thus: (1.) Humane Kind, which now inhabit the Earth, did not always exiſt, all Hiſtory whatever ſtill fixing a Beginning to Mankind: This they do not only aſſert in expreſs Words, but by the whole Series and Courſe of what they treat, make it manifeſt, ſince there is no Hiſtory which pretends to give us an Account of more than about 6000 Years. (2.) If Humane Kind did not always exiſt, but had a Beginning, there is a Ne-

Neceſſity that there ſhou'd be ſome other Cauſe of its Exiſtence; for from nothing, nothing can ariſe. (3.) Whatever that Cauſe is, it muſt have at leaſt all thoſe Properties, which we find in our ſelves; for none can give what he has not himſelf. (4.) Farther, there is a Neceſſity that there ſhou'd be in this Cauſe Properties which are not in us, ſince he cou'd do that which we cannot do, that is, make Man exiſt, who before had no Being, or that the Mind and Body of Man ſhou'd begin to exiſt, which Power we by no means find in our ſelves. (5.) We find that we have the Power or Faculty of *Underſtanding* and *Willing*, and a Body which can be mov'd various ways. (6.) Therefore, there muſt be thoſe Properties, and many far more excellent in the Cauſe of Humane Kind, ſuch as the Power of drawing out of nothing or making ſomething to exiſt, which had before no Exiſtence at all. (7.) But this Cauſe either exiſts ſtill, or has ceas'd to be. (8.) If he do not ſtill exiſt, he did not exiſt from Eternity; for whatever exiſted from Eternity, can neither by it ſelf, or by any other Cauſe, be reduc'd to Nothing. (9.) If it did not exiſt, it muſt have been produc'd by ſome other, for whatever has a Beginning muſt be generated by ſome other. Then wou'd the ſame Queſtion return of the Producer, which may be thus generally ſolv'd: All Things that are, had a Beginning, or they had none. Thoſe which had a Beginning, were produc'd by Cauſes which had none; therefore, if there be any Thing that does exiſt, there are eternal Cauſes. (10.) It muſt, therefore, be confeſs'd, that there is ſome eternal Being, which has in it ſelf all thoſe Properties which we find in our ſelves, and infinitely more, Whether he immediately created us by himſelf, or by any other Nature? which is not here the Queſtion. (11.) If this Cauſe of Humane Kind do ſtill exiſt, the ſame Reaſoning wou'd return which we us'd in the 9th and 10th Steps of our Progreſſion. (12.) Therefore, it neceſſarily follows from the Exiſtence of Humane Kind, that God does exiſt, or ſome eternal Cauſe, which mediately or immediately created Mankind.

9. Thus by the Method of *Reſolution* we prove, or rather find out the Exiſtence of a God. And we may teach or convey this Truth thus found out to others, by the Method of *Compoſition*, in this manner. (1.) All Beings have a Beginning of Exiſtence, or they have none. (2.) Nothing can come out of Nothing, or begin to exiſt by its own Power, when it had no Exiſtence. (3.) All thoſe Things, therefore,

fore, which had a Beginning, muſt be produc'd by ſome Being that had no Beginning. (4.) Humane Kind had a Beginning. (5.) It was therefore produc'd mediately, or immediately by ſome eternal Cauſe. (6.) That Cauſe we call *God*; and, therefore, *Humane Kind were created by God.*

10. All theſe Propoſitions, as we have obſerv'd, ought in both Methods to be nicely examin'd, that none be admitted as certain, and known, which is not ſo; and that no Conſequence be ſtid in which is not neceſſary. Having ſo done, we may know that we have found the Truth, or are taught the ſame by Others.

11. There are ſome Helps to be had for the more eaſy performance of this Task, and which are to be taught more diſtinctly, or with greater care and conſideration, becauſe on them depend the whole eaſineſs and certainty of ſuch Reaſons or Arguments as are alledg'd. Firſt, what ought to be the Diſpoſition of the Mind for the more happy diſcovery of Truth: Secondly, we ſhall deliver the Rules of the Method of *Reſolution*; and Thirdly, thoſe which belong to the Method of *Compoſition.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Neceſſity of Attention, *and the Means of obtaining it.*

1. WE have more than once aſſerted, that Evidence is the Main, or Criterion of Truth. But this Knowledge is not enough to direct our Enquiry after Truth, becauſe that Evidence is not always to be had, nor does the Mind diſcover it ſometimes, without a long Labour and Fatigue. We muſt, therefore, enquire by what Means we may obtain this Evidence in our Thoughts.

2. It is not enough that we can form Ideas of all Things, which we can conceive in our Minds to come at the Knowledge of Truth, but the Mind muſt conſider them with the greateſt and moſt lively Attention, if we wou'd obtain a thorough Knowledge of them.

3. We have ſhewn, that our Judgments are the Perceptions of certain Relations, in which the Mind does acquieſce, and that our Errors of Judgment ariſe from it, does acquieſce in obſcure Perceptions, as if they were clear, before it has with ſufficient Care examin'd into their Nature.

4. In

4. In Judgments of the Mind we ſhou'd uſe the ſame Method as in Judgments of the Eyes, which approach the obſcurer Objects nearer, and employ the help of artificial Lights, narrow looking into, to it; ſo ſhou'd the Mind in Judgments reſtrain its Aſſent, till it has with the utmoſt Attention conſider'd according to the Nature of the Thing into, which it enquires. Hence it appears of how great and neceſſary uſe Attention is, which is only a long and uninterrupted Conſideration of any one Idea, without the Interpoſition of any others.

5. We find that we are much more attent, and with greater eaſe apply our Thoughts to the Conſideration of thoſe things which affect us by the Intervention of our Senſes, certain Images of which are before the Mind, and ſuch as excite ſome Affection or Paſſion, than to thoſe which came into the Mind without any of theſe Things. Thus we are attent in the Conſideration of any enlighten'd Body, in ſome Image of a corporeal Thing offer'd to the Enquiry of the Mind; and in the Conſideration of a Thing that may bring us Advantage or Damage, which ſtrikes us with Fear, or Deſire.

6. Every one who has try'd it before Uſe has bred a facility, knows that 'tis much more difficult to fix the Mind on abſtract Ideas for any Time. The Reaſon of the difference is plain, becauſe the Mind in other Things finds aſſiſtance from the Intervention of the Body, as 'tis affected with more ſprightly and lively Senſations and Images, which will thruſt themſelves on it whether it will or not: On the contrary, in abſtract Contemplations, and which derive nothing from the Body, corporeal Motions obſtruct the Attention while they perpetually recall the Mind to Bodies, at the ſame time that the Object of the Mind has nothing in it ſelf that can much affect it, or engage the Attention; nay, when the Mind is employ'd in theſe abſtract Conſiderations, it muſt with all its Force baniſh all corporeal Images which croud perpetually upon it. Nor can this be perform'd without Pain, ſince the Law of Nature has oblig'd the Mind to be in Pain, when Force is offer'd to the Body.

7. Having laid down this, we muſt try whether or no we cannot encreaſe the Attention by the help of the Senſes and Imaginative Faculty, ev'n in things that are meerly incorporeal. By what Art this may be done, we ſhall ſhew hereafter; but above all things we ſhou'd take care that the Inconvenience do not ariſe, which uſually follows the Commotions

motions of the Mind by the Senſes, Imagination, or Paſſions; that is, when the Mind is ſomething more vehemently affected, it is turn'd in ſuch a manner to the Object which affects it, that it takes notice of nothing elſe. Then is this Motion ſo far from aſſiſting the Attention to Ideas of incorporeal Things, that on the contrary it proves an Obſtacle to it.

8. Hence this important Conſequence in our Enquiry after Truth is drawn, that they, who wou'd ſeriouſly apply themſelves to the ſearch after Truth, ſhou'd avoid, as much as they poſſibly can, all the more ſtrong and vehement Senſations; ſuch as great Noiſes, Light too ſtrong and glaring, Pain, Pleaſure, *&c.* They ſhou'd likewiſe take Care that their Imagination be not too vehemently mov'd by any Object, which ſhou'd infect it ſo far, as to make them think of it whether they will or not; for by this means the Attention will frequently be interrupted. Firſt, they ought not to be accuſtom'd to the ſtronger Emotions of the Paſſions; for thoſe who experience frequently theſe Perturbations, contract ſuch a Habit of Mind, that they can ſcarce think of any think elſe but the Objects of the Paſſions, or thoſe things which have ſome Connection with them; but ſince, for Reaſons which we ſhall not touch on here, no Man can be entirely exempt from them, they muſt make it their Endeavours to ſeek ſome Aſſiſtance from thoſe unavoidable Evils to their Enquiries after Truth.

9. The Senſes may be of advantage to the promoting the Attention, if we make uſe of them as the *Geometricians* do, who expreſs inviſible Quantities by Lines, Numbers, and Letters; for by this means the Mind more eaſily adheres to, attends, and is fix'd to the Thing which it enquires after; for while the Eyes are fix'd on the Figures, the Mind contemplates the Thing whoſe Signs they are. And this is done with the more ſafety, becauſe there is no Danger of confounding the Figures with the Thing he ſeeks, there being no Relation between them, but what he makes. Thus the ſwiftneſs and duration of any Motion can be examin'd by the Deſcription of certain Figures, which the *Geometrician* can never believe to be the Thing that is the Subject of his Enquiry.

10. By this means we may without Danger make Uſe of our Senſes in Ratiocination. That is, that we may not be oppreſs'd by the multitude of the Relations that are to be conſider'd, they may be expreſs'd on Paper by certain Words. Beſides, we give more eaſie Attention to Propoſi-

tions

tions already expres'd, and set down on Paper, than to their Ideas. We can review more often, and with more ease our Marks in long Arguments, when we have fix'd the Signs of them on Paper, than when we have them only in our Minds.

11. But these ought to be look'd on as Helps which may be made use of by young Beginners, but shou'd not be offer'd to those of riper Understanding, lest they shou'd accustom themselves too much to them, so that it render them incapable of understanding any thing without the Assistance of some corporeal Image.

12. The Faculty which brings the Images of corporeal Things to the Mind, is most strictly united to the Senses; and therefore belongs to what is said of the Senses, and yet afford a particular help to assisting the *Attention*. For example, when we in silent Contemplation compare the Ideas with the external and corporeal Objects, we may observe the like in the Operations of the Eyes as in the Actions of the Mind.

13. If we are to explain to others what we have found out, they will give more Attention to a Comparison, than to a bare and naked Exposition of the Thing; they will sooner apprehend and understand us, and remember it better. Hence arose the manner in the remotest Antiquities of using Fables, which was long in Vogue among the Oriental Nations.

14. But here we must beware of the Error of the Ancients in this Particular, which was, while they with too much Zeal sought the Attention of the Unskilful, they had Recourse to so many Figures and Phrases drawn from corporeal Things, that they offer'd to their Minds scarce any Thing but the Ideas of corporeal Beings: So that the Truth being overwhelm'd with those Figures, was perfectly hid, and cannot without the utmost difficulty be freed from them by the Learned themselves.

15. We must, farther, be very cautious of avoiding an Error too common to the Ancients and Moderns, who fancy'd the Comparison, or some other Figure, which was only to illustrate the Things, was really an Argument to prove them.

16. That the Passions often are Enemies to the Knowledge of Truth no body can doubt, and we have shown; many have made a Doubt whether they are ever of any use to it; yet since they are not Evil in their own Nature, they may by good Management be of great help to the encreasing

the Attention; nay, perhaps we may say, that it is never extreamly sharp without some Passion. Thus we may make a happy Use of the Desire of Glory, if we keep it within its due Moderation. When this Passion is alone, it is dangerous; other Passions are therefore to be excited in us, which shou'd hinder us from suffering our selves to be born down by the Desire of Glory: And this is the very Desire of knowing the Truth, which is in the Minds of all Mankind; for there is no Man that loves to be deceiv'd, nor any Man that is pleas'd with Ignorance.

17. But we must, ev'n here, take Care that the Desire of finding out the Truth be not the only Cause of our Judgments; for the Passions never give any Light to the Judgment, but only excite our Enquiry after what is advantageous for us to know: But the Judgment ought not to be given as long as we can withhold it, in things of which we can have an evident Knowledge.

CHAP. III.

Of the Capacity of the Mind, *and the Means of enlarging it.*

1. WE call that Mind *capacious* that has many Ideas before it at once; and the more of those it can have a distinct Perception of at once, the larger, or more capacious is the Mind; and the fewer, the more narrow we esteem it. The *Capacity* therefore of the Mind is enlarg'd by contracting a Habit or Custom of considering many Ideas at once without Confusion. We mean not all *together* and at *once*, that in one numerical individual Moment, and one only Perception of the Mind, many Things can be distinctly understood, since 'tis certain that few Things can be distinctly view'd together. But this Expression is to be allow'd the Latitude of meaning a very short Time; and the Reason we used the Term together, is, that there is no external Mensuration of Time to divide the Rapidity of the Minds motion from one Thought to another.

2. If any one shou'd demand, whether the Minds of all Men were alike, except what difference is made by Education? we shou'd only answer, That we do not certainly know, but that Experience gives us a certain Confirmation of two Things.

3. That some have so unhappy a Genius, that it is with Difficulty they conceive the Connection of two Propositions, unless they fall on Subjects with which their Experience has been conversant, but are perfectly blind in Contemplation, nor can in the least discover any difference betwixt a good and bad Ratiocination. Others again have a Mind something larger than this, and can by one View of the Mind comprehend more than one Connection of Propositions; but if the deduction of Consequences be something longer than ordinary, they cannot extricate themselves. But then there are some happy Genius's which can with ease, if not at one view, yet in a very little Time, and few Thoughts, comprehend a long Chain of Propositions. They are neither fatigu'd nor disturb'd with that Number of Propositions which would absolutely confound some Others.

4. It is apparent from Experience in the second place, that the *Capacity* of the Mind can be enlarg'd by a frequent Use of thinking of many Things at once. 'Tis sufficiently known, that the young Learners of *Geometry*, *Arithmetic*, or *Algebra*, are at first disturb'd with the number of Ideas to be consider'd together; nor can they, without a very painful Attention, understand what they read, or are taught, by reason of the number of Ideas which are to be consider'd: As for Example, —— Those who at first endeavour to learn the *Rule of Division*, are confounded or puzzl'd by the manifold comparison of the *Divisor* and *Dividend*; and they are surprizd to consider how the Master that teaches them shall be able at one View, or at least with very few, to comprehend the Connection of so many Propositions as are form'd in a long Arithmetical Operation; yet the same Students of this Art, after they have apply'd themselves to the Study of Accounts for some Months, comprehend many Operations with ease in their Mind, which before they cou'd not take one. Whence 'tis evident, that the Capacity of the Mind will admit of an Encrease.

5. If it shou'd farther be ask'd, whether the Capacity of all Men cou'd be improv'd by the same Method? we may answer, That Experience has shown us, that all such who can that way improve their Minds, have by it enlarg'd their Capacity; for there are some who, from their first Application, cou'd never make any Progress in these Studies; but among those who are not wholly incapable of these Studies, some make a swifter and greater Progress than others, even from the beginning, whether this be the effect of the Nature of the Mind or the Body.

6. To

6. To come to the point it self, whoever has a Desire to enlarge the Capacity of his Mind, must make it his endeavour to have his Attention at his Command, so as to apply it when, and to what he pleases, which may be obtain'd by the Means propos'd in the former Chapter. For he that cannot be attentive to a Few, will much less be capable of understanding Many together, and not be confounded by the Multiplicity of the Objects.

7. But since the Capacity of the Mind, as we have seen, is a Faculty within us by Nature, whatever we do to acquire it, as we have express'd it, comes only to this, that by frequent Exercise we render its Use easie to us. We must only examine on what Objects it is chiefly exercis'd.

8. Objects are of two kinds; one are Mathematical, the other cannot be treated Mathematically. Whatever can be examin'd in a Geometrical Method (which we shall deliver when we shall treat of the *Method* of Composition) are Mathematical; and of this kind are all things of which we can have a perfect Knowledge, that is, whatever belongs, or relates to *Modes*.

9. All who have apply'd themselves to the enlarging the Capacity of the Mind, tell us, that it is acquir'd by the Consideration of these Things. And 'tis certain, that in *Arithmetic* (to instance one part of the *Mathematics* for all) the manifold Parts of the Object are so distinctly noted, and so clearly perceiv'd, that provided the Attention be apply'd, there is no manner of danger of our being confounded. In Computation or Accompts, there are, first, as many *Objects* as *Unites*; next, certain *Names* are impos'd (for Brevity's sake) on certain Collections of *Unites*, without producing any Confusion, how great soever the Collection of *Unites* may be; as one *Hundred*, a *Thousand*, an *Hundred Thousand*, a *Million*, &c. Lastly, there are long Comparisons of Numbers made in the gross without coming to any one particular, or alone, but of many collectively together, and at once. For whether we add or substract, multiply or divide, to which all *Arithmetic* is reduc'd, many Numbers are consider'd at once, except only the Number *Two*, which consists only of two *Unites*; but in the Computation of that, there is not any need of Art.

10. In Computation therefore, we exercise the Faculty of distinctly understanding many Things together, which we call the *Capacity of Genius*; for we shou'd still remember, that this Capacity we speak of ought always to be join'd

with this diſtinct Perception, ſince a confus'd Underſtanding of Things is of no Uſe to the finding out of Truth.

11. The Conſideration of Subſtances cannot be Mathematically diſcuſs'd; and we ſhou'd in vain imagin, that in theſe the Capacity of the Mind cou'd ever be acquir'd; for ſince we have no clear Knowledge of particular Subſtances, much leſs can we know with Perſpicuity a Collection of Subſtances together, we can only conſider their Properties, and the Relations that there is between them.

12. Hence we may gather, that the Mind cannot be render'd more capacious by the Conſideration of *Genus* and *Species* of the old Philoſophers, who rang'd all Subſtances under thoſe Heads, becauſe it is an uncertain Diviſion of unknown Objects.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Laws of the Method of Reſolution.

1. BEfore we proceed to the Laws of the Method of *Reſolution*, we muſt recal to our Memory certain Maxims on which they are built. The firſt is what we have more than once taken notice of, *viz. That we muſt conſider Evidence in every Step or Degree of our Progreſſions in our Reaſoning or Arguments*; unleſs we wou'd run the Riſque of falling into Error.

2. The next is the Conſequence of this, *That we ought to Reaſon on thoſe Things only, of which we have clear and perſpicuous Ideas; or on obſcure Things only ſo far as we know them.* Whence we may gather, that our Reaſoning ought to be only converſant about the Properties and Modes of Subſtances and abſtract Ideas, and not about the inmoſt Nature of Things extreamly obſcure.

3. The third Maxim is, *That we ought always to begin from the ſimple and eaſie, and to dwell on them a while, before we proceed to Things compounded and more difficult:* For we ought firſt to have a clear Perception of ſimple Ideas, elſe we can never have a ſufficient Knowledge of the Compounded.

4. Theſe general Maxims are the common Principles of both the Method of *Reſolution* and *Compoſition*. For in both Methods are equally requir'd Evidence in the Degrees or Steps of Progreſſion, choice of the Subject of our Enquiries, and the Knowledge of Things ſimple before thoſe that are com-

compounded; as will appear from what follows. But now we ſhall proceed to thoſe Laws which are peculiar to the Method of *Reſolution*.

5. The firſt is, *That we muſt clearly and perfectly underſtand the State of the Queſtions propos'd.* If we propoſe any Thing as the Subject of our Enquiry, it is neceſſary to avoid rambling from the Point, that we have a diſtinct Knowledge or Idea in our Mind of the Thing we examine. If the Queſtion be propos'd by others in certain Words, we ought, before we proceed to the Solution, to have a diſtinct and clear Knowledge of the meaning of every Word, in which it is expreſs'd.

6. Having now a diſtinct Knowledge of the Subject of our Enquiry, and the Ideas which are contain'd in the Queſtion being now to be compar'd, another Law is, *That with ſome force and effort of the Mind, one or more middle Ideas muſt be diſcover'd, which ſhou'd be like a common Meaſure or Standard, by whoſe help the Relations between the Ideas to be compar'd be found out.*

7. But when the Queſtions are difficult, and ſtand in need of a long diſcuſſion, the third Law is, *That we cut off all that has no neceſſary Relation to the Truth ſought after from the Thing which is the Subject of our Conſideration.*

8. When the Queſtion is reduc'd to its narroweſt Bounds, that is, when we diſtinctly perceive the Matter in diſpute, having rejected all that does not neceſſarily belong to it, the fourth Law is, *That the compounded Queſtion be divided into Parts, and thoſe to be ſeparately conſider'd in ſuch Order, that we begin with thoſe which conſiſt of the more ſimple Ideas, and never proceed to the more compounded, till we diſtinctly know the more ſimple, and by Reflection have render'd them eaſie to our Conſideration.*

9. When by Reflection we have obtain'd a diſtinct Knowledge of all the Parts of the Queſtion, and manage it with eaſe in our Minds, thus the fifth Law is, *That certain Signs of our Ideas comprehended in eſtabliſh'd Figures, or in the feweſt Words that can be, be imprinted in the Memory, or mark'd on Paper, leſt the Mind have any more trouble about them.* This Law ought chiefly to be obey'd when the Queſtions are difficult, and conſiſt of many Heads, tho' it be not unuſeful ev'n in thoſe that are more eaſie. By the help of this Law the Reaſoning is ſooner concluded, than if they were conceiv'd in many Words and other Signs; and we thus likewiſe ſooner diſcover the Connection of the Parts.

10. When thoſe Things which are neceſſary to the Queſtion are clear to us, and mark'd with compendious Signs, and diſpos'd in Order, Then *muſt the Ideas* (by the ſixth Law) *be compar'd with each other, either by Reflection alone, or by expreſs Words.* When more Things than one are to be compar'd, the Memory and Judgment receive great Aſſiſtance from Writing, which are eaſily otherwiſe confounded, and we can make but an ill Judgment of Things confus'd.

11. If after we have compar'd all the Ideas, whoſe Signs we have committed to Paper, we cannot yet find out what we ſeek, then the ſeventh Law ſuggeſts, *That we cut off all the Propoſitions, which after a full Examination we find of no Uſe to the Solution of the Queſtion, then we may again proceed in the ſame Order in the reſt, which is deliver'd in the ſix preceding Laws.*

12. If after we have repeated this Examination as often as it is neceſſary, nothing of what we have mark'd ſeems to conduce to the Solution of the Queſtion, we muſt confeſs, that, as to us, it is not to be reſolv'd, ſince whatever we cou'd diſcover in its Parts prove inſufficient to ſolve it. We ought therefore to throw it entirely aſide, or conſult ſome Perſon more knowing in the Subject, or better skill'd in Enquiries.

13. Theſe are the Laws of the Method of *Reſolution*, all which are not to be obſerv'd in all Queſtions; for one or two of them are ſufficient for ſimple Queſtions, or thoſe which conſiſt of but few Propoſitions. But when they are very much compounded and intricate, we muſt often come to the laſt, and that to be repeated more than once. But this being a Matter of very great importance, we ſhall diſcourſe of them ſeparately in ſeveral *Chapters*.

CHAP. V.

Of the three Maxims on which all Method *is built.*

1. WE ſhall ſay nothing more than we have already on the firſt Maxim about *preſerving Evidence in every Step or Degree of Knowledge*; but we cou'd not but take Notice of it in this place, both to make appear the Connection of thoſe that follow with it, and alſo becauſe it cannot be too much inculcated to Men who have been us'd to give their Aſſent to Things that are obſcure.

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2. The next, which is the Conſequence of the former, is, *That we ought not to Reaſon on Things of which we have no clear Ideas, or of obſcure Things, as far as they are obſcure.* We muſt not take this Maxim in a Senſe that ſhou'd exclude the Nature of all Things which are yet unknown to us from our Enquiries; for this wou'd be directly oppoſite to our Deſign, by which we aim to open a way to the Diſcovery of Truths unknown to us.

3. But we are of Opinion, that a Philoſopher ought not to Reaſon on obſcure Things, in a double Senſe: the firſt is, That he ought not to chooſe ſuch Objects of his Contemplation, which it is plain cannot be diſcover'd by evident Demonſtrations. (1.) Thus, as ſeveral *Geometricians* have demonſtrated, the *ſquaring of the Circle*, and the *doubling the Cube*, cannot be found out. (2.) Thus we cannot diſcover what is the inmoſt Nature of Things; all we can know of that, is, that Experience has ſhown us, that there do co-exiſt in Subſtances certain Properties: We ſhou'd therefore reject the Enquiry into Subſtances, and only conſider their Properties. (3.) If we cannot find out the inmoſt, or whole Nature of any one created Subſtance, much leſs muſt we pretend to diſcover the Subſtance of that Supream Nature which created all the reſt. We may gather, as it were by Experience, from thoſe Properties which we ſee in the Creatures, that they are in the Creator, ſince no body can give what he has not, yet we cannot conceive how all the real Properties of all Creatures can co-exiſt in God.

4. The other Senſe of this Maxim is, That no certain Conſequence can be drawn from a Principle that is unknown or uncertain. Tho' this be a Maxim allow'd by all Philoſophers, both ancient and modern, yet have they all offended againſt it, perſuading themſelves that they do know their Principles to be clear and certain, which yet are often very uncertain, and many times not known at all. Thus all that we have any clear Perception of in our Minds, is the Property of Thinking; and therefore we cannot poſitively affirm, that there is any other in it; nor on the otherſide, can we deny that there is, becauſe there may be ſome, of which we are ignorant.

4. But it is here neceſſary to take notice (leſt any one ſhou'd wreſt what we mean by our Mind into another Senſe) that what we ſay is not to be underſtood as if we cou'd not deny Contradictions. For 'tis one thing to deny that any particular is not in a Subject beſides what we ſee, and

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another to deny that the ſame thing can be, and not be, in the ſame Subject at the ſame Time. Thus we cannot affirm, that there is nothing elſe in our Mind beſides the Faculty of Thinking, becauſe we diſcover nothing elſe in it; but we may without danger of Error, deny that the Mind, whilſt it is thinking, is deſtitute of Thought, ſince we clearly perceive that one of theſe two Propoſitions is neceſſarily falſe.

5. To obſerve the ſecond Caution which we have mention'd, we muſt neceſſarily examine with our utmoſt Diligence into the Principles laid down, before we proceed to the Conſequences of them. We are taught by the third Maxim, *That we muſt begin with the ſimple and eaſie Things, and dwell on them ſometime, before we proceed to the compounded and difficult.* Thus to learn *Arithmetic*, the Student muſt be perfectly acquainted with, and fix in his Memory the firſt four Rules of, *Addition*, *Subtraction*, *Multiplication* and *Diviſion*, before he can to any purpoſe proceed to the Rule of *Three*, and the following Rules.

CHAP. VI.

Of the firſt Rule of the Method of Reſolution.

1. ALL our Judgments being only the Perceptions of Relations, in which Perceptions we acquieſce, it is manifeſt, that when we enquire into any thing which is unknown to us, we only ſeek after an unknown Relation. When therefore we ſay in the firſt Rule, *that we muſt perfectly and clearly know the State of the Queſtion propos'd*; 'tis the ſame thing as if we ſhou'd tell you, that you are to take particular Care leſt you ſuppoſe that Relation the Object of your Enquiry, which does by no Means come under our Conſideration; for unleſs the ſought Relation be mark'd with ſome certain Note, we ſhall neither know what we ſeek, nor know it when found out.

2. But if ſuch a Relation be plainly and clearly known, you may ſay, How can we then make any farther Enquiry about it? But then ſay we, can there be any Deſire of knowing any thing of which we have no manner of Knowledge? None at all. That which is ſought, therefore, ought neceſſarily to be diſtinguiſh'd from all things elſe, that we may know it when we find it, and ſo far know it, before we make any Enquiry about it. No Queſtion can ever be ſolv'd, whoſe Terms are not in ſome meaſure known to us. Thus

for

for Example, we enquire, *What thoſe two Numbers are between which there is ſuch a Relation, as if you take a Unite from one, and add it to the other, they ſhall be equal; but on the contrary, if you add the Unite taken from the other, to that from which you ſubtracted, the Number ſhall be double to the other?* Tho' the Numbers between which there is this Relation be not known, yet are they ſo far known, that that Relation ought to be between them, whence they are acknowledg'd as ſoon as ever they are found out.

3. When a Queſtion is conceiv'd in Words, thoſe Words ought to be diſtinctly underſtood; or the Ideas which are ſignify'd by every Word ought to be thoroughly known to us. All Equivocation in the Terms muſt therefore be entirely remov'd, leſt, for one Queſtion, as many ariſe as there are different Senſes of the Propoſition; nor can we apprehend what Senſe he that propoſes it (if propos'd by another) gives his equivocal Propoſition.

4. If we cannot underſtand all the Senſes of the Words in which a Queſtion is conceiv'd, we can never know whether we have given it a Solution in the Senſe in which it was propos'd, which often happens in general Queſtions, and the occaſion of which is not ſufficiently known: Thus we can only gheſs at the Places in old Authors, which cannot be ſolv'd but by the Series of the Context.

5. When we have render'd the Terms in which any Queſtion is conceiv'd as plain and clear to us as we can, we muſt apply our Attention to the Conſideration of the Conditions, if there be any in it. If we underſtand not them, the Queſtion remains obſcure; for they often ſhew us the way to ſolve the Queſtion. If there be none expreſs'd or underſtood, then is the Queſtion general, in which we muſt obſerve thoſe Things which we have already deliver'd on that Head: But if the Conditions are not expreſs'd, but underſtood, tho' neceſſary, it can never be ſolv'd, if we have not the Opportunity of asking the Propoſer of it what they are. If the Conditions added to the Queſtion be ſuperfluous and of no Uſe, they muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from thoſe which are neceſſary; for without this, we often run after things of no Moment, and leave thoſe which are of Importance and Neceſſary, without any Notice.

6. This Queſtion may be propos'd—*to find out two Numbers, one of which deſign'd by the Letter* A, *ſhall be two Unites greater than another deſign'd by the Letter* B; *ſo that taking a Unite from* B, *and adding it to* A, A *ſhall be doubled.* The Con-

Condition of this Queſtion is conceiv'd in the Words *ſo that*, &c. thoſe therefore muſt have our Attention, becauſe without them the Queſtion is not underſtood. For the Queſtion is not ſimply, how a Number may be found out greater by two Unites than another, but ſuch Numbers in which that occurs which is in the Condition, which are 7 and 5.

7. The neceſſary Condition wou'd be omitted in this Queſtion, *Whether a Man, by putting his Finger in his Ear, cou'd be render'd ſo immoveable, as not to be able to walk till his Finger be taken out of his Ear?* A Queſtion propos'd in theſe Words wou'd be deny'd, becauſe the putting the Finger in the Ear cannot render any one immoveable. But this difficulty is remov'd by adding, *That the Man ſhall be ſo plac'd, that his Arm ſhall embrace a ſolid fixt Pillar, when he puts a Finger of that Arm into his Ear.*

8. Farther, ſometimes there are idle Conditions annex'd to the Queſtion propos'd, which conduce nothing at all to the Matter; as if we ſhou'd propoſe, *To make a Man, anointed with ſweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland, not able to lie ſtill, tho' he ſee not any thing that can move him.* Shou'd any one ſtop at, and conſider the meaning of this part, which ſays, *anointed with ſweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland*, he wou'd ſpend his Pains to no purpoſe, ſince thoſe Words have nothing to do with the Matter; But this is done, by putting a Man into a Ship driven on by the Winds; or if he fall from a Tower, or any other high place; for he will of neceſſity be mov'd, tho' he ſee not what it is that gives that Motion, ſince he is driven on by a Matter that do's not fall under the Senſe of Seeing.

9. Nor is this only to be regarded in ſuch Queſtions as are only feign'd for the Exerciſe of the Mind, for the like Caſes occur in Things drawn from the Critical Art, and from Natural Philoſophy, and all other Parts of Learning. Thus if we examine, what any particular Word does ſignify generally conſider'd? The Anſwer, tho' true, is very rarely of any Conſequence to the Solution of the particular Queſtion of, what that Word does ſignify in any one certain place. If, therefore, any one deſires to know the later, he ought not to propoſe the Queſtion in general Terms, but to repeat the Place in which the Senſe of that Word, which is ſought, occurs; for Words often vary their Senſe by their Situation to another, which when they ſtand alone, they do not ſignify.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The Explanation of the ſecond and third Rules of the Method of Reſolution.

1. ALL Queſtions may be refer'd to two Kinds, or Sorts; that is, Simple or Compounded. All that is neceſſarily requir'd to the Solution of the firſt, is a diligent compariſon of the Ideas of which they are compos'd. Thus when 'tis ſaid, that a Circle has this Property, that all the Lines that are drawn from its Centre to its Circumference, are equal: If any one doubt of the Matter of Fact, and wou'd enquire into the Truth or Falſhood of that Maxim, he need only compare the Idea of a Circle, with the Idea of this Property.

2. But Compounded Queſtions cannot be ſolv'd without comparing the Ideas of which 'tis compos'd, with ſome third Idea, or many Ideas; for no Man can find out the unknown Relations, which are the Subject of his Enquiry, by an immediate Compariſon of the Ideas of the Queſtion propos'd. There is, therefore, a Neceſſity of finding out ſome third Idea, or more, with which the Terms of the Queſtion muſt be compar'd; but theſe Ideas ought to be clear and perſpicuous, at leaſt, as to their Relation by which they are compar'd with others. And hence is drawn the ſecond Rule of the Method of *Reſolution*.

3. Examples will make this Matter more plain. If this Queſtion was propos'd, *Whether a Thief ought to ſuffer Death?* Since the Idea of a *Thief* cannot be immediately compar'd with the laſt Puniſhment, no Natural Connexion being between thoſe two Ideas; ſo that the Idea of a Thief ſhou'd neceſſarily excite the Idea of that capital Puniſhment: We can't ſolve that Queſtion without the Intervention of ſome third Idea, with which both the others ſhou'd be compar'd, and that is of *Vindicative Juſtice*, or the *Knowledge of the Law*. And when we have made this Compariſon, we ſhall ſay, 'tis Juſtice, for the good of the Commonwealth, that the Thief be put to Death, or undergo ſome milder Puniſhment.

4. If again we put the Queſtion, *Whether a Boy of fifteen, being guilty of Theft, ſhou'd be put to Death?* The former Queſtion is contain'd in this; for we muſt firſt enquire, whether

ther any Thief deſerve Death, before we ſee whether ſuch a Thief ſhou'd ſuffer in that manner. For unleſs the firſt Queſtion be ſolv'd, the later never can. But having found, by the Laws, that a Thief at Man's Eſtate, by the Law, is to be put to Death, we muſt farther enquire, whether a Thief of fifteen be liable to the ſame Puniſhment. Here, therefore, wou'd be another Compariſon, not of the Boy with the Puniſhment, but of the Puniſhment that is to be inflicted, with Juſtice, or the Law.

5. There may, in this very ſame Queſtion, occur ſeveral other Ideas, which muſt be compar'd, becauſe the Benefit of the Commonwealth is not a ſimple Thing; but here, for the ſake of Inſtruction, we make the Idea of Juſtice a ſimple Idea, and of the higheſt Clearneſs and Perſpicuity. We farther ſuppoſe, that there is no Enquiry into the Circumſtances of the Fact, which yet moſt commonly come into the Conſideration of the Thing.

6. But if the Queſtion was, *What Puniſhment ſhou'd be inflicted on* Peter, *who, without the Award of Law, had by force taken away what he pretends is his due?* Then, at firſt hearing, very many Things offer themſelves to our Conſideration. (1.) We muſt nicely examine, whether he were really the Creditor or not, of him from whom he had taken this Thing; in which Enquiry his Affirmation is to be compar'd with the Bond, Writing, or other Inſtrument, if there be any, or with the Affidavit, or Oath, or Witneſſes, &c. (2.) Next, we muſt examine, whether the Sum he lent be as great as he pretends, which is by comparing his Oath with the Words of the Deed, or Inſtrument, or of the Witneſſes, &c. (3.) We muſt enquire, whether he took it away, or not. (4.) Whether by Force, where we muſt hear Witneſſes, whoſe Evidence muſt be compar'd with manifold Ideas to make out the Truth. (5.) We muſt examine, whether the Laws condemn all manner of Force on ſuch an Occaſion, where we muſt compare the Fact with the Words of the Law. (6.) What Puniſhment the Laws inflict on that Force, which we here ſuppoſe to have been us'd, without the Intervention of the Sentence of the Judge. Before, therefore, we can ſolve this Queſtion, *What Puniſhment* Peter *muſt undergo?* We muſt many ways compare the middle Ideas with the Terms of the Queſtion.

7. But if in this Compariſon we take in Ideas that are not very clear, there is the greateſt Danger imaginable of Error, of which if any one ſlip in, all the following Propoſitions,

ſitions are either falſe, or nothing to the purpoſe, and the Concluſion muſt be abſolutely falſe.

8. The third Rule is, *To throw away every thing, from the Queſtion to be conſider'd, which doth not neceſſarily belong to the Truth that is ſought after.* This Rule is of manifeſt Advantage and Uſe; becauſe, whoever does not obſerve it, either wanders wide of the Matter, and finds not what he ſeeks, or forms his Judgment by Foreign Ideas, and gives his Mind a profitleſs Fatigue. Thus, in the former Queſtion, if we ſhou'd enquire, whether *Peter* were a Denizen or Foreigner, or what are the Laws of other Countries; on that Head or the like, 'tis plain, there cou'd nothing be drawn thence to the ſolution of the Queſtion.

9. We make uſe of this Caution in Queſtions that are conceiv'd in many Words, either by the Ignorance or Deſign of him who propoſes them, to make them the more intricate; or thoſe which are taken out of any Writing, which the Writer never deſign'd to propoſe with Clearneſs and Perſpicuity.

CHAP. VIII.

An Explanation of the fourth, fifth, ſixth and ſeventh Rules of the Method of Reſolution.

1. WHen we have taken away from the Queſtion propos'd all that did not, or appear'd not neceſſarily to belong to the Thing enquir'd after, if it yet remains compounded ſo far as to fall under two or more Heads, ſince we cannot with Attention examine ſeveral Things at once, by the fourth Rule we are oblig'd (1.) *To divide the Queſtion into its ſeveral Heads.* (2.) *To examine thoſe Heads ſeparately, in ſuch a manner, as to begin with thoſe which conſiſt of the more ſimple Ideas*; (3.) *and never to proceed to thoſe Heads which are more compounded, till we have by our Conſideration made them more ſimple, perſpicuous, and eaſie to our ſelves.*

2. The neceſſity of this Rule is manifeſt in the ſolution of compounded Queſtions; for, firſt, if we confound their ſeveral Heads, we can never have diſtinct Ideas of them; for Diſtinction and Confuſion are inconſiſtent. By that means we can never compare the Ideas with each other, as they ought to be compar'd to find out the Truth; which if we ſhou'd otherwiſe hit on, it wou'd be more the Effect of Chance, than our Skill or Underſtanding.

3. We ſometimes give the ſame Judgment of ſeveral Ideas, tho', generally ſpeaking, the ſame Judgments will not agree to ſeveral. [illegible] if we form a Judgment of various

Things mixt together, without conſidering each ſingly, we give a general Judgment of different Things which is ſeldom free from Error in ſome thing or other. We may diſcover that an Author has neglected this Rule, when, upon a diligent peruſal of his Works, we cannot (tho' the Argument he writes on be not unknown to us) reduce what he ſays to certain Heads: And this we may find in ſeveral of the Ancient as well as Modern Writers; who for that Reaſon are not read without difficulty and pain.

4. The ſame Inconveniences ariſe from the neglect of the ſecond and third Cautions of this our fourth Rule. Having ſaid ſomething of this in the fifth *Chapter*, we ſhall only add here, that when we are grown familiar and acquainted with the more ſimple Principles of the Queſtion propos'd, ſo far as to have them diſtinctly in our Minds, we never, in the leaſt Conſequences drawn from them, affirm any thing contrary to them. On the contrary, when we take but a tranſient View of the more ſimple, and paſs on ſo ſwiftly to the more compounded, we ſurely forget them, and the laſt prove often contradictory to the firſt.

5. The fifth, ſixth, and ſeventh Rules ſeldom come into Uſe in any Art but *Algebra*, Examples taken from whence wou'd ſoon and clearly declare their Uſe: But they being too difficult for thoſe who are unacquainted with them, and becauſe we are of Opinion that the ſame Rules can beneficially be adapted to other Arts, we ſhall draw our Examples elſewhere.

6. When we go about the ſolution of any propos'd Queſtion, and to ſet down in Writing what ſeems to us, may be anſwer'd to it, it will be of the greateſt uſe imaginable to write the Heads of the Queſtion down in the feweſt Words that may be, eſpecially if they are many, leſt while we conſider of one, the reſt, as it often happens by the multiplicity of the Queſtions, ſlip out of our Mind. By this means ev'n a happy Memory, which with difficulty retains many Heads, wou'd find a great Aſſiſtance; and the Mind unincumber'd with other Things, with leſs Pain attends the Conſideration of Particulars. 'Tis very ſeldom that all the Parts of a compounded and difficult Queſtion, which muſt be conſider'd, offer themſelves together, and at once. Moſt commonly we muſt conſider ſome time before we diſcover all, and then if we write not all that down which we have firſt found out, while we ſeek others, that ſlips out of our Memory. But becauſe it wou'd be very troubleſome to write down many things, therefore the various Relations [illegible]h are to be conſider'd, may be expreſs'd by ſome certain [illegible]ords. 7.

7. Hence ariſe two Advantages which are not by any means to be deſpis'd. The firſt is, that before we write down more fully what we have found out on any Queſtion, either by Conſideration, or that help'd by Reading, by this Art we eaſily conceive the Order of the things to be written, and change it with equal Eaſe, if perchance we find any thing amiſs in it; The other is, that both the Order and Parts of our Treatiſe is ſo fixt in our Memory, by reading over ſometimes what we have written, that when we come afterwards to ſet down our whole Diſſertation, we do not depart from that Order, nor omit any thing which is worthy of our Conſideration. Otherwiſe, by having too great a Confidence in our Memory we ſit down to write with our Order and Heads of our Diſcourſe only in our Mind, many things which occur to us while we are writing, like thoſe which we have thought, inſenſibly divert us from the right Track which we deſign'd to purſue, and make us omit what we ſhou'd have diſcours'd of, and meddle with thoſe things which have nothing to do in the Queſtion before us.

8. When we have, according to the fifth Rule, expreſs'd the Order we have conceiv'd with certain Marks and Signs, then, according to the ſixth Rule, we diligently conſider every Propoſition that is to be examin'd. There are never more than two Terms of one Propoſition to be compar'd, before we find what Relation is, or is not, between them. This thus found out, ſhou'd in few Words be written down, that the Memory be unburthen'd of it, that we may without any Pains read over our Traces, and ſee what we have found out, and what is the Connection of our Arguments.

9. When we have written down all the Propoſitions that were to be examin'd, and have not, however, found out what we ſought; the ſeventh Rule ordains, that we with greater Application peruſe what we have written, and cut off whatever we find of no Uſe to the ſolution of the Queſtion; and commands us then to examine any thing that may ſeem of Uſe, according to the former Method: For we often, on the firſt View, imagine ſeveral Things to be plainly neceſſary to the ſolution of the Queſtion, eſpecially in thoſe which are intricate, which afterwards we find on our Experiments, by an accurate comparing of the Ideas, to be of no manner of Uſe; and on the contrary, that ſome things, which at firſt ſeem'd of no Importance to the Queſtion, on a repeating the Examination, to be of that Uſe, as to open the Way to our diſcovery of Truth. And this every one will better know by Experience, than by any Examples brought from others.

10. Laſtly, If on a frequent Repetition we can diſcover no way of ſolving the Queſtion propos'd, we ought to daſh it out with our Pens, as beyond our Power. Or, if in our Enquiries we have diſcover'd, that there are no Ideas in it by which it can be ſolv'd, we ought to ſhew, that it is inſolvable in its Nature, that no body throw away their Time any more about it.

11. Perhaps ſome may object to this Method, that it is difficult: But then they muſt reflect that there is no eaſier, and that all theſe Rules are not made uſe of in Truths more eaſy to be diſcover'd, but only in thoſe which are more difficult and intricate. But it is much more difficult without this Method to find out the Truth, and to know it when diſcover'd, than to uſe this Method, and gather the Certainty of our Diſcoveries.

CHAP. IX.

The Rules of the Method of Compoſition.

1. WE hope 'tis plain from the Compariſon we made betweeen the Methods of *Reſolution* and *Compoſition*, in the firſt Chapter of this Part, what we mean by *Compoſition*. That is, that after we have found out the Principles of any Truth, or whole Art or Diſcipline, we muſt ſeek ſome Order, by which the Connection of its Parts may be eaſily underſtood, and the Thing it ſelf ſo prov'd, that having granted the Beginning, you muſt of neceſſary conſequence grant alſo all that follows.

2. There has been no better Way found out than, that the general Principles be firſt propos'd, and if Neceſſity require, to be prov'd, and that their Conſequences be ſo diſpos'd, that thoſe which follow, ſeem to flow as much as poſſibly they can from thoſe which went before. Beſides the gaining by this means the Order and Force of a Demonſtration, we avoid a great Inconvenience in teaching or conveying any Knowledge, which is the Neceſſity of Repetition: For if we ſhou'd begin from Particulars to come at laſt to the Generals, we muſt be forc'd to repeat what we know of its general, when we ſpeak of every particular, becauſe without the Knowledge of the *General*, you can never have a certain Knowledge of the *Particular*.

3. But we muſt here put you in Mind, that this Method can only be preſerv'd in thoſe Things whoſe Principles we perfectly know; as for Example, *Geometry*, which is wholly employ'd in the Conſideration of abſtract *Modes*, of which our Mind has clear and adequate Ideas; but when the Enquiry

quiry is into *Substances*, as in Natural Philosophy, we cannot make use of the Method of *Composition*, because the Kinds of *Substances* are not known to us, nor can we find out their inmost Essences.

4. This Method of *Composition* has been by none so justly and accurately observ'd hitherto, as by the *Mathematicians*, whose Principles are perfectly known; we can therefore draw its Rules from none better, than from the Teachers of *Geometry*.

5. Since they design'd to propose nothing that cou'd be contradicted, they thought they cou'd obtain this chiefly by three Ways. (1.) By offering nothing but what was couched in Words or Terms perfectly understood, and for this Reason they always carefully define the Words they make use of; of which we have spoken in the *Second Part*. (2.) By building only *on evident and clear Principles*, so that they cou'd not be controverted by any one who understood them. They, therefore, first of all propound their Maxims or Axioms, which they demand to be granted them, as being self-evident, and in need of no Proof. (3.) By *proving demonstratively* all their Consequences, and for this Reason they only make use of in their Arguments or Proofs of *Definitions*, *Axioms* that have been granted, and *Propositions* which they have already prov'd, which are Principles to those Things that come last.

6. To these three Heads may be referr'd all the Observations of the *Geometricians*, in the Demonstration of those Truths which they have discover'd.

7. These are the Laws or Rules of Definitions: (1.) *Never to use any Word doubtful, or the least obscure, without a Definition.* (2.) *To make use of no Words but such as are of a very known Signification, or such as have been already explain'd.*

8. The Rule of their Maxims or Axioms, is, *To allow nothing for a Maxim or Axiom, but what is most evident.*

9. These are the Laws or Rules of their Demonstrations. (1.) *To prove all Propositions that have the least Obscurity, and to admit nothing to the Demonstrations of them but constituted Definitions, granted Axioms, Propositions already prov'd, or the Construction of the Figure which is under Consideration, when any such thing happens to be done.* (2.) *Never to abuse the Ambiguity of a Word, by not affixing those Definitions by which they are explain'd.*

10. These are Rules which the *Geometricians* have thought necessary to be observ'd, to give those Truths which they design'd to prove, the last and greatest Evidence.

CHAP. X.

The Explanation of the Rules of Definition.

1. WE have already diſcours'd of the Definition of *Names*, but it being a thing of no ſmall Conſequence, and without which the *Geometrical* Method cannot be underſtood, we ſhall add ſome few things on the ſame Subject, avoiding as much as poſſible a Repetition of what we have ſaid.

2. The firſt Rule forbids us *admitting any Word that is the leaſt obſcure without a Definition.* The Neceſſity of this Rule is built on this Foundation: I. *That to prove any thing with Evidence, there is a neceſſity that what we ſay be perfectly underſtood.* For how can that Demonſtration be evident, which we do not fully underſtand? But there are a great many Words which cannot be perfectly underſtood, unleſs they are defin'd, ſince the Uſe of the Tongue from whence they are taken, have not fixt any certain and determinate Senſe upon them, and ſo leaves them obſcure; as we may find in ſtudying the Art of Criticiſm. But when Words of this Nature are made uſe of in the delivering, eſpecially the Principles of Arts or Sciences, we underſtand neither the Principles themſelves, nor the Conſequences drawn from them, nor the Order of the Argumentation, or the Connection of the Propoſitions; whence it follows, that we cannot certainly conclude, whether what is ſaid be true or falſe.

3. II. The Definitions of Words has this Effect on our ſelves, that it makes us more conſtant and conſiſtent with our ſelves, by giving always the ſame Senſe to the ſame Word. For when we have not a diſtinct Notion of that Signification which we have at firſt given to a Word, we are apt, by Inadvertence, to recede from it, eſpecially in long Diſputes, and when the Diſcourſe is of things of different Kinds; for on theſe Occaſions we our ſelves are not ſufficiently conſcious of what we mean, and of the Order of our Argumentation, much leſs can another underſtand us. But if we define our Terms or Words, their Signification makes a deeper Impreſſion on our Minds, and by that we are the more eaſily brought into the right Path, if in our Diſcourſe we have by Accident ſtray'd from it.

4. The ſecond Rule of Definitions forbids *us to make uſe of any Words in them, whoſe Signification is not diſtinctly known,*

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or already explain'd. The Reaſon of this is plain; for how can that which is obſcure be explain'd by what is obſcure?

5. But to avoid too great a multiplicity of Definitions, we muſt never make uſe of obſcure Words but when you cannot find any others; elſe we ſhall be oblig'd to make Definitions of Definitions.

CHAP. XI.

An Explanation of the Rules of Maxims, *or* Axioms.

1. THere are ſome Propoſitions of ſo great Perſpicuity and Evidence, and ſo univerſally known, that as ſoon as we hear the Words that expreſs it, we perfectly know and allow their Truth, as, *That Nothing cannot produce Something. No Cauſe can give what it has not it ſelf.* Theſe, and others of the ſame Nature, have no need of Demonſtration, becauſe no Demonſtration can be more evident than they are. And whatever has not this Evidence, is not to be admitted as a Maxim.

2. But we muſt be cautious of believing, that there is nothing clear and evident, but that which has never been deny'd, becauſe there are ſeveral that have been of old deny'd by the violence of ſome of the ancient Sects, eſpecially the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, which are now beyond Controverſie. For, ſhou'd the majority of Mankind conſpire to deny that *One* is leſs than *Two*, no Man in his Senſes can deny that Truth.

3. There are two Rules of Maxims or Axioms, which contain all that belongs to this Matter. The firſt is, *Whenever we plainly and evidently ſee that any Attribute agrees with any Subject, as we ſee that of the Whole being bigger, than its Part, we have not need of any long Conſideration of the Attribute and Subject, for the Mind to diſcover that the Idea of the Attribute has a Connection with the Idea of the Subject; we may well, therefore, give the Name of a Maxim to ſuch a Propoſition.* But this may be put into fewer Words. *Whatever Propoſition expreſſes the immediate clear Compariſon of two Ideas, without the help of the third, is an Axiom.*

4. The other Rule, oppoſite to the former, is thus expreſs'd. *When the bare Conſideration of the Ideas of the Subject and the Attribute are not ſufficient to diſcover the Agreement of the Attribute to the Subject, ſuch a Propoſition is not to be admitted as an Axiom, but muſt be demonſtrated by the help of other Ideas.* In fewer Words, thus: *Every Propoſition, the Proof of which requires ſome third Idea, beſides the Attribute and the*

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Subject, is not an Axiom. Or ſhorter yet: *A Truth which does not ariſe from an immediate Compariſon of two Ideas, is no Axiom.*

CHAP. XII.

An Explanation of the Rules of Demonſtration.

1. THere are two things requir'd in a right *Demonſtration*; firſt, that every Propoſition of which it conſiſts, conſider'd ſeparately, be true; the ſecond, that the Conſequences drawn from other foregoing things, neceſſarily flow from them; or that all the Conſequences be contain'd in the Antecedents, or Premiſes; both which will be certainly gain'd, by following ſtrictly the two Laws deliver'd in the *9th Chap.*

2. All the Propoſitions will be true, if none are admitted except *Definitions* which can be call'd in queſtion; or Maxims or Axioms, which muſt always be evident; or Propoſitions already demonſtrated, which by *Demonſtration* are freed from all Doubts, or the Conſtruction of Figures, if we make uſe of any. If therefore we reduce the former Rule to Practice, all the Propoſitions of which we make uſe, will be free from any manner of Doubt, ſince we can by that Rule make uſe of only thoſe things which we have reckon'd up.

3. The Conſequences likewiſe will be truly drawn, if we ſin not againſt the *ſecond Rule*, which orders us to avoid all manner of Ambiguity in our Words: For no Man in his Wits can believe falſely, that any Propoſition follows from another, or is contain'd in another, if he have a perfect Knowledge of both: Almoſt all the falſe Conſequences that are made, depend on Words ill underſtood; thoſe that are not ſo, are ſo evident and obvious, that no Man of a ſound Head can fall into them.

4. To avoid ſome Errors, we muſt remember, I. *Not to prove a thing to be true, without giving the Reaſon of that Truth.* II. *Not to prove that which does not need a Proof.* III. *Not to argue from Impoſſibility.* IV. *Not demonſtrate by Reaſons too far fetch'd.*

The Fourth Part *of* LOGIC.

Of the Socratic *Method of* Diſputing.

1. SInce 'tis certain, that the Aim of every honeſt Man is to find out the Truth, and to convey the Truth thus found out to others; and not to make a vain ſhow of his own, and expoſe the ſlowneſs of Apprehenſion of another: It follows, that the Art of Squabling, which has

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ſo long obtain'd in the Schools, and which only Mr. *Lock* condemns under the Name of *Logic*, and which has nothing in it but an empty Oſtentation of Wit, is abſolutely unworthy of a Man of Wiſdom. But ſince Truth cannot be diſtinctly known or prov'd without Art, it is neceſſary to do this rightly, that we apply our ſelves to the ſtudy of this Art. 'Tis often, likewiſe, neceſſary to ſilence the *Sophiſters*, who boaſt their Knowledge of that, of which they are realy ignorant, to make uſe of a great deal of Diligence, that by making them ſee their Ignorance, they may be better inform'd.

2. *Greece*, which always was peſter'd with abundance of theſe Sophiſts, was never more plagu'd with them than about the Time of *Socrates*, when Philoſophy began to find a more than uſual Cultivation. This great Man, form'd by Nature for the confounding the Pride of this ſort of Men, has ſhewn us a Way, by which we may attain the ſame End againſt them in our Times, if they happen to fall in our Way: And tho' this Way ought to have been purſu'd by former Ages, yet has it been entirely neglected; perhaps becauſe this Pride of ſeeming to know more than we realy do, had got the Aſcendant of the Followers of *Socrates* themſelves, which made them take to the ſubtile Arts of the *Sophiſts*, and reject the moſt admirable Method of a Man of that conſummate Wiſdom.

3. But we deſign to revive with ſome ſhort Explanations this Method, both in conſideration of the Reaſon we have given, and alſo becauſe it is moſt agreeable to that Candour and Sincerity which every honeſt Man ought to profeſs. 'Tis true, this Method requires a Genius, and Acuteneſs of Wit; but without theſe Qualities, the Mind cannot in any other Art be provided for extempore Diſputes.

4. The firſt Rule of this Method orders the Man who is to make uſe of it, *To Conduct himſelf in ſuch a manner, as if he deſir'd to learn ſomething of him with whom he argues.* And indeed, every one of us ought to have a Diſpoſition to hear and allow the Truth, let it come from what Hand ſoever. Nor ought any Man to think ſo well of himſelf, as to imagine he cannot be inform'd by another, or at leaſt be excited to think of a Thing of which perhaps he thought not before. But beſides that, every Man owes this Duty to himſelf, ſuch a Diſpoſition of Mind, which appears in the Countenance and Words, is moſt adapted to create in the Minds of thoſe who hear us, an Opinion of our Modeſty, which goes a great and ſure Way to perſuade them.

5. Secondly, Before we proceed to any Objections, *We ought, if the Perſon with whom we argue, makes uſe of any obſcure or doubtful Words, to ask him to explain what he means by them*: For it often happens, that Men have us'd themſelves to ſome Words which they do not perfectly underſtand themſelves; and then they will, by ſuch modeſt Queſtions, diſcover their Ignorance much better, than by a direct Oppoſition, which often raiſes the Paſſions. If the Perſon happen to be a Man of Sincerity, and Lover of Truth, he will own, that he did not ſufficiently underſtand the Matter, and then the Diſpute is at an end. But if we meet with a pertinacious and obſtinate Perſon, who will obtrude his Words upon us without defining them, we ought to proceed no farther in the Diſpute, till he has made plain what it is he means. We ought to preſs him with little Queſtions, not as the effect of his want of Skill in Arguing, but our dulneſs of Apprehenſion of what he underſtands and delivers in his Speech. In the mean while, we muſt not admit any one thing that is obſcure, tho' it ſtir up his Anger; which yet may be done by a happy Adreſs, of telling him, that we are ready to yield to Truth, but that we firſt ought to know it; ſince no Man in his Senſes can give his Aſſent to a Propoſition which he does not underſtand. But if we can by no means prevail with him to

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ſpeak plainly, we muſt put an End to the Diſpute; for thence 'tis evident that he knows not what he wou'd be at. By this means, thoſe that hear us will diſcover the Man's Vanity who talks of things which he does not underſtand, and many Times leaves a Sting in the Mind of a Man otherwiſe too pertinacious.

6. Thirdly, If we bring him at laſt to ſpeak plainly and clearly what he means, *We muſt ask him Queſtions on the Particulars of all the Parts of the Doctrine he advances, and their Conſequences; not as reproving them, but for a fuller and more clear Information of the Matter; ſo that he ſhou'd appear the Inſtructor, and we the Learners.* The Abſurdity of the Doctrine will appear from theſe Queſtions, if it labour with any, much better than by an open Oppoſition, provided it be done with Dexterity, and the Queſtions pretty numerous, and be oblig'd ſeveral Times to repeat the ſame thing, leſt he ſhou'd afterward deny that he had ſaid ſo. Here, that the Explanation may be the more ample, it wou'd not be amiſs to make uſe of Examples and Similitudes, and ask him, whether he means this, or that? The more copious we are in this Particular, the more evident will the Falſity of the Opinion appear.

7. The perſpicuous Expoſition of any Doctrine, with its Conſequences, if it be not true, ſhows generally its Abſurdity: But if this be not ſufficient, then we muſt ask him, *on what Arguments or Proofs he builds his Opinion*; and we muſt uſe the ſame Conduct in regard of the Arguments as to the other Parts. We are to enquire of him with whom we diſpute, as if we were by him to be inform'd of a Point of which we are ignorant; but we muſt not allow him the leaſt Obſcurity. In ſhort, we muſt hear the whole Series of his Argumentation in ſuch a manner, that there remain no Difficulty either in underſtanding his Doctrine, or the Foundation on which it is built.

8. When we have done this with diligence, the Perſon who propoſes his Doctrine, muſt plainly ſee its Falſity, or on what Proofs it depends. If Paſſion blind his Eyes, yet the Hearers will excuſe any farther Diſpute with a Man who is Angry, that we receive not his Opinion, tho' labouring with Abſurdity.

9. We ſhall give one Example of this Method on a Modern Controverſy, by which it will be better explain'd, betwixt a *Thomiſt* and another, diſputing upon the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

10. A. *I wonder you are ſo obſtinate, as to deny that God has an* Efficacious Operation *in the Sins of Men, which the Scriptures in many places ſo openly and plainly teſtify.*

B. I only deny'd that I underſtood how this is done. Perhaps my Dulneſs makes that a Difficulty to me, which is obvious to another. But I wou'd willingly be inform'd by you, becauſe I can neither believe, nor condemn what I do not underſtand; what, therefore, do you mean by an *Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men?* do you mean that he makes them Sin?

A. *Far be it from me, for ſo God wou'd be the Author of Sin. 'Tis Man commits Sin, not God.*

B. Do you mean, that God *makes Men to commit Sin, or forces Men to commit Sin?*

A. *I wou'd not have expreſs'd this in ſo rude a manner; but God, in a dark and unknown manner, ſo permits Sin, that it muſt neceſſarily be committed.*

B. You us'd before the Word *Operation*, now you uſe *Permit*; pray, do they mean the ſame thing?

A. *Theſe Words do not abſolutely mean the ſame thing, but they muſt be join'd together, ſo that what God does ſhou'd be call'd an* efficacious Permiſſion; *for God neither makes Sin, nor does he ſimply permit it.*

B. You,

B. You, therefore, mean that God permits ſomething, and does ſomething, ſo that Sin neceſſarily follows?

A. That is what I mean.

B. Perhaps then God does in this, what he does who cutting down the Dykes, lets the Waters in to overflow the Fields. For he *does* ſomething in breaking the Dyke, and he *permits* ſomething in ſuffering the Sea to paſs through the Breach.

A. My Mind cou'd not have been expreſs'd by a more happy Similitude.

B. But, according to our common way of Speaking, we ſhou'd ſay, that he who made a Breach in the Dyke, had let in the Waters; nor wou'd any one accuſe the Dyke or the Sea of any manner of Fault; but you, if I miſtake you not, accuſe Man of the Fault, and ſay Man, not God, committed the Sin. Wherefore, your *efficacious Permiſſion* ſeems unintelligible to me.

A. Do you not obſerve, that as to the Things themſelves, there is a vaſt difference between them? For Men are endow'd with Underſtanding and Will, which the Dyke and the Sea have not; and for that Reaſon, that is a Crime in the Man, which is not ſo in the Sea and the Dyke.

B. But I ask of you, whether that which God *does* or *permits*, has that Efficacy (for that Word you have likewiſe us'd) that Men can no more not Sin when that has order'd it, than the Sea not overflow the Fields through the Breach which affords a free Paſſage?

A. You have my Meaning?

B. According therefore to you, there is the ſame Relation in that Senſe between God and Sin, as there is between the Man who made a Breach in the Dyke, and the Deſtruction of the Fields.

A. There is, as to the Event, for both are equally neceſſary.

B. The Action therefore of both, according to the Cuſtom of Speech, may be expreſs'd in the ſame manner: That is,—— as he who broke down the Dyke is call'd the Cauſe of the Loſs of the Fields, becauſe he did that which neceſſarily produc'd that Loſs; ſo God is the Author of Sin, ſince he has put Man under a neceſſity of Sinning.

A. I told you before, that I will not make uſe of thoſe rude Expreſſions.

B. But either I do not underſtand what you ſay, or it comes to that Point; for we muſt not regard the empty ſounds of Words which ſignify nothing, but mind the Ideas to which they are annex'd.

A. What, you'l preſcribe Rules to me of Speaking, as if I did not know how to hold a Diſcourſe.

11. If the Dialogue once comes to this, there muſt be an end of it; and hence it will appear, that he (deſign'd by the Letter *A*) either knows not what he means, or elſe has a greater regard to Words than Things. That Opinion is look'd on as ſufficiently confuted, which its Defender is aſham'd to expreſs in clear and intelligible Words. Having in the former Dialogue ſufficiently explain'd the firſt and ſecond Rule, to explain the third, we ſhall ſuppoſe the ſame Diſpute again.

12. *A. You ſufficiently underſtand, that my Opinion is, that God has to do with Evil; that he is not a meer bare Spectator, but is ſo far an Agent, that on his acting Man commits Sin.*

B. If God did nothing before the Sin, wou'd not the Sin be committed.

A. No, for nothing is done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

B. What? do you believe that Man alone cannot violate Laws?

A. That he can, I deny, when I deny, that any thing can be done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

B. God, therefore, helps us to do wickedly in the ſame manner, as he helps us to do well?

A. You miſtake, for in Evil we muſt diſtinguiſh the Action, *and the* Viciouſneſs *of the* Action. *God helps us to the doing the* Action, *but not to the* Vice.

Vice. *But in good* Actions *he helps us to the* Good *that is in the* Actions.

B. I beg you, inform me, what you mean by the Words *an Action*, and what by the Viciouſneſs of an *Action*?

A. I will make it plain to you by this Example: In the hatred of our Neighbour, *there is the Action of the* Hatred, *which in itſelf is indifferent, and is only call'd* bad, *when directed to an unlawful Object, and* good *when to a lawful. Next, there is the Relation of that Action to the Object, which is Evil. God does not concur to this Relation, tho' there is a neceſſity of his* concurring to the Action, *without which it cou'd not be done.*

B. By what you have ſaid, I ſuppoſe you mean, that God firſt generates in the Mind of Man, Hatred in general; which is in it ſelf neither Good nor Evil: Then there comes another Relation of the Hatred to the Object, as in the Example to our Neighbour. Do I underſtand you?

A. Partly you do, but not entirely; for I do not think there is any ſuch Exiſtence as Hatred in general, which ſhou'd afterwards be determin'd to a certain Object; this is contrary to Experience.

B. Does God then create that very Hatred that is directed againſt our Neighbour?

A. Moſt certainly the Hatred, but not the Relation.

B. But does that Hatred exiſt without that Relation?

A. Not at all; for the very moment that it is created in our Minds, 'tis the Hatred of our Neighbour.

B. According, therefore, to you, God creates ſuch an Hatred which co-exiſts in ſuch a manner with a vicious Relation, that it cannot be ſeparated or diſtinguiſh'd from it but by Abſtraction.

A. He does ſo.

B. Can this Hatred, thus generated in the Mind of Man, be by the Man directed to a lawful Object, as *Vice*, for Example?

A. It cannot; for the Action of God being paſt, the certain Event muſt neceſſarily follow.

B. I beſeech you, Sir, if a Man ſhou'd put a Burthen on anothers Shoulder, which he that bore it cou'd not afterwards throw off, and by that means he ſhou'd break his Ribbs, wou'd not he that put on ſuch a Burthen be look'd on as the breaker of his Ribbs, if he had known the Event of his Action?

A. Moſt certainly.

B. Shou'd a Man puſh another, walking by a River-ſide, into the Water, who ſhou'd there be drown'd, ſhou'd we not ſay that he who thruſt him in drown'd him?

A. Certainly.

B. Yet there are ſome Men who wou'd ſay, that you are in an Error in this particular; that the *impeſing*, and the *thruſting* was produc'd by both; but not the breaking the Ribbs, and the drowning, as God generates the Hatred which is directed againſt our Neighbour without that evil Relation.

A. 'Tis indeed, moſt evident, that the Men inſtanc'd, were guilty of the Fracture and the Drowning; but the matter is otherwiſe with God, who is not oblig'd to give an account to poor miſerable Men of his Adminiſtration.

B. But if he did what you wou'd wickedly perſuade us, either all Sinners muſt be acquitted of any Crime, or God himſelf who compels the Sins, condem'd.

A. Don't you know, that God's Ways are not our Ways, nor his Thoughts ours? *Shall the Pot complain, that it was not made in ſuch and ſuch a manner?*

13. Hence it is evident to all that hear it, that the *Thomiſts* (noted by the Let. *A*) either knows not what he means, or makes God the Author of Sin.

The End *of* LOGIC.

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